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  While many existing accounts attribute the emergence of a new sexual sensibility 
in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) to the liberalization of laws regarding 
contraception and abortion that accompanied the beginning of Erich Honecker’s tenure as 
First Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) in the early 1970s, “Morality, Law, and 
the Socialist Sexual Self in the German Democratic Republic, 1945-1972” revisits the 
1950s and 1960s as a crucible for sexual change.  In the absence of Western-style civil 
society and the overt commodification of sexuality, the presence or absence of a “sexual 
revolution” in the GDR must be assessed with different yardsticks.  Despite the 
depredations of Stalinism and Nazism and the conservative moral climate of the early 
Cold War years, the spirit of Weimar-era progressive sex reform continued to inform the 
tenor of sexual change in the legal realm and in marital counseling, albeit in a muted 
fashion. 
Indeed, it was in part because of this legacy that the SED came to respect the 
inviolability of the right to private same-sex sexual intimacy despite its ostensible 
commitment to abolishing the concepts of the rights-bearing individual and the public-
private divide from liberal jurisprudence.  While many observers have criticized the East 
German polity for having failed to abide by its rhetorical commitment to gender equality, 
the SED promulgated new norms regarding the age of marital consent and no-fault 





endeavor, however, was undermined by the regime’s willful obliviousness to the 
discordance between official and popular mores.  By inviting citizens to submit petitions 
(Eingaben) and visit an expanded network of marital counseling centers, the regime 
facilitated the proliferation of discourse on sexual topics that many in the regime would 
rather have left unspoken.  Through an amalgam of ideological and medical measures 
designed to shape the socialist sexual self, the SED effectively redefined the terms of 
biopolitical interventions under state-socialist auspices in ways that were not reducible to 







CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Peter B. of Schwerin expected better of socialism.  In 1952, he showed no 
compunction about expressing his dissatisfaction to governmental authorities about the 
lack of official recognition for nonmarital heterosexual relationships in the nascent 
German Democratic Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republik, or GDR), which had 
come into being in 1949: 
 
I know that I am in agreement with many progressively minded people in our 
republic when I point to the pressing need to resolve a problem that has been 
handled in everyday life in a way that has not kept pace with the development of 
societal conditions in other respects.  I am referring to the type of relationship 
between two people that is known as a common-law marriage (Gewissensehe).1 
 
 
Peter B. was frustrated by the ostensible foreclosure of alternative conceptions of sexual 
morality because he took the “progressive” rhetoric of the Socialist Unity Party 
(Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, or SED) on face value.  As Detlef Pollack 
notes, “The SED always appeared in public with the claim of representing the more 
progressive social concepts and of being superior to all previous social systems.  Belief in 
progress was an important source of legitimization for the system.”2  Even “official 
                                                 
1 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 7212, Teil 2, letter from Peter B., Schwerin, to Ministerium des Innern 
(hereafter MdI), Abteilung für Personenstandsfragen (his rendering—it was actually the Abteilung für 
Personenstandswesen, hereafter Abt. für PSW), Berlin, March 30, 1952, 1 of document.  As Ute 
Schneider’s research reveals, an entreaty like Peter B.’s was not an isolated occurrence.  Ute Schneider, 
Hausväteridylle oder sozialistische Utopie?: Die Familie im Recht der DDR (Cologne: Böhlau, 2004), 196-
200.  Unless otherwise noted, all translations in this dissertation are my own. 
2 Detlef Pollack, “Modernization and Modernization Blockages in GDR Society,” in Dictatorship as 




culture under [SED First Secretary and East German Head of State Walter] Ulbricht” 
exhibited a “strange admixture of wild utopian aspirations and kleinbürgerlich norms for 
personal behavior.”3  The frequent injunctions for citizens to assimilate Communist 
values through workplace brigades and other collectives also provided opportunities for 
East Germans to remind one another of the SED’s ostensible silencing of the 
“progressive” mores that had been espoused by the Communist Party of Germany 
(Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, or KPD) before the onset of National Socialist 
rule.4 
Peter B. interpreted the constitutional guarantee of equality for children born in 
and out of wedlock to mean that the government was obliged to put marital and 
nonmarital heterosexual relationships on an equal legal footing as well, and that greater 
societal acceptance of common-law marriages would necessarily ensue.  Although he and 
his partner, an actress who lived in Leipzig, had a “serious, lasting, and monogamous” 
relationship, they did not want to get married while professional commitments required 
them to reside in different cities.  They did, however, consider themselves entitled to the 
train travel discount afforded to spouses who lived separately because they believed that 
                                                                                                                                                 
1999), 27-46, here 35-36; Paul Betts, Within Walls: Private Life in the German Democratic Republic (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 188. 
3 Joshua Feinstein, The Triumph of the Ordinary: Depictions of Daily Life in the East German Cinema, 
1949-1989 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 79.  Kleinbürgerlich is best translated 
as “petty-bourgeois.” 
4 Donna Harsch, “Society, the State and Abortion in East Germany, 1950-1972,” American Historical 
Review 102, no. 1 (February 1997), 53-84, here 79.  Josie McLellan notes that “[a] common tactic amongst 
petitioners was to criticize the regime for not being progressive enough, while stressing their own socialist 
credentials.”  Josie McLellan, Love in the Time of Communism: Intimacy and Sexuality in the GDR (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 152-153. 
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the national train service was already offering such a discount to unmarried partners of its 
own employees.5 
Whether or not such a discount for train travel existed, a few officials had been 
contemplating the prospect of affording some form of recognition to nonmarital 
relationships during the Occupation Zone period (1945-1949).  Helmut R., for instance, 
was confused by the use of the term “female life partner” (Lebenskameradin) during an 
event organized by the social insurance agency (Sozialversicherungsanstalt, or SVA) in 
1948.  A Ministry of Internal Affairs official informed him that “[t]he term 
‘Lebenskameradin’ is to be used when a man and a woman have lived together for a long 
period of time without having gotten married or intending to marry,” and that the SVA 
could exercise discretion in determining the types of insurance benefits to which 
unmarried couples would be privy.  If a life partnership was recognized as such, then a 
Lebenskameradin could be eligible for the same social insurance benefits as a legally 
married woman would be.6 
But there was no sign of the SVA’s relative open-mindedness for Peter B., who 
complained of having to suffer the indignity of being denied a hotel room with his partner 
in Erfurt because the clerk was afraid of “possible conflicts with the police” for aiding 
and abetting what he took to be an illicit sexual encounter.  As Annette Timm remarks 
about the early postwar years, 
 
                                                 
5 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 7212, Teil 2, letter from Peter B., Schwerin, to MdI, Abt. für PSW, 
Berlin, March 30, 1952, 2 of document. 
6 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 7212, Teil 2, letter from Helmut R., Altenburg, to MdI, Berlin, March 4, 
1950; BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 7212, Teil 2, letter from i. A. Neumann, MdI, Berlin, to Helmut R., 
Altenburg, March 17, 1950. 
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While some individuals were demanding help in repairing the damage that the 
war had wrought on marriages and families, others were openly flaunting 
nonmarital sexuality.  Yet in some sense, the behavior of both groups reveals a 
similar trend.  Both displayed attitudes that rejected the state’s interference in 
reproductive and sexual decisions.  In a larger sense, one could also argue that 




In order to “pull the rug from under […] petty-bourgeois attitudes [like those of the hotel 
clerk] in the future,” Peter B. asked for the Ministry of Internal Affairs to provide a 
certificate attesting to the unobjectionable nature of his relationship after the local police 
and family law court did not prove amenable to his entreaties.8  The Ministry ultimately 
denied his request, but not before consulting with the head of the police to verify that 
there was in fact no certification process for common-law unions.  Ultimately, the 
constitutional guarantee of governmental protection for “marriage and family” would not 
extend to nonmarital relationships.9  While the SED emulated the KPD in rejecting 
criminal penalties for adultery and endorsing no-fault divorce, it definitively distanced 
itself from the “free love” ethos that had animated parts of the Weimar-era Left.10 
                                                 
7 Annette F. Timm, The Politics of Fertility in Twentieth-Century Berlin (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 329-330. 
8 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 7212, Teil 2, letter from Peter B., Schwerin, to MdI, Abt. für PSW, 
Berlin, March 30, 1952, 3 of document. 
9 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 7212, Teil 2, letter from Lust, Chefinspekteur der Volkspolizei und 
Leiter der Hauptabteilung (hereafter HA) Pass- und Meldewesen, MdI, Hauptverwaltung Deutsche 
Volkspolizei und Leiter der HA, to MdI, HA Staatliche Verwaltung, Berlin, May 12, 1952; BArch Berlin-
Lichterfelde, letter from Röder, MdI, Berlin, to Peter B., Schwerin, May 24, 1952.  In 1951, the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs had turned down a similar request by Magdalene S. of Schwerin, who might very well have 
been Peter B.’s partner.  Magdalene S. requested recognition of a common-law marriage with her male 
cohabitational relationship partner of two and a half years whose divorce had not yet been finalized. BArch 
Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 7212, Teil 2, letter from Magdalene S., Schwerin, to MdI, HA Staatliche 
Verwaltung, Abt. für PSW, Berlin, November 12, 1951; BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 7212, Teil 2, 
letter from Sorgenicht, Leiter der HA Staatliche Verwaltung, MdI, Berlin, to Magdalene S., Schwerin, 
November 17, 1951. 
10 Willem Melching, “‘A New Morality’: Left-Wing Intellectuals on Sexuality in Weimar Germany,” 
Journal of Contemporary History 25 (1990), 69-85, here 80. 
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 Peter B. might not have been intimately acquainted with the intellectual legacy of 
Soviet sexual theorist Aleksandra Kollontai, but his campaign to secure recognition of his 
nonmarital partnership would have resonated with her utopian sexual imaginings.  In the 
aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, Kollontai envisioned a “future of eros 
freed from the constraints of private property, sex inequality, and hypocritical moral 
convention” and who had “acknowledged the value of experimentation in (heterosexual) 
love relationships.”11  The Bolshevik flirtation with “free love” took legislative form 
when the government liberalized divorce provisions, decriminalized consensual male 
same-sex sexual acts, and granted recognition to nonmarital heterosexual partnerships.12  
Kollontai was also at the forefront of intensive collaboration during the 1920s between 
Soviet and German researchers, theorists, and activists under the umbrella of the World 
League for Sexual Reform, an organization founded in 1919 by Dr. Magnus Hirschfeld 
that was based in Berlin.13 
But the initial wave of Soviet legislative reforms provoked a backlash on the part 
of those who defended conventional marital norms and rejected homosexuality as 
“‘unproletarian.’”  Already in 1923, fellow Bolsheviks harbored no qualms about 
                                                 
11 Dan Healey, Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia: The Regulation of Sexual and Gender Dissent 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 111; Barbara Taylor, Eve and the New Jerusalem: Socialism 
and Feminism in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983); Alexandra Kollontai, 
Selected Writings of Alexandra Kollontai, trans. and ed. Alix Holt (Westport, CT: L. Hill, 1977 [1918]); 
Gregory Carleton, Sexual Revolution in Bolshevik Russia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 
40. 
12 According to Grigorii Batkis, director of the Moscow Institute of Social Hygiene, the new legislative 
ethos reflected the “‘absolute non-interference of the state and society in sexual matters, so long as nobody 
is injured, and no one’s interests are encroached upon.’”  Blanche Wiesen Cook, “Feminism, Socialism, 
and Sexual Freedom: The Work and Legacy of Crystal Eastman and Alexandra Kollontai,” in Women in 
Culture and Politics: A Century of Change, eds. Judith Friedlander, Blanche Wiesen Cook, Alice Kessler-
Harris, and Carroll Smith-Rosenberg (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 358-375, here 373-
374. 
13 Healey, Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia, 111, 132-133. 
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attacking Kollontai for her espousal of “‘free love’” and “‘bourgeois feminism.’”14  
Indeed, when Hirschfeld visited the USSR in 1926, he was disappointed by the 
recrudescence of prudishness, the decline in scientific interest in homosexuality, and the 
absence of organized Soviet sex reform activism that could forestall the retrenchment of 
newly hard-won sexual liberties.15  This backlash set the stage for the Stalinist disavowal 
of the decriminalization of homosexuality in 1934 and the retrenchment of divorce-on-
demand and recognition of nonmarital partnerships in 1944.  These legislative changes 
occurred in the USSR as the National Socialist government was eviscerating the 
progressive sex reform movement that had flourished in Weimar Germany.  The new 
direction in Soviet policy was decisive in shaping the sexual asceticism and 
traditionalism of many German Communists who had gone into Soviet exile to avoid 
Nazi persecution.16  Even after the depredations of Nazism and Stalinism, however, East 
German Communism after 1945 contained both the seeds of sexual radicalism and the 
inclination to suppress it. 
 Interestingly, it was in the ostensibly more “conservative” Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG) that nonmarital heterosexual relationships met with a greater degree of 
official and popular acceptance—at least under certain circumstances.  A 1948 survey in 
Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein, both of which were located in the western zones of 
occupation, found that 61 percent of respondents believed that “free love” was not 
                                                 
14 Healey, Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia, 133. 
15 Healey, Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia, 138. 
16 Andrew I. Port, “Love, Lust, and Lies under Communism: Family Values and Adulterous Liaisons in 
Early East Germany,” Central European History 44, no. 3 (September 2011), 478-505, here 490. 
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immoral, with an additional 10 percent of survey participants claiming to be undecided.17  
Also noteworthy is the fact that a June 23, 1950 West German law stipulated recognition 
of common-law marriages for individuals who had not been able to marry under Nazi 
rule because of persecution on racial or political grounds. 
When faced with the perceived upheaval of marriage as an institution and 
unresolved questions of legal parity between the two new German states, the SED’s self-
ascribed antifascist principles met their limits.  The East German regime thus opted not to 
issue retroactive marriage certificates for Nazi-era common-law marriages.18  Waltraud S. 
had been classified by the Nazis as a person of multiracial origin (Mischling) of the first 
degree and had for this reason been prevented from marrying her fiancé Fritz K., who 
was missing in action since January 1945.  She therefore asked the East German 
government to provide retroactive recognition of her common-law marriage (freie Ehe) 
so that “justice [would] supplant injustice,” but instead Mr. Neumann of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs informed her that 
 
[s]ince the GDR and its administrative bodies are not the legal successors of the 
fascist state, you cannot expect us to provide recompense for the injustice that you 
suffered as a result of National Socialist administrative and legal actions, which 
are doubtlessly invalid (nichtig). […] Issuing a retroactive marriage certificate for 
your life partnership with Mr. K. would be the equivalent of allowing someone to 
marry a dead person, and we thus must reject this request for ethical reasons.19 
 
                                                 
17 Elizabeth D. Heineman, What Difference Does a Husband Make?: Women and Marital Status in Nazi 
and Postwar Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 130. 
18 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 7212, Teil 2, letter from i. A. Reinwardt, Abteilungsleiter, MdI, Berlin, 
to Landesregierung Sachsen-Anhalt, MdI, HA Staatliche Verwaltung, Referat für PSW, Halle/Saale, 
October 1, 1951; BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 7212, Teil 2, letter from Nathan, Leiter der HA 
Gesetzgebung, MdJ, Berlin, to MdI, HA Staatliche Verwaltung, Berlin, March 4, 1950. 
19 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 7212, Teil 2, letter from Neumann, MdI, Berlin, to Waltraud S., 
Seifhennersdorf, March 16, 1950. 
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Waltraud S. was supposed to derive consolation from the fact that children born out of 
wedlock were no longer at a legal disadvantage in the GDR, and that she could assume 
her deceased life partner’s surname should she wish to do so. She certainly wanted to 
adopt the surname “of the man that meant everything to me,” but not if the only way of 
doing so was through an “act of mercy” on the part of the government.20 
 Waltraud S. was distraught because the East German government was effectively 
compounding Nazi injustice with its own lack of empathy: 
 
I too am convinced that the anticipated reform of family law will confer further 
legal advantages upon my children.  But if Mr. Neumann believes that I am 
experiencing no disadvantages as a result of my legal status as a single woman, 
then he knows little about popular opinion in the countryside, which has changed 
little from what it was before.  It is, after all, not a secret that the consciousness of 
people, especially those living in the countryside, lags significantly behind the 
spirit of progressive legislation.  People in the countryside still consider me to be 
a single Fräulein with two children born out of wedlock and thus assume that I 
lead a profligate lifestyle (leichten Lebenswandel).  I always have to check off 
“single” on any official documents (census, indicating marital status [on forms], 
etc.).  The [GDR’s] democratic administrative bodies thus continually cause me 
pain since they remind me of the injustice that was done to me.  Perhaps you do 
not understand me either, Minister [Steinhoff], since a woman probably feels 
differently about such things.21 
 
 
Like Peter B., Waltraud S. bewailed the fact that popular attitudes lagged behind the 
“progressive” spirit of SED rhetoric even as she excoriated the government for not living 
up to its own ideals in the formulation and implementation of its laws regarding marriage.  
Despite their frustrations, however, both Peter B. and Waltraud S. were convinced that 
the government could and should lead the way in changing the tenor of popular opinion 
when it came to marital morality. 
                                                 
20 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 7212, Teil 2, letter from Waltraud S., Seifhennersdorf, to Steinhoff, 
MdI, Berlin, June 6, 1950, back side of page. 
21 Ibid., front side of page. 
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 The role of the East German party-state as an arbiter of sexual morality is a thread 
that weaves throughout this dissertation.  As a matter of general principle, socialist 
jurisprudence was supposed to reflect the moral “views of the working people,” but it 
was also intended to educate those “working people” whose consciousness had not yet 
caught up with socialist expectations.  In practice, however, it proved harder to achieve a 
perfect congruence between law and morality.  Existing historical accounts typically 
focus on East German legal and juridical practice as a transparent conduit of state power 
and a mechanism for political repression.  Politically inflected persecution veiled under 
the moralistic guise of warding off the allegedly invidious influence of fascism, 
capitalism, and imperialism was certainly a key element of jurisprudence under state-
socialism.  But Inga Markovits and Klaus Westen recognize that repression was not the 
primary motivation for every aspect of the SED’s legal and judicial vision, and Paul Betts 
exhorts other scholars to follow their lead in privileging nuanced analysis over monolithic 
condemnation.22   
The task of devising an East German legal codex that affirmed even as it sought 
to discipline popular mores was inherently contradictory—especially when it came to the 
realm of sexuality, for which a universally accepted catechismic text was lacking.  This 
disjuncture provided ample opportunity for the articulation of heterogeneous viewpoints 
both within and beyond governmental circles.  When it came to deliberating the fate of 
§ 175, the statute that penalized consensual same-sex sexual acts involving adult men, 
policymakers went back and forth regarding the need for the law to enforce the 
governmental and popular disapprobation of homosexual conduct.  Those who endorsed 
                                                 
22 Betts, Within Walls, 148. 
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decriminalization did so in a “bourgeois” jurisprudential idiom—namely, that the state 
should not intervene in private intimate encounters that transpired without attracting 
public notice.  Instead, “societal forces” (gesellschaftliche Kräfte) like mass 
organizations, workplace collectives, and neighborhood busybodies were supposed to 
take the place of the law in educating their peers about the incommensurability of gay 
identity with a conception of “healthy” socialist personhood.  Ultimately, the impetus to 
repeal § 175 in the GDR stemmed on the one hand from the SED’s respect for the 
inviolability of the private sphere, in the sense that homosexual acts that transpired out of 
public view and that did not harm third parties would no longer be subject to legal 
sanction.  On the other hand, the party displayed its heedlessness of the right to privacy 
given its expectation that societal proscription would prove mightier than the arm of the 
law in curtailing the prevalence of homosexual acts. 
In the case of marriage and divorce law, “societal forces” were ideally to 
complement rather than supplant the legal code in enforcing ethical expectations.  But 
many judges and officials did not trust that collectives were in a position to do so.  Some 
felt that such intervention constituted an unwarranted form of prying that would generate 
resentment rather than good will.  Others doubted the efficacy of collective intervention, 
not least because they could not count upon colleagues and neighbors to have internalized 
socialist moral injunctions.  Indeed, like Waltraud S., a number of ordinary East Germans 
were incensed by the obtuseness of a government that failed to abide by its own 
shibboleths when it came to its ostensible exoneration of marital infidelity through no-
fault divorce and alimony regulations that frequently allowed adulterous husbands to 
remarry without incurring any financial obligations to their ex-wives.  Others were 
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incredulous that officials would heedlessly increase the age of marital consent and 
thereby consign many more young women to the still-stigmatized status of unwed 
motherhood.  Thus “expecting better” of socialism could take the form of chastising the 
party-state for failing to abide by its “progressive” principles or for being too 
“progressive” in advancing a legislative agenda that contravened widely held views. 
The rapid proliferation of sexual and marital counseling centers in the wake of the 
1965 Family Law Code resulted in part from an implicit concession by the SED that legal 
and societal intervention would not suffice in resolving conjugal conflict.  The task of 
imbuing marriages with socialist moral content was not a task for political propaganda 
alone.  But would officials jealous of guarding their prerogatives be willing to accept 
scientific expertise as a viable substitute for more ideologically driven forms of legal 
intervention? 
 
Normalization and Its Discontents 
 Expecting better of socialism implied some degree of belief in the legitimacy of 
the GDR’s system of governance.  The 1990s witnessed a schism in the burgeoning field 
of GDR historiography between an accusatory stance that viewed the GDR as a 
fundamentally illegitimate Soviet imposition on the one hand and a tendency to 
characterize the GDR as a good idea that was badly implemented on the other hand.23  
Out of this historiographical thicket has emerged a debate over “normalization,” or the 
extent to which everyday life in the GDR could evade such dystopian or utopian 
                                                 
23 Konrad H. Jarausch, “Beyond Uniformity: The Challenge of Historicizing the GDR,” in Jarausch, ed., 
Dictatorship as Experience, 3-14, here 3-4. 
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parameters.24  Mark Allinson considers a significant impetus for thematizing 
“normalization” in historical scholarship on the GDR to have been the desire to move 
beyond a dichotomy predicated upon excoriating or apologizing for the SED regime.25  
Instead, this new analytical focus has arguably resulted in a hardening of the schism.  
Indeed, Martin Sabrow identifies proponents of the normalization paradigm as falling 
squarely on the exonerative end of the historiographical divide.26 
Mary Fulbrook, the primary proponent of the “normalization” paradigm, argues 
that the claim of East Germans to have led “normal” lives under SED rule is one that 
should be taken seriously, rather than dismissed as an apologetic stance or a misguided 
outgrowth of Ostalgie, a nostalgic celebration of the retrospectively positive aspects of 
the East German experience.  For Fulbrook, “normalization” in the GDR entailed an 
internalization of routines and viewpoints dictated by the SED in such a way that did not 
irreversibly distort the “normality” of everyday life.27  The “normalization” turn in 
historical scholarship on East Germany resonates with recent work on the USSR that “has 
challenged long-held views according to which the Stalinist totalitarian self represented 
                                                 
24 The term “normalization” has a fundamentally different meaning in the historiography of other countries 
in the Soviet Bloc.  “Normalization” in Hungary after 1956, Czechoslovakia after 1968, and Poland after 
1956 and 1980-1981 referred to the purging of reformist voices by Soviet and Soviet-aligned forces.  The 
equation of “normalization” with the elimination of dissent underscored the fundamental 
incommensurability of life under liberal democracy and authoritarian Communism.  Jiri Valenta, 
“Revolutionary Change, Soviet Intervention, and ‘Normalization’ in East-Central Europe,” Comparative 
Politics 16, no. 2 (January 1984), 127-151; Paulina Bren, The Greengrocer and His TV: The Culture of 
Communism after the 1968 Prague Spring (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010). 
25 Mark Allinson, Politics and Popular Opinion in East Germany, 1945-1968 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2000), 2. 
26 Martin Sabrow, “Consensus and Coercion: The Third Reich and the German Democratic Republic in 
Comparative Perspective,” in Ten Years of Unification: Transfer, Transformation, Incorporation?, eds. 
Jörn Leonhard and Lothar Funk (Birmingham: University of Birmingham Press, 2002), 69-80, here 69-71. 
27 Mary Fulbrook, “The Concept of ‘Normalisation’ and the GDR in Comparative Perspective,” in 
Fulbrook, ed., Power and Society in the GDR, 1-32, here 2-3, 14, 16. 
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little more than the negation of liberal individualism.” 28  Positing the aspiration for 
“normality” as a fundamental commonality of selfhood under both liberal democratic and 
authoritarian auspices is integral to this endeavor. 
Fulbrook has also vigorously rejected the insinuation that her espousal of 
“normalization” as a heuristic for East German historiography stems from a desire to 
mitigate the SED’s culpability in depriving its citizenry of fundamental rights.  But I 
would argue that her understanding of “normalization” has also been controversial 
because it presumes a kind of agency on the part of East Germans that co-opts and 
renders unnecessary Alf Lüdtke’s concept of Eigen-Sinn: 
 
One interesting feature to emerge is the way in which many East Germans felt 
able to articulate their grievances and interests with at least some limited hope of 
redress or input into future policy.  Thus, they were, if only to a limited degree 
and within certain boundaries (not least the physical boundaries of the East 
German state itself as a geographical entity), able to “work the system” for their 
own ends.  Many felt simultaneously committed to and critical of the system 
within which they lived and worked.  This highlights the fact that it is not 
sufficient simply to talk about “Eigen-Sinn” in terms of a defence of a person’s 
“own interests” and the bestowal of his or her “own meanings,” important though 
such a stance also is in some contexts.  The notion of “Eigen-Sinn” presupposes 
still some distance between an individual’s “own” and “society’s” interests and 
norms.  What is interesting—in addition—in the GDR is the as yet insufficiently 
explored question of the extent of overlap and merging of these two areas.  The 
notion of normalisation allows us to explore the extent to which certain norms 
were shared, or internalised, to such a degree that the sense of “Eigen-Sinn” 
becomes almost irrelevant.29 
 
 
Far from being “irrelevant,” Eigen-Sinn would seem to offer an ideal way to ascertain 
“the extent of overlap” between individual, collective, and governmental interests.  The 
                                                 
28 Greg Eghigian, Andreas Killen, and Christine Leuenberger, “Introduction: The Self as Project: Politics 
and the Human Sciences in the Twentieth Century,” Osiris 22, no. 1 (2007), 1-25, here 13-14. 
29 Mary Fulbrook, “The Concept of ‘Normalisation’ and the GDR in Comparative Perspective,” in Power 
and Society in the GDR, 1961-1979: The “Normalisation of Rule?,” ed. Mary Fulbrook (New York: 
Berghahn, 2009), 1-32, here 25. 
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very choice to focus on the workings of Eigen-Sinn in everyday life emanates from the 
belief that everyday life had a meaningful existence in the GDR beyond what SED 
officials hoped or intended it to be.  Since the concept of “normalization” prioritizes the 
internalization of norms over their contestation, does it not presume a considerable 
degree of “merging” between state, society, and the individual?  In other words, is 
“normalization” simply Sigrid Meuschel’s much debated notion of the “de-
differentiation” of state and society in a different guise?30  Jeannette Madarász rejects this 
comparison since she believes that the concept of normalization can never encompass the 
totality of state and society.  In her view, the widespread internalization of norms need 
not be universal to be a meaningful category of historical analysis.31  But this still begs 
the question as to why and whether the concept of “normalization” should bear so much 
analytical weight. 
Jan Palmowski, who critiques Fulbrook’s “normalization” model, does not fault 
Fulbrook for reifying normality as such, since he recognizes that Fulbrook has taken great 
pains to distance herself from a conception of “normality” as an objective, transhistorical, 
normative yardstick or form of value judgment.  In Palmowski’s estimation, however, 
Fulbrook’s normalization model is ultimately inadequate because it takes as a given that 
                                                 
30 One of the most influential refutations of Meuschel’s characterization of the East German society as 
“frozen” (stillgelegt)—in other words, a uniform entity in which there was little discrepancy between the 
SED’s ideal vision and social reality—comes from Ralph Jessen, “Die Gesellschaft im Staatssozialismus: 
Probleme einer Sozialgeschichte der DDR,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 21, no. 1 (1995), 96-110, 
especially 99-100, 106, 109; see also Pollack, “Modernization and Modernization Blockages,” 28-29.  But 
Jessen does not reject the notion of “de-differentation” entirely.  In place of Meuschel’s notion of a society 
that merged into the state (die verstaatlichte Gesellschaft), Jessen offers his own contention that the state 
was subsumed under society (der vergesellschaftete Staat).  In response to Jessen and her other critics, 
Meuschel insists that she never claimed that the SED’s goal of societal de-differentiation had been fully 
realized in practice. Thomas Lindenberger, “In den Grenzen der Diktatur: Die DDR als Gegenstand von 
‘Gesellschaftsgeschichte,’” in Bilanz und Perspektiven der DDR-Forschung, eds. Rainer Eppelmann, 
Bernd Faulenbach, and Ulrich Mählert (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2003), 239-245, here 240. 
31 Jeannette Madarász, “Economic Politics and Company Culture: The Problem of Routinisation,” in 
Fulbrook, ed., Power and Society in the GDR, 52-75, here 54. 
 
 15 
which should be analyzed, namely how and why norms promulgated by the SED came to 
be accepted as part of “normal” life.  It also does not pay sufficient attention to the ways 
in which these dynamics changed during the course of the GDR’s existence.32 
 If one substitutes “public transcript,” Palmowski’s heuristic of choice, for the 
“rules of the game,” the term preferred by Fulbrook, then it becomes apparent that both 
Palmowski and Fulbrook assume that the basic tenets of Communism for all aspects of 
life were unitary, readily intelligible, and easily instrumentalized in daily life, whether 
out of political conviction, fear of the consequences of non-compliance, resignation, or 
irony.  They have assumed—Palmowski rather explicitly, Fulbrook more implicitly—that 
the populace internalized or paid obeisance to the “rules” or “public transcript” because 
“[w]hat stops the dominant from being openly challenged is the appearance that their 
power is unavoidable.  Enlisting the dominated to the public transcript becomes central to 
the act of domination, because in formally complying, they signal that they expect 
existing power structures to be there to stay.”33  A key difference between the two lies in 
their points of emphasis, with Fulbrook preferring to highlight the “participatory” aspects 
of “normalization” and Palmowski opting to demonstrate how abiding by the “public 
transcript” allowed East Germans to avoid the cudgel of “hard power” that underpinned 
the transcript’s hegemonic pretensions. 
Other scholars have considered whether there was a wholesale rejection or 
assimilation of Communist norms on the part of the East German populace.  For Konrad 
Jarausch, it was “forms of resistance that allowed a degree of normality within the 
                                                 
32 Jan Palmowski, Inventing a Socialist Nation: Heimat and the Politics of Everyday Life in the GDR, 1945-
90 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 312. 
33 Palmowski, Inventing a Socialist Nation, 13. 
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abnormal confines of SED rule.”34  In this view, it was only in rejecting the “norms” of 
Communist society that East Germans could hope to attain any semblance of “normality” 
in their daily lives.  In contrast, Sabrow recognizes that the SED “dictatorship could 
create a form of normalcy that provided its citizens with a specific identity.”35  In his 
schema, “normality” was not a one-size-fits-all entity, but instead a matter of perception 
that the regime could shape to its own advantage. 
But even critics and skeptics of the “normalization” paradigm remain beholden to 
an implicit assumption regarding the underlying comparability of East and West German 
norms and aspirations—and the possibilities for realizing them in practice.  Like 
Fulbrook, both Sabrow and Jarausch accept as a given that “normality” remained the 
desideratum to which the East German populace and the SED aspired, presumably in no 
small part because scholarship on the FRG has revealed a widespread yearning on the 
part of West German citizens and officials for a “return” to normalcy after the defeat of 
Nazism.  When faced with the vagaries of dictatorial rule of the Nazi or the Communist 
variety, the presumed-to-be-nonpolitical German was inclined to retreat to her or his 
garden plot (Schrebergarten).  And even the more politically aware German pursued the 
“at once elusive and futile” goal of being “like everyone else, [blending] into Socialist or 
Western modernity, [and becoming] invisible citizens of a post-national Europe on either 
side of the Iron Curtain.”36  
                                                 
34 Konrad H. Jarausch, “Care and Coercion: The GDR as Welfare Dictatorship,” in Jarausch, ed., 
Dictatorship as Experience, 47-69, here 57. 
35 Martin Sabrow, “Dictatorship as Discourse: Cultural Perspectives on SED Legitimacy,” in Jarausch, ed., 
Dictatorship as Experience, 195-212, here 197. 
36 Till van Rahden, “Clumsy Democrats: Moral Passions in the Federal Republic,” German History 29, no. 
3 (September 2011), 485-504, here 496. 
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For Richard Bessel, in contrast, “normality” remained an impossible dream for 
East Germans because of the absence of a “conventional family policy for a private 
sphere independent of the state.”37  Bessel assumes that the private sphere disappeared in 
the GDR and that as a result of this, the SED’s family policy was not “conventional” 
even if its ultimate aims were.  The implication is that a “conventional family policy” was 
a necessary prerequisite for the attainment of “normality” in East Germany, as Robert 
Moeller has argued that it was for the nascent FRG.38  Even if one adopts Madarász’s 
qualification of “normalization” as not necessarily applying to the East German polity in 
its entirety, how is it possible to write a history of challenges to “conventional” notions of 
marriage and sexuality when the very notion of “conventionality” is inextricably linked in 
the historical imagination with the definition of “normality” advanced by both adherents 
and skeptics of the “normalization” model?  If there is no room in the “normalization” 
paradigm for syncretism or the selective appropriation of norms, and if it styles itself as 
the primary bulwark against the view of the GDR as a “de-differentiated” amalgam of 
state and society, is there anything else in the discursive and methodological toolbox of 
East German historiography that would lend itself to subject matter that defies the logic 
of “normalization,” conventionality, and uniformity? 
 Ultimately, the salience of “normalization” has important implications for the fate 
of the Sonderweg paradigm in the writing of post-1945 German history.39  Historians 
                                                 
37 Richard Bessel, “Hatred after War: Emotion and the Postwar History of East Germany,” History & 
Memory 17, nos. 1-2 (Fall 2005), 195-216, here 213. 
38 Robert G. Moeller, Protecting Motherhood: Women and the Family in the Politics of Postwar West 
Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). 
39 Katherine Pence and Paul Betts, “Introduction,” in Socialist Modern: East German Everyday Culture and 
Politics, eds. Katherine Pence and Paul Betts (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008), 1-34, here 
16-17.  For a definitive refutation of the notion that Germany ever pursued a Sonderweg (special path) 




have uttered a collective sigh of relief that West Germany finally learned how to liberate 
the German nation from the shackles of its Sonderweg through political unobtrusiveness, 
prosperity, and the “normal” lifestyle enabled by that financial well-being. From this 
perspective, as Germany’s “second dictatorship” of the twentieth century, the GDR 
represented yet another German failure when it came to the establishment of a modern, 
liberal polity.40 
Against this backdrop, one can understand why East Germans might want to 
claim that despite living in a country that extended the anti-democratic leg of the 
Sonderweg, they too have the right to claim to have led “normal” lives.  Fulbrook is right 
to ensure that their voices do not get lost in a historiography that has been far more 
attuned to identifying withdrawal from or resistance against the SED and its policies.  But 
epistolary petitions (Eingaben) drafted by East Germans reveal not only a yearning for 
normality, but also pointed challenges to the status quo.  Eingaben provided a forum for a 
“whispered dialogue—neither completely suppressed nor genuinely public” that served 
as a conduit for popular opinion and a means for challenging—and sometimes 
amending—the SED’s “public transcript.”41 
 
The Culture of Eingaben 
                                                                                                                                                 
Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in 
Nineteenth-Century Germany (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984).  Historians who have embraced 
the Sonderweg concept, such as Jürgen Kocka, Heinrich August Winkler, Kurt Sontheimer, and Wolfgang 
Mommsen, tend to argue that 1945 marked the end of the Sonderweg, at least for West Germany, as noted 
in George Steinmetz, “German Exceptionalism and the Origins of Nazism: The Career of a Concept,” in 
Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison, eds. Ian Kershaw and Moshe Lewin (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 251-284, here 274. 
40 Bernd Faulenbach, “Nur eine ‘Fußnote der Weltgeschichte?’: Die DDR im Kontext der Geschichte des 
20. Jahrhunderts,” in Eppelmann et al., eds., Bilanz und Perspektiven der DDR-Forschung, 1-23, here 4, 7-
8. 
41 Harsch, “Society, the State, and Abortion in East Germany,” 56. 
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Like other state-socialist polities, the GDR dismantled a formalized system of 
administrative appeal through courtroom adjudication and replaced it with a standing 
invitation to the populace to submit petitions to protest administrative malfeasance or 
unfairness and a guarantee that governmental officials would respond to these petitions in 
a timely fashion.  Indeed, this promise was codified in Article 3 of the GDR’s 1949 
Constitution, elaborated upon in a follow-up directive in 1953, and reiterated in Article 
103 of the revised Constitutions of 1968 and 1974.  The submission of an Eingabe was 
supposed to catalyze an internal review unfettered by arcane statutes that were intelligible 
only to a juridically literate elite.  From a contemporaneous West German perspective 
and that of an influential strand of the historiography of the East German legal system, 
the dismantling of the administrative court system was yet another manifestation of the 
SED’s departure from the rule of law.  The system of Eingaben put a populist patina on a 
fundamental abnegation of the commitment to an objective assessment of administrative 
grievances by impartial judges.42 
But the desire to make the East German system of jurisprudence “close to the 
people” (volksverbunden) through the petition system also made the barrier of entry to 
                                                 
42 Wolfgang Bernet, “Eingaben als Ersatz für Rechte gegen die Verwaltung in der DDR,” in Die 
Rechtsordnung der DDR: Anspruch und Wirklichkeit, ed. Uwe-Jens Heuer (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995), 
415-426; Oliver Werner, “‘Politisch überzeugend, feinfühlig und vertrauensvoll?’: Eingabenbearbeitung in 
der SED,” in Diktaturen in Europa im 20. Jahrhundert: Der Fall DDR, ed. Heiner Timmermann (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1996), 461-479, here 462.  Felix Mühlberg disputes the widespread contention that 
Eingaben were supposed to serve as a replacement for the adjudication of bureaucratic grievances through 
the administrative court system that the East German government dismantled in 1953; see Felix Mühlberg, 
Bürger, Bitten und Behörden: Geschichte der Eingabe in der DDR (Berlin: Dietz, 2004), 20, 29, 57.  
Mühlberg also argues that instead of being a carbon copy of the petition systems of the USSR or other parts 
of the Soviet Bloc, the laws governing Eingaben were a “genuine East German product” (ein originär 
DDR-deutsches Produkt) that were drafted in response to the overwhelming popular demand for epistolary 
petitions as a forum for citizen-state interaction in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War; see 
Mühlberg, Bürger, Bitten und Behörden, 86-88, 275, quotation from 88.  I would argue instead that the 
promulgation of the first Eingaben law and abolition of the system of administrative courts did not both 
happen in 1953 for coincidental reasons alone, and that while the legal provisions for and extensive 
popularity of Eingaben might have been unique to the GDR, the epistolary petition as such was not. 
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filing a complaint much lower.43  Rather than having to file a formal suit at a courthouse, 
an East German could simply sit at her or his desk at home and draft a letter about 
virtually any subject to the governmental body of her or his choice.  As Jan Palmowski 
argues, “Because of the assumed identity between citizen and state in Socialism, there 
was no reason why, in principle, citizens should not address the state directly with their 
concerns.”44  Indeed, the very indeterminacy of the Eingabe enabled it to serve as a 
vehicle not only for individualized complaints about bureaucratic intransigence, but also 
for the expression of concerns that were potentially of broader societal significance.  
Conversely, since the Eingaben system did not follow a clear chain of administrative 
command, even the lowliest complaint could find an audience at the highest echelons of 
the East German government.  Many East Germans directed their missives to President 
Wilhelm Pieck in the 1950s, for instance, because they trusted him as the “father of the 
country” (Landesvater) who would help petitioners’ interests to prevail against the 
misguided or parochial actions of lower-level officials.45  The system proved to be a quite 
popular one; as Betts points out, “no state in history ever recorded as many citizen 
                                                 
43 Betts, Within Walls, 174; Werner, “‘Politisch überzeugend,’” 464; Ina Merkel and Felix Mühlberg, 
“Eingaben und Öffentlichkeit,” in“Wir sind doch nicht die Meckerecke der Nation”: Briefe an das 
Fernsehen der DDR, ed. Ina Merkel (Berlin: Schwarzkopf & Schwarzkopf, 2000): 11-46, here 19; 
Mühlberg, Bürger, Bitten und Behörden, 11.  In fact, Betts has gone even further by tracing the theoretical 
justification for the system of Eingaben back to Lenin’s call for a move towards citizen self-government—a 
move that did not, to be sure, take place in the GDR. 
44 Jan Palmowski, “Citizenship, Identity, and Community in the German Democratic Republic,” in 
Citizenship and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Germany, eds. Geoff Eley and Jan Palmowski 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 73-91, here 81. 
45 Whether consciously or not, Eingaben authors relied upon a number of tropes that were not unique to the 
East German context.  For instance, Sheila Fitzpatrick’s catalog of conventions that appeared in nineteenth-
century Russian and 1930s Soviet petitions—“[c]onstruing an authority figure as a ‘beloved father,’ 
appealing for justice (without reference to law), complaining to higher authority about local abuses, writing 
pathetically of ‘the crust of bread’ that was so often lacking”—is applicable to quite a few epistolary 
petitions drafted in the GDR as well.  Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Supplicants and Citizens: Public Letter-Writing 
in Soviet Russia in the 1930s,” Slavic Review 55, no. 1 (Spring 1996), 78-105, here 92, 81; Betts, Within 
Walls, 183, 188. 
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complaints as East Germany did.”46  Between 1960 and 1966, for example, the Council 
of State (Staatsrat) alone received an average of 100,000 Eingaben annually.47  By the 
time the GDR ceased to exist, estimates posited that roughly half of the adult population 
had submitted an epistolary petition to the East German government at one time or 
another.48 
 According to one historiographical perspective, Eingaben perpetuated obeisance 
to the kind of authoritarian state (Obrigkeitsstaat) that was a staple of anti-democratic 
German political culture.  From this perspective, the East German system of governance 
was not something radically new or particularly “socialist,” but instead a reprise of 
entrenched autocratic habits.  Following scholarship by Kenneth Jowitt about the USSR 
and Andrew Walder about China, Andrew Port identifies “communist neotraditionalism” 
as a hallmark of SED rule.  This neotraditionalism was sustained by multi-layered 
 
“clientelist” relationships […] in which favors and rewards were selectively 
distributed in return for loyalty, consent, cooperation, and other desired forms of 
social, political, and economic behavior.  In a throwback to more traditional forms 
of rule, all of this supposedly helped ensure stability by co-opting privileged 
                                                 
46 Betts, Within Walls, 175. 
47 Inga Markovits, “Pursuing One’s Rights under Socialism,” Stanford Law Review 38, no. 3 (February 
1986), 689-761, here 699-700, statistic derived by Markovits from Neues Deutschland, December 9, 1966.  
Other important works on Eingaben include Monika Deutz-Schroeder and Jochen Staadt, eds., Teurer 
Genosse!: Briefe an Erich Honecker (Berlin: Transit, 1994); Ulrike Poppe, Rainer Eckert, and Ilko-Sascha 
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individuals and groups and, more generally, by making those who lived under 
Soviet-style regimes highly dependent on those in charge for the satisfaction of 
their everyday material needs.49 
 
 
For Port, Eingaben constituted but one pillar of this edifice of clientelism.  While it is 
true that Eingaben have a genealogy that predates the introduction of state-socialist forms 
of governance after the Second World War, it is not entirely clear to me what analytical 
gains are to be achieved by referring to “more traditional forms of rule.”  A political 
system predicated upon deferential systems of patronage could just as easily be ascribed 
to “modern” political party machines.  And the right to submit petitions was also 
enshrined in the “modern” democratic German constitutions drafted in 1849 by the 
National Assembly in Frankfurt and promulgated by the Weimar Republic in 1919.50  As 
Mary Fulbrook observes, “[w]hile rooted in this long-term tradition, the character and 
implications of the practice [of submitting Eingaben] inevitably changed in the very 
different political circumstances of the GDR.”51  Furthermore, Port’s analysis assumes 
that the petitioner was necessarily in a subservient position because she or he relied upon 
political and societal superiors for the satisfaction of basic material needs that were 
otherwise not being met.  As the subsequent chapters will reveal, however, the motivation 
to submit Eingaben did not necessarily stem from materialistic concerns alone. 
As Sandrine Kott avers, it was not unusual for Eingaben to feature “extensively 
standardized” language strategically deployed in the hope of eliciting a positive response.  
                                                 
49 Andrew I. Port, Conflict and Stability in the German Democratic Republic (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 269.  Cf. Johannes Huinink, “Individuum und Gesellschaft in der DDR: 
Theoretische Ausgangspunkte einer Rekonstruktion der DDR-Gesellschaft in den Lebensverläufen ihrer 
Bürger,” in Kollektiv und Eigensinn: Lebensverläufe in der DDR und danach, eds. Johannes Huinink, Karl 
Ulrich Mayer et al. (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1995), 25-44, here 30; Betts, Within Walls, 191. 
50 Betts, Within Walls, 176. 
51 Fulbrook, People’s State, 271. 
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For their part, officials often wielded a paternalistic tone as an “efficacious instrument for 
the depoliticization of public communication.”52  In other words, they attempted to render 
a potentially explosive political screed into a far less contentious and more personal 
matter to be resolved at the discretion of the supplicant’s interlocutor in government.  But 
this was not always the case.53  While it is not unusual to find obsequious language—
such as “In the hope that I have not made an inappropriate request” (In der Hoffnung, 
keine Fehlbitte getan zu haben)—particularly in Eingaben from the 1950s, this 
deferential stance is belied by the surprisingly strident attitude that emerges in many 
letters, including some that feature this ostensible gesture of humility.54  Indeed, it was 
this assertiveness that has led other scholars to view Eingaben as aiding and abetting not 
complaisance, but indeed its opposite—a widespread culture of complaint (Meckerkultur) 
in which petitions served as something akin to a corporate customer service hotline in a 
capitalist society.55  Petitioners not infrequently cited political speeches and statutes to 
demonstrate—whether ironically or sincerely—that they took the party leadership at its 
word and expected it to abide by its promises, especially when it came to the provision of 
                                                 
52 Sandrine Kott, “Entpolitisierung des Politischen: Formen und Grenzen der Kommunikation zwischen 
Personen in der DDR,” in Sehnsucht nach Nähe: Interpersonale Kommunikation in Deutschland seit dem 
19. Jahrhundert, ed. Moritz Föllmer (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2004), 215-228, here 225, 227; 
Werner, “‘Politisch überzeugend,’” 465; Merkel and Mühlberg, “Eingaben und Öffentlichkeit,” 18. 
53 Merkel and Mühlberg, “Eingaben und Öffentlichkeit,” 20. 
54 Betts, Within Walls, 185.  I think that Betts overemphasizes the shift from deference in Eingaben of the 
1950s and 1960s to stridency in Eingaben of the 1980s; while the earlier petitions might have featured less 
cynicism and more hope that citizens’ concerns would be addressed, they also often manifested an 
assertiveness for which Betts’ neat periodization does not allow.  Betts, Within Walls, 188-190. 
55 Fulbrook, People’s State, 273-275, 281-282; Betts, Within Walls, 173, 182; Merkel and Mühlberg, 
“Eingaben und Öffentlichkeit,” 40-41; Jochen Staadt, “Eingaben: Die institutionalisierte Meckerkultur in 
der DDR: Goldbrokat, Kaffee-Mix, Büttenreden, Ausreiseanträge und andere Schwierigkeiten mit den 




adequate housing.56  While Mary Fulbrook acknowledges the existence of a 
Meckerkultur, she characterizes the extensive recourse to Eingaben as a key vector for 
engagement between state and citizen in a “participatory dictatorship.”57 
Jonathan Zatlin synthesizes understandings of the petition system as both 
“premodern” and “modern” and recognizes that it could serve to invite or inhibit popular 
participation.  But he ultimately subscribes to the notion that by individualizing and 
privatizing the culture of complaint, Eingaben effectively squelched the potential for 
collective organizing and limited criticism to the misdeeds of individual functionaries 
rather than of the failings of the political system as a whole.58  Even the seemingly 
“democratic” and “participatory” facets of Eingaben are for Zatlin another manifestation 
of their fundamentally anti-democratic character: 
 
[T]he SED used direct-democratic arguments to assert a unity between citizen and 
state, much as enlightened despots had claimed to rule in the interest of all of their 
subjects. Because the aims of the Workers’ and Peasants’ State and the interests 
of its citizens were supposedly identical, legal guarantees aimed at protecting 
individuals from violations of their rights by the state were unnecessary.  Thus, 
the constitutionally guaranteed right to petition in the GDR was not a form of 
legal redress.  Rather, it was an expression of “codetermination and participation” 
(Mitbestimmung und Mitgestaltung) in the affairs of government.59 
                                                 
56 Merkel and Mühlberg, “Eingaben und Öffentlichkeit,” 23, 37; Mühlberg, Bürger, Bitten und Behörden, 
230-231. 
57 Fulbrook, People’s State, 171. 
58 Werner, “‘Politisch überzeugend,’” 467-468; Thomas Lindenberger, “Tacit Minimal Consensus: The 
Always Precarious East German Dictatorship,” in Popular Opinion in Totalitarian Regimes: Fascism, 
Nazism, Communism, ed. Paul Corner (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 208-222, here 217; 
Thomas Lindenberger, “Die Diktatur der Grenzen: Zur Einleitung,” in Herrschaft und Eigen-Sinn in der 
Diktatur: Studien zur Gesellschaft der DDR, ed. Thomas Lindenberger (Cologne: Böhlau, 1999), 13-44, 
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59 Jonathan Zatlin, The Currency of Socialism: Money and Political Culture in East Germany (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 288.  For Oliver Werner, even though Eingaben constituted the 
“‘strongest political reflex’” for many East Germans, they ultimately served as little more than a surrogate 
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überzeugend,’” 465 drawing upon Christoph Dieckmann, “Mein Osten heißt Heimat,” Die Zeit 36 (1995), 
3.  Betts issues the important reminder that the language of Mitbestimmung and Mitgestaltung was not 






While I do not maintain that Eingaben served as a haven of democratic possibility 
that compensated for the SED’s failure to live up to its promises of inclusive governance 
in other respects, I do not agree with Zatlin’s assumption that “codetermination and 
participation” could only occur on the SED’s own terms.  Although collective Eingaben 
were relatively rare, collective discussions of individual Eingaben were not, and even 
complaints of a seemingly individualized nature often had broader societal 
ramifications.60  According to Ina Merkel and Felix Mühlberg, Eingaben enabled East 
Germans to articulate their feelings of responsibility for and belonging in their society; 
the airing of collective vexation (Ärger) and discontent (Unzufriedenheit) could serve as a 
source of societal consensus-building.  And as Fulbrook remarks, 
 
[m]uch of the evidence suggests that, far from being merely cynical and 
manipulative, East German authorities were very often driven by a genuine desire 
to improve conditions for ordinary people—not least because such improvements 
were often tied in with state goals such as improvements in productivity, as well 
as increased popular support.61 
 
Petitioners had to strike a potentially precarious balance between articulating complaints 
while professing allegiance to and enthusiasm for the task of strengthening socialism, 
especially since they knew that authorities would try to ascertain the level of “‘deserving 
                                                                                                                                                 
part of the rhetoric of popular involvement in governance only with the issuance of the Constitutions of 
1968 and 1974; see Betts, Within Walls, 175. 
60 Gareth Dale, Popular Protest in East Germany, 1945-1989 (London: Routledge, 2005), 69 (drawing 
upon scholarship by Olaf Klenke and Bernd Gehrke); Fulbrook, People’s State, 286-287; Merkel and 
Mühlberg, “Eingaben und Öffentlichkeit,” 40; Mühlberg, Bürger, Bitten und Behörden, 29. 
61 Fulbrook, People’s State, 274.  Jan Palmowski is decidedly more circumspect about the success of the 
Eingaben system in cultivating loyalty to the regime: “petitions could ameliorate individual frustration, but 
they also could heighten frustration against the state (in the case of unpopular decisions) and against other 
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whether the citizens were brought closer to the state and to each other remains, in light of current research, 
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customer’ they were dealing with” in deciding which grievances were most worthy of 
resolution.62  But petitioners’ professions of political fealty did not necessarily guarantee 
a positive response, nor did petitioners always feel the need to demonstrate their 
allegiance to the socialist project. 
 The common denominator for the neotraditionalist, Meckerkultur, and “modern” 
participatory dictatorship analytical vantage points is their understanding of Eingaben as 
a safety valve.  The petition system allowed for criticism, albeit within strictly enforced 
limits, and thus ultimately perpetuated SED rule by preempting potentially more effective 
and communal forms of protest against governmental malfeasance.63  As Fulbrook 
argues, 
 
[t]o critique, within this framework, was thus not to criticise in the sense of attack 
but rather positively to contribute to the improvement of the system.  Sufficient 
numbers of people were satisfied, for the most part either by simply having let off 
steam and then understood why their request could not be met, or indeed by 
having achieved some real improvement with respect to their own personal 
problems, for the practice to be widely supported.64 
 
 
Betts concurs, noting that “letter-writing gave citizens the feeling that they were not 
really living in a dictatorship, or at least in a qualified sense.”  Eingaben might have been 
“powerful ‘weapons of the weak,’” but they ultimately enabled the ongoing viability of 
SED rule by mitigating the potential impact of popular discontent.65  But how could the 
SED, or any other political actor in the GDR for that matter, regulate the amount of 
                                                 
62 Fulbrook, People’s State, 273; Merkel and Mühlberg, “Eingaben und Öffentlichkeit,” 35.  By “deserving 
customer,” Fulbrook means “the productive, the politically committed and active, the needy—and best of 
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pressure that the “safety valve” could withstand?  Betts opines that by encouraging 
citizens to focus on concrete, material concerns rather than pleas for the recognition of 
“abstract civil rights,” the Eingaben “system was very effective in channelling dissent 
into a manageable arena.”66  This leaves open the question as to how this channeling 
might have taken place.  Betts ultimately ascribes agency to state and citizenry alike in 
determining the content and limitations of the petition system: “What this complaint 
system reveals is the extent to which East Germany’s own version of the ‘tyranny of 
intimacy’ was equally casual and coercive, imposed and self-generating.”67 
Many historians have addressed the paradox of the GDR’s decades of political 
quiescence juxtaposed with its quite rapid and cataclysmic collapse.  But while the 
GDR’s four-decade-long stability and ultimate demise are vital historical questions, they 
are not the only or necessarily the primary questions that should inform each and every 
study of East German history.  It is for this reason that the issue of the possibilities and 
limitations of the Eingabe as a safety valve for dissent and disgruntlement needs to be 
revisited. 
In assessing the role of petitions in the Stalinist Soviet Union, Sheila Fitzpatrick 
contends that “for all the qualifications that have to be attached to the term ‘public’ in this 
context, the writing and reading of these letters to the authorities is as close to a public 
sphere as one is likely to get during the Stalin period.”68  Along similar lines, Oliver 
Werner identifies the East German culture of Eingaben as fulfilling a function equivalent 
to that of a public sphere (öffentlichkeitsäquivalent).  The petition system, however, 
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67 Betts, Within Walls, 191. 
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occupied this role only because there was a vacuum as far as a real public sphere was 
concerned.  In other words, he considers Eingaben to have been an inferior alternative to 
what could or should have existed in the GDR and thus dismisses the ways in which they 
might have constituted a productive catalyst for state-citizen interaction in their own 
right.69  While I do not dispute the restrictions placed upon freedom of expression in the 
GDR, I would also reject the strong undercurrent in Werner’s analysis that retroactively 
condemns any aspects of East German society that failed to live up to an imputed West 
German norm.70 
It was not unheard of for an East German to articulate, as Fulbrook points out, 
“opinions that went beyond the constrained limits of acceptable complaints” and thereby 
unwittingly bring upon her or himself the unwanted intervention of the Stasi or other 
arms of the state.71  Also striking is “[t]he sheer honesty and widespread willingness to 
complain in a state where, on some models, one should be too afraid to want to draw 
attention to critical views.”72  This relative openness apparently stemmed from a 
consensus on the part of East German officials and citizens alike that Eingaben should 
and would serve as a “means of assessing public opinion” (Prüfstand der öffentlichen 
Meinung).73  The SED tolerated the ongoing existence of the petition system, according 
to Betts, “since most citizens—so the reports [of the time] concluded—‘preferred to 
concentrate on their local concerns and private lives rather than risk upsetting a rather 
                                                 
69 Werner, “‘Politisch überzeugend,’” 463; Merkel and Mühlberg, “Eingaben und Öffentlichkeit,” 18. 
70 Mühlberg, Bürger, Bitten und Behörden, 23. 
71 Fulbrook, People’s State, 284. 
72 Fulbrook, People’s State, 287. 
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precariously loaded applecart.’”74  But as Donna Harsch has argued, “‘local concerns and 
private lives’” were quite capable of rendering unstable the “‘applecart’” of SED rule.75 
I argue that it is necessary to consider the role of Eingaben beyond the largely 
consumerist, social welfare, and political frameworks that have dominated other 
accounts.  When it came to marital and sexual matters, Eingaben amplified the voices of 
those who expected better—or at the very least, expected something different—of 
socialism.  As Marti Lybeck observes about an earlier German sociopolitical context, 
“grievance petitions acted like a mirror exposing the gaps between the legitimating 
rhetoric and the actual operation of the system.”76  Eingaben could reveal popular 
disillusionment with the failure of state socialism to live up to the promise of its 
progressive rhetoric, but they could also challenge the desirability of moving society or 
the law in a “progressive” direction.77  While both Merkel and Mühlberg acknowledge 
that Eingaben could be a vehicle for articulating taboo topics such as abortion, scholars 
have yet to accord sufficient attention to epistolary petitions that focused on sexual and 
familial themes—and, more specifically, those that challenged rather than reaffirmed 
prevailing sexual mores.78 
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The process of contesting the policies and moral attitudes that would receive an 
official imprimatur was not limited to the populace at large.  The exigencies of 
responding to petitions provided opportunities for multivocality within the functionary 
class itself.  In their responses to citizens and during internal deliberations, authorities 
could make strategic use of “official-speak” to mask denial or even tacit recognition of 
dissenting opinions within governmental ranks.79  This marks a departure from prevailing 
historical assessments of “official-speak” that consider its uses to have been primarily 
strategic (on the part of petitioners seeking to curry favor with authorities) or didactic (on 
the part of functionaries seeking to impart lessons about socialism).80 
Indeed, many Eingaben were written by citizens who were not necessarily aligned 
with the SED’s worldview, and who were not afraid to say as much: 
 
That the vast majority of these formal complaints were written by unaffiliated, 
disgruntled citizens disclosed a crucial dimension of GDR everyday culture, 
namely a privatization of politics on the one hand, and a politicization of the 
private on the other.  Indeed, they could—and did—use their personal domestic 
concerns to criticize the state for not upholding expected standards of privacy, 
normality, and propriety.  Odd as it may seem, the state’s stepped-up monitoring 
of the private lives of its charges went hand in hand with the people’s usage of 
these complaints to preserve and assure the existence of a decent private sphere 
free of undue state interference.81 
 
 
Petitioners could demand the enforcement of existing policies and rectify materialistic 
gripes, but they could also contribute to the paradoxical constellation of a government 
that vacillated between the impulse to intervene in the private sphere on the one hand and 
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to leave it alone on the other.  Since Eingaben served as a key bridge between the 
personal and the political, they enabled citizens to negotiate the terms under which this 
relationship unfolded—sometimes by endorsing conservative mores, but at other times by 
challenging them. 
 
Why Uphold the Public-Private Distinction for the GDR?82 
The historiography of the GDR has never quite known what to do with the East 
German family.  This is because of a fundamental ambivalence regarding the extent to 
which the family demonstrated the palpable or obscured “limits of dictatorship” (Grenzen 
der Diktatur).  According to Thomas Lindenberger, the “limits of dictatorship” referred 
 
both to the outer geographical boundary protected against transgression by arms, 
concrete and barbed wire, and to the multitude of invisible boundaries pervading 
the body social, producing an inner landscape of relatively isolated units at the 
bottom of society.  The typical political conflict between ordinary GDR citizens 
and the SED was not about political issues and basic tenets of the ideology, but 
about transgressions of one of these invisible boundaries, e.g., when someone 
took the ideology literally and tried to act it out on his own, outside the social 
place accorded to him by the party’s omniscient wisdom.83 
 
 
For Betts and Fulbrook, however, the atomization of the social was not so much a “limit” 
of dictatorship as an integral part of sustaining it.  If a “typical political conflict” was “not 
about political issues,” in Lindenberger’s parlance, then what was it about?  He cautions 
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against misinterpreting the “limits of dictatorship” framework to mean that there was a 
dictatorial zone and a dictatorship-free zone in the GDR.84  But as the above quotation 
demonstrates, even Lindenberger’s sophisticated understanding of “rule as a social 
practice” (Herrschaft als soziale Praxis) is predicated upon a clear demarcation between 
the “political” and “apolitical,” albeit without an explication of the difference between 
the two categories.85  The implication, then, is that the “political” was within the domain 
of dictatorship whereas the “apolitical” was outside of it.  But it was precisely in this 
seemingly “apolitical” domain that political mobilization from below could and did take 
place.86 
Günter Gaus, who held the inaugural leadership post of the Permanent Delegation 
of the FRG in the GDR from 1974 to 1981, promulgated the notion of East Germany as a 
“niche society” (Nischengesellschaft).87  The term prefigured many of the points of 
contention that would characterize the historiographical debate regarding the relationship 
between state and society in the GDR, and as such served as an important reference point 
in that discussion.  Lindenberger, for instance, rejects Gaus’ characterization of the GDR 
as a Nischengesellschaft because of its connotation that citizens had to flee for cover in 
protective niches in order to survive the privation and repression that characterized East 
German life.  But he also maintains that a significant motivation for playing along with 
the socialist experiment for many otherwise politically uncommitted or indifferent East 
Germans was the desire to avoid governmental meddling in one’s personal affairs.  
Lindenberger thus effectively replicates the stark public-private distinction of the 
                                                 
84 Lindenberger, “In den Grenzen der Diktatur,” 243. 
85 Lindenberger, “Diktatur der Grenzen,” 20-23. 
86 Harsch, Revenge of the Domestic. 
87 Günter Gaus, Wo Deutschland liegt: Eine Ortsbestimmung (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1983). 
 
 33 
Nischengesellschaft model and fails to explain how his understanding of the defense of 
the private sphere against governmental meddling is qualitatively different than the act of 
“retreating” to a private niche.  For both Gaus and Lindenberger, East German citizens 
struck a deal with the SED when it came to state intervention: “until this point and no 
further (bis hierher und nicht weiter).”88  The private domain, whether defined as a kind 
of “niche” or not, was not only a refuge from, but also an unwitting pillar of, the SED’s 
rule. 
 Betts traces an elaborate intellectual genealogy for Gaus’ conceptualization of the 
Nischengesellschaft that includes Czeslaw Milosz’s anti-Communist critique of the 
Eastern Bloc’s “double game of public conformity and private individuality” of the 1950s 
in The Captive Mind as well as works by West German sociologists during the 1960s 
who pointed to the “‘ventilative’ character’ of the GDR’s private sphere as a ‘protective 
community’ (Schutzgemeinschaft) of family and friends.”89  He also provides an 
important reminder that Gaus did not intend the term Nischengesellschaft to be a 
negatively inflected one.  Instead, Gaus saw East Germans’ inclination to flourish within 
niches as a manifestation of their respect for German cultural values and the inviolability 
of the private sphere that transcended the Cold War divide between the two German 
polities.  From this standpoint, the form that the Nischengesellschaft took was a GDR-
specific response to the SED’s repressive rule, but the impulse to create a 
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Nischengesellschaft stemmed from the common heritage of the “unpolitical German” that 
would prevail against any unwarranted forms of intrusion on the part of the state.90 
 Betts could have added another element to his genealogy, namely the prior 
articulation of something akin to a Nischengesellschaft by East German observers.  GDR 
sexual advice manual author Klaus Trummer, for instance, admitted already in 1968 that 
some young people just pretended to be politically active—they professed political 
conviction that was notably devoid of sincerity or profundity.  They sought refuge from 
political engagement in “‘a small, idyllic world of personal happiness,’” but according to 
Trummer, such a retreat was never fully realizable.  The key difference between 
Trummer and Gaus was that the former condemned “unpolitical” inclinations while the 
latter celebrated them.91 
 Betts offers a number of challenges to the Nischengesellschaft framework that 
resonate with my own analytical objectives.  For one thing, he notes that for Gaus, the 
“‘exit to niches’” in the GDR began in the 1970s “with no explanation as to why or to 
what extent it related to the GDR’s earlier decades.”  For Betts, the most important shifts 
in the East German private sphere “actually straddle the GDR’s middle two decades.”92  
And while Gaus offers the caveat that “‘niches are not external [to the socialist system], 
but rather are niches inside GDR socialism,’” his analysis, like Lindenberger’s, proceeds 
from the assumption that the Nischengesellschaft was effectively sealed off from the 
realm of the political.  To refute this, Betts draws upon Mary Fulbrook’s notion of the 
GDR as a “honeycomb state,” in which 
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the lines demarcating state and society—or public and private—had been blurred 
beyond recognition in a “multiplicity of little honeycomb cells of overlapping and 
intersecting elements in the GDR networks of power and social organization.”  
Various “limits to dictatorship” did exist, but they were not absolute, and were 




Even though Fulbrook rejects the notion of a Nischengesellschaft as being predicated 
upon a conception of the family as an apolitical and ahistorical domain that could offer a 
haven from the interventionist policies of the SED, her honeycomb metaphor nonetheless 
reproduces Gaus’ notion of niches, albeit niches that were “sticky” and hence 
interconnected rather than scattered and isolated.94  While Fulbrook takes great care to 
chronicle the multifarious ways in which the SED sought to interpolate itself in private 
life, she does not explicitly identify what held the honeycomb together other than the 
presumed internalization and instrumentalization of the SED’s norms by the broader 
populace—in short, “normalization.”  This points to a key distinction between Gaus’ 
Nischengesellschaft and Fulbrook’s “honeycomb state”: whereas the former was based 
upon East Germans’ rejection of “socialist” norms, the latter was dependent upon GDR 
citizens’ willingness to assimilate them. 
 
The Coalition of Decency and the “Honeycomb” State 
 
 Another form of “honey” that could serve as a palliative for the more astringent 
forms of socialist ideological “medicine” was what many scholars have identified, 
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whether explicitly or not, as a “coalition of decency” (Koalition des Anstands).95  This 
was, in a sense, “normalization” operating in the opposite direction of what Fulbrook 
envisions.  In other words, if the SED could capitalize upon what it believed it had in 
common with the majority of the East German populace, then it could strengthen its 
claim to legitimacy not by promulgating new customs as part of a “normalizing” 
campaign, but instead by affirming existing ones.96  According to this logic, if the GDR 
was indeed a honeycomb state, then it was not held together by the populace’s 
internalization of Communist norms but instead by the regime’s cooptation of what it 
believed to be popular mores. 
Illustrative of the historiographical consensus regarding this coalition is Verena 
Zimmermann’s observation that “[t]he mentality of many GDR citizens and especially of 
party and state functionaries was informed by a petty-bourgeois canon of values and 
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habitus.”97  The irony was that “Red Prussia” was relying upon German “virtues” “that 
had not really changed all that much since the eighteenth century” to enlist support for 
the building of socialism.98  This recourse to a small-minded value system was, in 
Zimmermann’s estimation, the result of the “unprecedented opportunity for upward 
social mobility for ‘simple folks’ (kleine Leute)” in East Germany.99  Sven Korzilius has 
gone so far as to characterize the GDR as a country of “simple people lacking in 
solidarity” (entsolidarisierte kleine Leute) who, in the absence of other forms of social 
distinction, turned to philistinism (Spießigkeit) to prove their superiority over anyone who 
did not embody its tenets.100  Korzilius could have acknowledged that asserting 
respectability was not just a manifestation of working-class or petty-bourgeois status 
anxiety but also an emulation of a bourgeois strategy to assert moral superiority over a 
profligate aristocracy and degenerate lower class.101  
 In one sense, the Koalition des Anstands was the culmination of longstanding 
efforts on the part of the working-class movement to “domesticate and hegemonise 
lower-class identity.”102  The difference, however, was that the Koalition des Anstands 
                                                 
97 Verena Zimmermann, Den neuen Menschen schaffen: Die Umerziehung von schwererziehbaren und 
straffälligen Jugendlichen in der DDR, 1945-1990 (Cologne: Böhlau, 2004), 16; Fenemore, Sex, Thugs and 
Rock ‘n Roll, 24. 
98 Zimmermann, Den neuen Menschen schaffen, 3-4. 
99 Zimmermann, Den neuen Menschen schaffen, 17; Huinink, “Individuum und Gesellschaft in der DDR,” 
31.  In an analogous argument regarding the philistinism and puritanism of Soviet elites, Sheila Fitzpatrick 
implies that an arriviste new guard sought to defend its potentially still precarious social capital by adopting 
petty-bourgeois attitudes and mores.  Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in 
Revolutionary Russia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992). 
100 Sven Korzilius, “Asoziale” und “Parasiten” im Recht der SBZ/DDR: Randgruppen im Sozialismus 
zwischen Repression und Ausgrenzung (Cologne: Böhlau, 2005), 605. 
101 George L. Mosse, Nationalism and Sexuality: Middle-Class Morality and Sexual Norms in Modern 
Europe (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985). 
102 Geoff Eley, “Cultural Socialism, the Public Sphere, and the Mass Form: Popular Culture and the 
Democratic Project, 1900 to 1934,” in Between Reform and Revolution, 315-340, here 332-333; Fenemore, 
Sex, Thugs and Rock ‘n Roll, 88, drawing upon Nicholas B. Dirks, Geoff Eley, and Sherry B. Ortner, 




was supposed to transcend whatever residual class divisions remained in the GDR.  For 
Betts, the 
 
palpable post-1945 fascination with late nineteenth-century propriety can be read 
best not as a love affair with the starched world of Wilhelmine class society, but 
rather as a desperate attempt to go back to the last era of German history when 
violence and hatred were not the affective bonds of German society, back to a 
time when civil society as such existed and was taken very seriously.103 
 
 
The SED hoped that expectations regarding propriety could still serve as a unifying factor 
for East Germany even in the absence of civil society.  It was for this reason that Walter 
Ulbricht promulgated the Ten Commandments of Socialist Morality in 1958, which 
called upon East Germans to engage in “clean” and “decent” opposite-sex relationships.  
The Koalition des Anstands thus stood “in marked contrast to the disruptive elements of 
proletarian militancy” of the Weimar-era KPD.104 
To be sure, there was still a class-based animus directed at the profligacy of the 
aristocracy and bourgeoisie as well as condemnation of members of a residual 
Lumpenproletariat who refused to engage in dignified (kulturvoll) leisure pursuits.  
Given the purported liquidation of societal stratification in East Germany, however, class 
divisions held explanatory power only for the bourgeois past or capitalist present in the 
FRG.  For the GDR itself, officials substituted “asociality” for class difference.  By the 
1960s, they blamed deviant conduct not only on atavistic holdovers from capitalism, but 
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also on the failings of individuals—as opposed to societal groups or classes—who were 
not amenable to the ameliorative influence of Communism.105  The result was an 
individualization of nonconformism and a collectivization of philistinism. 
While I do not dispute the existence of something resembling a Koalition des 
Anstands in the GDR, I believe that like the concept of “normalization,” it obscures the 
existence of nonconformist opinions and practices.  While there is ample evidence 
regarding the salience of petty-bourgeois sensibilities in the GDR, there is also an 
archival trail that speaks to widespread ambivalence and uncertainty about the “socialist” 
moral codex.  The Koalition des Anstands model is predicated upon the assumption that 
this moral codex was mutually intelligible to the state and citizenry alike, and that it was 
a wellspring of consensus-building rather than contestation.  But for every instance in 
which officials commiserated with citizens’ displeasure at raucous dancing or long-haired 
male youth, there were also ordinary citizens who questioned the SED’s self-assigned 
role as moral arbiter.  In doing so, some East Germans might have had in mind the 
Weimar-era KPD’s support of progressive sex reform’s challenges to moral absolutism. 
 
The Fate of Sex Reform After 1945 
 
Did the SED dig the grave for the relationship that had existed between the 
progressive Weimar-era sex reform movement and the KPD, or did elements of this 
alliance continue to resonate in East German governmental policy and practice?  In Atina 
Grossmann’s estimation, the “motherhood-eugenics consensus” of Weimar-era sex 
reform became stronger in the postwar Germanies because the more progressive and 
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radical sex reformers who had challenged that consensus died or went into exile because 
of National Socialist terror.  Some exiled sex reformers initially returned to the Soviet 
Occupation Zone in the hope of reviving this progressive legacy, but many either left 
once again or became disillusioned.  Those who hoped that they could pick up where they 
left off presumably remembered the period between 1931 and 1933, when the KPD had 
turned to “‘social issue’-oriented politics such as abortion” in the face of prodigious 
unemployment.106  In forming an alliance with opponents of the law proscribing abortion 
(§ 218) who were not party members, the KPD struggled to balance the goal of 
organizing women “as a distinct constituency” while attempting to subordinate their 
political mobilization under the “larger (and more important) class struggle.”107  As 
Grossmann astutely observes, “[a]lways leery of women’s separatism and its association 
with ‘bourgeois’ feminism, the party leadership feared losing control over the strong, 
broad-based, and potentially autonomous women’s movement that its support of ‘alliance 
politics’ had helped to create.’”  Ultimately this fear, and the inhospitable climate for 
legal reform, made this alliance an untenable one.108   
The outcome of this attempt at coalition-building necessarily shaped the tenor of 
postwar sex reform as well.  Even those who advocated for reform of § 218 after 1945 
did not call for complete decriminalization; instead, they sought a social indication that 
would allow for abortion in case of maternal hardship even as they trumpeted pronatalist 
measures.  The idea was not so much to repeal § 218 as to “‘make it superfluous,’” even 
though in the short term the law was liberalized so as to allow German women who had 
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been raped by Soviet soldiers to terminate their pregnancies.109  Abortion law reform 
aimed not at the “bourgeois feminist” goal of ensuring individual autonomy in 
reproductive decision-making but instead was beholden to biopolitical exigencies.  Thus, 
“[t]he conflict between individual rights and collective welfare that had so bedeviled 
Weimar sex reformers was decided in favor of the latter,” and slogans such as “‘Your 
body belongs to you’” that had been part of the early 1930s campaign found no place in 
the nascent GDR.110 
 Donna Harsch agrees with Grossmann’s pessimistic assessment of the prospects 
for progressive sex reform after 1945: “The SED elite had no interest in reviving Weimar 
debates about sexuality, sexual pleasure, and birth control.  Leading Communists, 
especially Ulbricht, aimed for high fertility and were, anyway, prudish.  They overruled 
the reforming urges of some party activists and physicians.”111  While Timm concurs 
with Grossmann on this point, she cautions against reifying a distinction between 
conservative and progressive sex reform before 1933.112  For Timm, the lack of a clear 
distinction between progressive and conservative sex reform after 1945 was not just a 
matter of “personnel discontinuity,” as Grossmann argues, but instead a mirror of 
conditions that had also obtained in Weimar-era sex reform activism.113 
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The prudish sensibilities cultivated during the formative years of the SED 
constituted a form of what Alan Hunt calls “ideological retraditionalism,” that is, the 
deployment of rhetoric about the forward-looking nature of socialist society to justify 
“projects to reinstate traditional forms of social relations.”114  As Blanche Wiesen Cook 
observes, “[d]espite a brief moment of experimentation that involved communal living 
and cooperative kitchen and laundry arrangements, Lenin and his successors favored the 
traditional family, traditionally structured.”115  From this perspective, the SED’s paeans 
to progressivism masked a firm commitment to maintaining the status quo when it came 
to family relations and sexual morality.  Or did they? 
In the case of the FRG, Dagmar Herzog purports that “[o]vercoming both Nazism 
and its defeat involved the redomestication of sex.”116  By espousing sexual 
conservatism, West German religious and governmental authorities sought to put behind 
them the sexual profligacy that they associated with National Socialism and the 
occupation period between 1945 and 1949.  Herzog goes so far as to say that no regime 
prior to the Third Reich “had ever so systematically set itself the task of stimulating and 
validating especially young people’s sexual desires [as long as they were not homosexual 
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or racially ‘undesirable’]—all the while denying precisely that this was what it was 
doing.”117  During the 1950s, West German policymakers and religious leaders, in 
Herzog’s estimation, saw through this dissimulation.  But the protesters of 1968 failed to 
recognize or acknowledge National Socialist sexual permissiveness and instead saw the 
Third Reich and the immediate postwar era as a period of continuous sexual 
backwardness and repression: 
 
[B]y 1969, for example, the journalist Hannes Schwenger, in an influential book 
criticizing the “antisexual” politics of the Christian churches, could specifically 
identify the postwar churches’ attack on “free love, premarital intercourse, 
adultery and divorce” as speaking “the language of fascism.”  That the Nazis had 
themselves once vigorously encouraged premarital intercourse, adultery and 
divorce had become simply unimaginable.118 
 
 
Elizabeth Heineman offers an important qualification of Herzog’s pathbreaking 
argument, namely that West German stances on sexuality during the 1950s and early 
                                                 
117 Dagmar Herzog, Sex after Fascism: Memory and Morality in Twentieth-Century German (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2005), 18. 
118 Dagmar Herzog, “Sexuality, Memory, Morality,” History & Memory 17, nos. 1-2 (Fall 2005): 238-266, 
here 260-261.  Mark Fenemore challenges Herzog’s characterization of West German amnesia about Nazi 
sexual liberality by noting that “[f]ar from having forgotten about ‘the antibourgeois and sexually 
transgressive aspects of Nazism,’ commentators from across the political spectrum continued to make 
direct references to them.”  Mark Fenemore, “The Recent Historiography of Sexuality in Twentieth-
Century Germany,” The Historical Journal 52, no. 3 (September 2009), 763-779, here 773.  Fenemore also 
believes that the Nazis’ admonitions against the “non-reproductive search for sexual pleasure” were of far 
greater consequence than their jettisoning of bourgeois scruples regarding unwed motherhood.  Fenemore, 
“Recent Historiography,” 774-775.  Along similar lines, Annette Timm contends that Nazis spoke of 
(hetero)sexual pleasure not as an end unto itself but as a vehicle for national rejuvenation and the assertion 
of racial superiority.  Annette F. Timm, “Sex with a Purpose: Prostitution, Venereal Disease, and 
Militarized Masculinity in the Third Reich,” in Sexuality and German Fascism, ed. Dagmar Herzog (New 
York: Berghahn, 2004), 223-255, here 225-227.  Herzog anticipated these objections to her interpretation 
of Nazi sexual politics: “[T]o read Nazis’ paeans to the delights of love as simply tactical embellishment of 
what was actually a narrowly reproduction-oriented agenda would be to miss the ways Nazi advice-givers 
inserted themselves into the most elemental desires for personal happiness—how much, in short, Nazism’s 
appeal lay (in a Foucaultian sense) in the positive rather than negative workings of power—even as the 
glorification of heterosexual romance provided the context for (and distracting counterpoint to) defenses of 
some of the most grotesque and violent aspects of Nazi politics.”  Dagmar Herzog, “Hubris and Hypocrisy, 
Incitement and Disavowal: Sexuality and German Fascism,” in Herzog, ed., Sexuality and German 
Fascism, 1-21, here 15. 
 
 44 
1960s were not only about distorting the memory of Nazism but also about following 
broader patterns of conservatism and liberalization of other Western societies at the time.  
Sexuality as a prism for Vergangenheitsbewältigung (dealing with the Nazi past) was the 
domain of elite and governmental discourse rather than of everyday popular 
experience.119 
Herzog astutely observes that “while East Germany entered a period of sexual 
conservatism in the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s in many respects comparable 
with the sexual conservatism of West Germany in those years, there were also already in 
the 1950s notable elements of liberality in the East which had no parallel in West 
Germany.”  It is my contention that the ongoing influence of progressive sex reform—
even when governmental officials and professional experts did not explicitly 
acknowledge it as such—played a significant role in tempering the sexual conservatism 
that characterized the early years of the Cold War.  Otherwise, the “notable elements of 
liberality” to which Herzog alludes might have been lost in the SED’s propagandistic 
onslaught against the alleged moral decadence of capitalism.120 
 Herzog’s nuanced view of the interplay between conservative and progressive 
impulses during the 1950s is largely lost when she turns to the 1970s, when a definitive 
shift in official attitudes enabled the “romance of socialism” to prevail against 
prudishness.121  Her argument about the symbolic valence of sexuality during the later 
years of the GDR is strikingly resonant with her argument about the liberalization of 
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(hetero)sexual mores under National Socialist auspices.  But even as Herzog scrupulously 
examines the mutual imbrication of pleasure and evil under Nazism, whereby sexual 
pleasure was inextricable from the regime’s gruesome excesses, she provides no 
comparable framework for the GDR.  Her insistence that both the Nazis and the SED 
promoted sexual pleasure for its own sake (rather than merely instrumentalizing it in the 
hope of attaining demographic or other more “pragmatic” policy aims) implicitly posits 
the celebration of sexual fulfillment as an integral aspect of non-democratic central 
European governance during the twentieth century.  This makes Herzog vulnerable to 
Josie McLellan’s admonition against viewing sexuality as a carefree realm rather than a 
site of power and privilege, precisely because she does not explain why the Nazis and the 
SED might have liberalized sexual mores, whether their motivations differed, and what 
the broader implications of this commonality might be. 
She also downplays East German sexual conservatism because it does not fit 
readily into her argument about the role of postwar West German sexual discourse in 
mediating and obfuscating memories of Nazi atrocities.  Indeed, she does not consider 
whether the articulation of conservative or progressive sexual mores played a role in the 
East German confrontation with Nazi atrocities at all.  While it is true that the lack of an 
unfettered forum for public debate in the GDR did not allow for the same kind of 
memory discourse that took place in West German civil society during the 1950s, this 
does not mean that the legacy of National Socialist attitudes towards marriage and 
sexuality were unquestioningly perpetuated by East German officials and citizens or that 
they played no role in East German memory construction at all.  National Socialist 
policies and their afterlife did in fact have a role in the Vergangenheitsbewältigung of the 
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GDR, and this was in part because of potentially similar motivations behind the 
articulation of “conservative” sexual mores on both sides of the German Cold War 
divide.122 
Herzog’s contribution is nonetheless an extremely important one, however, since 
the sex-positive aspects of the East German polity have at times been forgotten or 
ignored, particularly during the initial phase of the Wende.123  Kurt Starke, a man who 
would become one of East Germany’s foremost researchers on sexuality during the 
decade leading up to and following the Wende, appears to have suffered from such 
amnesia: 
 
it is no surprise that the 1950s and at least the first half of the 1960s in East 
Germany have been remembered by contemporaries as the dark ages of an 
enforced fixation with conventionality and respectability. […] According to 
Starke, “[t]here was in that era “no public discussion about many questions 
related to sexuality” but rather a “self-disciplining morality, unfriendly to 
pleasure, chaste … ascetic or pseudo-ascetic, uptight, interventionist.”124 
 
 
Herzog does not reject Starke’s contention outright, but instead makes the case for a more 
nuanced view of the sexual climate during this period of East German history: 
 
What needs to be grasped […] is the double quality of the messages sent about 
sex in the 1950s and 1960s.  There was in numerous texts, in all the sympathy 
expressed for the inevitability of premarital sex, nonetheless a strongly normative 
expectation that this sex would be entered into in the context of a relationship 
heading toward marriage and that ideally sexual relations would not start until 
“psychological maturity” had been attained.125 
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 Michel Foucault’s notion that the ostensible repression of and secrecy 
surrounding the discussion of sexuality in modern Europe actually served to mask the 
expansion of sexual discourse has been very influential for historians of sexuality.  His 
refutation of the repressive hypothesis, however, cannot be understood as a rejection of 
the notion of repression in toto.  Instead, Foucault reinscribed repressive tendencies into a 
larger dynamic that simultaneously perpetuated and undermined the status of the sexual 
as a secret or taboo.126  This proliferation was largely the work of experts who found the 
pursuit of scientific inquiry about sexuality a useful way to lay claim to their share of the 
public sphere in liberal, bourgeois polities as part of the larger project of constructing 
welfare states and rhetorics of biopolitical knowledge and practice.  Through an 
examination of the development and propagation of normative and alternative 
conceptions of sexual morality, my dissertation explores the factors that enabled or 
inhibited the proliferation of sexual discourse in the GDR. 
One of the questions that this dissertation seeks to answer from the vantage point 
of the East German case is whether there was a necessary correlation between biopolitics, 
democratic forms of political participation, and the rule of law when it came to 
conceptions of sexual morality and married life.  Biopolitics was a privileged locus for 
sexual discourse in the GDR given the lack of an organized sex reform movement.  
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Because of the persistent doubts about East Germany’s political legitimacy and ongoing 
demographic viability, biopolitical measures provided a vital tool for renegotiating the 
relationship between individual bodies, reproductive bodies (Gattungskörper), and the 
national body (Volkskörper).127 
Edward Ross Dickinson argues against a new master narrative of German history 
that all too easily conflates German biopolitics with totalitarianism and that characterizes 
biopolitics primarily as a “project of elites and experts” rather than a “complex social and 
cultural transformation.”128  In doing so, he echoes Laura Engelstein in challenging the 
elective affinity between biopolitics and authoritarian polities.  She contends that despite 
the existence of elites who were sympathetic to “Western” ideas, it was very difficult for 
Foucaultian “regimes of knowledge” to take hold in Russia under a Tsarist regime that 
was averse to upholding the rule of law.  Engelstein identifies an implicit teleology in 
Foucault’s analysis of biopolitics—namely, that its emergence was contingent upon a 
progression from “absolutism to enlightened despotism to liberalism.”129  Dickinson 
sounds very much like Engelstein when he characterizes democracy as uniquely 
conducive to biopolitical endeavors since “scientific ‘fact’ is democracy’s substitute for 
revealed truth, expertise its substitute for authority.  The age of democracy is the age of 
professionalization.”130 
 Unlike Engelstein, however, Dickinson emphasizes the biopolitical potentialities 
of both democratic and authoritarian forms of governance.  But he ultimately concludes 
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that democracy was uniquely suited to provide the tools not only for solidifying the 
hegemony of professional expertise, but also for challenging it through “participatory 
biopolitics.”  He argues that “at the level of interactions with actual persons and social 
groups, public policy often takes on a life of its own, at least partially independent of the 
fantasies of technocrats.”131  Dickinson is thus situating himself within the strand of 
historiography devoted to questioning the overlap between the pretension to social 
discipline and its realization.132  Also influential for his analysis is Konrad Jarausch’s 
claim that what distinguished the East German “welfare dictatorship” (Fürsorgediktatur) 
from its antecedents before 1933 was the greater level of “individual participation” that 
was possible under the Kaiserreich and during the Weimar Republic.133  For both 
Dickinson and Jarausch, biopolitics “from below” was a distinctive feature of 
participatory democracy that persisted from the imperial period to the Federal Republic 
despite the triumph of antidemocratic forces under Nazism.  This continuity was 
predicated upon the popular expectation under democratic systems that the welfare state 
would confer not only entitlements, but also rights. 
 Dickinson’s model thus posits a stark dichotomy between the “participatory 
biopolitics” of democracies and the top-down approach of authoritarian biopolitics 
precisely because “[t]he decisive differences [during different periods of modern German 
history] are to be found not so much in biopolitical discourse as in issues of institutional 
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structure, regime form, and citizenship.”134  While he acknowledges the importance of 
the tactical polyvalence of discourse, to borrow a Foucaultian term, in the “microphysics” 
of power, he urges historians of Germany not to overlook the significance of the role of 
the state as a guiding force at the macro level.135  Given the prioritization of 
governmental form over biopolitical content in his analysis, Dickinson does not quite 
know what to do with the GDR.  At one point, he explicitly equates the biopolitical 
approaches of the GDR and Nazi Germany because of the authoritarian nature of their 
political structures.  He acknowledges that the Nazi and East German regimes sought to 
motivate their populace through biopolitical incentives, but he insists that “such 
mobilization is not necessarily democratic in nature.”136   
For Daphne Hahn, the Foucaultian understanding of biopolitics holds 
considerable explanatory power for the GDR because even without “democratic” 
mobilization, its pronatalist policies moved from largely repressive measures, such as 
strict limits on the availability of contraception and abortion, to policies that encouraged 
self-regulation and self-monitoring, such as improved access to birth control, pregnancy 
termination, and sexual counseling.  From her perspective, the distinction between 
democratic and authoritarian polities is immaterial because East German biopolitics was 
part of a continuum of modernization that persisted despite the different political 
orientations of the Kaiserreich, Weimar Republic, Third Reich, and state socialism.137  
But her reliance upon a monolithic modernization paradigm leaves unexplained the 
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appeal of biopolitical modernization across political caesuras and the ways in which the 
targets of biopolitical intervention experienced such policies under different regimes. 
 It is my contention that the GDR is largely absent from Dickinson’s 
reconceptualization of the modern German historical master narrative because it does not 
fit very well into his dichotomization of democratic versus authoritarian biopolitical 
regimes.  Even though the SED assumed the congruence of governmental, societal, and 
individual interests, it provided avenues of political participation that enabled ordinary 
citizens to assert claims upon the state when these interests were discordant.  As in 
democratic polities, participatory biopolitics in the GDR impeded a top-down imposition 
of unchanging biopolitical imperatives.  East Germany and other non-democratic states 
were far from immune to the unintended consequences and thwarted implementation of 
policies decreed by centralized authorities.  Timm, who like Dickinson emphasizes 
continuity over discontinuity in biopolitical imperatives before and after 1933 and 1945, 
acknowledges that “even in a socialist dictatorship, the definition of sexual duties 
entailed both restrictive government policies and a sensitivity to the desires of the 
population.”138 
Biopolitics “from below” was alive and well in the GDR in the form of recurrent 
challenges from both ordinary citizens and professional experts to evolving East German 
norms regarding marriage and sexuality.  Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate that one such 
challenge took the form of a psychiatrist’s campaign to defend the legitimacy of his 
“bourgeois” professional expertise as he campaigned to decriminalize homosexuality.  In 
Chapters 4 and 5, I explore the ways in which new regulations for marriage and divorce 
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provoked a flurry of protest from ordinary citizens who rejected the new measures or who 
tried to instrumentalize them for their own ends.  And in Chapter 6, I delve into the 
intragovernmental disputes regarding the valence of medicine versus ideology in 
imparting socialist familial norms and sexual morality amidst the proliferation of 
relationship counseling centers in the GDR during the mid-1960s.  A major impetus 
behind the SED’s unflagging devotion to the concept of marital counseling was precisely 
the desire to harness professional findings in the interest of imparting a “socialist” 
imprimatur to family life.  As in democratic polities, the marshaling of expertise for 
political ends did not occur without friction or ambivalence.  But contrary to Dickinson’s 
characterization of the unique affinity between democracy and scientifically 
demonstrable facts, by the 1960s there was a strong relationship between SED 
governance and expert knowledge, even if that knowledge was not infrequently distorted 
or viewed through rose-colored glasses. 
 
Chapter Overview 
 There is a dearth of studies of East Germans who did not fit neatly into the 
categories of perpetrators, resisters, or “apolitical” conformists leading lives punctuated 
by varying degrees of Eigen-Sinn.  While nonconformist youth cultures have attracted 
scholarly attention, iconoclastic individuals in the GDR generally have not.  It is for this 
reason that Chapter 2, entitled “Was Rudolf Klimmer the Magnus Hirschfeld of East 
Germany?  Progressive Sexology after Hitler,” is devoted to psychiatrist Rudolf Klimmer 
(1905-1977) and the reception of his ideas in the East German psychiatric and social 
hygienic communities during the 1950s.  Klimmer asserted his authority as a psychiatric 
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expert at a time when the SED and its sympathizers in the medical establishment were 
attacking the very basis of that expertise as a bourgeois relic that needed to be overcome. 
 Klimmer’s efforts to revive the legacy of Magnus Hirschfeld’s research on 
sexuality and advocacy reveal that postwar sex reform did not entirely forsake its 
progressive strand in favor of unmitigated pronatalist fervor after 1945.  But he 
recognized that the failure of the SED to rebuild the institutional basis for progressive sex 
reform that had been decimated by the Nazis meant that he would have to cultivate 
contacts with like-minded individuals in other countries, including contributors to the 
homophile publication Der Kreis and researchers at the Kinsey Institute.  He thus 
demonstrated that the boundary of mid-twentieth-century homophile activism did not end 
at the Cold War divide.  Klimmer’s intermittently successful efforts to promulgate his 
understanding of homosexuality in East German publications reveal the extent to which 
the Nazi scientific legacy and research on both sides of the Iron Curtain influenced the 
discourse on homosexuality in the GDR. 
While Chapter 2 focuses on the scientific and transnational dimensions of 
Klimmer’s professional activities, Chapter 3, entitled “Neither a Disease nor a Crime?  
Contesting the Legal Status of Homosexuality in the Early GDR,” explores the 
ramifications of his thinking for the political and jurisprudential realms in the GDR.  
Josie McLellan maintains that “[h]omosexuality and ‘socialist morality’ were to prove 
difficult bedfellows throughout the lifespan of the East German state.”139  The orthodox 
view was that same-sex sexual conduct, which was little more than yet another 
instantiation of class-based exploitation and decadence in capitalist societies, would 
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invariably dissipate under the salutary influence of Communism.  As this chapter 
demonstrates, however, there was a remarkable heterogeneity of opinion regarding the 
stance of socialist morality on precisely this issue. 
Long before the 1980s, when the SED begrudgingly tolerated circumscribed 
public commemorations of the victimization of homosexuals during the Third Reich, 
Klimmer challenged East German authorities to justify their unwillingness to consider 
homosexuals to have been victims of Nazism.  He was unwilling or unable to deploy a 
discursive register that would make his case for decriminalizing adult male consensual 
homosexual acts intelligible to an audience of officials and experts who—at least judging 
from the SED’s public pronouncements and stated policymaking goals—did not share his 
belief in the inviolability of a private sexual sphere.  But his bricolage of arguments 
ultimately converged with a consensus—however tenuous and unevenly articulated—on 
the part of those deliberating Penal Code reform that at least when it came to private, 
consensual same-sex sexual conduct, the congruence between socialist morality and 
jurisprudence would no longer apply.  In other words, homosexuality needed to be 
countered with moral censure, but the law was not the best vehicle for these purposes 
despite the fact that the main purpose of socialist jurisprudence was supposed to be its 
role in ethical education.  
Klimmer’s influence in the process of Penal Code reform went largely 
unacknowledged.  Thus the embers of progressive sex reform could remain viable in the 
GDR as long as they were invisible.  But this does not detract from the fact that even as 
the SED faced a barrage of criticism from the West for failing to establish a Rechtsstaat 
that would uphold the rule of law and refrain from excessive incursions on the part of the 
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state in the private sphere, it nonetheless repealed § 175 in 1968.  The GDR thereby 
became a sexual Rechtsstaat that explicitly recognized the existence of a private realm 
that should remain beyond the reach of the law. 
 This noninterventionist stance did not extend to the codification of East German 
marital law in the Marriage Ordinance of 1955, which I analyze in Chapter 4, “The 
Unintended Consequences of Gender Equality: Premarital Sexuality and the Age of 
Marital Consent in the 1950s.”  In What Difference Does a Husband Make? Women and 
Marital Status in Nazi and Postwar Germany, Elizabeth Heineman is intrigued by the 
fact that, in her conversations with citizens of the former German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) in the early 1990s, the term “women standing alone” (i.e., women who had lost 
their husbands during the Second World War and women who could not find husbands 
due to the gendered demographic imbalance following the war) “did not trigger an 
association with the postwar period or with a particular generation of women left single 
by the [Second World W]ar.”  Such an association was, by contrast, very common among 
her West German interlocutors.  Heineman attributes this discrepancy at least in part to 
the fact that “topics that had left mountains of records in West Germany, like the status of 
unwed mothers and war widows’ pensions, seemed to have been nonissues in the East,” 
at least as far as available documents seemed to indicate.140  She later qualifies this 
statement by saying that the SED sought to transform marital status into a less salient 
marker of difference as it tried to convince both single and married mothers to seek 
fulfillment in motherhood, workforce participation, and political activism.  The SED’s 
efforts notwithstanding, “[a]t least through the 1950s, the experiential divide between 
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married and single women remained firm.”141  There is in fact quite an elaborate archival 
paper trail revealing intense contestation of the parameters of normative marital sexuality 
in the early years of the GDR.  While it is true that media outlets in the GDR did not 
bewail the fate of “women standing alone” in the way that their counterparts in West 
Germany did, this does not mean that marital status had lost its significance as a marker 
of social difference for East German women in particular.142 
Contemporary observers and historians alike have castigated the SED for having 
failed to live up to its self-proclaimed ideal of gender equality particularly in the domain 
of familial life.  The codification of parity in the age of marital consent for men and 
women, however, was an important instance in which the SED sought to put the weight 
of the law behind the promise of equality and found itself confronted with an array of 
unintended consequences.  The Ordinance augmented the age of marital consent for 
women to eighteen, thereby doing away with the practice whereby adult men could marry 
female minors who were at least sixteen years of age.  This was supposed to be a decisive 
move in the direction of gender equality, since women could now presumably make 
informed decisions to embark upon matrimony as fully-fledged adults without being 
subjected to manipulation on the part of parents and would-be spouses.  But the success 
of this initiative was predicated upon a moral consensus between state and citizenry that 
simply did not exist.  While the law stipulated that the stigmatization of unwed 
motherhood had been consigned to the historical dustbin, the experience of many East 
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Germans—especially in rural areas—strongly suggested otherwise.  Even as officials 
sought to downplay the extent of dissatisfaction with this new provision, they could not 
entirely ignore the entreaties of pregnant underage women who could not understand why 
the state was preventing them from doing the morally correct thing by getting married.  
Eventually, popular pressure led to a slight relaxation in the state’s unwillingness to grant 
exceptions to the age of nubility. 
The SED elicited even greater levels of popular incredulity regarding its moral 
priorities when it also introduced no-fault divorce in the Marriage Ordinance of 1955, 
which is the subject of Chapter 5, “Making Way for “Winged Eros?” Divorce Law 
Reform and Marital Infidelity in the 1950s.”  Instead of providing couples with an 
incentive to devise spurious rationales so as to abide by a fixed set of criteria for divorce, 
the new law exhorted judges to conduct a thorough investigation—with the help of 
neighbors and socialist collectives—as to whether the extent of discord warranted the 
dissolution of a marital union.  In practice, this meant that adultery no longer constituted 
automatic grounds for divorce.  Aging wives resented a judicial system that seemingly 
facilitated the desire of their husbands to acquire younger spouses.  To add insult to 
injury, the new law restricted alimony payments in most instances to two years and 
limited their disbursement to women who, in the estimation of the court, were 
temporarily unable to secure their own livelihood.  Real-existing socialism had done 
away with the conception of marriage as a source of sustenance (Versorgungsehe) in 
which crass material considerations outweighed the bonds of companionate love.  This 
meant that such husbands could escape both moral censure and financial burdens despite 
their unconscionable conduct. 
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 Betts has identified the emergence of a sensibility that the “personal is political” 
in the GDR in the 1960s.  But the Marriage Ordinance unwittingly provided an 
opportunity for East Germans—and in particular East German women—to express this 
sentiment already in the 1950s.  Women’s resentment of the state’s apparent moral 
agnosticism extended to their skepticism regarding the seemingly arbitrary and parochial 
administration of justice by judges who could not be counted upon to uphold popular 
moral standards.  As in the case of the age of marital consent, the SED paradoxically 
provided the impetus for the emergence of a “cultural language” of sex that was not 
contingent upon an unfettered public sphere or the commercialization of carnality that 
fostered the salience of such a “cultural language” in the West.  Yet courts proved to be 
remarkably skeptical regarding the efficacy of “societal forces” like neighborhood and 
workplace collectives in imbuing marital life with a socialist imprimatur.  As in the case 
of legal proscriptions on homosexual conduct and the political valence of relationship 
counseling, the revision of marriage law forced the SED to confront the limits of 
socialism’s much vaunted ability to exert an educational influence. 
 Having recognized that socialist pedagogy regarding the family could not rely 
upon legal reforms and rhetorical exhortations alone, the SED stipulated the creation of a 
widespread network of relationship counseling centers in the new Family Law Code of 
1965.  Whereas the preceding chapters concentrate primarily on the law as a vehicle for 
contesting sexual mores, Chapter 6, entitled “A Palimpsest of the Weimar Sex Reform 
Movement?  Relationship Counseling During the 1960s,” looks to a different forum for 
interaction between the state and its citizenry.  While the “cultural language” of sex that 
emerged in response to the Marriage Ordinance of 1955 was largely limited to the realm 
 
 59 
of Eingaben, the establishment of a widespread network of relationship counseling 
centers resulted in the proliferation of this “cultural language” in the semi-public domain 
of the counseling session.  What Greg Eghigian calls the “psychologization of the 
socialist self,” which took root in the SED beginning in the late 1950s, led officials to 
recognize the advisability of relying upon expert knowledge to ensure the efflorescence 
of “socialist” familial mores that were apparently not emerging on their own.143  After 
having largely ignored the decimation of the institutional basis for progressive sex reform 
for two decades, the SED was now poised to revive one of the sex reform movement’s 
signature legacies.  Despite the regime’s demographic concerns, pronatalist sentiments 
were remarkably absent from the discussion of these centers.   
But the regime was counting on the eleemosynary inclinations of unpaid 
counselors and underfunded local government agencies to establish a viable network of 
counseling and instead found itself confronted with bureaucratic insubordination or 
indifference.  And like the visitors to Weimar-era counseling centers, East Germans 
wanted to receive counseling on their own terms.  Just as East Germans doubted the 
ability of judges to abide by socialist moral tenets in an impartial fashion, they were 
reluctant to accord their trust to the vast majority of sexual counseling centers despite 
assertions by several historians to the contrary.  Indeed, the most popular centers were 
those devoted to the distribution of contraception and sexual counseling.  This was ironic 
given experts’ frequent lamentations regarding the populace’s supposed inability to 
overcome its prudish inhibitions regarding sexuality.  Thus an institution that was 
supposed to espouse a view of socialist familial life that did not place undue importance 
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upon sexuality actually served to reinforce the importance of sexual satisfaction to 
marital harmony.  Since medical experts were much better suited to satisfy the demand 
for sexual counseling, judicial counselors resented the populace’s apparent rejection of 
socialist ideology as a panacea for problems in the intimate realm.  As in the case of the 
decriminalization of homosexuality, policymakers ultimately conceded—however 
begrudgingly—that medical expertise was a necessary complement to ideological 
exhortations and jurisprudential interventions in attaining an evolving ideal of “socialist” 
familial and sexual life. 
 A theme that informs each of these chapters is the advisability of moving beyond 
what Josie McLellan characterizes as the dichotomy between romance and repression that 
has become entrenched in the historiography of East German sexuality.144  This 
bifurcation warrants further elaboration than McLellan provides.  If one views the GDR 
as having been a totalitarian polity in which invidious governmental influence was all-
pervasive and rendered East German society a diffident, somber, and undifferentiated 
mass, then it follows that even the most intimate aspects of private and familial life could 
not escape the opprobrium of Communist repression.  But there is also a different version 
of the repression paradigm in which the sources of sexual prudishness were multivalent 
as officials and citizens built a tenuous but nonetheless lasting “coalition of decency” 
based upon a commonly held zeal for philistinism.  Far from alienating the East German 
populace, the government’s deployment of morally repressive measures provided a basis 
for finding common ground even when consensus regarding more conventionally 
“political” convictions remained elusive. 
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The romance model can also be cast in a way that provides a more or less 
sympathetic view of East German governance.  Particularly from the 1970s onwards, as 
Herzog demonstrates, publications that received the imprimatur of governmental 
approval proclaimed that socialism was especially conducive to the attainment of sexual 
pleasure.  During the Wende, many West Germans believed that sexual activity offered 
one of the few forms of diversion from East Germans’ humdrum and disconsolate daily 
lives.  One can also bring these two perspectives into harmony with one another by 
noting that the liberalization of sexual attitudes and behaviors from below increasingly 
met with approbation from above, Dickinson’s doubts about the possibilities for 
democratic participation in authoritarian biopolitical regimes notwithstanding. 
 But however much Herzog points to the valorization of sexual fulfillment in the 
GDR, her qualification of East Germany’s trajectory as a sexual “evolution” rather than a 
“revolution” like that of West Germany reveals that even in the romance paradigm, 
sexual liberalization under authoritarian conditions had its limits.145  Although McLellan 
believes that the emancipationist tendencies in the GDR warrant a revolutionary rather 
than evolutionary designation, she also qualifies her endorsement of the liberatory 
tendencies in the evolution of East German sexual mores.  More specifically, she 
contends that everyday experience mattered more than discourse in a polity with severely 
curtailed opportunities for the public exchange of ideas.146  This insight certainly has 
merit, but McLellan does not explain how it relates to the vibrant historiographical debate 
that took place during the 1990s about the primacy of experience or discourse in 
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historical inquiry.147  Whether in the form of Klimmer’s campaign to decriminalize 
homosexuality, popular discontent regarding new marital consent and divorce provisions, 
or the public’s uneven acceptance of state-run relationship counseling, discursive 
interventions from below played a decisive role in accelerating or impeding the rate and 
nature of change in legislative reform, policy implementation, and official rhetoric 
regarding sexuality.  
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CHAPTER 2.  WAS RUDOLF KLIMMER THE MAGNUS HIRSCHFELD OF 
EAST GERMANY?  PROGRESSIVE SEXOLOGY AFTER HITLER 
 
For many scholars who have been inspired by the formidable intellectual 
framework established by Michel Foucault, the “‘making of the modern homosexual’” 
during the nineteenth century entailed the transformation of sexual deviance from a 
category denoted by acts to a defining characteristic—if not the defining characteristic—
of personal identity.1  This was part of a larger process that unfolded during the 
nineteenth century in which a scientifically informed understanding of sexuality became 
the linchpin of a new form of “biopower” that affirmed boundaries between the normal 
and the abnormal by means of moral, medical, and legal criteria.  According to one 
particularly influential strand of Foucault-inspired interpretation, the exercise of 
biopower was devoted towards the punitive or at the very least judgmental ends of social 
discipline.2 
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Even when the wielders of biopower harbored pretensions of social control, 
however, they did not necessarily succeed in wielding such authority in practice.  There 
are numerous ways in which scholars have questioned the seeming impregnability of the 
quest for societal uniformity and the stigmatization of deviance.  Harry Oosterhuis, for 
instance, demonstrates how the delineation of homosexual identity was not solely a top-
down process.  Instead, homosexual research subjects and patients made decisive 
contributions to the process of defining homosexual identity by divulging their own 
understanding of their sexual experiences and feelings.  Rather than suppressing these 
viewpoints in the interest of maintaining a patina of dispassionate professional expertise, 
pioneering sexologists such as Richard von Krafft-Ebing (1840-1902) allowed 
homosexuals’ voices to emerge in their own writings.3 
Others have challenged the hegemonic pretensions of biopolitical potentialities by 
shifting their analytical focus away from scientific endeavor in general and sexology in 
particular.  Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick points to the “limitations in thinking of a unitary 
homosexuality rather than ‘overlapping, contradictory, and conflictual definitional 
forces,’” and David Halperin follows her lead in positing the existence of a genealogy of 
different kinds of “pre-homosexual” tropes and discourses that predated, influenced, and 
in some instances coexisted with the “modern” category of homosexuality.  George 
Chauncey, John Howard, Matt Cook, and Matt Houlbrook call into question the timing, 
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or indeed the very existence, of a shift from behavior to identity in the crystallization of 
the homosexual by pointing to the uneven unfolding of that subject position in urban and 
rural Anglo-American historical contexts.4 
 Barry Reay emerges from this historiographical thicket with potentially 
contradictory injunctions.  On the one hand, he argues that “the most useful sexual 
histories are those that provide depth of context without either assuming sexual identity 
or anticipating its complete absence; and without forcing taxonomies.”  He worries that 
Halperin’s genealogical heuristic “risks masking the multiplicity of homosexualities 
[and] the complexity and blurring of acts and identities” that result from such 
multiplicity.  Drawing upon the work of Valerie Traub, Reay instead calls for a history in 
which fragmentary and dissenting “‘voices and the histories they articulate [come] 
together and [fall] apart, like the fractured images of a rotating kaleidoscope.’”  In doing 
so, however, he ignores the ways in which the elements of Halperin’s “grand narrative of 
homosexual making” provide a vital if not exhaustive set of discursive tools for 
understanding the constitutive fractures of homosexual identity that Reay endeavors to 
reveal.5 
                                                 
4 Barry Reay, “Writing the Modern Histories of Homosexual England,” The Historical Journal 52, no. 1 
(2009), 213-233, here 213-214, 216.  Reay’s account draws upon Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of 
the Closet (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); David M. Halperin, How to Do the History of 
Homosexuality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); George Chauncey, Gay New York: Gender, 
Urban Culture, and the Making of the Gay Male World (New York: Basic Books, 1994); John Howard, 
Men Like That: A Southern Queer History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Matt Cook, 
London and the Culture of Homosexuality, 1885-1914 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); 
Matt Houlbrook, Queer London: Perils and Pleasures in the Sexual Metropolis, 1918-1957 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
5 Reay, “Writing the Modern Histories of Homosexual England,” 216-217, 233; Valerie Traub, “The 
Present Future of Lesbian Historiography,” in A Companion to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and 




Historical narratives about the evolution of biopower in the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) and Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) are still very much works in 
progress.  Atina Grossmann was a pioneer in this regard.  In discussing the unfavorable 
climate for progressive German sex reform after 1945, Atina Grossmann maintains that 
 
[t]he Weimar “motherhood-eugenics consensus,” which stressed the importance 
of fertility regulation and heterosexual intimacy leading to healthy offspring and 
stable marriages, remained.  Lost, however, was the sense that heterosexual 
satisfaction, family stability, and eugenic health were also tied to abortion and 
homosexual rights or sex counseling for adolescents.6 
 
 
According to Grossmann, this “sea change in politics and terminology [was] impelled by 
both the destruction of German sex reform and Stalinist repression.”7  More recently, 
scholars have investigated the evolution of biopolitics around the fulcrum of 1945 
through the lenses of population politics (Bevölkerungspolitik), sterilization, and the 
remarkably resilient characterization of deviance as “asociality.”8 
This chapter investigates the extent to which the Nazis’ murderous 
instrumentalization of biopower and the vagaries of denazification affected the valence of 
                                                 
6 Atina Grossmann, Reforming Sex: The German Movement for Birth Control and Abortion Reform (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 209, 197; Christian Schäfer, “Widernatürliche Unzucht” (§§ 175, 
175a, 175b, 182 a.F. StGB): Reformdiskussion und Gesetzgebung seit 1945 (Berlin: Berliner 
Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2006), 70.  An argument akin to Grossmann’s about the conservative tenor of 
postwar sex reform, albeit with reference only to homosexual activism, is made by Schäfer, 
Widernatürliche Unzucht, 70 and David S. Churchill, “Transnationalism and Homophile Political Culture 
in the Postwar Decades,” GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 15, no. 1 (2009), 31-66, here 31-32. 
7 Grossmann, Reforming Sex, 188. 
8 Annette F. Timm, The Politics of Fertility in Twentieth-Century Berlin (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 253; Henning Tümmers, Anerkennungskämpfe: Die Nachgeschichte der 
nationalsozialistischen Zwangssterilisationen in der Bundesrepublik (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2011); Stefanie 
Westermann, Verschwiegenes Leid: Der Umgang mit den NS-Zwangssterilisationen in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland (Cologne: Böhlau, 2010); Sven Korzilius, "Asoziale" und "Parasiten" im Recht der SBZ/DDR: 
Randgruppen im Sozialismus zwischen Repression und Ausgrenzung (Cologne: Böhlau, 2005); Matthias 
Zeng, “Asoziale” in der DDR: Transformationen einer moralischen Kategorie (Münster: LIT, 2000).  
While Timm echoes Grossmann in chronicling the decline of “progressive” sex reform after 1945, she also 
warns against reifying a clear dichotomy between “progressive” and “reactionary” tendencies in sex reform 
during the Weimar era. 
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progressive sexology in the scientific discourse on homosexuality in the GDR.  From the 
time of its emergence in the nineteenth century, sexology “held almost as precarious a 
position as homosexuality before the law” because of the perceived incommensurability 
of the scientific study of sexuality with prevailing standards of decency and propriety.9  
In seeking to place sexology on a solid footing after the Second World War, psychiatrist 
Dr. Rudolf Klimmer (1905-1977) encountered a new set of challenges, since key voices 
within the Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, or SED) 
were calling into question not just his focus on homosexuality but also the validity of the 
“bourgeois” psychological sciences more generally.  
While I acknowledge the salience of the “motherhood-eugenics consensus” in the 
postwar era, I contend that National Socialism and Stalinist Communism did not entirely 
extinguish the flame of “progressive” sex reform.  Its embers lived on in the form of 
individuals like Klimmer, who perpetuated the legacy of prewar sexology and activism 
against § 175, the law proscribing consensual same-sex sexual acts among men, in a 
dramatically transformed sociopolitical landscape.  His situatedness within a 
transnational network of scientists and homophile activists influenced the ways in which 
elements of biopower, and the concept of homosexuality itself, fractured or strengthened 
as a result of escalating Cold War tensions in the context of the Soviet Occupation Zone 
(Sowjetische Besatzungszone, or SBZ) and nascent GDR.  This chapter explores the 
degree to which Klimmer’s ideas resonated with his scientific colleagues, while Chapter 
                                                 
9 Joseph Bristow, “Symonds’s History, Ellis’s Heredity: Sexual Inversion,” in Sexology in Culture, 79-99, 
here 95; Lesley A. Hall, “Feminist Reconfigurations of Heterosexuality in the 1920’s,” in Sexology in 
Culture, 135-149, here 136. 
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3 focuses on the ramifications of Klimmer’s activism for the protracted process of East 
German Penal Code reform. 
When Klimmer’s aspirations met with increasing opposition during the late 1940s 
and 1950s, his longstanding if clandestine participation in a transnational homophile 
network provided him with an emancipatory outlet that transcended the Cold War divide.  
Through the network of homophile activism, Klimmer could become a “citizen of the 
world” without leaving East Germany.10  In her recent study of the International 
Committee for Sexual Equality (ICSE), the foremost international homophile 
organization of the 1950s, Leila Rupp argues that 
 
[d]espite its global intentions, the ICSE did not encompass countries outside 
Europe west of the Iron Curtain and the United States, although correspondence 
did come in from countries on other continents. […] Because the ICSE relied on 
existing homophile groups to affiliate, there was little way to reach beyond the 
boundaries of the Euroamerican world.11 
 
 
Rupp acknowledges the activism of East Germans devoted to the cause of 
homosexual emancipation in the GDR.12  And it is true that the political climate in the 
GDR was not conducive to the establishment of homophile groups, which precluded East 
Germans’ formal participation in the activities of the ICSE.  But transnational 
homosexual reform activism was not limited to group-level engagement with the ICSE.  
                                                 
10 Schwules Archiv und Museum Berlin (hereafter SchA), Klimmer Nachlass (hereafter Klimmer NL), 
folder: Briefwechsel Dr. Klimmer + Originaltext der Grabrede für Dr. Rudolf Klimmer anläßlich der 
Urnenbeisetzung in Dresden (hereafter Briefwechsel/Grabrede), letter from Otto Andree, Leipzig, to Jim 
Steakley, March 19, 1980.  Andree had delivered the oration at Klimmer’s funeral in 1977. 
11 Leila J. Rupp, “The Persistence of Transnational Organizing: The Case of the Homophile Movement,” 
American Historical Review 116, no. 4 (October 2011), 1014-1039, here 1022. 
12 Rupp, “The Persistence of Transnational Organizing,” 1022.  There was at least one correspondent of 
unspecified nationality who was based in East Berlin and who submitted articles for publication in an 




As Klimmer’s involvement on an individual basis with the homophile periodical Der 
Kreis and the Kinsey Institute demonstrates, transnational homophile and sexological 
networks did not necessarily stop at the Iron Curtain. 
Klimmer made no secret of his aspiration to become the Magnus Hirschfeld 
(1868-1935) of East Germany.13  He remembered having “enthusiastically followed [Dr.] 
Hirschfeld’s work until the Nazis came to power and its development was interrupted.”  
Indeed, he had hoped to work at Hirschfeld’s Institute for Sexual Research in Berlin and 
tried to establish a sexological institute of his own in the GDR.14  His affinity for 
Hirschfeld’s legacy was not unique, since “[i]n many ways the European and American 
gay movements after the Second World War took up the cause of Hirschfeld’s 
[Scientific-Humanitarian] Committee: the striving of a minority for equal rights.”15  But 
was it even possible for a “Magnus Hirschfeld” to exist in either Germany after the Third 
Reich? 
                                                 
13 Schäfer, Widernatürliche Unzucht, 125-126; James D. Steakley, “Gays under Socialism: Male 
Homosexuality in the German Democratic Republic,” Body Politic 29 (December 1976/January 1977), 15-
18, here 15; Gudrun von Kowalski, Homosexualität in der DDR: Ein historischer Abriß (Marburg: Verlag 
Arbeiterbewegung und Gesellschaftswissenschaft, 1987), 24, 77; SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: 
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14 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Sonderdrücke von wissenschaftlichen Arbeiten Dr. Klimmer/Diverse 
Zeitungsartikel über Dr. Rudolf Klimmer (hereafter folder: Sonderdrücke), Thomas Derra, “Sexualforscher 
in der DDR, Interview mit Dr. Rudolf Klimmer, am 11./12. Dez. 1976,” Schwuchtel (Spring 1977), 19-20, 
here 19.  The Institute for Sexual Research, which Hirschfeld founded in 1919, was the first of its kind in 
the world. Nazis ransacked it on May 6, 1933 and immolated its library.  Hirschfeld was out of the country 
on a lecture tour at the time, and he never returned to Germany after the Nazis took power.  He passed 
away in France on May 14, 1935.  For more on Hirschfeld, see Manfred Herzer, Magnus Hirschfeld: Leben 
und Werk eines jüdischen, schwulen und sozialistischen Soziologen, 2nd rev. ed. (Hamburg: 
Männerschwarm Verlag, 2001 [1992]); Elena Mancini, Magnus Hirschfeld and the Quest for Sexual 
Freedom: A History of the First International Sexual Freedom Movement (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010). 
15 Harry Oosterhuis, “Homosexual Emancipation in Germany Before 1933: Two Traditions,” in Harry 
Oosterhuis and Hubert Kennedy, eds., Homosexuality and Male Bonding in Pre-Nazi Germany: The Youth 
Movement, the Gay Movement, and Male Bonding Before Hitler’s Rise (New York: Harrington Park Press, 
1991), 1-28, here 8.  Hirschfeld co-founded the Wissenschaftlich-humanitäres Komitee (Scientific-
Humanitarian Committee, or WhK) in 1897. 
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Klimmer’s attempt to establish his own Institute for Sexual Research in 1949 met 
with the following response: 
 
Before we can express an opinion about your proposal to create an Institute for 
Sexual Research, we ask that you provide us with more specific details about 
what you envision its work to entail.  I must inform you now that we would under 
no circumstances agree to a private institute of this sort; only a public institution 
would be considered.16 
 
 
This did not constitute an outright rejection of Klimmer’s request, since a public Institute 
for Sexual Research would have been preferable to Klimmer than no institute at all.  He 
was thus more than willing to oblige in providing “more specific details”: 
 
The importance of founding an Institute for Sexual Research can be summed up 
succinctly in one sentence.  The hardiness of a people manifests itself above all in 
its sexuality.  The great political importance of this institute arises from the fact 
that when the Nazis came to power, they utterly destroyed the institute that had 
existed in Berlin.  Sexuality is a particularly prominent and socially important 
drive.  Above all the social, and not just an individual, sense of personhood is 
produced in the sexual domain.  Sexuality has thus from time immemorial been 
inescapable and of particular importance.17 
 
 
Klimmer’s rhetorical strategy was designed to appeal to the SED’s antifascist 
stance, in that he saw the re-establishment of an institution devoted to sexual research as 
a way to rectify Nazi injustice.  It was, however, also inflected by a eugenic sensibility, in 
that he appealed to concerns that transcended political affiliation about the “hardiness” of 
the German people.  But he was also offering a challenge to the reification of economic 
determinism in socialist thought when he highlighted the constitutive role of sexuality in 
                                                 
16 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Schriftwechsel Dienststellen (hereafter DS), Behörden, Dr. med. Rudolf 
Klimmer, 1947-1958, letter from Stoletzky, Ministerium für Arbeit und Gesundheitswesen (hereafter 
MfAuG), Berlin, to Rudolf Klimmer, Dresden, December 28, 1949. 
17 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Schriftwechsel DS, Behörden, Dr. med. Rudolf Klimmer, 1947-1958, letter 
from Rudolf Klimmer, Dresden, to Stoletzky, MfAuG, Berlin, February 5, 1950. 
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shaping the “social” and “individual” “sense of personhood.”  Klimmer thereby linked 
the sexualized body to the body politic and implicitly argued that the sexualized 
embodiment of social belonging was common to both socialist and capitalist societies. 
Klimmer derived inspiration for his planned institute not only from Hirschfeld, 
but also from American sexologist Alfred Kinsey (1894-1956).  Kinsey’s study of the 
sexual lives of 12,000 Americans did not go unnoticed in the GDR; the East German 
periodical Der Nervenarzt (The Neurologist) reported on his findings in 1949.18  Klimmer 
suggested that one of the goals of his institute would be to replicate the expansive scope 
of Kinsey’s research in East Germany since there was no comparably comprehensive data 
for the German populace.  Klimmer’s plans were nothing if not ambitious: 
 
At first we would hold office hours to help patients deal with all sorts of sexual 
problems and to collect “cases” for scientific research.  In this way, money would 
flow into the institute.  Providing forensic expertise to the courts would also yield 
money for the institute.  It would make sense to require the courts to obtain an 
expert opinion from the institute in all cases involving sex crimes.  In order to 
build its scientific research capability, it will be necessary to work closely with 
the local university.  The university should be directed to inform the institute of 
every case of sexological interest.  Later, institute staff members will be able to 
deliver lectures for doctors and jurists at the university.  I perceive another field of 
endeavor in the reform of the Penal Code, to the extent that it occupies itself with 
sexual matters.  Alongside these activities will come the establishment of a 
scientific library, card index, and archive.  Later, when enough resources are 
available, other divisions can be established.  The Institute should be in a position 
to research all of human sex and love life from a biological, anthropological, 
ethnological, cultural, medical, and forensic perspective.  Special divisions will 
later work on emotional and neurological sexual suffering, sexual problems of a 
physiological nature, marital counseling, population policy and eugenic questions, 
counseling for mother and child, and providing expert opinions in forensic matters 
involving sexuality.  Other areas of research will include sexual hygiene, ethics, 
and pedagogy.  We will supplement these areas of focus by devoting ourselves to 
sexual pedagogy, the prevention of venereal disease, the anti-prostitution 
campaign, and the fight against pimps and sexual blackmail.  The institute will 
                                                 
18 That same year, Der Nervenarzt also published Klimmer’s research findings: Rudolf Klimmer, “Ist die 
Homosexualität psychogenetisch oder anlagebedingt?” Der Nervenarzt 20, no. 3 (March 1949), 127-133. 
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eventually employ psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, gynecologists, venereal disease 
specialists, hygiene experts, jurists, ethnologists, sociologists, and social workers 
so as to be able to research these topics in all of their complexity.19 
 
 
Klimmer’s professional credentials and political loyalties notwithstanding, his 
proposed institute never came to fruition because the government’s ideological and 
financial priorities lay elsewhere.20  Klimmer recognized that “[i]n a society with no need 
for sexology […] there was little room for the ‘homosexual,’” and he worried that the 
scientific basis for identifying homosexuals as a discrete sexual minority was threatening 
to erode despite his best efforts to avert such an outcome.21  But “the homosexual” had 
been able to withstand earlier setbacks of a comparable nature.  For example, prominent 
Weimar-era sex reformer Max Hodann’s efforts to revive the World League for Sex 
Reform in the immediate aftermath of the First World War had also met with failure.22  
The efforts of Klimmer’s colleagues in the FRG met with greater success.  West German 
sexologist Hans Giese (1920-1970) founded an Institute for Sexual Research in Kronberg 
im Taunus in 1949, and he joined Hans Bürger-Prinz (1897-1976) in establishing a 
(West) German Association for Sexual Research in 1950.23  Unlike Klimmer, however, 
Giese and Bürger-Prinz took up the mantle of sex reform in part to obfuscate their 
                                                 
19 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Schriftwechsel DS, Behörden, Dr. med. Rudolf Klimmer, 1947-1958, letter 
from Rudolf Klimmer, Dresden, to Stoletzky, MfAuG, Berlin, February 5, 1950. 
20 Derra, “Sexualforscher in der DDR,” 19; Erik N. Jensen, “The Pink Triangle and Political 
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involvement in Nazi-era research on homosexuality and the Nazi Party itself.24  
Moreover, Giese’s Institute for Sexual Research “explicitly rejected identification as a 
group that advocated homosexual rights.”25 
More than ten years later, Klimmer remained frustrated that the antifascist thrust 
of SED policy did not extend to support for restoring the progressive sex reform 
movement that the Nazis had obliterated.  But he also acknowledged that the SED 
leadership was not solely to blame: “Writing about sexual questions is a touchy subject, 
since many people are still quite backward when it comes to their sexual awareness.  
Ascetic, sex-negative tendencies originating in early Christendom are still quite 
prominent today.”  Just as Kinsey had been able to “demonstrate the large discrepancy 
between traditional customs and the actual sexual behavior of the populace,” Klimmer 
would seek to do so in the GDR even without the trappings of an Institute for Sexual 
Research to support his endeavors.26 
  
The Life and Times of Rudolf Klimmer 
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Rudolf Klimmer was born on May 17, 1905 in Dresden.  He received his medical 
training at the Institute of Forensic Medicine at the University of Leipzig, and he 
completed a dissertation entitled “The Forensic Medical Assessment of Sex Crimes 
Involving Children” on August 12, 1930 under the direction of Richard Kockel (1865-
1934), who had founded the institute in 1900.  The dissertation was a study of two men 
who had been convicted of rape with lethal consequences under section 3 of § 176, which 
addressed opposite-sex sexual assault.27 
 On January 1, 1931, Klimmer began his tenure as a medical resident at a clinic in 
the Saxon town of Waldheim, but he returned to the University of Leipzig to work in its 
neurological clinic on May 2, 1932.  That same year, he spent several months as a ship 
doctor as part of an expedition to western Africa; Klimmer would come to enjoy the 
itinerant lifestyle afforded by such journeys around the world both during and after the 
Third Reich.28  On April 15, 1933, just eight days after the Nazi regime passed the Law 
for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service to purge Jews and political 
opponents from its ranks, his tenure as a medical resident in Leipzig came to an end 
because of his involvement with the KPD since 1926.  He was, in his own words, 
“repeatedly threatened with internment in a concentration camp” because of his 
“antifascist stance.”  Despite the recurrent prospect of immurement, he was able to 
complete his training as a psychiatrist at the University of Halle in 1935, after having had 
a brief stint at a Berlin hospital in 1934 and having served as a ship doctor for the 
                                                 
27 Günter Grau, “Ein Leben im Kampf gegen den Paragraphen 175: Zum Wirken des Dresdener Arztes 
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Hamburg-America Line from May 1934 until January 1935.  Klimmer secured 
employment as an attending psychiatrist at a clinic in Bielefeld in June 1936 before 
transferring to a sanatorium in Thüringen on January 15, 1938.  His professional 
responsibilities and political affiliation did not prevent him from being called to serve as 
a medical orderly during the first three weeks of the Second World War.  In 1941, he 
secured a position in Berlin as a researcher at the pharmaceutical company Schering 
A.G., which, according to Günter Grau, served as something of a haven for medical 
professionals who had run afoul of the regime.29  In 1943, he was declared unfit to serve 
in the military.30 
 Klimmer’s political affiliation, however, was not the only factor that altered the 
trajectory of his professional development under Nazi rule.  Grau maintains that Klimmer 
was in a sexual relationship with Karl Hausmann during the 1930s, and that he served 
just over five months in jail in 1938 and a year in prison from 1940 to 1941 for violations 
of § 175.  According to Grau, Klimmer tried to keep his two convictions a secret, both 
before and after 1945.31  Since Klimmer was one of the first people to call upon the East 
German government to recognize gay men as having been victims of National Socialism, 
it is ironic that he felt obliged to keep his own persecution by the Nazi regime a secret.  In 
this regard, however, one could argue that he was merely following the example of 
Hirschfeld, who had scrupulously concealed the extent to which his own sexual 
                                                 
29 Grau, “Ein Leben im Kampf,” 54-56; Derra, “Sexualforscher in der DDR,” 19; SchA, Klimmer NL, 
folder: Schriftwechsel DS, Behörden, Dr. med. Rudolf Klimmer, 1947-1958, letter from Rudolf Klimmer, 
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inclinations served as a catalyst for his efforts to mitigate the legal and societal 
opprobrium faced by homosexuals.32 
While Klimmer claimed that he had not known any gay men who were murdered 
in Nazi concentration camps, he had been acquainted with many who “tried to avoid the 
concentration camps by entering into sham marriages,” adding that he was “not sure what 
later became of these marriages.”33  Klimmer proved to be just as circumspect about his 
own attempts to avoid Nazi persecution as he was about the persecution itself.  On 
August 28, 1943, he married Martha Brumecki, who was purportedly a lesbian, and 
thereby defied his own subsequent warnings about the inadvisability of nuptials for gay 
men.  They divorced in 1948 for what he characterized as “‘political reasons.’”  Although 
Klimmer and Brumecki had been united in their opposition to Hitler during the Third 
Reich, she did not want to leave Frankfurt am Main to join Klimmer in the SBZ once the 
war had ended.  This was not least because she supposedly could not reconcile herself 
with Klimmer’s SED membership and “Communist mindset”—even though this 
“mindset” had already been two decades in the making.34 
No longer encumbered by the threat of persecution at the hands of the Nazis, 
Klimmer left Berlin to establish a psychiatric practice in Dresden during the summer of 
1945.35  He also made use of his training in forensic medicine to serve as an expert 
witness in trials involving alleged perpetrators of sexual offenses.36  In the late 1940s, he 
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assumed the role of lead doctor at the neurological department of a polyclinic in Dresden-
Löbtau, where he established one of the first marital and sexual counseling centers in 
what would become the GDR.  In the wake of the call for the establishment of a dense 
network of marital and family counseling centers (EFBs) in the 1965 Family Law Code, 
he joined forces in 1966 with a judge and a teacher to establish an EFB in Dresden-
Freital, even though his participation in this counseling collective elicited surprise from at 
least one state official.37 
After the dissolution of his marriage, Klimmer lived with his mother until her 
death in 1954, at which point he applied to serve as a doctor for the GDR’s fleet of trade 
ships.  He was informed on August 9, 1954 that he would have to wait until late 1955 to 
assume a position as ship doctor, but that when he did, it would be a lifetime 
appointment.  As Klimmer noted in his diary in 1957, “‘[b]efore the time of my departure 
arrived, my life changed fundamentally once again.  I find myself no longer alone, and 
thus have obtained a leave of absence for just one year.’”38  In the interim, Klimmer had 
met Armin Schreier, who would become his life partner.  Thus the very thing that might 
have prompted Klimmer to leave the GDR for a country with less stringent legal 
regulations—namely, his desire to cultivate sexual and romantic relationships with 
men—was one of the factors that convinced Klimmer to remain in East Germany.  
                                                 
37 It was perhaps an official at the Ministry of Justice who underlined Klimmer’s name and job title and 
wrote an “!” in the margin while reading a letter from the Freital District Court about the new EFB in 
Dresden-Freital; see BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1756—Dresden subsection, letter from 
Bernhardt, Direktor des Kreisgerichts Freital, to MdJ, Berlin, October 21, 1966, unpaginated archival file.  
For more on sexual and relationship counseling in the GDR, see Chapter 6. 
38 Grau, “Ein Leben im Kampf,” 63. 
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Despite the longevity of their relationship, Klimmer sought to shield his sexual 
orientation from the broader public by referring to Schreier as his stepson.39 
In 1977, Klimmer took advantage of a 1964 provision that permitted elderly East 
Germans to visit relatives in the FRG.  He went to Wuppertal for this reason and was 
planning on fulfilling a lifelong dream by traveling to Iceland thereafter.  This dream 
remained unrealized, however, since he had a heart attack en route in Hannover and 
succumbed to a second heart attack in Wuppertal on July 26, 1977.  Even though he 
passed away in the FRG, Klimmer had remained in the GDR not least because of his 
longstanding Communist sympathies and his fervent desire to see the Communist project 
live up to its humanist ideals when it came to the societal and legal status of homosexual 
men. 
 
The Psychological Sciences in the SBZ and Early GDR 
In many respects, denazification was more comprehensive in the SBZ than in the 
western zones of occupation.40  But in the medical realm, denazification in what would 
become the GDR warranted far less propagandistic bombast on the part of Soviet and 
East German officials alike.  Mary Fulbrook has noted that 
                                                 
39 Grau, “Ein Leben im Kampf,” 60, 63.  Numerous authors claim that Klimmer was a closeted gay man, 
including Schäfer, Widernatürliche Unzucht, 125, fn 260; Steakley, “Gays under Socialism,” 15; Kowalski, 
Homosexualität in der DDR, 23, 25; Grau, “Ein Leben im Kampf,” 56.  The sources that I consulted in 
Klimmer’s Nachlass include an undated diary entry from one of Klimmer’s excursions as a ship doctor in 
which he made a euphemistic reference to Schreier as well as an album of homoerotically tinged 
photographs that Klimmer took of young southeast Asian men during another stint overseas.  The basis for 
the assertions regarding Klimmer’s sexual orientation may lie in materials that I did not view, such as a 
1952 Stasi report: Klimmer’s “‘circle of acquaintance consists of well-dressed men,’” but while “‘there is a 
rumor in his neighborhood that he is disposed towards homosexuality (homosexuell veranlagt), this 
allegation could not be confirmed by anyone.’”  Grau, “Ein Leben im Kampf,” 60-61. 
40 Timothy Vogt, Denazification in Soviet-occupied Germany: Brandenburg, 1945-1948 (Cambridge, MA: 




[b]y 1949, fewer than 15 per cent of the medical profession had irrevocably lost 
their positions as a result of denazification measures. [...] [T]he vast majority of 
the medical profession in the Soviet zone and early years of the GDR were 
individuals who had been actively involved in sustaining the Nazi “racial state.”41 
 
 
The limits of denazification were also apparent in the medical specialty of psychiatry.  As 
Greg Eghigian has noted, 
 
One government estimate in 1947 indicated that 48 percent of all psychiatrists and 
neurologists in the Soviet-Occupied Zone had been members of the Nazi Party.  
By June 1947, only around 15 percent had joined the Communist Party.  This 
discrepancy was the source of what proved to be a chronic distrust of East 
German psychiatrists on the part of the ruling SED.42 
 
 
Even though Klimmer’s longtime involvement in Communist politics would have 
absolved him of immediate suspicion regarding his political sympathies, he was seeking 
to assert the validity of his expertise as a psychiatrist during the early years of the GDR in 
a professional environment that questioned the very status of that expertise on ideological 
grounds.43  As Michael Clark and Catherine Crawford observe, “[e]xpertise is not entirely 
relative, but its multiple historical meanings can only be grasped if expertise itself is 
                                                 
41 Mary Fulbrook, The People’s State: East German Society from Hitler to Honecker (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 2005), 203.  See also Sigrid Oehler-Klein and Volker Roelcke, eds., 
Vergangenheitspolitik in der universitären Medizin nach 1945: Institutionelle und individuelle Strategien 
im Umgang mit dem Nationalsozialismus (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2007). 
42 Greg Eghigian, “Was There a Communist Psychiatry?  Politics and East German Psychiatric Care, 1945-
1989,” Harvard Review of Psychiatry 10, no. 6 (2002), 364-368, here 365.  Given the trauma experienced 
by many Germans during the immediate postwar period, the demand for psychotherapeutic services in the 
four zones of occupation was high, and the need for qualified personnel to meet this demand provided 
another disincentive for more thorough denazification.  
43 Greg Eghigian, “The Psychologization of the Socialist Self: East German Forensic Psychology and its 
Deviants, 1945-1975,” German History 22, no. 2 (2004), 181-205, here 184, 186.  Practitioners of such 
disciplines as pedagogy, social work, and economics contested the efficacy and legitimacy of psychological 
expertise during the first two decades of West Germany’s existence as well, albeit for very different 
reasons.  Alexandre Métraux, “Der Methodenstreit und die Amerikanisierung der Psychologie in der 
Bundesrepublik 1950-1970,” in Geschichte der deutschen Psychologie im 20. Jahrhundert, eds. Mitchell G. 
Ash and Ulfried Geuter (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1985), 225-251, here 244-245. 
 
 80 
made the object of historical enquiry, rather than being treated as an absolute standard by 
which to judge the shortcomings and achievements of the past.”44  Gudrun von Kowalski 
postulates that nonnormative sexuality retained the stigma of pathology in the GDR 
precisely because of the incomplete denazification of the East German medical 
profession.  But as she also notes, even when the historical-materialist social scientific 
study of sexuality supplemented the medical model in the GDR during the 1960s, the 
status of homosexuality as a form of “deviance” (Abartigkeit) remained.45  Historical-
materialist analysis predicted the demise of nonnormative sexuality and thus was quite 
compatible with a view of deviance as a disease that could afflict the social body just as 
much as individual bodies. 
However limited in reach the denazification of the medical profession might have 
been, it is important to bear in mind that ideologically conformist doctors coexisted with 
colleagues who professed a devotion to “apolitical humanism” in East Germany.46  For 
Anna-Sabine Ernst, “apolitical humanism” was a manifestation of the belief that the 
objectivity of scientific endeavor placed it above politics, whether of the National 
Socialist or Communist variety.  Klimmer invoked humanism as well, albeit not as a 
cloak for unwelcome political affinities.  Instead, he drew upon a decidedly politicized 
humanism that sought to reconcile universalist rights-based claims with the particularities 
                                                 
44 Catherine Crawford and Michael Clark, “Introduction,” in Legal Medicine in History, eds. Catherine 
Crawford and Michael Clark (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 9-10. 
45 Kowalski, Homosexualität in der DDR, 20, 30-32. 
46 Anna-Sabine Ernst, “Die beste Prophylaxe ist der Sozialismus”: Ärzte und medizinische 
Hochschullehrer in der SBZ/DDR, 1945-1961 (Münster, New York, Munich, and Berlin: Waxmann, 1997), 
267, 275-276.  See also Kristie Macrakis and Dieter Hoffmann, eds., Science under Socialism: East 
Germany in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
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of socialist and capitalist jurisprudence, and he viewed science as the most suitable, albeit 
imperfect, vehicle for attaining this reconciliation.47 
Since many leading practitioners of both East and West German psychotherapy 
had trained or worked at the German Institute for Psychological Research and 
Psychotherapy (commonly known as the Göring Institute), the Institute’s practices 
continued to be influential.48  Klimmer exhorted his colleagues to confront the 
unacknowledged legacy of Nazi-era thought for their own professional opinion regarding 
the status and etiology of homosexuality.  As Dagmar Herzog observes, 
 
one remarkably understudied aspect of Nazi attitudes about homosexuality is the 
conviction articulated that homosexuality was very much a possibility lurking 
within the majority of men, and even a phase that many men literally went 
through.  This perspective, which could have been used for antihomophobic 
purposes, instead was—quite self-reflexively—deployed to fuel the regime’s 
punitive homophobic radicalism.49 
 
In other words, while Nazi researchers invested a lot of effort in determining the 
congenital roots of non-Aryan inferiority, they refuted the primacy of biological 
determinism when it came to homosexuality because of the perceived need to reject the 
“Jewish” scientific legacy of Magnus Hirschfeld and his distinction between 
homosexuality as conduct and homosexuality as identity.  Hirschfeld had deployed the 
                                                 
47 For a discursus on this subject for an earlier era of Soviet history, see Daniel Beer, Renovating Russia: 
The Human Sciences and the Fate of Liberal Modernity, 1880-1930 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2008). 
48 Geoffrey Cocks, Psychotherapy in the Third Reich: The Göring Institute, 2nd ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers, 1997 [1985]), 374; Frank Biess, Homecomings: Returning POWs and the Legacies 
of Defeat in Postwar Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 84.  The Göring Institute 
supplanted the German Psychoanalytic Institute as part of National Socialist coordination, or 
Gleichschaltung, in May 1935. 
49 Dagmar Herzog, “Hubris and Hypocrisy, Incitement and Disavowal: Sexuality and German Fascism,” in 
Sexuality and German Fascism, ed. Dagmar Herzog (New York: Berghahn, 2005) [originally published as 
a special issue of the Journal of the History of Sexuality, 11.1/2 (2002)], 1-21, here 20, fn 57. 
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logic of congenital determinism, after all, to make the case for the status of homosexuals 
as a biologically distinct minority.  The Nazis, by contrast, emphasized the role of social 
construction, as exemplified most vividly by the threat of “seduction,” in the “creation” 
and “curing” of homosexuals, and this thinking proved to be remarkably resilient after 
1945.50  As Frank Biess has noted, this resilience stemmed in no small part from fears 
regarding the sexual proclivities of returning POWs, who had presumably become 
accustomed to masturbation and homosexual conduct after their prolonged exposure to 
all-male environments.51 
Ironically, in their attempt to jettison Hirschfeldian thinking, Göring Institute 
researchers reproduced some of its basic tenets.  In order to support the contention that 
“‘there is no stark either-or, no incurable fateful naturalness” when it came to 
homosexuality, at least some of these scientists instead embraced the notion of 
“‘transitional stages and in-between forms’” that could account for the “appeal” of same-
sex sexual acts to an expansive cross-section of the population.52  Yet Hirschfeld had 
spoken of precisely such “in-between forms” as proof of a broad spectrum of 
congenitally determined variation in gender characteristics and sexual orientation. 
                                                 
50 Beachy, “German Invention of Homosexuality,” 837-838; Dagmar Herzog, Sex after Fascism: Memory 
and Morality in Twentieth-Century Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 34 and 130.  In 
contrast to Herzog, Geoffrey Cocks emphasizes that many Nazi-era psychiatrists, Ministry of Justice 
officials, and Gestapo officers were resolute in their belief that homosexuality was an “incurable hereditary 
defect.”  But Cocks provides support for Herzog’s view when he reveals that the Nazi Criminal Police 
agreed with the Göring Institute that “not all homosexuals were incurable [and that] there was [thus] hope 
that treatment could help to solve the problem.”  He points out that the psychotherapists at the Göring 
Institute proudly claimed to have “cured” 500 men of their homosexuality.  Geoffrey Cocks, “The 
Professionalization of Psychotherapy in Germany, 1928-1949,” in Treating Mind & Body: Essays in the 
History of Science, Professions, and Society under Extreme Conditions (New Brunswick, NJ and London: 
Transaction Publishers, 1998), 31-49, here 46-47. 
51 Biess, Homecomings, 90. 
52 Herzog, Sex after Fascism, 34. 
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The initial, short-lived postwar impulse to rehabilitate Freudianism in the SBZ 
was a reaction to the lingering shadow of the Göring Institute.  Dietfried Müller-
Hegemann (1910-1989) sought to develop a Marxist psychology that was inflected by 
psychoanalysis; indeed, he had gone so far as to praise the “‘dialectical characteristics’” 
of Freudian psychoanalysis.53  But the status of Sigmund Freud and of psychology more 
generally became more precarious during the years leading up to the establishment of the 
GDR, with SED party leader Fred Oelßner bewailing the “miserable phenomenon that is 
psychology” (Elend der Psychologie) in 1948.  Freud’s name became a shorthand for the 
“bourgeois” tendency to privilege psychological and biological factors over societal and 
economic ones in determining human behavior, and indeed for Freudianism’s subversive 
potential to substitute subjective impressions for a more “objective” form of analysis.54  
The rejection of Freudianism represented a disturbing line of continuity with the National 
Socialist era.55  While the explicit anti-Semitic thrust disappeared in East German 
psychotherapists’ antipathy towards Freud, the negative connotation of an undesirable 
fixation on sexuality remained. 
Beginning in 1950, when Stalin declared Pavlov’s theories to be the “sole basis of 
Soviet psychology,” leading practitioners of psychiatry and psychotherapy in the GDR 
                                                 
53 Stefan Busse, Psychologie in der DDR: Die Verteidigung der Wissenschaft und die Formung der 
Subjekte (Weinheim and Basel: Beltz Verlag, 2004), 31. 
54 Busse, Psychologie in der DDR, 27. 
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worked to ensure that the Pavlovian paradigm would take precedence in East German 
psychotherapeutic practice—even erstwhile Freudian enthusiast Müller-Hegemann 
quickly fell into line.56  Pavlovian methods, unlike their supposedly outdated and 
discredited Freudian counterparts, were grounded in a materialist conception of the 
psyche that Soviet professionals and their East German acolytes deemed to be more in 
line with socialist conceptions of personhood.57  At a conference convened on January 
15-16, 1953 in Leipzig, Müller-Hegemann argued that overcoming the supposedly 
imperialist character of Freudian thought was tantamount to transcending the legacy of 
fascism in the profession.  By embracing Pavlov and other strands of Soviet thinking, 
according to Müller-Hegemann’s logic, the GDR would triumph over the FRG as the true 
beacon of progress in research on psychotherapeutic methods.58  Thus, the SED’s 
                                                 
56 Ethan Pollock, Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 8, 10-
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tendency to conflate fascism and postwar Western capitalism in its propaganda was well 
underway in psychotherapeutic circles by 1953.59 
 Psychiatrist Dr. Alexander Mette (1897-1985), a key figure in the Pavlov 
campaign, would come to play a significant role in limiting Klimmer’s ability to espouse 
his conceptualization of homosexuality within East German scientific circles.  Although 
he had worked as a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst in Berlin from 1928 until 1946, Mette 
joined former psychoanalysis proponent Müller-Hegemann in attempting to tailor the 
Soviet-inspired Pavlovian and anti-psychoanalytic turn to East German circumstances.60  
At the 1953 conference, Mette went so far as to accuse psychoanalysts of having 
hindered the development of psychotherapy and to say that he would have embraced 
Pavlov instead of Freud in the 1920s had he been aware of Pavlov’s work at the time.61  
While proclaiming, “‘I believe that I am the only person in this room who was ever a 
member of the International Psychoanalytic Association,’” he did not mention that on 
April 1, 1933, the day of a Nazi-led boycott of Jewish businesses, he had been suspected 
(incorrectly) of being Jewish precisely because of his psychoanalytic practice.62 
One would think that Mette would have more vigorously defended psychoanalysis 
given his knowledge of the stigmatization of Freudian thought and practice by the Nazis.  
A book of Mette’s published in 1934 was banned by the Gestapo in 1935 for its 
                                                 
59 For the logic undergirding East German antifascism, see Alan L. Nothnagle, Building the East German 
Myth: Historical Mythology and Youth Propaganda in the German Democratic Republic, 1945-1989 (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 12. 
60 Bernhardt, “Mit Sigmund Freud und Iwan Petrowitsch Pawlow im Kalten Krieg,” 192; Busse, 
Psychologie in der DDR, 63.  According to Anna-Sabine Ernst, this was not least because German 
scientists were accustomed to having Russian scientists follow their lead rather than the other way around.  
Ernst, Die beste Prophylaxe ist der Sozialismus, 319, 386. 
61 Ernst, Die beste Prophylaxe ist der Sozialismus, 389. 
62 Ernst, Die beste Prophylaxe ist der Sozialismus, 386.  As it turns out, Mette was incorrect on this count; 
fellow conference attendee Walter Hollitscher had also been a member of the Association. 
 
 86 
“‘deleterious tendencies and threat to public security,’” and he was effectively forbidden 
to deliver lectures at the Göring Institute given his left-wing political sensibilities.63  Thus 
Mette had suffered professional setbacks analogous to those endured by Klimmer during 
the Nazi era.  Unlike Klimmer, however, Mette did not become involved in Communist 
politics until he joined the KPD on August 1, 1945.64  And he proved himself to be an 
adept ideological chameleon when official enthusiasm for Pavlov began to wane in 
1957.65  This was due to the fact that even at the height of Pavlovian fervor, some had 
used his name as a cloak for a non-Pavlovian agenda.  As Dr. Wolfram Körner, an 
internist at the Charité Hospital in Berlin during the 1950s, put it, “‘Just because Pavlov’s 
name was on something does not mean that it was actually Pavlovian (Nicht überall wo 
Pawlow draufstand, war auch Pawlow drin).’”66 
Mette had abandoned his psychoanalytic practice to become the Deputy Director 
of the Thüringen State Health Agency in Weimar in July 1946.  He co-founded the 
journal Psychiatrie, Neurologie und medizinische Psychologie (Psychiatry, Neurology, 
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and Medical Psychology) in 1949.67  From 1950 until 1962, Mette was a member of the 
Volkskammer (People’s Chamber).  In 1952 he assumed the position of editor-in-chief at 
the publishing house People and Health (Verlag Volk und Gesundheit).  That same year, 
he began teaching psychotherapy at the Humboldt University in East Berlin, where he 
received a full professorship in 1954.68  Mette’s tentative challenges to East German 
orthodoxy (when contrasted to Klimmer’s far more strident ones) enabled him to reap 
professional rewards despite the SED’s ongoing wariness about the psychological 
sciences.69  Mette’s professional life intersected with Klimmer’s particularly after Mette 
became head of the Department of Science and Education at the Ministry of Health in 
1956.  It was in this capacity that he assessed the suitability for publication of Klimmer’s 
monograph, Die Homosexualität als biologisch-soziologische Zeitfrage (Homosexuality 
as a Biological and Sociological Question of Our Times).  Mette acquired even greater 
influence in governmental circles when he ascended to a seat on the Central Committee 
of the SED from 1958 to 1963.70 
 
                                                 
67 Klimmer published four articles in Psychiatrie, Neurologie und medizinische Psychologie in 1949, 1968, 
1969, and 1972.  During the 1950s, Mette did not accept Klimmer’s submissions about homosexuality from 
a “medical and biological perspective” and the “criminal responsibility of a person committing homosexual 
acts” for publication in the journal.  SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Briefwechsel/Grabrede, draft of Otto 
Andree’s obituary for Rudolf Klimmer that was to appear in Psychiatrie, Neurologie und medizinische 
Psychologie in 1977 or 1978; SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Briefwechsel/Grabrede, Rudolf Klimmer’s 
response to Alexander Mette’s assessment of his manuscript Die Homosexualität, May 2, 1957, 3 of 
document. 
68 Günter Grau, “Im Auftrag der Partei: Versuch einer Reform der strafrechtlichen Bestimmungen zur 
Homosexualität in der DDR 1952,” Zeitschrift für Sexualforschung 9 (June 1996), 109-130, here 114; 
Ernst, Die beste Prophylaxe ist der Sozialismus, 387-388. 
69 For instance, in 1956, Mette published a biography of Freud, which praised him for some aspects of his 
thinking while ultimately rejecting his theoretical oeuvre.  The fact that Mette had any praise at all to spare 
for Freud made him a magnet for criticism from colleagues like Dietfried Müller-Hegemann of Leipzig; 
consequently, a new 1958 edition of the biography featured the subheading From Freud to Pavlov even 
though Pavlov’s star had already fallen by then.  Ernst, Die beste Prophylaxe ist der Sozialismus, 389-390. 
70 Ernst, Die beste Prophylaxe ist der Sozialismus, 388. 
 
 88 
Competing Understandings of Homosexuality 
The Göring Institute had ostracized both Klimmer and Mette for political reasons.  
Klimmer’s implicit argument was that if Mette wanted to eliminate the influence of the 
Göring Institute over East German psychiatry, then he should have rejected the seduction 
hypothesis that the Institute had so fervently embraced.  While Mette admitted the 
existence of both congenital and environmental factors in the etiology of homosexuality, 
he attributed a greater causal role to the development of homosexuality through seduction 
(Verführung) or acclimation (Angewöhnung).  Klimmer never denied that one could be 
seduced into engaging in occasional homosexual acts, and he conceded that the 
development of a homosexual orientation might even be induced to some degree by 
familial influences during the first few years of a person’s life.71  But Klimmer ultimately 
put greater stock in a century’s worth of sexological findings in support of the primacy of 
congenital factors in the etiology of a homosexual orientation.72 
Klimmer’s conceptualization of homosexuality owed a debt to sexological 
predecessors like Hirschfeld and Richard von Krafft-Ebing, but it also resonated with 
views espoused after 1945 by Bürger-Prinz, who went to great lengths to distance himself 
from his Nazi-era viewpoints.  Bürger-Prinz articulated a “quite sophisticated, even 
radical, theory of sexuality” marked by “the decoupling of physical desires from psychic 
attachments or the awareness that there is nothing natural or inevitable about 
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heterosexuality.”73  Also integral to this theory was the decoupling of sexuality from 
procreation, and Klimmer made a point of noting that one of East Germany’s foremost 
gynecologists—Norbert Aresin (1911-1971), a professor at the University of Leipzig who 
along with his wife Lykke Aresin presided over one of the GDR’s most popular sexual 
counseling centers—agreed with him on this count.74 
While there were other sexual researchers in both the GDR and FRG who 
advocated decoupling the linkage between sexuality and procreation, however, Klimmer 
echoed his West German counterpart Giese in his advocacy of the societal usefulness of 
stable same-sex sexual relationships during the 1950s.  He characterized as 
 
incorrect […] the contention that homosexual relationships have no social 
purpose.  This is an outdated point of view.  Sexology has demonstrated that 
human sexual activity does not merely serve the aim of procreation.  Only the 
regular, full satisfaction of the sexual drive can help one to avoid dangerous 
obstructions.  Preventing this easing of sexual tension from taking place often 
leads to illness, a lack of desire to work, or to the eruption of the drive in socially 
dangerous forms.  Thus same-sex sexual relations have meaning and value for 
homosexually oriented people since such relations are conducive to making 
oneself and one’s partner happy and thereby capable of engaging in socially 
important work.75 
 
Klimmer was convinced that preventing gay men from acting upon their sexual 
predisposition would prevent them from reaching their full potential in the workforce.  
Since contented and productive workers were integral to the building of both socialist and 
capitalist societies, Klimmer advanced the novel argument that the destigmatization and 
decriminalization of homosexuality would actually strengthen the nascent postwar 
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German states.  If some gay men were seemingly thwarting the viability of these polities 
through their “unemployment and other ‘difficulties in fulfilling the male role in modern 
society,’” they were certainly not doing so on purpose.76  It was for this reason that 
Klimmer hoped that the psychological sciences would do more to focus on helping gay 
men cope with the implications of their sexual orientation for other aspects of their lives 
rather than expend so much effort in trying to discern the etiology of homosexuality.77 
The conceptual framework that Klimmer shared with Bürger-Prinz, Hirschfeld, 
and Krafft-Ebing ascribed great significance to the distinction between homosexual acts 
(homosexuelle Handlungen), homosexual sensibility or feeling (homosexuelles 
Empfinden oder Gefühl), and homosexuality as a sexual orientation (Homosexualität).78  
Klimmer believed that feelings trumped acts when it came to identifying a true 
homosexual inclination.79  This distinction originated with Johann Ludwig Casper, who 
in 1852 differentiated between “sexual act and disposition” in characterizing same-sex 
sexual activity and desire.  While the “disposition” connoted a “‘hermaphroditism of the 
soul’” for Casper, the sexual act itself did not.80 
The semantic slippage inherent in the term “homosexuality,” however, made it 
difficult even for those who supported Klimmer’s point of view to abide by this 
differentiation.  Novelist and playwright Johannes Tralow of East Berlin, for instance, 
agreed with Klimmer that a same-sex sexual orientation could not be eliminated through 
hormone therapy or surgery and consequently believed that Klimmer’s efforts were “all 
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the more worthwhile.”  But when he published his autobiography Der Beginn (The 
Beginning) in 1958, Tralow chose to conceal his earlier homosexual feelings.  Tralow 
confided to Klimmer, “I am not at all proud of [my failure to mention] this.  I feel the 
need to atone for my omission since I once believed that I felt a faint stirring in this 
direction (eine leise Regung in dieser Richtung).  But this stirring went away immediately 
and has never shown itself again.”81  While Tralow endorsed Klimmer’s notion of 
homosexual orientation as immutable, his own experience of homosexual feeling was 
fleeting.  Since both orientation and feeling fell under the rhetorical rubric of 
homosexuality, the experiential dimension of a homosexual orientation could be transient 
even for someone like Tralow who believed that orientation to be permanent. 
Even though Klimmer frequently relied upon Kinsey’s findings regarding the 
prevalence of homosexual conduct, he rejected Kinsey’s ostensible conflation of 
homosexual acts, feelings, and identities.  As Klimmer pointed out, if Kinsey were right, 
“there would have to be far more homosexuals, since many people had their first sexual 
experiences with members of the same sex.”82  Also worrying to Klimmer was the fact 
that his colleagues in both East and West Germany were instrumentalizing Kinsey’s 
findings so as to perpetuate the Göring Institute’s espousal of the seduction hypothesis 
and the concomitant belief that there was some degree of homosexual sensibility in 
everyone.83  This assumption weakened the scientific basis for categorizing homosexuals 
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as a distinct minority and drew unwarranted attention to the threat allegedly posed by 
same-sex sexual activity to the “healthy” sexual maturation of adolescents.  It is for this 
reason that Klimmer criticized prominent West German sociologist Helmut Schelsky for 
echoing Kinsey’s confusion of “homosexual acts with homosexuality.”84  While Giese 
felt that Kinsey had shown that pretty much anyone was conceivably susceptible to 
engaging in nonnormative sexual behavior and experiencing homosexual feelings, 
Klimmer firmly believed that not everyone had the propensity for the kind of sexual drive 
and conduct experienced by “real” gay men: “[w]hat is unique about homosexuals is not 
that they have a form of sexual feeling [Empfinden] to which many people are privy, but 
that they have it continuously and exclusively.”85  If an underage male prostitute did not 
acquire a homosexual orientation after having engaged in repeated same-sex sexual acts 
at a relatively young age, Klimmer wondered, then who would?86  To refute the notion of 
acclimation to a homosexual disposition, Klimmer reiterated stances articulated earlier by 
Krafft-Ebing, Albert Moll (1862-1939), and Havelock Ellis (1859-1939), all of whom 
had maintained that acquired homosexuality was most likely a belated manifestation of a 
previously latent congenital homosexual or bisexual orientation.87 
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This disagreement was part of a discursive trajectory reaching back to the 
nineteenth century whereby the preservation of heterosexual male hegemony was 
ironically contingent upon drawing attention to the precarious stability of a heterosexual 
orientation.88  The concern that male youth could be seduced into homosexuality had 
emerged in the nineteenth century and was predicated upon the characterization of same-
sex sexual object choice as a form of contagion that would lead to degeneration and the 
inevitable decline of society.  Thus Mette could rightly point out that a belief in the 
malleability of both homosexual and heterosexual orientations was not unique to the Nazi 
mindset.89  His concern that all men could prove vulnerable to homosexual temptation 
was a correlate of his belief that under the right conditions, like those obtaining in 
socialist society, a gay man could become acclimated to opposite-sex sexual acts. 
Given the precarious status of the psychological sciences in the GDR at the time, 
the prevailing “cure” for homosexuality entailed not so much an exploration of one’s 
conscience as a raising of one’s socialist consciousness.  To challenge this mindset, 
Klimmer claimed that “homosexual behavior is not a form of bourgeois degeneration 
(Entartung), as has been falsely assumed.”90  While his use of the passive voice allowed 
Klimmer to avoid ascribing this assumption to his fellow East Germans, he challenged 
the strand of socialist and Communist thought that posited homosexuality as part of the 
climate of profligacy that pervaded the exploitative propertied classes under capitalism 
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and that would gradually disappear under the auspices of socialism.91  Indeed, he 
identified as a promulgator of such misguided thinking the Communist French novelist 
Henri Barbusse (1873-1935), who had maintained that “sexual orientations that deviate 
from the norm only occur among the highly decadent propertied classes.”92  By asserting 
that homosexuality was an innate condition rather than a decadent vice through which 
men of higher social station sexually subjugated proletarian men, Klimmer was at odds 
with Communist understandings of the constitution of the self in which societal 
conditions played the key constitutive role. 
For Klimmer, the universality of homosexual proclivities was evidence of their 
congenital origin.  Klimmer’s strategy was akin to that of other homosexual rights 
activists of the time outside of East Germany.  As David Churchill contends, 
 
[t]o be able to make rights claims and appeal to universal foundations, 
homophiles had to show that homosexuals were not merely a small group of 
sexual deviants living in the modern West.  In order to demonstrate that 
homosexuality was not pathology, they needed to prove that homosexuals were 
human actors with a deep and ancient history, one that appears throughout time, 
in all corners of the earth.93 
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Mette interpreted this historical evidence quite differently: 
 
When, for example, Sophocles, Euripides, and Socrates are mentioned, it would 
be more appropriate to discuss in more depth the problem of pederasty in Greece 
and to shed light upon the relationship between homosexuality and pederasty, 
rather than to adhere to terminology in the way that he does.  Pederasty as a 
special form of eroticism is not dealt with more closely, even though taking up 
this theme would be suitable for showing how homosexual acts can certainly 
develop on the basis of widespread customs (verbreiteter Gepflogenheiten).94 
 
 
For Mette, ancient Greece was a cautionary tale regarding the consequences of 
permissive societal mores rather than an example of a society in which naturally 
occurring same-sex impulses had attained some form of societal recognition.  Klimmer 
did not challenge the notion that homosexual acts could become more widespread during 
various historical periods, but he wondered whether “more homosexual acts are really 
being performed and if there are really more homosexuals during these times, or if people 
were more open about homosexuality and thus homosexuals were more identifiable than 
                                                 
94 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DQ1 2129, Ministerium für Gesundheitswesen (hereafter MfG), HA 
Wissenschaft, Berlin, Gutachten über das Manuskript Dr. med. Rudolf Klimmer Die Homosexualität, 
signed by Alexander Mette, December 29, 1956, 3 of document, 296 of archival file.  Klimmer noted in 
1970 that “Greek love also speaks against the assumption that one can be seduced into pure homosexuality 
[since] ancient Greeks who indulged in pederasty were married and had children, and the youth whom they 
loved also married when they became older.”  In other words, Klimmer deemed it important to repudiate 
the notion of ancient Greece as a touchstone for “widespread” homosexuality.  Instead, the example of 
cross-generational same-sex relationships in ancient Greece provided for Klimmer further confirmation of 
the impossibility of converting the sexual orientation of otherwise heterosexual adolescents through 
situational homosexual conduct alone.  Klimmer, “Zur Frage des Schutzalters,” 3.  Whatever their other 
disagreements, both Klimmer and Mette appeared to rely upon a conception of “customs” derived from 
“Western” anthropology, a discipline that had largely disappeared from the East German academic 
landscape.  In later years, the reliance upon a “Western” anthropological understanding of the cultural 
variability of “customs” became explicit even in East German sexual advice literature intended for popular 
audiences; see Siegfried Schnabl, Mann und Frau intim: Fragen des gesunden und des gestörten 
Geschlechtslebens, 5th ed. (Berlin: Verlag Volk und Gesundheit, 1972 [1969]), 31. 
 
 96 
at other times.”95  He might have added that more vigorous enforcement of penal 
provisions against homosexuality also tended to enhance its visibility in society.  In 
denigrating same-sex sexual behavior as a form of depravity, Mette was allowing a moral 
and ideological vantage point to take precedence over his medical sensibility.96  But 
Klimmer also opened himself to a potential objection of Mette’s, namely that if East 
Germany were itself to become more “open” regarding the topic of homosexuality, then it 
could appear that homosexuality was on the rise in the GDR, whether or not that was 
actually the case. 
For Mette, the higher incidence of homosexuality during certain historical epochs 
was not a result of the greater prevalence of a pathological constitutional predisposition 
towards homosexuality but instead of contextually specific customs that fostered a 
penchant for same-sex sexual acts.97  But even Mette and Giese harbored some doubts 
about the seduction hypothesis.  Giese conceded that “the fundamental imprinting of 
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sexuality no longer occurs during puberty.”  And Mette acknowledged that Sigmund 
Freud had shared Klimmer’s hypothesis that a child could no longer be seduced into 
homosexuality once he had reached the age of fourteen.  But Mette ultimately felt that 
Klimmer’s distinction between congenital and acquired homosexuality was an arbitrary 
and spurious one.98  Even though he believed that same-sex sexual experience during 
adolescence might not result in a lifelong homosexual orientation, Giese feared that it 
might nonetheless evoke “sexual disorders even when the ability to enjoy heterosexual 
acts otherwise remains intact.”99  Just as sex advice authors continued to caution against 
the deleterious effects of masturbation in the mid-twentieth century even though most 
medical experts had come to disavow such warnings, Giese adopted a better-safe-than-
sorry attitude regarding the advisability of avoiding same-sex sexual contacts.100  For 
Klimmer, by contrast, if seduction early in life could not account for a lifelong 
homosexual orientation, then it could not be correlated with rather nebulously defined 
“sexual disorders” either. 
And even though Kinsey’s studies were based upon a quantitative measurement 
of sexual behavior than a qualitative study of sexual identities, he was not actually 
providing fodder for the seduction hypothesis, as Klimmer also recognized.  Kinsey 
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found that 37 percent of urban North American men and 13 percent of urban North 
American women had engaged in some form of same-sex sexual activity and that 50 
percent of American men had been sexually aroused by members of their own sex.  But 
Kinsey made a point of noting that this sexual activity had occurred after the conclusion 
of puberty.  Klimmer also relied upon Kinsey’s determination that while 37.5 percent of 
nineteen-year-old men in his survey had engaged in same-sex sexual acts, only 4 percent 
of those nineteen-year-olds developed a homosexual orientation over the long term.101  
Klimmer’s own estimate that 2.3 percent of the population was exclusively homosexual 
was lower than Kinsey’s.102 
But this knowledge did not stop Klimmer from remaining puzzled as to why 
heterosexuals would want to engage in same-sex sexual acts and thereby unnecessarily 
subject themselves to the possibility of criminal prosecution.  While he did not discount 
the existence of a bisexual orientation, he deemed it to have been far more prevalent in 
the global south than among peoples north of the equator.103  A recurring argument of 
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Klimmer’s was, after all, that while heterosexuals could choose whether or not to engage 
in homosexual acts because they could satisfy their sexual drive with heterosexual acts 
and not face criminal penalties, those with a homosexual orientation did not have the 
liberty of such a choice.104  Klimmer definitively rejected the argument that gay men 
could “choose” to marry women and thus overcome their attraction to members of their 
own gender, and he felt that it was impossible for gay men to abide by the unreasonable 
expectation that they sublimate their sexual drive. 
Even though Klimmer drew upon a formidable body of research for his 
monograph, Mette criticized him for ignoring the heterogeneity of opinion within the 
scientific community regarding homosexuality and for selectively invoking evidence that 
supported his own standpoint.105  Mette did not give Klimmer any credit for having 
attempted to engage with the Pavlovian paradigm even as he criticized Klimmer for 
contradicting himself in trying to reconcile his congenital understanding of 
homosexuality with the Pavlovian concept of an environmentally determined “dynamic 
stereotype.”106  Mette also failed to acknowledge that Klimmer’s view of the power of 
science to foster the emancipation of homosexuals was an ambivalent one.  While 
Klimmer fervently believed that science could provide the empirical basis for changing 
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legal codifications and popular attitudes regarding homosexuality, he was frustrated that 
all too many scientific experts had failed to capture the full range of conceivable 
homosexual subjectivities or overcome their own prejudices.  From Klimmer’s 
perspective, Mette’s critique was disingenuous, since his real objection was that Klimmer 
had authored a book that characterized homosexuals as a biological minority burdened by 
societal discrimination and that rejected the possibility of a cure for homosexuality.107 
Mette was particularly critical of what he took to be Klimmer’s reification of the 
sex drive at the expense of procreative imperatives.108  After all, for Mette a homosexual 
disposition resulted not just from an excess of same-sex desire, but of sexual drive itself.  
In fact, Mette cited oversatiation (Übersättigung) by sexual contacts with women as 
another paradoxical trigger for the emergence of a homosexual orientation.109  This was 
another example of how both Mette and Klimmer could instrumentalize Krafft-Ebing’s 
theories for their own purposes.  As Charles Upchurch observes, in 
 
Krafft-Ebing’s case studies[,] effeminacy and the lack of masculine self-control 
were the greatest markers of degeneration rather than sexual desire for other men.  
Men born with feelings of same-sex desire, congenital inverts, could easily 
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become diseased through lack of self-control, just as men born with heterosexual 
desires became degenerate in the same way.110 
 
Klimmer insisted that he was not heedlessly following Wilhelm Reich’s warnings 
about the deleterious consequences of sexual repression and thereby promoting an 
inappropriately Freudian reification of the sexual drive or rejecting the importance of 
self-control.111  Instead, Klimmer was intent on demonstrating that “the homosexual drive 
is merged with one’s personhood in its entirety.  The homosexual cannot be understood 
through his sexuality alone, but instead through his overall individual characteristics.  His 
sexual inclinations and aversions are merely symptoms.  What matters are his psyche and 
his habitus in its entirety.”112  Whether intentionally or not, this positioning on Klimmer’s 
part actually resonated with the East German refrain that militated against Freud’s 
supposedly excessive emphasis on an indomitable sexual drive that took precedence over 
other facets of personhood. 
While Klimmer denied that same-sex sexual activity would bring about the 
degeneration of the social body, his thinking still bore the marks of eugenicist fears that 
homosexuality would lead to a distortion of appropriate gender behavior on an individual 
level.  Even as Klimmer tried to absolve gay men of the accusation that they were 
harbingers of societal decline, he found that they were often guilty as charged when it 
came to the question of gender transgression.  Klimmer attributed this verdict to no less a 
medical authority than the preeminent Rudolf Virchow (1821-1902), who was convinced 
                                                 
110 Charles Upchurch, “Liberal Exclusions and Sex between Men in the Modern Era: Speculations on a 
Framework,” Journal of the History of Sexuality 19, no. 3 (September 2010), 409-431, here 424-425. 
111 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Briefwechsel/Grabrede, Rudolf Klimmer’s response to Alexander Mette’s 
assessment of his manuscript Die Homosexualität, May 2, 1957, 2 of document. 




that homosexuality was the result of a “female disposition (Gemüt) in a male body.”113  
And Klimmer emulated Hirschfeld and other early twentieth-century sexologists in 
warning gay men against fathering children lest they transmit their congenital 
predisposition to another generation.114 
Klimmer insisted that there were more “virile” gay men than commonly assumed, 
and that lack of awareness of their existence was “often conducive to a faulty assessment 
of homosexuals” as uniformly posing an affront to respectable masculinity.  He criticized 
Bürger-Prinz for having dismissed gay men’s effeminate habitus as merely “superficial 
imitation” of female characteristics that resulted from their “weakness, a lack of an 
adventuresome spirit (Erlebnisleere), and a craving for validation (Geltungssucht).”115  
Klimmer also mentioned the defense of gender nonconformists that Karl-Heinrich 
Ulrichs (1825-1895), a pioneer in the conceptualization of same-sex sexual desire, had 
advanced.  Ulrichs contended that effeminacy was an integral attribute of many 
homosexual men, and that if gay men were engaging in any form of “superficial 
imitation,” it was of the masculine mannerisms that had been imposed upon them during 
their upbringing.116 
And yet Klimmer did not challenge the fundamental validity of Bürger-Prinz’s 
assumption regarding the gender characteristics of gay men.  Indeed, he deemed it 
                                                 
113 Ibid. 
114 For the rationale behind Hirschfeld’s stance, see Sengoopta, “Glandular Politics,” 455.  For the 
articulation of this argument by Ernst Rüdin in 1904, see Herrn, “On the History of Biological Theories,” 
38-39. 
115 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: HE-DDR, Rudolf Klimmer, “Die Homosexualität,” April 30, 1947, 3 of 
document.  Before reinventing himself as a proponent of enlightened attitudes towards homosexuality after 
1945, Bürger-Prinz had “advanced his career under Nazism by promoting theories of homosexuality as a 
deficit of heterosexual vitality.”  Herzog, Sex after Fascism, 34. 




necessary to maintain the association between gender inversion and homosexuality in 
order to substantiate the congenital nature of a homosexual orientation.117  Klimmer 
acknowledged the Hirschfeldian viewpoint that “absolute exemplars of the sexes are only 
fabricated abstractions” and that everyone had some attributes, “even if only minimal 
ones,” commonly associated with the opposite sex.  At the same time, however, he 
insisted that homosexuals were more likely than heterosexuals to have bodily and mental 
characteristics that were typical of the opposite sex, and that the association between 
same-sex sexual orientation and gender dissonance typically manifested itself before 
puberty.118  For Klimmer, the linkage between same-sex sexual and gender inversion was 
not an invention of modern sexology.  Instead, he was convinced that “the congruence of 
manifestations of homosexuality and the parity of homosexual life in primitive and 
cultured peoples, among all races and strata of society, is remarkably extensive.”119  One 
of the most salient markers of this cross-cultural commonality was gender inversion.  For 
instance, African speakers of Swahili and numerous Native American tribes had 
formulated a vocabulary to account for the coexistence of female sensibility and male 
                                                 
117 In this respect, Klimmer was less willing to challenge the association of gender inversion and 
homosexuality than some of his sexological predecessors had been. “Confronted with medical discourses 
that constructed the homosexual male as useless, sick, and effeminate, in the 1880s the physician and 
naturalist Gustav Jaeger (1832-1917) attempted to construct a countervailing model of the sexual health 
and exceptional virility of the ‘deviant’ male. […] He considered any desire healthy that was directed 
toward another person rather than the self […] What made a person’s sexual desire normal was not its 
procreative and familial function, but its function in forging a bond to another human being, and through 
them to society at large.”  Jaeger’s ideas served as the inspiration for Benedict Friedländer’s theory of 
“physiological friendship” and for Hans Blüher’s ideas about the “male society” (Männerbund) as ideal-
typical forms of same-sex eroticism.  Claudia Bruns, “The Politics of Masculinity in the (Homo-)Sexual 
Discourse (1880-1920),” German History 23, no. 3 (2005), Special Issue: Sexuality in Modern German 
History, 306-320, here 308-310, 313-314. 
118 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: HE-DDR, Rudolf Klimmer, “Die Homosexualität,” April 30, 1947, 3, 5 of 
document.  Klimmer’s inconsistent stance echoed that of Hirschfeld and Freud.  For Hirschfeld, see 
Steakley, “Per scientiam ad justitiam,” 144; for Freud, see Erin G. Carlston, “‘A Finer Differentiation’: 
Female Homosexuality and the American Medical Community, 1926-1940,” in Science and 
Homosexualities, 177-196, here 179. 
119 Klimmer, Die Homosexualität als biologisch-soziologische Zeitfrage, 161. 
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corporeality in one and the same person.120  While Klimmer embraced the notion of 
binary gender inversion, however, he did not subscribe to Hirschfeld’s theory that 
homosexuals constituted a “third sex.”121   
Klimmer hoped to convince his readers and interlocutors that gender deviance 
was more pronounced among female than among male homosexuals.  Despite his 
application of the category of inversion to both male and female homosexuality, Klimmer 
was of the opinion that lesbians were more inclined to adopt clothing typically worn by 
the opposite sex than gay men were, “whereas only very few homosexual men dress in a 
feminine fashion.”  He believed that this discrepancy in the propensity for cross-dressing 
stemmed from women’s “greater freedom” to violate gender norms and “the previously 
more lofty public reputation of men in bourgeois society,” which meant that they had 
more to lose by going against societal expectations.122  Intriguingly, he also suggested 
that for men, biological factors could potentially exert greater determinative influence 
over gendered characteristics than societal conditions.123  If gender and sexuality were 
entirely socially contingent, after all, then societies might exist entirely without 
homosexuality—which was precisely the hope of East German authorities who viewed 
homosexuality as an atavistic relic of capitalism. 
                                                 
120 This vocabulary ranged from “mke-simume” (“woman not man” in Swahili) to “bote” (“not woman, not 
man” in the Crow Indian language) and berdache (“half-man, half-woman” in the Tulalip Indian language).  
Klimmer, Die Homosexualität als biologisch-soziologische Zeitfrage, 42.  Social scientific “fascination 
with non-Western societies’ accepting attitudes toward homosexuality” had become particularly salient 
during the 1920s and 1930s.  Wake, Private Practices, 3; Carter, “Normality, Whiteness, Authorship,” 164. 
121 In jettisoning the “third sex” terminology, Klimmer was following the example set during the 1920s by 
the WhK, which had abandoned its pre-First World War enthusiasm for this part of Hirschfeld’s conceptual 
framework.  Jason Crouthamel, “‘Comradeship’ and ‘Friendship’: Masculinity and Militarisation in 
Germany’s Homosexual Emancipation Movement after the First World War,” Gender & History 23, no. 1 
(April 2011), 111-129, here 112, 123. 
122 Klimmer, Die Homosexualität als biologisch-soziologische Zeitfrage, 190, 192. 
123 Klimmer, Die Homosexualität als biologisch-soziologische Zeitfrage, 76-78. 
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Klimmer did not invent these ideas, but he was articulating them in a Cold War 
context in which West German critics accused the East German regime of masculinizing 
all women, regardless of their sexual orientation, by purportedly compelling them to 
enter the workforce and even engage in traditionally male occupations and by denying 
them the pleasures of the fashion and make-up to which Western women had access.124  
But Klimmer did not mention this propaganda; indeed, his gender and sexual imaginary 
was unencumbered by the Cold War divide.  Even though Klimmer’s emphasis on the 
societal contingency of gender norms accorded quite well with the SED’s conviction that 
equality of the sexes (Gleichberechtigung) was only truly attainable under socialism, he 
was convinced that this principle applied to non-socialist societies as well. 
Like many other sexologists, Klimmer considered male and female homosexuality 
to be analogous phenomena, albeit with male homosexuality serving as the norm against 
which female homosexuality was to be assessed.125  He thus concluded that “the types of 
homosexual acts in which women engage largely correspond to the kinds of acts 
performed by men.”126  In Klimmer’s opinion, mutual masturbation was the most 
common form of sex for both homosexual men and women, and for many of them, it was 
the only type of sexual activity in which they would engage.  Oral sex came in a close 
                                                 
124 “In the East, female crane operators and production line workers were touted as the signs of great 
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und frühen DDR,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 26, no. 4 (2000), 602-628, here 614-615, 617-618. 
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Changing Society,” in Rosenberg and Golden, eds., Framing Disease, 104-133, here 106; Tracie Matysik, 
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126 Klimmer, Die Homosexualität als biologisch-soziologische Zeitfrage, 187. 
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second.127  Intercrural sex was far less common, and the least common form of lesbian 
sex (at least according to Klimmer) involved the insertion of a dildo into the vagina.  
Klimmer rejected the notion of women as less sexually driven than men.  Indeed, he was 
convinced that pseudohomosexuality was more common among women than among men 
since “apparently women are less afraid or repulsed by members of their own sex than 
men are.”128  Furthermore, he maintained that supposedly “frigid” women who were not 
desirous of sexual activity in a heterosexual relationship were “not infrequently 
homosexual, whether consciously or not.”129 
When it came to the question of the status of homosexuality as pathology, 
Klimmer and Mette were speaking at cross-purposes to one another.  Somewhat 
surprisingly, Mette opined that the distinction between the “normal” and “diseased” in 
sexual matters was a relative one.  Ironically, he believed that Klimmer upheld this 
distinction as absolute in order to preserve the integrity of his hallowed dichotomy of 
“normal” heterosexuality and “abnormal” homosexuality as non-overlapping categories 
of sexual predilection.130  In other words, Mette challenged Klimmer’s privileging of 
biological factors as not lending sufficient credence to environmental influences (i.e., that 
degenerate societies were conducive to the emergence of degenerate forms of sexuality) 
                                                 
127 Klimmer was following the example set by Casper, who maintained that same-sex sexuality “did not 
require anal penetration, [and] was often confined to embraces and mutual masturbation,” and by Ellis, who 
“sought to normalize male homosexuality by rendering it acceptable to a wider audience, downplaying its 
association with effeminacy and anxiously stressing the rarity of anal intercourse as a sexual practice.”  
Oosterhuis, “Homosexual Emancipation in Germany Before 1933,” 12; Rita Felski, “Introduction,” in 
Sexology in Culture, 1-8, here 4. 
128 Klimmer, Die Homosexualität als biologisch-soziologische Zeitfrage, 188. 
129 Klimmer, Die Homosexualität als biologisch-soziologische Zeitfrage, 189. 
130 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DQ1 2129, MfG, HA Wissenschaft, Berlin, Gutachten über das Manuskript 
Dr. med. Rudolf Klimmer Die Homosexualität, signed by Alexander Mette, December 29, 1956, 2 of 
document, 295 of archival file. 
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even as he criticized Klimmer’s notion of biology (or least of health and disease) as being 
too relativistic. 
Like Hirschfeld, Klimmer maintained that earlier experts had clung to the disease 
model because they had only encountered homosexuals as psychiatric patients.131  He 
also believed in the importance of heeding the viewpoints not only of fellow experts, but 
also the self-perception of homosexuals: 
 
Homosexuals do not consider themselves to be sick and hardly ever seek medical 
attention for their predisposition (Veranlagung).  Those who do so usually have 
another reason.  They require treatment only because of adverse societal 
influences, legal and societal persecution, and blackmail.  No experienced 
psychiatrist today would still consider trying to change someone’s sexual 
orientation.132 
 
Klimmer was doubtlessly aware that this last statement—that psychiatry no longer had 
any interest in “curing” homosexuality”—was untrue.  Ultimately, he acknowledged (if 
only to dismiss) the multifarious attempts to eliminate same-sex sexual desire.  Castration 
did nothing to change someone’s sexual orientation and only occasionally diminished 
someone’s sex drive, with deleterious psychological consequences.  Hypnosis and 
psychoanalysis would inevitably fail since “homosexuality is deeply rooted in one’s 
entire personality and not an acquired neurosis.”133  Implantation of “normal” hormonal 
glands was similarly futile.134  But terms such as “pathogenesis” and “disturbance” 
remained part of Klimmer’s diagnostic vocabulary.135 
                                                 
131 For Hirschfeld’s view on this issue, see Steakley, “Per scientiam ad justitiam,” 147. 
132 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: HE-DDR, Rudolf Klimmer, “Die Homosexualität,” April 30, 1947, 5 of 
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 Professor Kurt Schneider, who led the neurological clinic at the University of 
Heidelberg in the FRG, considered homosexual conduct to be both immoral and a disease 
in need of a cure.  In fact, he believed that gay men should receive “an injunction to 
undergo therapy […] [if they] have been granted a reprieve from punishment.”  Klimmer 
retorted that just because the sexual acts of gay men deviated from those of the 
“overwhelming majority” did not mean that they were intrinsically immoral (unsittlich) 
or pathological.136  By asserting that homosexuality was not a “problem” in need of 
punitive measures or a “cure,” Klimmer defied the logic of professional self-assertion 
whereby medical experts sought to assume jurisdiction over the “problem” of 
deviance.137  His authority as an “objective” expert was instead directed towards 
releasing homosexuals from both juridical and therapeutic control.  Like U.S. sex 
researcher Evelyn Hooker, Klimmer felt that increased focus on well-balanced 
homosexuals who were not entangled with the criminal justice system would help to 
remove the taint of pathology and deviance from homosexuality.138 
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But Klimmer followed his sexological forebears in upholding the category of the 
“perverse.”  Indeed, he argued that the intercourse-like acts practiced by homosexuals 
were not “perverse” because they bore a greater resemblance to their heterosexual 
counterparts than they did to “perverse” acts such as transvestism, sadism, and 
masochism.139  Klimmer and Giese agreed that the distinction between what was or was 
not perverse should be contingent upon the likelihood that a sexual practice would be 
conducive to the development of “we-ness” (Wirheit)—in other words, a relationship 
based upon love and mutuality that was not reducible to its sexual component.140  
According to this logic, perversions disrupted a person’s personality and ultimately 
resulted in disappointing sexual experiences.  By contrast, homosexuality, like 
heterosexuality, was a salutary complement to one’s personality and was thus conducive 
to sexual satisfaction.  The criterion of emotional fulfilment thus supplanted moral 
condemnation and pathologization in Klimmer’s distinction between salutary and 
harmful forms of sexual expression.141 
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 Mette agreed with Klimmer that the problems faced by gay men deserved more 
attention, but he would not go as far as Klimmer did in highlighting the political bona 
fides of East German homosexuals who had been honored as “activists” or suggesting 
that individuals who persecuted homosexuals most ruthlessly were doing so in an attempt 
to suppress their own homosexual inclinations.142  In other words, pointing out that gay 
men could be good Communists was for Mette yet another sign of Klimmer’s lack of 
“objectivity.”143  What Mette did not say—at least not explicitly—was that Klimmer 
relied upon the patina of “objective” science so as to efface his own personal stake in the 
matter.  Like Magnus Hirschfeld, Klimmer felt compelled to hide his own sexual 
orientation in order to secure the requisite distance from his subject matter and thereby 
burnish his credibility as an expert.  Despite his impassioned language, his expertise 
rested upon his professional qualifications, and not his status as an actual or potential 
victim of the criminal sanctions and societal discrimination against which he fought.144 
 Already in 1948, Klimmer was repeatedly thwarted in his attempts to publish his 
work in SBZ periodicals such as Urania, Die Weltbühne (The World Stage), and Das 
                                                                                                                                                 
relationship between homosexuality and pathology.  SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Sonderdrücke, Rudolf 
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deutsche Gesundheitswesen (The German Health Care System).145  Despite these 
setbacks, Dr. Rolf Helm, the State Prosecutor for Greater Berlin and the Director of the 
German University for Law (Deutsche Hochschule der Justiz) in Potsdam-Babelsberg, 
reassured Klimmer in 1949 and again in 1951 that his book manuscript, which then bore 
the title Die homosexuelle Liebe (Homosexual Love), would be published with minimal 
delay so that it could be used by the Legal Committee of the Volkskammer during its 
deliberations on a new Penal Code.146  But the censors denied permission to publish in 
1950, and again in 1951.147 
 At around the same time, the editorial board of the periodical Neue Justiz (New 
Justice) led by Wolfgang Weiß admonished Klimmer that 
  
[t]he point of a scientific description is not to set up a unity front of all those who 
side with one’s own viewpoint.  On the contrary, I think that it is also necessary to 
draw a clear dividing line in your area of specialization between what is really 
scientific and what only refers to itself as such.148 
 
 
Weiß challenged Klimmer’s scientific objectivity because of their fundamental 
disagreement over the very definition of the word “scientific.”  For Weiß, being 
“scientific” meant “harmoniz[ing] psychological research with the principles of 
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dialectical materialism” and avoiding frequent reference to the decidedly non-dialectical 
notion of a “‘soul.’”  Incredibly, Weiß contended that Klimmer offered “no opinion on 
the subject of how homosexuality is to be explained,” and that “[t]he standpoint from 
which you approach these fundamental questions thus remains unclear.”149  Klimmer’s 
standpoint was of course far from “unclear,” but it deviated from what Weiß took to be 
the “scientific” line on the subject.  This consensus crystallized quite rapidly in Weiß’ 
mind since just one year earlier he had recognized that there had been “no clear stance” 
(keine klare Linie) on the criminal status of male same-sex erotic behavior in no small 
part due to the lack of agreement among self-proclaimed experts regarding its etiology.150 
 Mette let Klimmer’s manuscript languish for so long that it had become, in 
Klimmer’s own estimation, outdated.151  But despite his numerous reservations about 
Klimmer’s approach to the subject of homosexuality, Mette ultimately was reluctant to 
censor Klimmer’s monograph entirely.152  Instead of publishing it as a widely accessible 
book, however, he recommended that it appear in a limited print run accessible only to 
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professionals concerned with sexual matters.153  Experts, Mette presumed, would be more 
discerning than the general populace about what he saw as Klimmer’s lack of objectivity 
and yet would still profit from the book’s contribution to the scholarly debate about 
homosexuality.  This was a continuation of earlier thinking that works on sexual matters, 
even if they were of a scientific bent, should be limited to a professional readership so as 
to avoid providing titillation for the prying eyes of the broader public.154  Karl Dietz, 
editor-in-chief at the Greifenverlag, did not challenge Mette’s recommendation.  Indeed, 
Dietz even identified Greifenverlag’s Das aktuelle Traktat (The Up-to-Date Treatise), a 
book series that had a limited print run of 1,000-1,500 copies and was read primarily by 
professionals concerned with sexual matters, as a suitable forum for Klimmer’s tome.155  
                                                 
153 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DQ1 2129, MfG, Abteilung (hereafter Abt.) Wissenschaft, Sekretariat, letter 
from Karl Dietz, Greifenverlag zu Rudolstadt, to Alexander Mette, MfG, Berlin, undated but from 
December 1956-April 1957.  According to Josie McLellan, in 1962 the Ministry of Culture reiterated 
Mette’s exhortation for limiting access to Klimmer’s manuscript to an audience of medical professionals; 
McLellan, Love in the Time of Communism, 117, drawing upon BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DR1 5010, 25. 
154 Bland, “Trial by Sexology,” 189; Laura Doan, “‘Acts of Female Indecency’: Sexology’s Intervention in 
Legislating Lesbianism,” in Sexology in Culture, 199-213, here 200. 
155 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DQ1 2129, MfG, Abt. Wissenschaft, Sekretariat, letter from Karl Dietz, 
Greifenverlag zu Rudolstadt, to Alexander Mette, MfG, Berlin, undated but from December 1956-April 
1957; BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DQ1 2129, MfG, HA Wissenschaft, Berlin, Gutachten über das 
Manuskript Dr. med. Rudolf Klimmer Die Homosexualität, signed by Alexander Mette, December 29, 
1956, 4 of document, 297 of file.  The Greifenverlag “had a record of left-wing sexual education literature 
dating back to the Weimar era,” and it was due to the tenacity of Dietz and his colleagues that “[t]he sex 
reform movement continued to have a muted influence in the world of [East German] publishing.”  
McLellan, Love in the Time of Communism, 116 (first quotation), 7 (second quotation), 167, drawing upon 
Carsten Wurm, Jens Henkel, and Gabriele Ballon, Der Greifenverlag zu Rudolstadt 1919-1993: 
Verlagsgeschichte und Bibliographie (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2001), 35, 47-49.  Other works 
with sexual themes that were published as part of Das aktuelle Traktat include Rudolf Neubert, Die 
Geschlechterfrage: Ein Buch für junge Menschen (Rudolstadt: Greifenverlag, 1956 and numerous 
subsequent editions); Rudolf Neubert and Rudolf Weise, Das sexuelle Problem in der Jugenderziehung 
(Rudolstadt: Greifenverlag, 1956); Rudolf Neubert, Das neue Ehebuch (Rudolstadt: Greifenverlag, 1957); 
Rudolf Neubert, Fragen und Antworten zum neuen Ehebuch (Rudolstadt: Greifenverlag, 1961); Hans 




Klimmer, for his part, reacted to Mette’s verdict by saying, “Typical for him.  He is 
worried about people becoming enlightened.”156 
On April 2, 1957, Dietz informed Klimmer of the governmental censorship 
board’s decision not to grant permission to publish his manuscript in the GDR, whether 
for a limited or general audience.157  It is not clear whether Dietz contested this decision, 
but he did have a reputation with the state authorities as “‘a publisher who defends the 
most outlandish manuscripts the most stubbornly.’”158  The very next day, Klimmer 
informed Dietz that he was soliciting offers from a West German publisher, but he still 
hoped to receive the indemnity that Dietz had promised him for his labors.  The ensuing 
financial disagreement led to an estrangement between Klimmer and Dietz.159  Klimmer 
published his book with the Kriminalistik Verlag of Hamburg in 1958, and he released a 
revised edition from the same publisher in 1965. 
Did publication of Klimmer’s book help to change attitudes within the East 
Germany psychiatric profession?  Helmut Rennert, Professor of Psychiatry at the Martin 
Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, agreed with “many of [Klimmer’s] main points, 
                                                 
156 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Briefwechsel/Grabrede, letter from Rudolf Klimmer, Dresden, to Ludwig 
Renn, February 7, 1957. 
157 This rejection occurred despite the fact that Klimmer had undertaken numerous rounds of revision and 
had garnered the support not only of the Greifenverlag but also of the Division of Art and Literature in the 
Saxon Ministry of Education.  Kowalski, Homosexualität in der DDR, 24.  This decision deviated from a 
longstanding pattern whereby German governmental authorities before 1933 were less likely than their 
counterparts elsewhere in Europe to censor works that addressed homosexuality; see Beachy, “German 
Invention of Homosexuality,” 820.  It was perhaps because of this legacy that Karl Dietz and Peter G. 
Hesse explicitly invoked Klimmer’s book in their sexological reference work, Wörterbuch der Sexuologie 
und ihrer Grenzgebiete (Rudolstadt: Greifenverlag, 1964). 
158 McLellan, Love in the Time of Communism, 117, drawing upon BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DR1 5015, 
28, Böhm to [Helmut] Ostmann, May 29, 1957. 
159 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Schriftwechsel DS, Behörden, Dr. med. Rudolf Klimmer, 1947-1958, letter 
from Rudolf Klimmer, Dresden to Karl Dietz, Greifenverlag zu Rudolstadt, July 19, 1959.  The 
disagreement was ostensibly of relatively limited duration, however.  According to a source consulted by 
Josie McLellan, Dietz continued his efforts to secure permission for the Greifenverlag to publish 
Klimmer’s book until at least 1962; McLellan, Love in the Time of Communism, 117, drawing upon BArch-
Berlin Lichterfelde, DR1 5010, 25. 
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and went so far as to observe that “this assiduously compiled work would be very 
valuable for laypeople and particularly for police officers and jurists” because of its 
implications for the crafting and implementation of legal provisions.  But Rennert also 
harbored reservations.  While he praised “the writing style and numerous references to 
the literature” as “quite moderate in tone,” he nonetheless felt that “everything evidently 
is deployed towards the same goal: a justification of homosexuality,” and that it was 
precisely for this reason that “some of [the book] […] could somewhat alienate 
psychiatrists.”160 
During the height of Pavlovian fervor, Klimmer had struggled to assert the 
ongoing validity of expertise deriving from the “bourgeois” strands of the psychological 
sciences.  He hoped that the aura of scientific legitimacy conferred by his status as a 
psychiatrist would serve as the primary bulwark against accusations of partiality.  By the 
end of the 1950s, after enthusiasm for the Pavlovian paradigm had faded, it was two of 
the most prominent members of his own profession in East Germany—Alexander Mette 
and Helmut Rennert—who challenged his claim to objectivity precisely because his 
conclusions went against their self-understandings as psychiatrists.  It turned out that 
Klimmer had good reason to remain ambivalent about the emancipatory potential 
inherent in a scientific approach to homosexuality. 
For Karl-Heinz Mehlan, Acting Dean of the medical faculty at the University of 
Rostock and one of the GDR’s foremost proponents of the discipline of social hygiene, 
the problem with Klimmer’s book was quite different, namely, that it neglected the 
                                                 
160 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Schriftwechsel DS, Behörden, Dr. med. Rudolf Klimmer, 1947-1958, letter 
from Helmut Rennert, Direktor der Klinik und Poliklinik für Psychiatrie und Neurologie, Martin-Luther-
Universität Halle-Wittenberg, to Rudolf Klimmer, Dresden, January 8, 1960. 
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concerns of professionals beyond the discipline of psychiatry.  Mehlan complained that 
Klimmer’s “book pays insufficient attention to social hygienic, sociological, and 
criminological aspects of homosexuality, which can certainly contribute more to the 
analysis of this problem than biological or psychological aspects of the origin of 
homosexuality.”161  Like Mette, Mehlan felt that Klimmer did not lend enough credence 
to the notion that homosexuality was the result of habituation rather than a congenitally 
determined form of behavior: 
 
I cannot with absolute conviction agree with your contention regarding the 
obligatory nature of the development of homosexuality.  To the extent that I have 
an overview of the pertinent psychiatric, sexological, and psychological literature, 
I cannot avoid the conclusion that it is equally evident that a relatively large 




In referring to “psychiatric or psychological causes,” Mehlan was doubtlessly 
employing a euphemism for acquired neuroses, but he was also contradicting himself.  
He criticized Klimmer for privileging the psychological sciences over other disciplines 
even as he excoriated Klimmer for discounting psychological insights when it came to 
the etiology of homosexuality.  Even though Mehlan disagreed with many of Klimmer’s 
points, he agreed with Rennert that Klimmer’s ideas deserved a wider audience: 
 
As far as your manuscript [“Ursachen der Homosexualität,” or “Causes of 
Homosexuality”] is concerned, I would like to grant myself the right to ask why 
you have not offered it to GDR publishers, since it is only through a discussion of 
the matter in our professional press that the problem can become of pressing 
importance.163 
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Mehlan did not realize that at least on this matter, he and Klimmer were in complete 
agreement.  Even as Klimmer was thwarted in his efforts to publish in the GDR, there 
were preeminent figures like Mehlan and Rennert who joined Mette in challenging 
Klimmer’s ideas but who nonetheless believed that Klimmer’s views deserved an East 
German professional audience.164 
Klimmer’s efforts to build a network of professional contacts extended beyond 
the borders of the GDR.  Günter Grau purports that while Klimmer’s book received 
favorable reviews in West Germany, most West German sexual researchers—most 
notably Giese—kept their distance, in large part for the same reason that Alexander Mette 
did: Klimmer’s ostensible lack of scientific impartiality.165  But as in the GDR itself, 
Klimmer’s work provoked a variety of responses on the part of his colleagues in the rest 
of the German-speaking world.  In a West German competition held in 1960 to determine 
the best new work on homosexuality from a medical perspective, Klimmer lost to Giese.  
C. M. Hasselmann, who headed the Academic Advisory Council of the German Society 
for Sexual Research, invited Klimmer to submit another manuscript for the 1962 
competition only if he had “something really new and scientifically worthwhile” to 
contribute rather than “summaries of what has long been known […], [which] have no 
                                                 
164 In correspondence with an unnamed professor, Klimmer recounted that after Mette had rejected 
Klimmer’s article “Die strafrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit für homosexuellen Handlungen,” Klimmer 
published it in a 1958 edition of the West German journal Der medizinische Sachverständige instead (full 
citation in footnote 138).  SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Schriftwechsel Dr. med. Klimmer, letter from Rudolf 
Klimmer, Dresden, to an unspecified addressee (a professor), undated.  The professor with whom Klimmer 
had been corresponding was also astounded at Klimmer’s lack of success in finding publication venues for 
his work in the GDR. 
165 Grau, “Ein Leben im Kampf,” 62-63. 
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chance whatsoever of being awarded a prize.”166  In other words, for Hasselmann, the 
greatest weakness of Klimmer’s work was its lack of originality rather than its lack of 
objectivity.  But what Hasselmann failed to acknowledge was that the synthetic nature of 
Klimmer’s magnum opus was intended at least in part to preserve and interpret the legacy 
of pre-1945 sexology for an East German polity that was decidedly inhospitable to new 
sexological endeavors. 
In contrast, Swiss psychiatrist Theodor Bovet praised Klimmer for the 
comprehensiveness of his overview of existing research on homosexuality.  He also 
found compelling Klimmer’s rejection of a simplistically monocausal view of the 
etiology of homosexuality in favor of a nuanced approach that took into account the 
relative weight of nature versus nurture for each individual.  Bovet was less convinced by 
what he took to be Klimmer’s unwarranted nonchalance regarding the possibility of 
seduction into homosexuality for adolescents.  He warned that Klimmer’s “appraisal of 
homosexuality was perhaps too positive,” but he nonetheless believed that 
 
[i]t would be a felicitous development if this book enabled doctors, theologians, 
and jurists to delve more deeply into this problem and if it thereby fomented 
public discussions.  (This has already happened here and there.)  It is also 
noteworthy that homosexuals themselves deem this to be the best book of its kind, 
even though the author is certainly not homosexual himself.167 
 
 
                                                 
166 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Schriftwechsel DS, Behörden, Dr. med. Rudolf Klimmer, 1947-1958, letter 
from C. M. Hasselmann, Direktor der Universitäts-Klinik und Poliklinik für Haut- und 
Geschlechtskrankheiten, Erlangen, und Leiter des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats der Deutschen Gesellschaft 
für Sexualforschung, eine wissenschaftliche Gesellschaft im Gesamtverband Deutscher Nervenärzte, to 
Rudolf Klimmer, Dresden, January 12, 1961. 
167 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Schriftwechsel Dr. med. Klimmer, Theodor Bovet, Rezension von Die 
Homosexualität als biologisch-soziologische Zeitfrage (1958 edition), Schweizer Archiv für Neurologie, 
Neurochirurgie und Psychiatrie 88, no. 2 (1961), 1st and 3rd pages of unpaginated transcript. 
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While Bovet echoed Mette in suggesting that the book’s primary audience should consist 
of professionals, he differed from Mette in hoping that the professional discourse would 
have ramifications in the broader public sphere.  Significantly, Bovet considered the 
favorable assessment of Klimmer’s book by homosexuals to have been another indication 
of the work’s intrinsic value. 
Klimmer’s professional gaze was not only directed westward.  He successfully 
cultivated a professional relationship with psychiatrist Dr. Kurt Freund, a steadfast 
supporter of homosexual rights in Prague.  Freund gratefully received Klimmer’s 
monograph in 1959 and invited Klimmer to deliver a short paper on legal questions 
regarding sexuality in the Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc at a conference that he was 
organizing.168  Like Klimmer, Freund sought to debunk the notion of seduction, 
particularly of working-class youth, by dissolute “bourgeois” men.  Freund pointed out 
that in countries like East Germany and Czechoslovakia, those engaged in “bourgeois” 
professions now often stemmed from a working-class milieu and thus either avoided the 
taint of the bourgeoisie’s moral decay or no longer felt the erotic frisson of seducing 
someone of lower social standing.169 
Klimmer also engaged with the transnational network of homosexual rights 
activists, most notably through Der Kreis, the signature periodical of the international 
homophile movement that was published in Switzerland from 1932 until 1967.170  His 
                                                 
168 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Schriftwechsel Dr. med. Klimmer, letter from Kurt Freund, Psychiatric 
Research Institute, Prague, to Rudolf Klimmer, Dresden, December 22, 1959. 
169 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Schriftwechsel Dr. med. Klimmer, letter from Rudolf Klimmer, Dresden, to 
Kurt Freund, Psychiatric Research Institute, Prague, March 5, 1960. 
170 For more information on Der Kreis, see Hubert Kennedy, The Ideal Gay Man: The Story of Der Kreis 
(Binghamton, NY: Haworth Press, 1999); Karl-Heinz Steinle, Der Kreis: Mitglieder, Künstler, Autoren 
(Berlin: Verlag Rosa Winkel, 1999); Clayton Whisnant, “Styles of Masculinity in the West German Gay 
Scene, 1950-1965,” Central European History 39, no. 3 (2006), 359-393, here 383. 
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interest in this magazine did not elude East German customs officials, who seized his 
copy of the journal in 1955 while it was en route to him.171  The customs officials had the 
support of Dr. Bruck at the Health Ministry, who deemed that 
 
Der Kreis only serves to propagate the homosexual mindset (Propagierung des 
homosexuellen Gedankens) and is in no way useful for scientific purposes.  In 
your capacity as a neurologist and in marriage and sexual counseling, you no 
doubt have to occupy yourself with the problem of homosexuality, albeit not on 
the basis of propaganda tracts, but instead by making use of scientific literature.  
This scientific literature, however, is not being made available to you in this 
magazine.172 
 
But when Klimmer tried to carry out scientific research of his own, he also faced the 
objection of a research commission that, as Dr. Bruck admitted, “does not deem work on 
this topic to be necessary.”  Dr. Bruck struck a conciliatory note when he remarked that 
“[i]t is gratifying to learn that three of your writings on homosexuality have been 
published, and that you continue to work on this question.”173  Thus government 
officials’ ostensible rejection of Klimmer’s endeavors as superfluous could go hand-in-
hand with qualified praise. 
Klimmer did not cancel his subscription to Der Kreis, and he found himself 
having to defend his right once again to receive it in May 1956: 
 
It is a mistake on your part to assume that Der Kreis is a propaganda tract.  
Indeed, to characterize it as such is conceivable because propaganda is directed 
towards those who think differently in an attempt to win them over whereas Der 
Kreis is only written for like-minded individuals.  This homosexual monthly 
                                                 
171 Censorship of publications like Der Kreis was by no means unique to the GDR.  For a chronicle of the 
International Homophile World Organization’s (IHWO) struggle against such censorship in the FRG, see 
Raimund Wolfert, “Gegen Einsamkeit und ‘Einsiedelei’”: Die Geschichte der Internationalen Homophilen 
Welt-Organisation (Hamburg: Männerschwarm Verlag, 2009). 
172 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Schriftwechsel DS, Behörden, Dr. med. Rudolf Klimmer, 1947-1958, letter 




magazine is important for my medical practice because as an outsider I need to be 
aware not only of scientific findings but also of the psychological attributes of this 
group.  I deal with homosexuals not only in my capacity as a forensic expert in 
court but also in my work as a marriage and sexual counselor.  Der Kreis also 
often contains writings by doctors and jurists, reports on court sentencing 
decisions, penal code reforms in other countries and other interesting articles that 
are of great value for my scientific work.  The importance of the magazine Der 
Kreis is underscored by the fact that an Institute for Sexual Research has not yet 
been reestablished in the GDR.  The Institute for Sexology was destroyed by the 
Nazis in 1933.  Scientific sexological literature about sexology does not yet exist 
again in the GDR.174 
 
 
While Klimmer referred to himself as an “outsider” to the homosexual community, he 
also defended his right to receive Der Kreis by characterizing it as intended only for 
“like-minded individuals” so as to parry the accusation that it was a form of homosexual 
“propaganda” that might be conducive to the spread of homosexual behavior.  He 
emphasized that his professional interaction with gay men occurred both in the courtroom 
and at the clinic, and thus—like the editors of Der Kreis—he could not draw a clear line 
between political advocacy and scientific objectivity.  And he reminded officials that 
since the East German government had done nothing to restore the institutional support 
for sexology that the Nazis had decimated, it could at least facilitate rather than hinder 
Klimmer’s access to sexological research performed elsewhere.  Klimmer’s multifaceted 
appeal did nothing to change the Central Office for Scientific Literature’s determination 
that Der Kreis could not be construed as scientific literature.175 
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 The transnational homophile movement of which Der Kreis was an integral part 
was able to transcend, albeit in limited ways, the Cold War divide.176  Klimmer was not 
only a recipient of the periodical, but also a contributor.  He authored an article in a 1957 
issue of Der Kreis about the “effeminate homosexual” that demonstrated his alignment 
with the international homophile movement’s preoccupation with “respectable” 
masculinity.  When addressing a non-homophile audience in 1947, Klimmer had 
criticized the Nazi-era writings of Bürger-Prinz for condemning the effeminacy of 
homosexuals as nothing more than a superficial form of gender performance that 
stemmed from weakness and a desire for attention.  In Der Kreis, however, Klimmer 
agreed with Bürger-Prinz’s condemnation of “‘aunts’” (Tanten).  Even though an 
effeminate gay man did not choose to be womanlike, he could still exert control over his 
public gender performance.  Indeed, “he has the duty to behave as inconspicuously as 
possible in public, not to let his hair down (sich gehen zu lassen) and above all not 
outwardly project his feminine demeanor.”  Even if gay men confined their sexual 
activity to the private realm, Klimmer argued, they would still meet with widespread 
moral disapprobation if they failed to confine their flamboyant behavior to venues outside 
of the public eye.177 
It was not difficult to find zealous defenders of respectable masculinity in the 
ICSE and nationally based homosexual rights organizations.178  But this reification of an 
idealized version of masculinity did not go uncontested within the homophile movement.  
                                                 
176 Der Kreis owed its relative longevity and cosmopolitanism to its location in multilingual Switzerland, 
where it was presumably less susceptible to the deleterious impact of nationally based forms of censorship 
designed to curb or eliminate allegedly indecent publications.  I am thankful to Helmut Puff for pointing 
out to me the importance of the location of Der Kreis’s editorial headquarters. 
177 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Publikationen von Dr. med. Rudolf Klimmer über Homosexualität, Rudolf 
Klimmer, “Der frauenhafte Homosexuelle,” Der Kreis XXV, no. 2 (1957); Kennedy, Ideal Gay Man, 173. 
178 Churchill, “Transnationalism and Homophile Political Culture,” 37, 39-40. 
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Appended to Klimmer’s article was a comment by Rolf (a pseudonym for the editor of 
Der Kreis, Karl Meier) that rendered in a more positive light the contributions made by 
effeminate gay men to society in fields such as hairstyling, fashion, theater, and film:  
 
Women would still be wearing braided pigtails and their hair in a bun and walking 
around in boring clothes if the fantasy of many homoerotically inclined men 
(Homoeroten) did not create a steady stream of new and enchanting 
transformations of women’s appearance.  And it is an open secret that girls and 
widows have sleepless nights because of heroes of the stage or the screen who 
will never touch a woman.  But the world has always preferred being deceived to 
staring the truth in the face.  So we should let them believe that effeminate 
homosexuals play no role in today’s society.  The realization of the actual 
contexts [in which effeminate homosexuals play a key role] would cause too 
many people in the bourgeois world to faint!179 
 
 
While more celebratory of the societal significance of non-masculine gay men, Rolf 
advised them to render their gender nonconformity less visible to the public for strategic 
reasons, not because it was intrinsically wrong.  Indeed, Rolf maintained that the 
effectiveness of the “queer eye for the straight woman” stemmed in large part from the 
delusion that the queer eye needed to remain unseen by precisely those women whose 
lives had been made vastly more enjoyable and stylish by taking advantage of the talent 
and vision of homosexuals who subverted masculine norms. 
Generally speaking, however, Der Kreis provided Klimmer with a source of 
affirmation for his professional and activist endeavors.  After all of the effort that he had 
expended to secure a publisher for his monograph, Klimmer must have been gratified to 
see the revised edition of it reviewed in Der Kreis in 1965.  And already in 1949, 
Klimmer received a letter from Kinsey, who had learned through a staff member at Der 
                                                 
179 Klimmer, “Der frauenhafte Homosexuelle.”  My identification of the author behind the pseudonym Rolf 
is based upon Churchill, “Transnationalism and Homophile Political Culture,” 39. 
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Kreis that Klimmer was interested in the Kinsey Institute’s research on human sexual 
behavior.  In July 1950, Kinsey thanked Klimmer for having sent an offprint of one of his 
articles on homosexuality, which he promised to “read […] through as soon as 
possible.”180  This correspondence resumed in the wake of Alfred Kinsey’s untimely 
death in August 1956, when Klimmer wrote to the Institute to ask, among other things, 
about the prevalence of anal sex between men and women in the United States; the new 
Kinsey Institute Executive Director Paul Gebhard confirmed Klimmer’s understanding 
that it was “extremely uncommon” and generally viewed only as an “experiment or a 
novelty.”181  In the absence of a domestic commitment to sexology, Klimmer found other 
resources to augment the scientific basis of his counseling endeavors. 
Klimmer was also curious whether the Institute engaged in or knew of studies that 
employed the new technique of genetic skin swabs to ascertain the hereditary aspects of 
homosexuality; Gebhard replied in the negative, but was motivated to contact other 
researchers to inquire about the possible existence of such research.182  Even though 
Gebhard believed that a child was born with amorphous gender and sexual inclinations, 
this did not mean that a child necessarily “evolved” from a state of mixed heterosexual 
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Sex Research, letter from Paul Gebhard, Bloomington, Indiana to Rudolf Klimmer, Dresden, October 1, 
1956. 
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and homosexual inclinations to an exclusively homosexual orientation.183  Klimmer had 
just acquired more evidence regarding the impregnability of a person’s sexual orientation. 
Klimmer also wondered whether Gebhard worried about the potential “‘harm’” 
(Schaden) that homosexuality could cause.  Once again, Gebhard confirmed what 
Klimmer already believed, namely that homosexuality was not intrinsically harmful, but 
that a homosexual living in a society that condemned his sexual orientation and practices 
could suffer deleterious legal, societal, psychological, and emotional consequences.  Such 
opprobrium could elicit such emotional responses as fear and guilt, or compel a 
homosexual man to embark upon a heterosexual marriage that was doomed to fail or 
make both partners miserable.  Gebhard’s assurance that many gay men managed to 
avoid emotional, legal, or societal harm through “discreet conduct” (diskretes Betragen) 
provided Klimmer with even more reason to resort to the politics of respectability.184 
It did not take Klimmer long to ensure that his monograph Die Homosexualität 
als biologisch-soziologische Zeitfrage found its way onto the shelves of the Kinsey 
Institute’s library, and Gebhard thanked Klimmer for what he deemed to be an 
“enrichment” of the library’s collection.185  He also lobbied the Institute to publish a 
review of his book, but Gebhard turned down this request given the Institute’s policy of 
not reviewing monographs or articles given the time and effort involved and the 
likelihood of pointed critique fomenting resentment on the part of researchers who were 
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otherwise sympathetic to the work of the Institute.186  In 1968, the Institute enlisted 
Klimmer for advice regarding a three-year-long study that Alan Bell, Martin Weinberg, 
and Gebhard were preparing to conduct involving 1,100 homosexuals (white and black, 
male and female) in the San Francisco area.  The study focused on the impact of 
homosexuals’ experiences with family members and therapists as well as etiological 
aspects of homosexuality.  To this end, the Kinsey Institute wanted to be informed about 
the nature of Klimmer’s own research on homosexuality, the people with whom he had 
consulted, and his suggestions for shaping and improving the San Francisco-based 
study—indeed, the trio of researchers even extended an invitation to Klimmer to meet 
with them in person to discuss these matters.187  Given the restrictions placed upon travel 
for East Germans, it is unlikely that such a meeting ever transpired, but it is significant 
that like Klimmer, the Kinsey Institute sought to expand its network beyond and in spite 
of the Cold War divide. 
 Perhaps emboldened by the positive reception that his book received outside of 
the GDR, the ever-persistent Klimmer sought to reestablish contact with Dietz in 1962 
when he was working on a second edition of his book for the Kriminalistik Verlag in 
Hamburg.  Klimmer admitted to Dietz that “[w]e unfortunately had differences of 
opinion, which I very much regret, regarding my book.”  While he conceded that “[i]t is 
unfortunately not possible to publish a book like mine at the present time in the GDR[,] 
[o]ne could nonetheless try to obtain permission to publish a purely biological book about 
                                                 
186 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Briefwechsel Dr. Klimmer mit Alfred C. Kinsey bzw. seinem Institute for 
Sex Research, letter from Paul Gebhard, Bloomington, Indiana, to Rudolf Klimmer, Dresden, November 
25, 1959. 
187 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Briefwechsel Dr. Klimmer mit Alfred C. Kinsey bzw. seinem Institute for 
Sex Research, letter from Alan P. Bell, Senior Psychologist; Martin S. Weinberg, Senior Sociologist and 
Paul H. Gebhard, Director, Kinsey Institute for Sex Research, Bloomington, Indiana, to Rudolf Klimmer, 
Dresden, October 16, 1968. 
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homosexuality that does not address the question of its punishment as a crime.”  Klimmer 
continued to regret the absence of literature in the GDR on homosexuality, and he still 
hoped that he could fill this lacuna.188 
Dietz passed away in August 1964, and Klimmer tried in 1967 to convince 
Dietz’s successor to publish his book, albeit to no avail.189  In retrospect, Klimmer did not 
consider his decision to pursue publication options in the FRG to have been a “forbidden 
act,” although he did receive a “warning” at the time from the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
because he had not secured its permission to seek out a West German publisher.  Beyond 
“heated exchanges,” however, “there were no further repercussions.”  Indeed, when 
Klimmer distributed copies of his newly published book, the East German Ministry of 
Health, Ministry of Justice, and Supreme Court acknowledged receipt of them with 
gratitude.190  Klimmer’s decision to publish in the FRG was not unusual for East German 
medical professionals in the 1950s.  Indeed, doing so was a badge of prestige for East 
Germany’s most prominent doctors.  Since the GDR government tried to block access to 
Western scientific literature, however, it was effectively depriving East German doctors 
                                                 
188 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Schriftwechsel DS, Behörden, Dr. med. Rudolf Klimmer, 1947-1958 folder, 
letter from Rudolf Klimmer, Dresden to Karl Dietz, Greifenverlag zu Rudolstadt, April 8, 1962.  In light of 
Klimmer’s failed quest to publish his book in the GDR, it is striking that Kurt Freund was able to publish 
his own tome on homosexuality in German translation with an East German publisher just a few years later 
in the 1960s: Kurt Freund, Die Homosexualität beim Mann, 2nd ed. (Leipzig: Hirzel Verlag, 1965 [1963]).  
Freund’s monograph received a positive review in the East German press: Hans Hinderer, “Dr. med. Dr. 
Sc. Kurt Freund, Die Homosexualität beim Mann,” Neue Justiz 20, no. 22 (1966), 704, as noted by 
Kowalski, Homosexualität in der DDR, 35. 
189 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Schriftwechsel Klimmer mit DS, Behörden, Vorgesetzten über seine 
Veröffentlichungen und der Versuch der Anwendung restriktiver Maßnahmen, 1967-1974, letter from 
Wenig, Chefredakteur, Greifenverlag zu Rudolstadt, to Rudolf Klimmer, Dresden, June 23, 1967. 
190 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Schriftwechsel Klimmer mit DS, Behörden, Vorgesetzten über seine 
Veröffentlichungen und der Versuch der Anwendung restriktiver Maßnahmen, 1967-1974, letter from 
Rudolf Klimmer, Dresden, to Lippmann, Obermedizinalrat, Dresden, April 15, 1974; Derra, 
“Sexualforscher in der DDR,” 20; Steakley, “Gays under Socialism,” 16. 
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of direct access to research findings even though it had funded that research with the goal 
of having it benefit the practice of medicine within the country’s own borders.191 
Curiously, it was after the decriminalization of same-sex sexual acts in 1968 that 
Klimmer faced the most overt challenge from governmental officials.  In 1974, Klimmer 
responded to an apparent summons for an interrogation by noting that he had always 
trumpeted the progressive stance of the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland and that he 
had published eleven articles in East German periodicals between 1946 and 1972 while 
working at two polyclinics and serving as an expert witness in trials regarding sexual 
offenses.  After the Nazis had prevented him from pursuing an academic career, he hoped 
that he would not encounter obstacles to his work in the GDR—especially after the Free 
German Workers’ Trade Union League (Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) had 
recognized his victimization on political grounds during the Third Reich.  Instead of 
having to undergo a humiliating interrogation, Klimmer thought that he would receive 
accolades for his longstanding and wide-ranging professional engagement.192 
 
Conclusion 
 My analysis of Klimmer’s place in the evolving climate of the East German 
psychological sciences reveals the challenges that he faced in his quest to revive the spirit 
of “progressive” Weimar-era sex reform.  But it also demonstrates how the question of 
what might count as “progressive” had been fundamentally transformed by the tangled 
web of continuities and discontinuities in psychiatric, sexological, criminological, and 
                                                 
191 Ernst, Die beste Prophylaxe ist der Sozialismus, 295. 
192 SchA, Klimmer Nachlass, folder: Schriftwechsel Klimmer mit DS, Behörden, Vorgesetzten über seine 
Veröffentlichungen und der Versuch der Anwendung restriktiver Maßnahmen, 1967-1974, letter from 
Rudolf Klimmer, Dresden, to Lippmann, Obermedizinalrat, Dresden, April 15, 1974. 
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eugenic thinking before and after 1933.  According to Richard Wetzell, “the German 
criminological discourse of the 1920s and 1930s was characterized by a central tension 
between the hereditarian biases of most psychiatrists and an increasing methodological 
and conceptual sophistication that promoted a complex view of the interaction of heredity 
and environment.”  It was precisely because of this ongoing tension that “the triumph of 
genetic determinism under the Nazi regime was not as complete as has often been 
supposed.”193   
The SED also drew upon both biological and social constructionist ways of 
thinking.  In embracing its own version of social constructionism, namely the notion that 
sexual deviance would inevitably disappear under the influence of socialism, the SED 
was rejecting not only the instrumentalization of scientific inquiry for murderous ends of 
the National Socialists, but also Hirschfeld’s hereditarian logic that had supported the 
claim that homosexuals did not deserve the opprobrium of criminal punishment and 
societal ostracization.  The temporary Pavlovian detour in the psychological sciences 
during the 1950s made it clear, however, that the socialist penchant for “materialism” 
could be quite easily reconciled with biological determinism.  Klimmer thus needed to 
oppose social constructionism of both the National Socialist and Communist varieties but 
also rescue hereditarian thinking from its National Socialist and Pavlovian shackles. 
As the next chapter will reveal, Klimmer’s campaign was a political one as much 
as it was a scientific one.  Through his engagement with Der Kreis and the Kinsey 
Institute, Klimmer cultivated a transnational network in order to challenge the prevailing 
                                                 
193 Peter Becker and Richard F. Wetzell, “Introduction,” in Criminals and Their Scientists: The History of 
Criminology in International Perspective, eds. Peter Becker and Richard F. Wetzell (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1-22, here 19-20. 
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“motherhood-eugenics consensus” in postwar sex reform in both German states.  
Klimmer’s positioning lends credence to recent skepticism regarding the supposedly 
hasty “retreat to respectability” on the part of mid-twentieth-century homophile 
movement adherents.194  The politics of respectability was not the outcome of a craven 
failure to engage societal discrimination head-on but instead reflected a strategic choice 
for engaging with the broader public given the prevalence of homophobic attitudes.  As 
Martin Meeker maintains, “for the homophile movement to assert its difference and 
promote a separate queer world would have been to demand what, in fact, they already 
possessed: separate and unequal social status.  By fighting for equal civil rights […] [it] 
was [actually] daring, aggressive, and successful.”195 
Even though Klimmer did not explicitly self-identify as an adherent of the 
homophile movement, he also deployed respectability as a political tactic in order to shift 
attitudes regarding the transgressive nature of homosexuality and reach out to those who 
continued to suffer from societal stigmatization.  Like homophiles in the West, Klimmer 
downplayed the “‘sex in homosexual subjectivity.’”196  And by cultivating contacts in 
both the sexological and homophile milieus, Klimmer demonstrated that the science of 
sexuality and homophile activism depended upon one another to rekindle a progressive 
spirit in sex reform, and that this spirit could and did transcend the political and 
ideological obstacles posed by the Cold War divide.
                                                 
194 John D’Emilio, Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities: The Making of a Homosexual Minority in the 
United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 75-91. 
195 Martin Meeker, “Behind the Mask of Respectability: Reconsidering the Mattachine Society and Male 
Homophile Practice, 1950s and 1960s,” Journal of the History of Sexuality 10, no. 1 (January 2001), 78-
116, here 99-100 (quotation), 116; Nan Alamilla Boyd, Wide-Open Town: A History of Queer San 
Francisco to 1965 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 165. 
196 Churchill, “Transnationalism and Homophile Political Culture,” 41. 
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CHAPTER 3.  NEITHER A DISEASE NOR A CRIME?  CONTESTING THE 




The [East German] state should come to terms with the existence of 
homosexuality regardless of whether it considers this phenomenon to be desirable 
or not. (Dr. Rudolf Klimmer, 1958)1 
 
Now as before, I am absolutely convinced that it is repugnant and indeed 
among the most offensive manifestations of government to begin sniffing around 
in the bedroom when it is incapable of accomplishing anything else.  From time 
immemorial, relying upon a contrary-sexual disposition as the basis for judging 
someone’s political worth has been one of the most unsavory aspects of political 
life.  (Ralph Liebler, 1952)2 
 
 
In the wake of Nazi Germany’s defeat, the Dresden morality police raided the 
restaurant To Peace (Zum Frieden), which served as a popular meeting place for gay men 
and lesbians, on January 19, 1946.  For these restaurant patrons, who had presumably 
hoped that the demise of the Third Reich would bring about a respite from the Nazis’ 
persecution of homosexuals, it suddenly seemed as if peacetime might not be so peaceful 
after all.3  And yet there were also glimmers of hope that change was afoot.  For instance, 
                                                 
1 Rudolf Klimmer, Die Homosexualität als biologisch-soziologische Zeitfrage, 1st ed. (Hamburg: 
Kriminalistik Verlag, 1958), 237, as quoted in Günter Grau, “Ein Leben im Kampf gegen den Paragraphen 
175: Zum Wirken des Dresdener Arztes Rudolf Klimmer 1905-1977,” in 100 Jahre Schwulenbewegung: 
Dokumentation einer Vortragsreihe in der Akademie der Künste, ed. Manfred Herzer (Berlin: Verlag rosa 
Winkel, 1998), 46-64, here 61. 
2 Schwules Archiv und Museum Berlin (hereafter SchA), Klimmer Nachlass (hereafter Klimmer NL), 
folder: Schriftwechsel Dienststellen hereafter DS), Behörden, Dr. med. Rudolf Klimmer, 1947-1958, letter 
from Ralph Liebler, Minister der Justiz in Thüringen und Mitglied der Volkskammer, Erfurt, to Rudolf 
Klimmer, Dresden, May 7, 1952. 
3 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Schriftwechsel Dr. med Klimmer, vorwiegend Reformvorschläge, den § 175 




Dr. Rudolf Klimmer (1905-1977), a Dresden-based psychiatrist, and Willy Kulaszewski, 
a lawyer, spoke on February 28, 1947 in Leipzig about the need to decriminalize 
consensual male same-sex sexual acts.4  Although the event was open only to medical 
and legal professionals, it received coverage in the newspaper Leipziger Zeitung and thus 
became part of a larger conversation about the relationship between law and sexual 
morality in the Soviet Occupation Zone.5  Klimmer convened a similar event two months 
later in Dresden in collaboration with Horst Glaser, also a lawyer, and this time, 
representatives from the regional government and the “antifascist” political parties were 
also in attendance.6  In the hope of averting further raids on gay-friendly establishments, 
Klimmer collaborated with author Ludwig Renn and physician Dr. Rudolf Neubert in 
organizing a seminar entitled Sexual Development and Sexual Deviations: Sex Crimes 
for Dresden police officers in 1949.7 
                                                                                                                                                 
Rudolf Klimmer, Dresden, to E. Schiffer, Leiter des Deutschen Justizverlags, Justiz- und 
Gesundheitswesen in der Landesverwaltung Sachsen und der Medizinisch-Juristischen Arbeitsgruppe im 
Kulturbund, March 4, 1946, 1 of document. 
4 Grau, “Ein Leben im Kampf,” 48. 
5 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Schriftwechsel Dr. med Klimmer, “Homosexualität und Justiz,” Leipziger 
Zeitung, March 13, 1947.  Klimmer’s and Kulaszewski’s lectures took place at the Leipzig branch of the 
Cultural League for the Democratic Renewal of Germany (Kulturbund zur demokratischen Erneuerung 
Deutschlands, hereafter Kulturbund), a mass organization for intellectuals united in their commitment to 
antifascism, humanism, and restoring (East) Germany’s reputation in the world.  Before 1933, it was not 
uncommon for discussions of homosexuality to occur within closed circles of experts so as to demonstrate 
professional “ownership” of sensitive subject matter.  For this reason, Klimmer might not have viewed the 
fact that his audience consisted primarily of fellow professionals as an undue limitation upon his ability to 
articulate his arguments before a broader public. 
6 These lectures also took place at the Kulturbund.  SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Schriftwechsel Dr. med. 
Klimmer, “Homosexualität und § 175.”  For a useful timeline of Klimmer’s advocacy and other relevant 
milestones in the history gay male life in East Germany, see Olaf Brühl, “Sozialistisch und schwul.  Eine 
subjektive Chronologie,” in Homosexualität in der DDR: Materialien und Meinungen, ed. Wolfram Setz 
(Hamburg: Männerschwarm Verlag, 2006): 89-152, here 98-104; Karl-Heinz Steinle, “Homophiles 
Deutschland—West und Ost,” in Goodbye to Berlin?: 100 Jahre Schwulenbewegung.  Eine Ausstellung des 
Schwulen Museums und der Akademie der Künste, eds. Andreas Sternweiler et al. (Berlin: Verlag Rosa 
Winkel, 1997), VI.1; Rainer Herrn, 100 Years of the Gay Rights Movement in Germany (New York and 
Berlin: Goethe Institut, 1997), 28-33. 
7 Grau, “Ein Leben im Kampf,” 49. 
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The fact that such events occurred amidst the chaotic conditions of the immediate 
postwar years constituted at least an implicit recognition on the part of the Kulturbund 
that the “democratic renewal” of Germany would entail not only denazification on the 
institutional and individual level, but also a reexamination of laws whose degree of 
National Socialist content was up for debate.  Paragraph 175 (§ 175), the law that 
proscribed consensual same-sex sexual acts involving adult men, had been part of the 
German Penal Code since 1871, and the National Socialist government expanded the 
scope of the law in 1935 to encompass not only intercourse-like acts (beischlafähnliche 
Handlungen) but indeed any kind of physical or sexual intimacy between men.8  The 
process of dismantling the Nazi system of governance offered the first opportunity since 
the late 1920s to remove the opprobrium of legal discrimination against consensual same-
sex sexual relationships.  But Klimmer’s ability to espouse the repeal of § 175 in the 
nascent East Germany would encounter considerable challenges during the ensuing years.  
How did the Foucaultian network of power and discourse that had developed around 
sexuality in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries evolve in the early German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) given the evaporation of institutional support for sexology 
and the diminishing viability of the public sphere?  Would it be advisable to 
reconceptualize what is meant by biopower under these altered sociopolitical 
circumstances, or perhaps jettison the term entirely?9  
                                                 
8 On June 28, 1935 the Nazis promulgated the revised version of § 175, which took effect on September 1, 
1935.  Geoffrey J. Giles, “Legislating Homophobia in the Third Reich: The Radicalization of Prosecution 
Against Homosexuality by the Legal Profession,” German History 23, no. 3 (August 2005), 339-354, here 
340 and 349. 
9 I am grateful to Kathleen Canning and Gayle Rubin for encouraging me to rethink the applicability of 




  Dagmar Herzog aptly observes that “for quite some time it was not at all self-
evident what sort of sexual politics would emerge from the wreckage of 1945” in the 
western zones of occupation, and I contend that this insight also applies to the Soviet 
Occupation Zone (Sowjetische Besatzungszone, or SBZ).10  Indeed, “despite pervasive 
homophobia there was a brief window of greater openness around homosexuality as 
well.”  In the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), this window abruptly shut when West 
German conservative voices increasingly trumpeted their antifascist bona fides by 
denouncing the sexual profligacy that they associated with Nazism and asserting a 
conservative morality that did not have a place for homosexuality.11  But the reification 
of a traditionalist sexual morality did not occur solely in a religious milieu; it also 
permeated the ranks of those who supported decriminalization of homosexuality.  Indeed, 
in 1950 the (West) German Society for Sexual Research (Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Sexualforschung, or DGfS) recommended that the West German Bundesrat (upper house 
of parliament) and Bundestag (lower house of parliament) repeal § 175 not because the 
statute was unjust, but because it was ineffective.  Members of the organization were 
convinced that vigilant observance of prevailing moral standards would do more to 
condemn and reduce the prevalence of homosexual conduct.12 
                                                 
10 Dagmar Herzog, “Desperately Seeking Normality: Sex and Marriage in the Wake of the War,” in Life 
after Death: Approaches to a Cultural and Social History of Europe during the 1940s and 1950s, eds. 
Richard Bessel and Dirk Schumann (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 161-192, here 161. 
11 Herzog, “Desperately Seeking Normality,” 172.  Herzog draws upon Dieter Schiefelbein, “Wiederbeginn 
der juristischen Verfolgung homosexueller Männer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Die 
Homosexuellen-Prozesse in Frankfurt am Main 1950/51,” Zeitschrift für Sexualforschung 5 (1992), 59-73. 
12 Christian Schäfer, “Widernatürliche Unzucht” (§§ 175, 175a, 175b, 182 a.F. StGB): Reformdiskussion 
und Gesetzgebung seit 1945 (Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2006), 82-86.  The DGfS’ 
recommendations were less “progressive” than Klimmer’s, as they did not call for rendering the age of 
consent equal for same-sex and opposite-sex sexual acts and made no reference to the need for greater 
leniency in sentencing guidelines.  The DGfS also seemed untroubled by the lack of gender equity in the 
existing law and saw no reason to challenge the seduction hypothesis. 
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 What distinguished the German Society for Sexual Research from those who 
sought to retain § 175 was not their moral valuation of homosexuality, which was 
uniformly negative.  Instead, they disagreed on the most efficacious vehicle for enforcing 
ethical expectations.  While the Society for Sexual Research believed in the importance 
of disaggregating law and morality, conservative West German Christians and neo-
traditionalist East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) members alike were united in 
their conviction that the law should be a transparent reflection of what the latter were 
fond of calling the “moral views of the working people” (Moralanschauungen der 
Werktätigen).  Both groups presumed these views to be profoundly conservative.13 
Indeed, Klimmer did not expect his interlocutors to overcome their “instinctive 
aversion” to same-sex sexual activity.14  In this regard he was following the example of 
Dr. Magnus Hirschfeld (1868-1935), who had deemed it important to emphasize the 
distinction between heterosexual male friendship and homosexual male eroticism so as to 
“avoid scaring away potential heterosexual allies of the homosexual movement.”15  
Klimmer, like Hirschfeld, addressed “only value judgments, and not the presuppositions 
underlying this way of thinking.”16  Instead, Klimmer hoped that his audience would rely 
                                                 
13 Günter Grau, “Im Auftrag der Partei: Versuch einer Reform der strafrechtlichen Bestimmungen zur 
Homosexualität in der DDR 1952,” Zeitschrift für Sexualforschung 9 (June 1996), 109-130, here 111; 
Dagmar Herzog, Sex after Fascism: Memory and Morality in Twentieth-Century Germany (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2005), 2. 
14 SchA, Klimmer NL, Rudolf Klimmer, “Die Homosexualität” (speech delivered at the Kulturbund in 
Dresden on April 30, 1947).  Another version of this document, which does not contain this quotation, is 
located in another part of Klimmer’s Nachlass. 
15 Harry Oosterhuis, “Homosexual Emancipation in Germany Before 1933: Two Traditions,” in Harry 
Oosterhuis and Hubert Kennedy, eds., Homosexuality and Male Bonding in Pre-Nazi Germany: The Youth 
Movement, the Gay Movement, and Male Bonding Before Hitler’s Rise (New York: Harrington Park Press, 
1991), 1-28, here 16-17.  For more on Klimmer’s attempts to revive Hirschfeld’s legacy, see Chapter 2. 
16 Oosterhuis, “Homosexual Emancipation in Germany Before 1933,” 15.  Klimmer made the strategic 
calculation that rallying support for decriminalization would prove to be more auspicious than challenging 
the attitudes that had led to the criminalization and pathologization of homosexuality in the first place.  




upon “incorruptible objectivity and fairness” in deciding whether it was reasonable to 
“rob thousands of people unfairly of their freedom and subject them to social ruin, in 
gross violation of the basic democratic principle of the freedom of the individual.”17 
 
A Brief History of § 175 
In 1869, the drafters of a new Penal Code for Prussia convened a panel of medical 
experts but blithely ignored its recommendation to decriminalize homosexuality.18  
Rudolf Klimmer was very much aware of this precedent, and he hoped that East German 
authorities would not repeat the folly of their Prussian forebears, who were responsible 
for introducing § 175 into the Penal Code in 1871.19  From the outset, there was 
disagreement regarding the range of offenses that the new law would proscribe.  In 1880, 
the Reichsgericht decreed that § 175 would apply only to “lewdness contrary to nature,” 
i.e., sexual activity akin to copulation.  It would not apply to non-intercourse-like sexual 
acts, which were not considered—at least as far as legislative terminology was 
                                                                                                                                                 
occupation, although this was not explicitly specified), 48 percent of the more than 1,000 respondents 
considered homosexuality to be a vice (Laster), 39 percent viewed it as an illness (Krankheit), 15 percent as 
an acquired habit (Angewohnheit), and 4 percent as a natural phenomenon (natürliche Sache).  Dietrich 
Treber, “Schwulsein unter dem § 175.  Ein historischer Bilderbogen,” in Schwulenbuch.  Lieben, kämpfen, 
leben, ed. Winfried Schwamborn (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1983), 80-137, here 121, as quoted by 
Gudrun von Kowalski, Homosexualität in der DDR: Ein historischer Abriß (Marburg: Verlag 
Arbeiterbewegung und Gesellschaftswissenschaft, 1987), 26, fn 50. 
17 SchA, Klimmer NL, Rudolf Klimmer, “Die Homosexualität,” April 30, 1947.  Much of the material in 
this lecture also appeared in Rudolf Klimmer, “Über das Wesen der Homosexualität,” Psychiatrie, 
Neurologie und medizinische Psychologie 1, no. 11 (1949), 341-348.  In his book, Klimmer went further in 
claiming that even those averse to homosexuality would have to admit that it was not so harmful to society 
as to warrant criminal penalties and, even more provocatively, that “‘[h]arm to society does not in and of 
itself justify an action’s classification as criminal.’”  Klimmer, Die Homosexualität als biologisch-
soziologische Zeitfrage (1958), 175, as quoted in Günter Grau, “Sozialistische Moral und Homosexualität: 
Die Politik der SED und das Homosexuellenstrafrecht 1945 bis 1989—ein Rückblick,” in Die Linke und 
das Laster: Schwule Emanzipation und linke Vorurteile, ed. Detlef Grumbach (Hamburg: 
MännerschwarmSkript Verlag, 1995), 85-141, here 113.   
18 Schäfer, Widernatürliche Unzucht, 28. 
19 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Homosexuelle Emanzipationsbewegung DDR in 50er Jahren (hereafter HE-
DDR), Rudolf Klimmer, “Die Homosexualität,” April 30, 1947, 7-8 of document. 
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concerned—to be “contrary to nature.”20  The question of whether or not to maintain this 
distinction would prove to be fraught for the duration of § 175’s existence.  From 1880 
until 1935, “the courts invariably required proof of anal penetration […] and most cases 
were simply thrown out on the basis of denial by the accused pair.”21  Despite the 
circumscription of punishable acts to those that involved phallic penetration, legislators 
repeatedly wondered whether or not to extend the criminalization of same-sex sexual acts 
in Germany to women.  Indeed, the expansion of § 175 to members of both sexes was a 
feature of the 1909 Penal Code preliminary draft as well as drafts issued in 1911 and 
1929.22 
It is important to bear in mind that all official German Penal Code drafts—as 
opposed to unofficial or committee-level drafts—retained § 175 in an unmodified state 
prior to the GDR’s first Penal Code draft in 1952.23  Indeed, the first official Weimar-era 
Penal Code draft issued in 1919 actually increased the severity of the punishments 
stipulated for same-sex sexual acts.24  In 1929, the Reichstag’s Penal Code Commission 
voted to approve a committee-level (i.e., non-official) draft that revoked § 175, but this 
                                                 
20 Schäfer, Widernatürliche Unzucht, 33; Geoffrey Giles, “Legislating Homophobia in the Third Reich: The 
Radicalization of Prosecution Against Homosexuality by the Legal Profession,” German History 23, no. 3 
(August 2005), 339-354, here 339.  Robert Beachy and Rüdiger Lautmann, however, suggest that the 
decision’s use of imprecise terminology like “intercourse-like” meant that any male same-sex sexual act—
including in some instances “frottage, petting, or mutual masturbation”—“that could be analogized to 
heterosexual intercourse was illegal.”  Beachy admits, however, that in most instances the application of 
the law was limited to such “intercourse-like” acts as anal, oral, or intercrural intercourse.  Robert Beachy, 
“The German Invention of Homosexuality,” Journal of Modern History 82, no. 4 (December 2010), 801-
838, here 808-809; Rüdiger Lautmann, “Emanzipation und Repression—Fallstricke der Geschichte,” in 
Lexikon zur Homosexuellenverfolgung 1933-1945: Institutionen—Personen—Betätigungsfelder, ed. Günter 
Grau (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2011), 3-12, here 8. 
21 Giles, “Legislating Homophobia,” 339. 
22 Marti Lybeck, “Gender, Sexuality, and Belonging: Female Homosexuality in Germany, 1890-1933” 
(PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2007), 276. 
23 Schäfer, Widernatürliche Unzucht, 34. 
24 Glenn Ramsey, “The Rites of Artgenossen: Contesting Homosexual Political Culture in Weimar 
Germany,” Journal of the History of Sexuality 17, no. 1 (January 2008), 85-109, here 96. 
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recommendation fell on fallow political ground given the ascendancy of the nationalist 
Right and Center parties at the time.25 
 Momentum for altering § 175 resumed under National Socialism in 1935, but this 
time, it went in a far more punitive direction.26  On June 28, 1935, the Reichsgericht 
overturned the precedent that it had set in 1880 and extended the reach of the § 175 to 
encompass all forms of same-sex sexual intimacy rather than only intercourse-like acts.27  
The Nazi regime also introduced § 175a, which stipulated stringent punishment for 
manifestations of homosexual conduct such as those involving coercion, profit, 
relationships of dependence, and sexual contacts between adults and legal minors.  Even 
though § 175a also extended the scope of punishable same-sex sexual acts, it stemmed 
from a jurisprudential legacy that had favored decriminalization of homosexual acts as 
“victimless” crimes as long as they did not infringe upon the legal or corporeal integrity 
of others.  This Enlightenment-imbued conceptual genealogy began with Cesare Beccaria 
                                                 
25 Ramsey, “Rites of Artgenossen,” 108. 
26 The literature on homosexuality under National Socialism is quite extensive.  Key works include:  Hans-
Georg Stümke, Homosexuelle in Deutschland: Eine politische Geschichte (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1989), 92-
131; Burkhard Jellonek, Homosexuelle unter dem Hakenkreuz: Die Verfolgung der Homosexuellen im 
dritten Reich (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1990); Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann, The Racial 
State: Germany, 1933-1945 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 182-198; Peter von Rönn, 
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(September 1998), 220-260; Andreas Pretzel and Gabriele Rossbach, eds., “Wegen der zu erwartenden 
hohen Strafe…”  Homosexuellenverfolgung in Berlin, 1933-1945 (Berlin: Verlag rosa Winkel, 2000); Todd 
Ettelson, “The Nazi ‘New Man’: Embodying Masculinity and Regulating Sexuality in the SA and SS, 
1930-1939” (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2002); Burkhard Jellonek and Rüdiger Lautmann, eds., 
Nationalsozialistischer Terror gegen Homosexuelle: Verdrängt und ungesühnt (Paderborn: Schöningh, 
2002); Günter Grau, ed., Homosexualität in der NS-Zeit: Dokumente einer Diskriminierung und 
Verfolgung, 2nd rev. ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2004 [1993]); Susanne zur 
Nieden, ed., Homosexualität und Staatsräson: Männlichkeit, Homophobie und Politik in Deutschland 
1900-1945 (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2005). 
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(1738-1794), was developed further by Voltaire (1694-1778) and Anselm von Feuerbach 
(1775-1833), and manifested itself in jurisprudential practice with the issuance of the 
1810 Napoleonic Code pénal, which had punished only those same-sex sexual acts that 
transpired in public, occurred because of the threat of violence, or included minors and 
which had been influential in the evolution of criminal law in several German states prior 
to 1871 as well.28  Indeed, the WhK and other pre-1933 “progressive” sex reformers had 
been calling for a law akin to § 175a to replace § 175.29  The punishment of “qualified” 
homosexuality had been an issue on which proponents and opponents of decriminalizing 
consensual adult male same-sex sexual acts could agree. 
 Although some cultural conservatives during the 1920s had called for 
criminalizing both male and female same-sex sexual acts, Nazi jurists opted to continue 
to limit the penal provisions of § 175 and § 175a to men.30  Their assessment that 
“women who experienced lesbian relationships did not usually withdraw their 
reproductive potential from the population” was not specifically National Socialist.  
Furthermore, Nazi lawmakers worried that “criminalization might result in a flood of 
false accusations since heterosexual women’s customary intimacies with each other 
might be confused with sexual interactions,” even though comparable “intimacies” such 
as handholding now fell under the purview of § 175 for men.  This did not mean that 
“lesbianism was desirable but only that it was not usually worth persecuting in 
                                                 
28 Schäfer, Widernatürliche Unzucht, 23-26; SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Schriftwechsel Dr. med. Klimmer, 
“Homosexualität und Justiz,” Leipziger Zeitung, March 13, 1947.  Prussia was the exception in this regard; 
the 1794 Prussian Civil Code (Allgemeine Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten) stipulated punishment 
for “sodomy” and nonprocreative sexual practices regardless of the gender of the practitioners.  The revised 
Prussian Penal Code of 1851 retained penalties for “lewdness contrary to nature” but exempted women 
from prosecution. 
29 Grau, “Im Auftrag der Partei,” 114; Schäfer, Widernatürliche Unzucht, 24. 
30 Lybeck, “Gender, Sexuality, and Belonging,” 313; Schäfer, Widernatürliche Unzucht, 111-113. 
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isolation.”31  Instead, female same-sex behavior was usually disciplined in conjunction 
with other manifestations of “asocial” behavior.  The potential consequences of 
homosexual conduct became much more dire when an edict was issued on November 15, 
1941 that prescribed the death penalty for SS and police officers found guilty of same-sex 
sexual conduct, even though Geoffrey Giles notes that “the new ruling was applied rarely 
and inconsistently.”32 
Given the lack of a clear directive from the occupation authorities after 1945, 
there were numerous potential courses of action: authorities at the regional and proto-
national level weighed whether to adopt, modify, or abolish the existing § 175 and § 
175a.  On November 1, 1945, the Provincial Administration of Thüringen demonstrated 
its reformist zeal by restoring the less stringent, pre-1935 version of § 175 before the 
Allied occupation authorities had even taken a stance on the validity of National Socialist 
legislation in the postwar era.33  Going even further, the Juridical Commission for 
Legislation and the Implementation of the Law, which since mid-1946 had been working 
on a new Penal Code, suggested on December 6, 1946 that § 175 be abolished and that § 
175a be altered.34 
                                                 
31 Heineman, What Difference Does a Husband Make?, 28-29. 
32 Geoffrey Giles, “The Denial of Homosexuality: Same-Sex Incidents in Himmler’s SS and Police,” in 
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33 Allied directives Number 1 and Number 11 were intended to invalidate laws tainted by their association 
with Nazism, but § 175 and § 175a were not considered by the Allies to be among those laws.  Grau, 
“Sozialistische Moral und Homosexualität,” 86-87. 
34 The commission recommended lowering the age of protection from twenty-one to eighteen and reducing 
the maximum potential period of incarceration from ten to five years.  Grau, “Sozialistische Moral und 
Homosexualität,” 87-88.  GDR courts would come to recognize this five-year ceiling on prison sentences 
for homosexual offenses.  Grau, “Im Auftrag der Partei,” 112; Günter Grau, “Liberalisierung und 
Repression: Zur Strafrechtsdiskussion zum § 175 in der DDR,” Zeitschrift für Sexualforschung 15 (2002), 
323-340, here 324. 
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Jennifer Evans maintains that “[i]n many ways, postwar [court] decisions about 
which version of [§ 175] should be upheld broke down along the East/West axis,” 
whereby judges in the SBZ were more likely than their western German counterparts to 
endorse the pre-Nazi version of § 175 that concerned itself only with intercourse-like 
acts.35  While such a divide had clearly manifested itself by 1950, the outcome of cases 
regarding § 175 and 175a between 1946 and 1948 in the SBZ was decidedly mixed.  In 
several decisions issued in 1946 and 1947, the Superior Court (Kammergericht) of Berlin 
repeatedly affirmed the validity of the changes made to § 175 in 1935.36  And on July 1, 
1948, judges at the Superior State Court (Oberlandesgericht) of Halle reached the same 
conclusion even though a different set of judges at the same court had declared the 1935 
versions of § 175 and § 175a to be “typically National Socialist” and thus invalid on July 
25, 1947.  When the Soviet Occupation Zone’s Interior Ministry (Deutsche Verwaltung 
des Innern, DVdI) instructed police in February 1949 to implement § 175a and § 175 in 
their 1935 iteration, it seemed as if the nascent GDR might emulate the nascent FRG in 
upholding the changes to the law that had been made under National Socialist rule.37 
The overall tide of SBZ judicial decision making was shifting in the direction of a 
rejection of the Nazi version of § 175.  On September 20, 1948, the Superior State Court 
in Halle overcame the dissension in its own ranks and proclaimed the 1935 versions of 
both § 175 and § 175a to be invalid because of their “National Socialist legal content” 
(nationalsozialistisches Rechtsgut).38  After the Superior Court of Berlin ruled in favor of 
                                                 
35 Evans, “Bahnhof Boys,” 615. 
36 Grau, “Sozialistische Moral und Homosexualität,” 87. 
37 Grau, “Sozialistische Moral und Homosexualität,” 96-97. 
38 Schäfer, Widernatürliche Unzucht, 76.  Jim Steakley states incorrectly that § 175a was no longer in effect 




the pre-1935 version of § 175 on February 21, 1950, the East German Supreme Court 
(Oberstes Gericht) affirmed this stance on March 28, 1950.  The pre-1935 version of § 
175 would henceforth be valid throughout the GDR.39  Yet the Supreme Court’s decision 
left the 1935 formulation of § 175a unchallenged, since § 175a purportedly protected 
societal interests such as the sexual integrity of male youth that were not tainted by their 
association with National Socialist authorship.40  This outcome echoed the logic of the 
pre-1933 KPD, which had distinguished between the undesirable criminalization of adult 
male homosexual acts and the need for ongoing legal sanctions against same-sex sexual 
acts involving youth, abuse, or extortion.  But the Supreme Court did not abide by the 
KPD’s endorsement of parity in the age of protection regardless of the gender of the 
parties involved in a sexual act.41  Instead, on March 13, 1951, the Supreme Court 
confirmed that the age of protection for same-sex sexual acts would remain at twenty-
one, as it had been set by the 1935 version of § 175a, even though the SED had 
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established eighteen as the age of legal majority on May 17, 1950 and had retained 
sixteen as the age of consent for heterosexual behavior.42  In 1954, the East German 
Supreme Court confirmed the fact that while proof of intercourse-like acts was required 
for a § 175 conviction, evidence of behavior akin to copulation was not necessary in 
order for the criteria of § 175a to be fulfilled.43 
 
Privacy and the Socialist Sexual Self 
It is tempting to ascribe the closing of the window of opportunity for reform in the 
SBZ and GDR to the increasing Stalinization of the SED beginning in early 1948.44  For 
the Soviet Union, Dan Healey maintains that it was actually “[d]e-Stalinization [that] 
brought [with it] […] an illiberal form of sexual modernity in which science and police 
methods were combined to enforce, with more apparent efficiency than before, a 
compulsory heterosexual norm.”  It is debatable, however, whether this was a necessary 
consequence of de-Stalinization (or, for that matter, Stalinization), since, as Healey 
himself notes, “[n]one of this varied that greatly from the oppression of same-sex love in 
the 1940s-60s in Britain, the U.S., or the Germanies.”45  What was different in the Soviet 
Union, East Germany, and other parts of the Eastern Bloc, however, was the paradoxical 
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coexistence of a fear of the spread of homosexuality with the propagandistic certainty 
that it was an atavistic “vice of Western capitalism” and “‘typical manifestation of 
degeneration among the ruling classes’” that was bound to dissipate under the influence 
of socialist society.46 
 According to Katrin Sieg, 
 
the [SED’s] configuration of homosexuality in opposition to socialism […] was a 
remnant of the earlier (fascist and communist) condemnation of homosexuality as 
a symptom of asocial attitudes, behaviors, and beliefs.  It was also informed by a 
repressive discourse codified by Ulbricht’s ‘Ten Commandments’ [in 1958], 
which configured sexuality (irrespective of orientation) as a symptom of 
bourgeois individualism and an anti-socialist morality. […] Gays and lesbians sat 
on the horns of a dilemma: defined as a community by virtue of their sexuality, 
they came to personify sexuality per se, and were thus subject to the anti-sexual 
mores governing the culture-at-large, which rested on the principle of delayed 
gratification and the subordination of individual happiness to economic-political 
exigencies.47 
 
While this analysis certainly has merit, it overlooks the fact that there was no unitary 
“Marxist idiom” when it came to homosexuality in the GDR.  The SED’s orthodoxy on 
homosexuality as a historical relic of bourgeois society would seemingly have 
undermined the viability of any conception of homosexuality as an unchangeable 
category of biologically determined difference.  During the occupation years and at the 
inception of the GDR, however, there were numerous challenges to the assumption that 
homosexuality would inevitably disappear under socialist auspices.  Indeed, there were 
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“sex liberals” who sought not only to expand the Marxist idiom regarding sexual norms, 
but also to circumvent it.48 
Johannes Gerats, a stalwart opponent of the ongoing criminalization of consensual 
same-sex sexual acts involving adults who taught at the Institute for Criminology at the 
Humboldt University in East Berlin, issued his own challenge to the notion of a unitary 
and clearly defined Marxist idiom when it came to sexual morality: 
 
Unfortunately, we do not yet possess developed ethics [noch keine ausgebildete 
Ethik], much less a clearly defined ethical stance regarding sexual relationships.  
There certainly are general principles, but in my opinion they do not suffice to 
characterize specific acts as morally objectionable.  Nonetheless, I maintain that 
the current viewpoints of socialist morality—as long as they have been generally 
accepted—must be heeded.  Of course, one cannot rely upon the mostly 
backwards-looking levels of society, but should turn to the moral views of the 
progressive circles of the working population.49 
 
 
One could say that Gerats arrived at the same conclusion as his more doctrinaire 
colleagues, albeit via a discursive detour.  In his assessment, after all, attitudes towards 
homosexuality in the “progressive circles of the working people” were as uniformly 
negative as in the population as a whole.  But Gerats’s uncertainty about the SED’s moral 
compass for carnal behavior provided an opportunity for individuals like Klimmer to 
reclaim the “progressive” label for their own (re-)definitions of sexual morality. 
 Rethinking the valence of the private sphere in the GDR may help to explain the 
emergence of “sex liberals” like Klimmer and the tenor of their challenges to prevailing 
moral standards.  According to Hannah Arendt, totalitarian regimes’ thorough 
                                                 
48 Herzog, Sex after Fascism, 185.  Herzog traces the emergence of East German “sex liberals” to the 
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politicization of every aspect of life effectively rendered the bourgeois liberal distinction 
between public and private realms moot.50  Arendt’s thinking was in line with 
propaganda in West Germany that forecast the demise of an unpoliticized private sphere 
in the GDR.  Sheila Fitzpatrick and Alf Lüdtke challenge the notion that the private 
sphere was completely politicized under state socialism by noting that familial bonds did 
not weaken in such polities.  From their perspective, state socialism was actually 
conducive to the emergence of formal and informal types of social interaction within and 
beyond the household and workplace.51  In other words, even if state socialist polities 
such as the GDR sought to impart an ideologically conformist and “socialist” imprimatur 
on private life, this did not mean that uniformity or conformity necessarily resulted. 
Paul Betts takes this argument even further by contending that the GDR’s 
authoritarian forms of intervention in the private sphere paradoxically served to 
strengthen the private sphere under a state-socialist system that was ostensibly devoted to 
dissolving the distinction between public and private.  He thereby challenges the notion 
that “privacy […] is the natural and exclusive offspring of liberalism, not least because 
privacy is theoretically grounded in individual liberty and a distant relationship between 
state and citizen.”  As Betts remarks, “it was precisely the relative absence of any public 
sphere of open debate and genuine civil society that rendered the [East German] private 
sphere so important and politically potent.”  Even though 
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the SED devoted a huge amount of state energy to integrating the private 
individual into the full machinery of GDR state and society, endeavouring to fully 
fuse I and We[,] […] it is misleading to interpret these well-known developments 
as merely proof of the absence of privacy in the GDR; for if privacy really did not 
exist, then the state would hardly have gone to such extraordinary lengths to 
investigate it.52 
 
There is much that is compelling about Betts’s interpretative framework, but there 
are at least two facets of his conceptualization of the East German private sphere that 
warrant further exploration.  Because the “private sphere functioned for many citizens as 
a cherished locus of individuality, alternative identity-formation, and/or dissent and 
resistance” in the GDR, Betts maintains that 
 
[i]ts protean quality and changing boundaries were what made it so resilient and 
intractable, and accounts for its irrepressible political place in a state that did its 
best to keep its potential power under control.  In the end, private life was as 
much a claim and assertion as a fixed place or spatial barrier.53 
 
 
Even as Betts questions the efficacy of “authoritarian” attempts to undermine the private 
sphere, he leaves unquestioned the motivation behind East German governmental 
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intervention.  In his schema, the SED’s involvement in the private sphere stemmed solely 
from the ideological and rhetorical imperative to fuse the individual with the collective—
in other words, an aim that was diametrically opposed to that of “liberal,” capitalist 
nation-states.  But when it came to policing homosexuality, the motivations of capitalist 
and state-socialist governments in circumscribing the “private” were not all that different.  
The purported exigencies of “protecting” youth and using the criminal law as an 
instrument of moral sanction outweighed the Cold War ideological divide between 
Communism and capitalism. 
 If the East German private sphere was “a claim and assertion,” then what was the 
basis for making such claims?  Betts’s emphasis on the importance of “individuality, 
alternative identity-formation, and/or dissent and resistance” in the “resilient and 
intractable” East German private sphere is evocative of Alf Lüdtke’s concept of Eigen-
Sinn, which manifested itself when ordinary citizens defied conformist expectations in 
their everyday lives through seemingly minor, but ultimately significant, acts of 
intransigence.54  Klimmer’s campaign emanated from the kind of willful defiance in the 
face of attempts to dissuade or exclude him that is a hallmark of Eigen-Sinn.  But his 
subject position was not merely one of subordination, since he refused to allow himself to 
be silenced.  Thus an emphasis on Klimmer’s resilience and intractability alone does not 
provide a sufficient explanation for the motivations behind his efforts to secure the right 
of “alternate identity-formation” for the homosexual community of the GDR.  Indeed, his 
defiance stemmed from his conviction that the SED should perpetuate the Weimar-era 
alliance between the KPD and progressive sex reform.  Part of the legacy of progressive 
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sex reform was respect for the integrity of the sexual self against unwarranted 
governmental infringement on individual autonomy, and this constituted a provocation to 
a state-socialist polity intent upon dismantling the notion of the liberal rights-bearing 
individual as an antiquated relic of liberal jurisprudence.  Klimmer’s campaign to 
decriminalize homosexuality in the GDR provides an important vantage point from 
which to complicate existing understandings of the “private” in the GDR and the extent 
to which evolving understandings of socialist jurisprudence accommodated 
nonconformist forms of private life. 
 A signature goal of what the SED dismissed as “bourgeois” jurisprudence was to 
shield citizens from the unwarranted or arbitrary intrusion of the state.  This was one of 
the basic tenets of the liberal Rechtsstaat, but one that it failed to uphold when it came to 
laws like § 175.  Klimmer effectively accused the GDR of perpetuating the failure of the 
“liberal” state to live up to its own principles of non-intervention when it came to 
respecting the right of adult gay men to engage in consensual, private sexual acts.  
Central to his case for repealing § 175 was his contention that homosexual conduct that 
remained behind closed doors and that did not involve coercion or pecuniary exchange 
did not pose any harm to public welfare or sensibilities and thus should be absolved from 
the threat of criminal sanctions.  Underlying this argument was the assumption that gay 
men would confine their sexual behavior to the private realm if given the opportunity to 
do so in a lawful manner.  The timing for this kind of argument, however, was not 
particularly auspicious.  East German legislators and jurists were increasingly attuned to 
the threat posed by “bourgeois tendencies in [GDR] jurisprudence” and condemned such 
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“tendencies” with particular vehemence at a 1958 conference in Potsdam-Babelsberg.55  
And as Healey observes, “[e]ven those on the left who expressed tolerance of private 
same-sex relations among adults felt that public displays or culturally transmitted forms 
of such intimacies would lead to an undesirable spread of nonprocreative practices.”56 
At the same time, West German critics accused the SED of putting the nail in the 
coffin of the liberal Rechtsstaat by assuming the complete congruence of individual, 
collective, and state interests and by exercising arbitrary, coercive power backed by 
Soviet military might and without the imprimatur of democratic legitimacy.57  Out of this 
ideological quagmire, Klimmer emerged to call upon the GDR to become a sexual 
Rechtsstaat in the “liberal” sense of the word.  In other words, Klimmer believed that the 
protection of the sexual integrity of the private sphere was not supposed to be the 
antithesis or unintended byproduct of socialist jurisprudence, as Betts argues, but instead 
one of its core tenets.  Klimmer deployed the same argument in the GDR and the 
“capitalist” world because he felt that all polities, regardless of their ideological affinities, 
should affirm the integrity of the private sphere for otherwise law-abiding and inobtrusive 
gay men. 
Given Klimmer’s intermittent attempts to tailor his arguments to East German 
circumstances, it is revealing that he did not try to articulate a defense of the “bourgeois” 
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principle of a (sexual) private sphere in a state-socialist discursive register.  Thus even 
though the SED unwittingly and paradoxically upheld the private-public distinction, the 
rhetorical tools for fostering this development “from below” were of decidedly 
“bourgeois” provenance.  In 1947, for instance, the lawyer Kulaszewski, Klimmer’s 
fellow presenter at the Kulturbund, acknowledged that proponents of criminalizing same-
sex sexual conduct felt strongly about the threat that such conduct allegedly posed to 
sexual morality, shame, and modesty.  This made no sense to Kulaszewski, since he 
believed that the public was typically not exposed to or affected by homosexual acts.  
Moreover, he pointed out that there were no comparable penal sanctions for “perverse” or 
morally reprehensible forms of opposite-sex sexual activity as long as they occurred 
beyond the purview of the public gaze—in a private sphere that the law should consider 
to be sacrosanct.58 
How might Klimmer have articulated an alternative justification for the right to 
sexual privacy?  He did try to draw attention to the fact that other Soviet Bloc states—and 
in particular, Poland—had already decriminalized adult male same-sex sexual conduct.  
He neglected to mention, however, that Poland had reformed its law on homosexuality 
already in 1932, long before the Communist Party assumed power.59  He could have paid 
obeisance to SED sensibilities by pointing that August Bebel had affirmed already in 
1895 the “satisfaction of the sex drive [as] a necessity for good mental and physical 
                                                 
58 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Schriftwechsel Dr. med. Klimmer, “Homosexualität und Justiz,” Leipziger 
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health for both sexes” in his book Die Frau und der Sozialismus (Woman under 
Socialism).60  Paying homage to this canonical text for socialist conceptions of the 
intimate realm would have strengthened Klimmer’s own case for the commensurability 
of sexual satisfaction with socialist consciousness.  During Klimmer’s formative years in 
Weimar Germany, numerous left-wing intellectuals had affirmed sexual freedom as “the 
inalienable right of every citizen.”61  In 1929, for instance, Ewert, a Communist 
Reichstag member from Thüringen and member of the Reichstag’s Legal Committee, 
reputedly said, “‘It is immoral to deny people the right to sexual release, and to force 
them into the category of criminal with provisions that in practice cannot even be 
enforced.  Invocation of the supposed sensibility of the people simply serves to mask 
prejudice that rejects the abnormal out of a lack of understanding and knowledge.’”62 
 But Klimmer would have also remembered that the alliance between progressive 
sex-reform and pre-Stalinist Communism had been at best an uneasy one.  After all, 
“[a]ccording to Lenin, the very notion of sexual emancipation was typical of capitalist 
societies and a symptom of bourgeois degeneracy.  Above all, the class struggle required 
the suppression of individualistic sexual desires and self-sacrifice in the interests of the 
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collective.”63  Nonetheless, it remains indisputable that the postwar SED had a decidedly 
less favorable disposition towards the notion of progressive sex reform than did its 
Communist Party (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, or KPD) predecessor before 
1933.64  The repressive policies of the Nazis and of the Soviet Union under Stalin 
towards homosexuality had definitely left their mark.  During the early 1930s, the SPD 
and KPD both stigmatized the Nazis as homosexuals while distancing themselves from 
Marinus van der Lubbe, an ex-Communist accused of setting fire to the Reichstag 
building on February 29, 1933, by branding him a homosexual.65  The high number of 
male casualties during the Second World War and the flight of East Germans to the FRG 
also heightened demographic concerns during the 1950s. 
 This chapter explores the obstacles that Klimmer faced in promulgating his ideas 
regarding the legal status of homosexual conduct in the GDR but also identifies 
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numerous allies who tried to help him overcome these impediments.  He came 
tantalizingly close to attaining his goal of decriminalization in 1951 in the region of 
Saxony, only to see his hopes dashed by the centralizing aspirations of the SED.  In 
attempting to secure recognition for gay men as victims of National Socialist persecution, 
he forced the party to confront a lacuna in its vision of what antifascism and 
denazification entailed.  At a time when religious officials were seemingly preoccupied 
with fending off attacks from the SED and restoring the sexual moral compass that the 
Nazis had subverted, Klimmer found leaders within the Protestant Church who were 
willing to reconsider the relationship between Christian morality and secular 
jurisprudence.  Many of the arguments articulated by Klimmer made an appearance 
during Penal Code reform commission deliberations even though he himself did not.  
There was no simple teleological progression towards reform, as legislators 
recommended decriminalization of consensual adult male same-sex sexual acts in the 
early 1950s, the preservation of the status quo in the late 1950s, and decriminalization 
once again when the revised Penal Code finally appeared in 1968. 
 
The Reception of Klimmer’s Ideas in the Political, Judicial, and Ecclesiastical 
Realms 
It must have been particularly poignant for Klimmer to have received a rejection 
letter for his submission in 1948 to Aufbau (Construction), the flagship periodical of the 
Kulturbund, just one year after the Kulturbund had hosted his lectures.66  Klaus Gysi, the 
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federal secretary of the Kulturbund, compounded the insult in 1951 when he wrote to 
Klimmer: 
 
After reviewing your various publications and the enclosures that you sent us, we 
must inform you that the questions and problems with which you are grappling do 
not fall under the purview of the Cultural League for the Democratic Renewal of 
Germany.  It is for this reason that we do not find ourselves capable of offering 
you our viewpoint [regarding the criminalization of male homosexuality].67 
 
 
Klimmer’s understandable frustration over developments like this led him to relinquish 
his membership in the Kulturbund.68 
Dr. Maxim Zetkin, Vice President of the German Central Administration for 
Health Policy in the SBZ, did not accept Klimmer’s view of a congenital basis for 
homosexuality and its status as a naturally occurring variant of human sexuality.  Instead, 
he ascribed its genesis to random events and equated it with pathological aberrations such 
as “the unhealthy predilection for polished boots, women’s handkerchiefs, or cut-off 
braids.”  Zetkin opined: 
 
I am also of the opinion that § 175 should be done away with, but I do have to tell 
you that we have far more urgent tasks.  At some point or other we will occupy 




Despite receiving such feedback, Klimmer proved himself to be indefatigable in 
waging an epistolary campaign both within and beyond the ranks of the SED.  This 
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correspondence reveals that Zetkin’s dismissive attitude was neither universal nor 
hegemonic, and that supporters of decriminalizing male homosexuality espoused a 
diverse array of opinions and varying levels of enthusiasm for Klimmer’s efforts.  Even 
though he received repeated signals that the SED’s priorities lay elsewhere, Klimmer’s 
tenacity in advocating decriminalization stemmed from his belief that the early 1950s 
provided an opportunity for reform akin to that of the late Weimar period.70  On October 
16, 1929, the Legal Committee of the Reichstag had voted to decriminalize consensual 
same-sex sexual acts between adult men.  Yet the impetus to eliminate § 175 never 
advanced beyond the committee level during the 1920s, and Klimmer was determined not 
to let the momentum for reform stagnate once again. 
 Klimmer continually pushed against the boundaries of permissible dissent in the 
nascent GDR, even when he was not quite sure where those parameters lay.  Existing 
accounts—most notably those of Günter Grau—have extrapolated from the kind of 
negative reaction exemplified by Gysi’s comments to cast the outcome of Klimmer’s 
endeavors in a decidedly pessimistic light.71  Along similar lines, Evans has written that 
“[u]nfortunately, Klimmer’s ideas (not to mention writings) were suppressed in the East, 
never being allowed to guide policy or practice in the GDR.”72  Both Grau and Evans 
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downplay the heterogeneity of viewpoints that existed at the time.73  They also do not 
take into account the degree to which even functionaries at the Ministry of Justice 
sometimes had to struggle to make their suggestions heard and accepted by the SED’s 
Division for Governmental and Legal Questions.  The fractious dynamic between 
different branches of East German government stemmed from uncertainty about the role 
of legal parity in the relationship between the two Germanies, the threat of intra-party 
purges, and the efforts of the SED to assert itself within the block party system.74 
 The difficulties that Klimmer encountered also echoed what Herzog has called the 
“longue durée post-fascist learning processes” in postwar western Europe: 
 
These [processes] were initially led by isolated, and often embattled, individuals 
in the later 1950s and early 1960s. […] In West Germany, Jewish re-émigrés (the 
jurist Fritz Bauer, the sociologist-philosopher Theodor Adorno, and the historian 
of religion Hans Joachim Schoeps) were singularly important in articulating the 
case for a new sexual morality based on the values of consent and privacy.75 
 
When Evans contends that “[t]here was no longer any room for Klimmer to lobby for the 
decriminalization of homosexuality on the basis of sexual choice and individual 
freedom,” she forecloses the possibility of a similar “learning process” having taken 
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place in the GDR as well.76  Whether out of conviction, stubbornness, naiveté, or an 
unwillingness to abandon the rhetorical toolbox of pre-1933 homosexual reform 
advocates, Klimmer continued to employ a language of sexual self-determination.  
Officials did not invite him to participate in Penal Code reform commission deliberations, 
but it is nonetheless possible to discern his impact—or at the very least the impact of 
ideas akin to Klimmer’s own—on the legislative process.  Following Michel Foucault’s 
history of Victorian-era sexual discourse, what looks like repression might have been 
something else entirely.77 
Significantly, Klimmer escaped the ignominious fate of prominent gay men and 
advocates of tolerance for homosexuality in other countries at the time.  The acclaimed 
British scientist Alan Turing committed suicide in 1954 after having been forced in 1952 
to undergo hormonal therapy to “cure” him of his homosexuality, and many gay 
government employees lost their livelihoods as a result of McCarthyist anti-homosexual 
agitation during the 1950s in the United States.78  Botho Laserstein, an outspoken West 
German Jewish proponent of eliminating legal and societal discrimination against gay 
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men, committed suicide in 1955 in the wake of a barrage of negative coverage in the 
conservative press, a blackmail campaign, and an investigation by the Department of 
Constitutional Protection, which unfairly characterized his criticism of Prime Minister 
Konrad Adenauer as a threat to the viability of West German democracy.79 
  
 Klimmer’s message found considerable support among many of his 
correspondents during the SBZ period and the years immediately following the 
establishment of the GDR in 1949.80  Key figures at the German Central Administration 
for Justice (Deutsche Zentralverwaltung der Justiz, or DZJ) and the Justice Department 
of the Central Secretariat of the SED reassured Klimmer that they were committed to 
eliminating § 175 provided that criminal sanctions remained in place for homosexual acts 
involving coercion, profit, taking advantage of a relationship of dependence, or underage 
partners.81  Instead of condemning homosexual conduct as an atavistic relic of bourgeois 
society, these officials cast the legal proscription of such behavior as outdated.  As 
Werner Gentz, a department head at the DZJ, put it, “This law is on par with the 
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paragraphs devoted to blaspheming God, which no state prosecutor would dare to 
implement today.”82 
 Support for Klimmer’s initiative took its most concrete form in the region of 
Saxony.  In May 1947, he asked the SED leadership in Saxony whether it would make a 
motion in the Saxon parliament (Landtag) to abolish § 175.  By October 1947, the 
subcommittee entrusted with legislative reform in the Landtag asked Klimmer for his 
advice on how to proceed, and Klimmer conferred with Regional Court of Appeals 
(Oberlandesgericht) President Otto Weiland and Leipzig Mayor Erich Zeigner about 
drafting a new statute.  Weiland noted that 
 
even if one were to approve of the underlying purpose of the previous legal 
provision, it has contributed in no way to fighting the evil (Übel) [of 
homosexuality], and has instead created a breeding ground for blackmail that 
could not be any worse than it is.  The consequences of this are much worse than 
the elements of the offense deprecated by the law, and this fact alone should 
necessitate the abolition [of the law].83 
 
Weiland hereby echoed Klimmer’s contention that one did not have to approve of 
homosexual conduct in order to endorse its decriminalization and advanced the pragmatic 
argument that a law as inefficacious as § 175 deserved to be revoked. 
 Weiland also invoked the need for the government to respect sexual privacy: 
 
[The abolition of the law] is necessitated by the freedom that should be granted to 
people to behave as they please in their personal activities in the sexual realm as 
in any other, as long as the activities stay within the confines of a person’s four 
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walls and do not affect the public.  [This freedom] has always been recognized as 
self-evident for women—why not for men as well?84 
 
 
The latter statement referred to the fact that women, unlike men, were not penalized for 
engaging in same-sex sexual acts, and was very much in line with contemporaneous calls 
for gender equality that would find expression in the GDR’s Constitution of 1949.  But it 
also implied that the domestic sphere should remain sacrosanct even when that domestic 
sphere was occupied by homosexual men.  Along similar lines, Heinz Hellweg, a civil 
court judge in the Saxony-Anhalt town of Sangerhausen and a member of the 
Volkskammer’s legal committee, fervently believed that “a man of legal age […] must be 
able to decide with whom he wants to have sex—the state has no grounds for 
intervention.”85 
 Dr. Karl Kohn, Deputy State Prosecutor in Saxony, was also concerned about the 
existing law’s infringement upon the inviolability of the private sphere: 
 
From the standpoint of a normal person (normal Veranlagten), homosexuality is 
an unfortunate disposition, but one that is not worthy of punishment unless its 
enactment occurs in a manner that encroaches upon the interests of the public 
(Öffentlichkeit).  The public interest is in no way harmed when two people who 
are in full possession of reason act upon their sexual feelings in a way that neither 
provokes annoyance nor is dangerous to the public.  I am convinced that the 
deletion of § 175 will rather cause homosexuality to diminish in significance as a 
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social problem.  In many cases, crimes that result from the criminal status of 
homosexuality will dissipate.  I am thinking of prostitution (gewerbsmäßige 
Unzucht) and blackmail.86 
 
Kohn might have felt that the public should be “protected” from visible manifestations of 
homosexual behavior, but he also postulated that the public’s moral qualms need not find 
their codification in the law, at least as far as consenting adults were concerned.  In 
November 1947, Kohn hoped that the authorities would suspend § 175 prosecutions until 
the ultimate fate of the law was determined.87 
The existing law perpetuated another form of gender inequality in setting a higher 
age of protection for same-sex sexual acts involving men than it did for opposite-sex 
sexual acts.  While taking advantage of a relationship of dependence was a punishable 
offense if homosexual conduct was involved, it was merely a workplace indiscretion if 
the liaison was of the heterosexual variety.  As Klimmer observed, “women in 
relationships of dependence are not protected from intercourse, deflowering, and 
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Beantwortung der Bemerkungen Klimmers und Leonhards” [the original article under discussion was 
authored by Bilikiewicz and appeared in Psychiatrie, Neurologie und medizinische Psychologie 20, no. 1 
(1968), 10-13],” Psychiatrie, Neurologie und medizinische Psychologie 21, no. 7 (1969), 275-278, here 
277. 
87 Grau, “Sozialistische Moral und Homosexualität,” 92-93.  While a suspension of prosecutions did not 
come to pass, Jennifer Evans has found evidence that West and East Berlin courts sentenced young male 
prostitutes to more arduous punishments than those meted out to the adults who had solicited them.  She 
attributes this to an implicit acceptance on the part of judges and the postwar German public at large that 
the prostitutes were exploiting the weaknesses of “real” homosexuals and that the latter belonged in a 
doctor’s office rather than a prison cell.  It would thus seem as if the notion that young male prostitutes 
were sexual aggressors rather than the victims of adult advances permeated public opinion beyond the 
ranks of activists who supported the reform of § 175.  Evans, “Bahnhof Boys,” 633-634. 
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pregnancy.  Even blameless and seduced girls up to sixteen years of age are only 
protected from intercourse.”  This disparity in the age of protection made no sense to 
Klimmer, especially given his assumption that young men were better able to defend 
themselves from unwanted sexual advances than young women were.88  Ultimately, 
Klimmer hoped to dispense with the provision regarding relationships of dependence 
entirely.  Many gay men hired their boyfriends to provide cover for their relationships, 
according to Klimmer, and the existence of such a statute unfairly penalized this 
understandable act of self-preservation and provided unscrupulous relationship partners 
with fodder for blackmail.89 
Just as Klimmer’s lecture at the Kulturbund in Leipzig prompted coverage in the 
regional press, so did his contacts with Saxon politicians facilitate the dissemination of 
his viewpoints to a popular audience through the publication of an article, “On the 
Question of Homosexuality,” in the newspaper Sächsische Zeitung on August 31, 1948.90  
In October 1948, Saxony’s Minister of Justice Johannes Dieckmann even sent Klimmer 
his own proposal for a reform of § 175, noting that his ministry agreed with many of the 
points that Klimmer had made.91  The “new” version of § 175 that Dieckmann 
                                                 
88 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Schriftwechsel DS, Behörden, Dr. med. Rudolf Klimmer, 1947-1958, letter 
from Rudolf Klimmer, Dresden, to Rolf Helm, Generalstaatsanwalt von Gross-Berlin, November 6 
[1948?]. 
89 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: HE-DDR, Rudolf Klimmer, “Die Homosexualität,” April 30, 1947, 8 of 
document. 
90 Grau, “Ein Leben im Kampf,” 48-49. 
91 Dieckmann devised this draft even though Zeigner had already informed Klimmer that there would be no 
replacement for § 175 that was specific to Saxony since the SED did not countenance legal reform on a 
regional basis (except when it came to abortion-related statutes during the SBZ period).  SchA, Klimmer 
NL, folder: Schriftwechsel DS, Behörden, Dr. med. Rudolf Klimmer, 1947-1958, letter from Erich Zeigner, 
Oberbürgermeister, Leipzig, to Rudolf Klimmer, Dresden, January 7, 1948; Grau, “Sozialistische Moral 
und Homosexualität,” 93-94, 96. 
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propounded looked very much like § 175a.92  What disappeared in this proposed 
reformulation of the law was the sanction against consensual same-sex erotic behavior 
between men over the age of eighteen.93 
By the beginning of 1949, Klimmer had enlisted enough support in the Saxon 
regional government to decriminalize consensual same-sex sexual acts involving men.94  
In 1951, the Saxon Landtag voted to repeal § 175 even though this largely symbolic 
move exceeded the scope of its legislative jurisdiction and was quickly rescinded by the 
SED.95  Klimmer’s frustration at the SED’s obstructionist stance induced him to 
dissociate himself from the party.96  Ralph Liebler, Minister of Justice for the region of 
Thüringen, had become quite pessimistic about the prospects for reform at the national 
level, although he did note that § 175 prosecutions were “very low in number” in 
Thüringen at the time.97  Rolf Helm, State Prosecutor in Berlin, also tried to mitigate 
Klimmer’s disappointment by noting that when East Berlin courts did prosecute 
                                                 
92 Dieckmann’s proposed law called for a minimum prison sentence of six months for a man who engaged 
in lewdness (Unzucht) with another man if violence or a threat occurred, if an older person took advantage 
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other was not yet eighteen, or if material gain was involved.  Offenders under the age of twenty-one could 
receive less than the six-month minimum sentence or be spared punishment altogether. 
93 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Auszüge aus Briefen, letter from Johannes Dieckmann, Justizminister von 
Sachsen, to Rudolf Klimmer, Dresden, October 23, 1948.  When Dieckmann was serving as president of 
the Volkskammer five years later, he assured Klimmer that he was still “personally prepared to adopt the 
standpoint in this matter [i.e., the reform of § 175] that I already advanced on October 23, 1948 as the 
Minister of Justice in Saxony.”  Whether Dieckmann’s advocacy would have had much of an impact in his 
role as the head of a largely ceremonial parliamentary body is questionable, but this does not diminish the 
significance of his willingness to adopt such a position.  SchA, Klimmer NL, Auszüge aus Briefen, letter 
from Johannes Dieckmann, Präsident der Volkskammer der DDR, Birkenwerder bei Berlin, to Rudolf 
Klimmer, Dresden, February 26, 1953. 
94 Grau, “Ein Leben im Kampf,” 49. 
95 Grau, “Sozialistische Moral und Homosexualität,” 94; Ursula Sillge, Un-Sichtbare Frauen: Lesben und 
ihre Emanzipation in der DDR (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 1991), 88; Kowalski, Homosexualität in der 
DDR, 19. 
96 Steakley, “Gays under Socialism,” 16; Derra, “Sexualforscher in der DDR,” 19; Grau, “Ein Leben im 
Kampf,” 62; Kowalski, Homosexualität in der DDR, 25, drawing upon Manfred Herzer, “Rudolf 
Klimmer,” emanzipation no. 5 (1977), 16. 
97 Grau, “Sozialistische Moral und Homosexualität,” 99-100. 
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homosexual infractions, they frequently granted some degree of clemency to 
defendants.98 
 On March 28, 1950, the East German Supreme Court rejected the 1935 version of 
§ 175, which encompassed all conceivable forms of male same-sex intimacy, as National 
Socialist in its legal content.  But it harbored no comparable qualms about the pre-1935 
version of the law or about § 175a, which the Nazi regime had also introduced in 1935.  
Even though this decision was a binding one, it did not augur the silencing of dissenting 
voices within the government’s ranks.  On June 29, 1950, for instance, officials at the 
headquarters of the Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (Free German Trade Union 
League, henceforth FDGB) argued that “from the standpoint of the differential treatment 
of men and women in the now still-valid version of § 175 alone, this legislation is to be 
regarded as obsolete.”99  And Götz Berger, a member of the Zentralsekretariat (Central 
Secretariat) of the Parteivorstand (Executive Committee) of the SED, informed Klimmer 
that 
 
[y]our reform proposal will not be ignored in consultations regarding the creation 
of a new Penal Code.  You are surely aware that we also do not support 
maintaining § 175 in its current form and that our professional journal Neue Justiz 
has at least in one sense expressed an opinion that accords with your train of 
thought (in den Bahnen Deiner Gedankengänge bewegt).100 
 
                                                 
98 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Schriftwechsel DS, Behörden, Dr. med. Rudolf Klimmer, 1947-1958, letter 
from Rolf Helm, Generalstaatsanwalt von Gross-Berlin, to Rudolf Klimmer, Dresden, May 14, 1949. 
99 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Auszüge aus Briefen, letter from Kranke und Kirschner, Freier Deutscher 
Gewerkschaftsbund, Bundesvorstand, Abteilung Arbeit und Sozialpolitik, Berlin, to Rudolf Klimmer, 
Dresden, June 29, 1950. 
100 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Auszüge aus Briefen, letter from Götz Berger, Parteivorstand der SED, 
Zentralsekretariat, Justizabteilung, Berlin, to Rudolf Klimmer, Dresden, March 14, 1950. 
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Berger might very well have been thinking of a 1950 Neue Justiz article that Klimmer 
himself had written.101 
The FDGB also supported Klimmer’s efforts as a matter of principle: “For this 
reason, § 175 no longer has any reason to exist in an antifascist, democratic state in which 
concern for people must take precedence in all aspects of life.”102  According to Klimmer, 
homosexuality was the result of a “deeply rooted natural drive” that could not be 
suppressed by any means, “whether by execution during the Middle Ages or in National 
Socialist concentration camps,” and it was “thus absurd to want to put an end to it (dem 
gebieten zu wollen absurd ist).”103  To overcome this legacy of persecution, postwar 
Germans had the duty to let science and a humanitarian spirit (Menschlichkeit) prevail. 
It seemed as if the Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes (Union of the 
Victims of the Nazi Regime, or VVN) was inclined to agree.  In 1948, the VVN wrote to 
Klimmer that “in today’s day and age, it is particularly urgent that the decade-long 
struggle waged by all progressive people to abolish § 175 come to a [satisfactory] 
resolution.”104  Dr. Harald Pölchau, a member of the VVN’s Executive Committee, even 
convinced the Board of Legal Examiners in Berlin, which was entrusted with the 
responsibility to remove the taint of fascism from jurisprudence in the German 
                                                 
101 Rudolf Klimmer, “Die Homosexualität und ihre Bestrafung,” Neue Justiz, no. 4 (1950), 109-111; Grau, 
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102 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Auszüge aus Briefen, letter from Kranke und Kirschner, Freier Deutscher 
Gewerkschaftsbund, Bundesvorstand, Abteilung Arbeit und Sozialpolitik, Berlin, to Rudolf Klimmer, 
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103 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: HE-DDR, Rudolf Klimmer, “Die Homosexualität,” April 30, 1947, 3 of 
document. 
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Occupation Zones, to submit a recommendation to repeal § 175 to the Kontrollrat (Allied 
Control Council).105  While the Kontrollrat did not see fit to implement this 
recommendation, the fact that it came from a German organization devoted to rectifying 
National Socialist injustices was quite significant.  East German antifascism has often 
been characterized as a mere foil for disingenuous anti-West German propaganda, but in 
the case of Pölchau’s initiative at least, it was more than just a rhetorical construct.  His 
action constituted an implicit acknowledgment that dismantling the legal architecture of 
the persecution of gay men was in fact part of the antifascist project. 
If this was the case, then why did the VVN reject Klimmer’s petition to accord 
victim status to gay men who had been persecuted by the National Socialist regime?  For 
the VVN, the category of antifascist was predicated upon political resistance to National 
Socialist rule, not victimization on the basis of personal characteristics.  The VVN’s logic 
unfolded along the following lines: 
 
The fact that the Nazis considered homosexuals to be their political opponents is 
certainly not decisive for antifascists.  The Nazis, relying upon typically fascist 
generalizations, viewed many groups as their political opponents even though in 
actuality [these groups] were not [opposed to the regime].  Freemasons, for 
example, also fall into this category.  This does not mean that there were no 
Freemasons or homosexual individuals who fought against fascism; these 




In other words, the vast majority of gay men could not have been considered true victims 
of Nazism because they had not been overt political opponents of the regime—even if the 
                                                 
105 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Auszüge aus Briefen, letter from Harald Pölchau, Mitglied des 
Zentralvorstandes der Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes, to Rudolf Klimmer, Dresden, undated. 
106 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Schriftwechsel Klimmer mit VVN, letter from Harry Kuhn, Vereinigung der 
Verfolgten des Naziregimes, Generalsekretariat Berlin, to Rudolf Klimmer, Dresden, June 23, 1949. 
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Nazis had apparently considered them as such.  This retroactive characterization of gay 
men’s political sensibilities emanated from the assumption that gay men were bourgeois 
opponents of the new East German social order who had thus relinquished their claim to 
antifascist bona fides.107 
Harry Kuhn of the VVN operated under the assumption that homosexual conduct 
should be classified as a criminal offense—a curious stance to adopt given the zeal with 
which at least some VVN officials sought to overturn § 175: 
 
No one denies that Nazi judicature—to the extent that one can even speak of such 
a thing—acted against homosexuals in a brutal manner.  These brutal methods, 
however, were applied to many groups that cannot be counted among the political 
opponents of National Socialism for this reason alone.  Criminals, for instance, 
were sentenced to death and executed for offenses that would have merited a 
more lenient punishment under other kinds of regimes.108 
 
Kuhn professed interest in learning about instances of oppression against gay men during 
the Third Reich because of his interest “in any and all material regarding Nazi methods 
[of persecution],” and he conceded that the punishment meted out by the Nazis for 
homosexual offenses was far from commensurate with the severity of these crimes.109  He 
also admitted that the VVN had working groups devoted to individuals whom the Nazis 
had consigned to concentration camps for racial and religious rather than political 
reasons.  None of this, however, changed his opinion that homosexual men who had not 
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been a part of the political opposition did not deserve membership or a working group of 
their own in the VVN.110  Although Klimmer’s quest was ultimately unsuccessful, its 
very existence meant that the victimization of gay men by the Nazis was thematized in 
the GDR long before the 1980s, when gay activism attained an unprecedented level of 
public visibility.111 
 While Klimmer brought attention to the victimization of gay men by the Nazis, 
Saxony’s Attorney General Karl Kohn tried to convince his colleagues in Thüringen of 
the complicity of Rudolf Lemke, a professor at the University of Jena’s neurological 
clinic, in this persecution.  Kohn alerted them to the fact that Lemke’s 1940 book, Über 
Ursache und strafrechtliche Beurteilung der Homosexualität (On the Origins and Penal 
Assessment of Homosexuality), attributed “zealous propaganda for exempting 
homosexuality from criminal penalty” to Jews and characterized “the struggle against 
homosexuals” as “an urgent responsibility” given the National Socialist state’s “racial-
hygienic demands.”  He accused Lemke of having been “a convinced adherent of 
National Socialist violent rule, and in particular its racial thinking,” and thus unworthy of 
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a professorship in the SBZ.  Kohn thus explicitly linked the nefarious logic that informed 
both racist and homophobic thinking during the Third Reich.112  And he was not alone in 
doing so.  Ludwig Renn also averred that “[t]hreatening [homosexuals] with punishment 
for a predisposition that they have not created is just as unjust as persecuting a person 
because of his race.”113 
 Kohn’s efforts to hold Lemke accountable for his positions on homosexuality 
during the Third Reich ran up against a climate of opinion in the SBZ and GDR that 
ascribed the “asocial” phenomenon of homosexuality not only to Nazism’s victims, but 
also to Nazis themselves.114  In other words, how could Nazis have been intent upon 
persecuting gay men if they themselves were homosexuals?115  East German jurists Udo 
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Dressler and Manfred Naundorf followed a logic akin to that of the VVN in contending 
that National Socialism’s ostensible animus towards same-sex eroticism was little more 
than a pretense for stigmatizing political opponents, such as Catholic clergy and enemies 
within the party’s own ranks.116  If the Nazis did not implement § 175 to target 
homosexuality per se but instead perceived threats to their political power, then the 
ongoing criminalization of same-sex sexual acts was devoid of any National Socialist 
taint.  From Dressler and Naundorf’s perspective, this legal sanction constituted a vital 
bulwark that would protect the moral sensibilities of the working people (Werktätigen) in 
general and of youth in particular.117 
Given the positive reception of Klimmer’s ideas by Professor Hans Hinderer of 
the German Academy for Political Science and Law at Potsdam-Babelsberg, which was 
the quintessential juridical Kaderschmiede (elite party cadre training school) of the GDR, 
Klimmer was livid that the Academy would deign to publish Dressler and Naundorf’s 
book: 
 
One would expect jurists who deal with and give reasons for [the classification] of 
economic crimes to be knowledgeable about economics.  One would be similarly 
justified in demanding that jurists who address sexual offenses 
(Sittlichkeitsvergehen) and their definition should have engaged with research on 
sexuality and possess knowledge about normal sexuality and that which deviates 
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from the norm.  I must emphasize that both authors are completely ignorant of 




After the assurances that Klimmer had received that his scientific arguments would be 
taken into consideration as the statute on homosexuality was being revised, he viewed 
Dressler and Naundorf’s profound disregard for the value of sexology as an affront to his 
status as an expert.  As a retort, Klimmer provided a scathing evisceration of their 
jurisprudential reasoning: 
 
[Dressler and Naundorf] think that they can justify a new Penal Code by making 
use of a few Marxist formulations.  This matter is not so easily addressed.  They 
speak of a new moral mindset stemming from the new socialist relations of 
production, but they only recycle the old bourgeois phrase “the healthy sensibility 
of the people” [gesundes Volksempfinden] with a few altered words. […] They 
base their justification of § 175 and § 175a on the purported “violation of the 
moral and ethical views of the working people.”  How do they know this? […] If 
materials about criminal law are published today, it is not unreasonable to expect 
that they would be based upon the latest scientific knowledge instead of “views of 
the working people” that have not been substantiated by any surveys.119 
 
 
Klimmer was adamant that the progressive spirit of sex reform did not perish with the 
Third Reich.  For their part, Dressler and Naundorf believed that even if there had ever 
been popular support for repealing § 175, “the moral and ethical views of the working 
people in their judgment of homosexuality [had] changed to the disadvantage of 
homosexuals when compared to the time before 1933.”120  Two years later, the Penal 
Code reform commission’s research group on sexual offenses was able to confirm that 
the overwhelming majority of working people did in fact consider homosexuality to be 
                                                 
118 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Schriftwechsel DS, Behörden, Dr. med. Rudolf Klimmer, 1947-1958, letter 





“morally reprehensible (moralisch verwerflich),” but they came to this conclusion on the 
basis of consultations with only twenty-two male power plant workers and nine female 
employees at a textile spinning mill.121 
 Klimmer noted that Dressler and Naundorf were doing their own constitutional 
and legal principles a disservice by applying them selectively: 
 
The authors speak of the free development of the personality and that socialist 
society provides the only solid guarantee that the interests of individuals will be 
protected.  Where is the guarantee of the free development of personality for the 
homosexual man, and the guarantee for the defense of his interests? […] One can 
agree with both authors when they assert that “not every indecent act, even if it is 
morally reprehensible, is worthy of punishment.” […] Why should one then 
punish homosexual acts?  One can view them as indecent and morally 
objectionable from an unscientific and Christian viewpoint, but that does not 
make them liable to punishment.122 
 
 
In other words, Klimmer was calling for a socialist jurisprudence in which moral 
condemnation did not connote illegality, and in which the free development of the 
personality extended to those personalities that did not conform to the supposed socialist 
norm.  And he was not alone in advancing this argument; influential jurists like Gerats 
also believed that “posing a threat to moral relations does not suffice in itself to make an 
act into a punishable crime.”123  Klimmer reminded Dressler and Naundorf that the 
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source of their moral condemnation of homosexual conduct was not socialist principle or 
the working people.  Instead, it stemmed from a legacy of Christianity that the SED was 
supposedly trying to leave behind. 
Klimmer was very concerned that Dressler and Naundorf’s text might become a 
definitive one for East German judges and prosecutors and thereby result in a “wave of 
persecution against homosexuals—completely innocent people.”  But he was not only 
worried for gay men’s sake: “I fear a disturbance of the peaceful building of the GDR and 
increased emigration by homosexuals who are important for our economy and culture.”124  
In other words, Klimmer admonished Hinderer that it was in the SED’s own best interests 
to respect the sexual privacy of otherwise law-abiding gay men.  Klimmer’s ally Renn 
also cast gay men as indispensable to the ongoing task of strengthening socialism: 
 
One normally sees only the most crass and repulsive cases [of homosexuality], 
which are already covered by other laws insofar as they are offenses stemming 
from asociality.  What one does not see are the many who struggle with their 
problem and who are people just like us—people who are participating in the 
rebuilding of our country.125 
  
 Grau considers Dressler and Naundorf’s stance to have been exemplary of the 
SED’s position on homosexuality during the 1950s.126  But the discursive terrain within 
the Academy was far from uncontested when it came to the question of homosexuality, 
and Hinderer was not Klimmer’s only ally there.  Hans Weber, a jurist who launched his 
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career at the Academy, emulated his dissertation adviser Joachim Renneberg in becoming 
a staunch proponent of revoking § 175.127  Klimmer was invited to Weber’s dissertation 
defense and returned the favor by mentioning Weber’s dissertation in his own 
monograph.128  Grau maintains that Weber’s dissertation was of little consequence even 
as he acknowledges that the 1963 Research Group on Sexual Offenses explicitly cited 
Weber’s work in its report for the Penal Code reform commission.129  Perhaps 
emboldened by Weber’s support for his ideas, Klimmer asked to be included in the 
deliberations of the Penal Code subcommittee devoted to sexual offenses during the late 
1950s.130  
Even in the absence of the organizational infrastructure provided by the pre-1933 
Scientific-Humanitarian Committee (Wissenschaftlich-humanitäres Komitee, or WhK) 
for building a network of professionals supportive of decriminalizing homosexuality, 
Klimmer had reason to believe that he could revive the spirit of the WhK and the 
alliances that it had cultivated.  Professor Arthur Baumgarten, Director of the Institute for 
Legal Philosophy at the Humboldt University in East Berlin, had been “a principled 
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opponent of the penalization of homosexuality for years,” and his ardor for reform did 
not diminish even though he discerned that the SED was in no hurry to change the law.  
Baumgarten was even willing to serve as Klimmer’s proxy in legislative meetings to 
which Klimmer was not privy, and he urged Klimmer to emulate the WhK’s 1897 
campaign in conducting a survey to gauge the breadth of jurists’, politicians’, and 
medical experts’ support for the repeal of § 175.  Klimmer solicited Dr. Alexander 
Mette’s assistance in disseminating such a survey, albeit to no avail.131 
 Klimmer also followed the example of the WhK when he initiated 
correspondence with ecclesiastical authorities.132  His contacts with leading figures in the 
Protestant Church were particularly noteworthy at a time when Protestants and Catholics 
alike sought to obscure German responsibility for National Socialist crimes by 
emphasizing the Nazis’ purported sexual profligacy in order to draw attention away from 
the moral egregiousness of Nazi crimes against humanity.133  There was also a 
“progressive version” of postwar West German Christianity that drew different lessons 
from the Nazi past than did the dominant conservative Christian ethos, but according to 
Dagmar Herzog, this progressive sensibility did not extend to sexual matters.  As a salient 
example of this, she notes that “[m]ost Christian commentators on male homosexuality 
[in the FRG] in the 1950s opposed decriminalization.”134 
 By the early 1960s, Robert Moeller argues that some West German church 
officials had digested the findings of the British Wolfenden Report of 1957 and had come 
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to accept its endorsement of the decriminalization of consensual adult male homosexual 
acts.135  But Klimmer was able to identify Protestant authorities in both German states 
who already believed during the early 1950s that the Church should not intervene in 
matters pertaining to the legislation of morality.136  These officials proceeded from the 
assumption that an agnostic stance regarding the ethical valence of secular legislation did 
not have to entail an abdication of Protestant moral authority: 
 
From the church’s standpoint, every form of immoral behavior is against the 
precepts of God. […] The church does not have the responsibility, except in 
extreme cases, to have an opinion about such legal considerations and decisions 
about whether certain forms of immoral behavior should be subject to punishment 
while others are not.  In the current climate, the Protestant Church has no direct 
motive to offer an opinion with regard to the problems related to § 175.137 
 
Dr. Otto Dibelius, Evangelical Bishop for all sectors of Berlin, went beyond moral 
agnosticism to an embrace of the value of respecting sexual privacy as long as safeguards 
for the “protection” of youth remained in place: 
 
Our sort [i.e., religious figures] knows the tragedy of the 175ers all too well.  
None of us would deny compassion to these miserable people.  If a youth is 
endangered in either body or mind, a protective barrier should be erected.  But it 
is something entirely different when a situation involves two adults with a 
conscious sense of responsibility.138 
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Professor Karl August Busch of the Martin Luther Church in Dresden expressed similar 
sentiments: 
 
I absolutely share your opinion that the laws against the homosexual affliction 
(Leiden) should be eliminated in order to lift the spirits (Gemütsbefreiung) of 
many miserable people.  They bear no guilt [for their orientation] but are instead 




While Klimmer presumably objected to their characterization of gay men as “miserable 
people,” he welcomed Dibelius’s and Busch’s support for decriminalization on the basis 
of gay men’s “conscious sense of responsibility” and lack of legal accountability for a 
sexual orientation that they could not change.  Supporters of decriminalization in the 
ecclesiastical realm might not have been aware of one another’s existence, however, 
since Provost D. H. Grüber of Berlin characterized himself as a lone voice encouraging 
the Protestant Church to embrace rather than spurn homosexuals: 
 
Again and again, I have come across such ill-fated people for whom the universal 
contempt to which they are subjected exacerbates what is already an unfortunate 
predisposition [Anlage].  I am the one who is trying to muster up understanding in 
the church leadership for the tragedy that these people must endure.  When 
conditions have been clarified and things have calmed down, I think that this task 
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Even as Klimmer tried to convince his psychiatric colleagues of the primacy of 
congenital factors in the etiology of a homosexual orientation, Busch and Grüber were 
already certain that same-sex desire stemmed from a constitutionally determined 
predisposition.  But while Klimmer felt that the moment for reform was ripe, Grüber 
echoed the argument of many governmental officials who were inclined to wait until the 
East German political and societal landscape became more settled. 
 
The Complicated Trajectory of Penal Code Reform 
 It would seem as if the SED had decided that the time for reform might be ripe 
after all, since the first Penal Code reform commission in the GDR convened in March 
1952 under the leadership of Supreme Court Vice President Hilde Benjamin.141  Evans 
asserts that “[b]iological explanations of homosexuality, such as those advocated by […] 
Klimmer, while circulating in the West, made little impact on legal definitions of 
deviance in the GDR” given the prevailing emphasis on “social environment, class 
struggle, and material inequality as contributing factors to moral debasement and 
criminality.”142  For a decisive majority of Penal Code reform commission members, 
however, it would seem as if pre-1933 KPD support for decriminalization had not faded 
from their memories.143  They included Supreme Court Judge Ranke, Ministry of Justice 
State Secretary Heinrich Toeplitz (1914-1998), Neue Justiz editor Hans Nathan (1900-
1971), Joachim Renneberg of the Academy for Political Science and Law in Potsdam-
Babelsberg, Supreme Court Vice President Hilde Benjamin, and Gerats, all of whom 
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considered “simple homosexuality (einfache Homosexualität) to be an “abnormal 
corporeal predisposition (eine abnorme körperliche Anlage) for which homosexuals 
could not be held any more responsible than the mentally ill could be for their 
afflictions.”144 
But the congenital basis of a homosexual orientation would ultimately prove to be 
less decisive than an estimation of the “danger” to society posed by certain kinds of 
homosexual acts.  Gerats, Toeplitz, and Renneberg did not see the logic of exempting 
other, similarly “dangerous” sexual “abnormalities” such as masturbation and “certain 
kinds of sexual intercourse” from punishment while imposing penalties on homosexual 
conduct.145  And Toeplitz had not yet heard a single convincing argument regarding the 
harm allegedly posed to society by the sexual acts of men with a same-sex orientation.  
He considered demographic objections to be spurious, since he had firsthand knowledge 
of the fact that forcing gay men to marry straight women invariably resulted in unhappy 
unions rather than offspring.146  Gerats pointed out that if the government justified 
criminal penalties for homosexuals because they could not or would not have children, 
then it would “also have to punish the use of contraceptives, which certainly have played 
a far greater role in lowering the birthrate.”147  Like their predecessors in the Weimar era, 
proponents of decriminalization considered homosexual acts to be harmful and in need of 
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punitive measures only when they involved coercion, profit, and the seduction of legal 
minors.148 
While many commission members ascribed to the view that a homosexual 
orientation had congenital origins, there was no consensus on the issue.  Instead of 
indicating a “failure” of Klimmer’s efforts, however, the internal debates mirrored many 
of Klimmer’s epistolary discussions.  Ranke, for instance, believed that “labile” 
individuals could be tempted to succumb to “perversion” and a deficient work ethic in the 
event of decriminalization.149  Kurt Schumann, President of the Supreme Court, agreed 
with Ranke that while some cases of homosexuality did result from heredity, the 
“overwhelming percentage […] results from seduction, habit, and lack of opportunity [to 
engage in heterosexual intercourse].”150  For this reason, Schumann believed that “[t]he 
value of the penal provision lies in its ability to prevent the initial attempts at same-sex 
sexual acts [gleichgeschlechtlichen Dingen] and thereby protect a portion of the 
population from exposure to such things.”151 
Mette, who was invited to share his psychiatric expertise with the commission, 
recommended decriminalization for “simple” homosexuality and ongoing criminal 
penalties for homosexuality acquired along the vectors outlined by Schumann and Ranke.  
Mette was convinced that “habituation [Gewöhnung]” to homosexuality was more 
common than congenital homosexuality, even though he admitted that he had no data to 
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support this contention and that such figures would be “very difficult to ascertain.”152  
Despite this admission on Mette’s part, Schumann averred that “[t]he explanations of Dr. 
Mette have strengthened my opinion that congenital factors play a very minor role and 
that the question of habituation must be taken very seriously.”153 
 When Gerats challenged Schumann’s view that homosexuals’ aversion to “normal 
sexual intercourse” and “family life” could also interpreted as a “sign of illness,” 
Schumann disagreed, noting that “it is the same as with hereditary drunkards.”154  For 
Schumann, both alcoholism and homosexual conduct warranted punitive measures even 
if they were genetic in origin.  And he had the support of Dr. Gehring, the other medical 
expert invited to testify by the commission, who opined that “even if [homosexuality] 
occurs due to congenital factors […] it should be subject to punishment.”  While 
Klimmer argued that someone could only be “seduced” into homosexuality if she or he 
had a latent homosexual orientation, Gehring was doubtful: “[w]hether the other person 
has the congenital disposition or not—who is capable of making that call?”155  
Ultimately, even Gerats and Benjamin were not absolutely sure about the primacy of 
genetic factors, since they called for the criminalization of “clubs with nude dancing” that 
might provide unwelcome temptation to engage in homosexual licentiousness.156 
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 Schumann felt that criminalization was necessary because the adverse societal 
influences of the recent past continued to make themselves known in the GDR.  He noted 
that “[i]t is well known that unnatural lewdness became widespread at castles of noble 
orders and in the Hitler Youth vacation camps during the Nazi era” and that “[a] large 
proportion of the homosexuality that we still experienced after the war stems from this 
[earlier] era.”  Toeplitz countered that the problem of the spread of homosexuality had 
already been a trenchant trope of Weimar-era discourse.  While he neither confirmed nor 
denied Schumann’s observation about the prevalence of homosexual conduct under 
National Socialism, Toeplitz insisted instead that it was “precisely the Nazis who brought 
their racist views to bear upon this question” and meted out harsher punishments for 
homosexual offenses.157  Thus the Third Reich served as a cautionary tale for both 
Schumann and Toeplitz, but for very different reasons.  While Schumann saw Nazism as 
having eliminated necessary fetters on aberrant salaciousness, Toeplitz warned against 
perpetuating the Nazi crime of penalizing such deviant sexual conduct on grounds 
emanating from racialized population policy. 
 It was thus possible for commission members to agree that “the spread of 
homosexuality is a typical sign of the degeneration of the ruling class” under capitalism 
but to disagree about the implications of this for the GDR.  Lekschas lamented that “[i]t 
is not at all possible for us to have overcome these remnants [of capitalist degeneration] 
during the short time span that separates us from the collapse of fascism” and that it was 
precisely because of the persistence of these remnants from pre-socialist society that the 
Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia had elected to (re-)criminalize homosexual conduct.  
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Gerats also felt it necessary to “combat” these “remnants” of capitalist degeneration, but 
he did not believe that it was advisable to rely upon criminal sanctions in doing so.158 
 As Renneberg noted, “[i]n the Soviet Union we are faced with the fact that the 
penalization of homosexuality was actually introduced belatedly.  There the course of 
development must have been the reverse.  It was the same in Czechoslovakia.”159  Article 
154a of the Soviet Penal Code specified three to five years of incarceration for 
consensual same-sex sexual acts involving adult men, and five to eight years in the 
penitentiary for non-consensual acts involving violence or taking advantage of a 
relationship of dependence.  What Renneberg failed to mention was that this “belated” 
criminalization was that it took effect in 1934, just one year before the Nazi regime made 
§ 175 much more stringent, and constituted a revocation of the decriminalization of male 
homosexual acts that had taken effect in Russia (but not the Soviet republics) in the 
immediate aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917.  By characterizing the Soviet 
legal trajectory as the “reverse” of what the GDR was experiencing, he was also rejecting 
the Soviet model as a template for the East German version of socialist jurisprudence—at 
least when it came to homosexuality. 
 Lekschas emphasized that the moral condemnation of homosexuality was 
necessary and would continue even if consensual same-sex sexual acts involving men 
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were no longer subject to criminal penalty.160  The oft-invoked “moral views of the 
working people” were to serve as the basis for this condemnatory stance.  In order to take 
the pulse of popular opinion, the commission included a few members of the working 
class, but the transcripts of the commission’s deliberations reveal their contributions to 
have been few in number.  More often than not, workers parroted viewpoints expressed at 
greater length by the professional experts on the commission.  Occasionally, however, the 
transcripts yield a more complicated picture, such as when commission member Kant 
spoke of his experiences in working at a book bindery: 
 
there were at least six couples that met each other there--mostly women between 
the ages of 28 and 35.  I allude to this because our colleague mentioned that 
[homosexuality was not as prevalent] among workers than in higher social circles.  
It was good to work with these people.  I am working with women again but have 
not observed [such relationships] anymore.  Society must have developed itself in 
a much better way in this respect.161 
 
 
Kant thus revealed a selective internalization of the viewpoints of his fellow commission 
members.  For one thing, he pointedly refuted the notion that homosexual relationships 
were intrinsically alien to the working class, and that individuals in same-sex 
relationships were harbingers of bourgeois decadence.  But he did not see his lesbian 
colleagues as constituting a biologically distinct minority, since he attributed the recent 
absence of same-sex couplings at his workplace to positive societal influences. 
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 According to Dr. Gehring, however, there were still East German workplace 
environments that were alarmingly conducive to the emergence of same-sex sexual 
relationships.  He cited the example of 
 
nurses who were crammed into the attics of hospitals and lived for long periods of 
time isolated from the rest of society.  There were many cases of lesbian love 
[sehr viele Fälle von lesbischer Liebe] there.  We discovered one such case 
marked by a frightening degree of codependence.  The two partners could do 
nothing unless they were together.162 
 
 
The topic of wayward nurses had already been on the agenda the previous month, and 
Hilde Benjamin had offered a less alarmist assessment of the peril that they posed; she 
recommended thwarting same-sex sexual relationships by letting “nurses live outside the 
hospital or not assign[ing] two nurses to the same room in a hospital.”  She did not 
dispute, however, that same-sex environments constituted “unnatural conditions,” and 
where the dissolution of such conditions was not possible, as in the military, penal 
provisions would continue to be necessary.163  Gehring’s fear stemmed from a larger 
concern, namely that homosexuals would gravitate towards asocial behavior, clique 
formation (Bandenbildung), and even espionage.  It was for this reason that he deemed 
same-sex “codependency” in the workplace to have been more threatening than its 
opposite-sex counterpart.  Such concerns were very much part of the contemporaneous 
West German discourse as well, most notably in Helmut Schelsky’s influential book 
Soziologie der Sexualität (The Sociology of Sexuality).164 
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Toeplitz objected to the aspersions that Gehring cast upon same-sex relationships 
by noting that 
 
these undesirable manifestations of codependence and clique formation by 
homosexuals were produced by these individuals’ social isolation, which was 
itself the result of the penal provision. […] The same kind of relationship of 
codependence can exist between a man and a woman who are engaging in sexual 
relations, such as between a nurse and a doctor in a hospital.  This is a case that is 
just as undesirable, but which has the same consequences.  The socially dangerous 
consequences that are specific to homosexuality are still not apparent to me.165 
 
 
Toeplitz was effectively ventriloquizing Klimmer’s stance that the most deleterious 
consequences of homosexuality were not intrinsic to the phenomenon itself but instead 
the products of criminalization and societal discrimination.  He also echoed Klimmer in 
making the case for the fundamental comparability of homosexual and heterosexual 
relationships, since inappropriate workplace liaisons were apt to offend the populace’s 
moral sensibilities regardless of the gender of the partners involved. 
 As Hilde Benjamin put it, “One must from the outset provide a legal definition of 
that which violates the moral views of the working people.  These views are only harmed 
by that which happens in public.”166 For this reason, Renneberg suggested that the new 
statute on exhibitionism could supplant a statute that targeted homosexual conduct as 
such: 
 
If we define the crime so that we subject homosexuality—simply the homosexual 
relationships themselves—to punishment, then we have specified the offense in a 
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manner that reaches into the most intimate nooks and crannies and thus has 
something of an unreal quality to it. […] Whenever [homosexual] relations appear 
in public and meet with the moral disapproval of the authoritative strata of our 
populace—namely, our working people, who normally have absolutely nothing to 
do with homosexuality—this law [on disturbing the peace] suffices to address 
such phenomena whenever they make their disturbing appearance in our society.  
Beyond this there is no need to pursue this act as a criminal offense with the force 
of our state organs and for those state organs to sniff out where [homosexual] 
relations might exist so that the prosecutorial apparatus is set in motion any time 




Renneberg’s overarching goal was to drive this “egregious custom [Unsitte]” into the 
“darkest corner” where “we can no longer see or grasp it.”168  But unlike Schumann, who 
viewed an all-encompassing legal ban on homosexual acts as a necessary prophylactic, 
Renneberg believed that the law’s “curative” powers were decidedly limited and that it 
could at most keep the more obvious manifestations of homosexual conduct at bay. 
Mette provided Schumann with anecdotal evidence as to why the law’s 
preventative function was so important.  Mette claimed that 
 
[o]n the basis of observations that have been made during the last decades, it 
cannot be doubted that the spread of homosexuality is to be expected if it is not 
restricted by punishment.  Earlier I characterized this tendency with the term 
“fashion.”  During the last few decades, a fairly broad swath of our youth has 
been strongly interested in homosexuality.  We have also had periods in which the 
liability of homosexuality to punishment was only nominal and during which no 
homosexual acts were prosecuted.  I can recall times when we as psychiatrists 
were kept quite busy by this question, when the [gay] bars in Berlin were known 
to be open to everyone and there was a certain romanticism associated with 
spending time there.  We have also had phases during which homosexuality was 
trendy in literary circles.  I call your attention to the brief period of Klausmann 
[sic, presumably referring to Klaus Mann] and his friends during which one 
actually almost characterized homosexuality as a matter of good taste.  This was 
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only a phase for youth.  But it still shows that something like this can occur if one 
lets go of the reins entirely in this domain.169 
 
 
Mette was cautiously optimistic that the GDR might have found another way to ensure 
that homosexuality would never again become “fashionable” for youth, but he still 
counseled vigilance: 
 
I of course must add: when we direct our gaze to the past, we turn it to times 
when there was nothing that could exert a positive influence over youth.  We are 
now for the first time in the midst of a historical development that has a decidedly 
different character.  Perhaps this would serve as a valuable and sufficient source 
of protection for today’s youth.  I do not think that it is impossible for this to be 
the case.  But if one is guided purely by the experiences of the past, then one 
cannot avoid admitting that habituation to homosexuality is possible.170 
 
 
Toeplitz dismissed Mette’s fears about the likelihood of homosexuality regaining 
popularity among youth and also pointed out that § 175 had not served as an effective 
bulwark against such popularity in the past: 
 
It is self-evident that homosexuality could not become fashionable through 
literary or other circles in our [stage of societal] development or in the future.  
Although the old § 175 was rarely or unevenly enforced, one cannot ignore the 




While proponents of criminalization like Ranke were convinced that § 175 would 
continue to exert educational influence and serve as a moral cudgel, Toeplitz preferred to 
rely upon the tutelary impact of moral disapprobation that was not mediated through 
jurisprudence.  Lekschas concurred: 
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I believe that we will retain the moral condemnation of homosexuality as before, 
and in my opinion it will become even more pointed.  If we say nothing about it, 
then homosexuality will be a completely normal societal phenomenon [eine 
durchaus gesellschaftsnormale Erscheinung].  For this reason we must continue 
with the moral condemnation of such things so that these people will isolate 
themselves and be isolated, if only because of the fact that homosexuality is 




How, then, did legal and non-legal disapprobation of homosexuality differ?  The 
proponents of decriminalization asserted that non-legal moral censure would be more 
effective than its legal counterpart had been, but they did not explain why this would be 
the case beyond vague assurances of the power of Communist socialization.  Lekschas’s 
inability to define the advantages of decriminalization more clearly stemmed from his 
own uncertainty about the ramifications of sexual discourse within and beyond the realm 
of the law.  Too little condemnatory talk about same-sex sexual acts might result in 
greater societal acceptance of them, Lekschas feared.  But he was also concerned that too 
much talk about same-sex sexual acts—if generated by the prosecution of “real” 
homosexuals who would otherwise remain “isolated” and thus out of public view—might 
foster the spread of homosexual conduct because the populace would continually be 
reminded of its ongoing existence even under socialism. 
 Not all commission members who favored decriminalization of consensual male 
same-sex sexual acts also endorsed Toeplitz’s and Lekschas’s view that moral 
condemnation would replace legal sanctions for homosexual behavior.  For Nathan, the 
congenital basis of a homosexual orientation meant that homosexual conduct should not 
be subject to criminal sanctions or moral condemnation—unless the rather vague notion 
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of “state necessity” dictated otherwise.  But Nathan did not explicitly state why 
decriminalization would have no discernible effect on the prevalence of homosexual 
behavior.  It would seem as if he was implicitly drawing upon Klimmer’s notion that 
given the ineradicable genetic basis of homosexuality, “real” homosexuals would engage 
in same-sex sexual acts whether they were criminalized or not. 
 Even though Klimmer did not believe that homosexuality was pathological, he did 
try to argue that—given the existing legal framework—homosexuality should be 
considered in legal terms only as a form of mental illness that absolved gay men of 
criminal responsibility on the basis of § 51 of the Penal Code.  According to § 51, a 
person with mental illness that prevented her or him from harboring truly criminal intent 
could not be held legally accountable.  For Klimmer, the existence of a homosexual 
orientation obviated the possibility that gay men were intentionally trying to violate the 
law, and thus should be considered a mental disability in court even though, from his 
perspective as a clinician, it did not warrant that designation.  Klimmer “saw the use of § 
51 not as an ideal solution but as an interim measure until § 175 is eliminated.”173  
Klimmer’s use of § 51 to exonerate “real” homosexuals invited criticism, not least 
because he seemed to be reinforcing the pathologization of homosexuality that he 
otherwise condemned.174  Others worried that if the courts regularly invoked § 51 in § 
175 cases, then punishable homosexual offenses would become the exception rather than 
the rule.  Klimmer certainly would not have objected to such an outcome, and he hoped 
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that it would make the opponents of decriminalization question whether it made sense to 
uphold § 175 at all.175 
Beyond pointing out the usefulness of § 51 as an exculpatory tool, Klimmer 
defended himself against these accusations by noting that medicine and law proceeded 
from different conceptions of illness.  While doctors perceived sexual abnormalities as 
“mere varieties of sexuality that do not stem from illness,” jurists considered mental 
illness, emotional conditions, and disruptions of the drives (Triebstörungen) as mitigating 
circumstances.176  Klimmer insisted that he was not suggesting compulsory psychiatric 
treatment as an alternative to incarceration since he believed that institutionalizing gay 
men was akin to sending them to concentration camps.177  For some members of the 
Penal Code reform commission, the indomitable nature of this drive and thus the 
applicability of § 51 to § 175 trials remained very much an open question.  Ranke, for 
one, wondered whether it was possible for gay men to “control” their impulses.  
Unsurprisingly, Mette noted that it was “rightfully disputed” whether “the pathological 
mental disturbance [of homosexuality] is such that it suspends the will.”178 
 This debate about gay men’s capacity for self-control reflected a more 
fundamental uncertainty over the relationship between gendered characteristics and 
sexual propensities.  Commission members wondered in particular whether gay men and 
lesbians engaged in comparable sexual acts.  If the same-sex sexual behavior of men and 
women was analogous, after all, then how could the commission justify punishing men 
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while exculpating women?  Gerats believed that while there were specific forms of same-
sex sexual conduct that were “just as dangerous when engaged in by women,” he 
reminded his colleagues that this would only matter if the commission voted to retain the 
all-encompassing criminalization of homosexual behavior—and it had already decided 
against doing so.179  Other commission members who joined Gerats in endorsing the 
decriminalization of “simple” homosexuality nonetheless differed from him in 
emphasizing what they took to be fundamental differences between the sexual behavior 
of homosexual men and women.  Toeplitz proclaimed that “[t]he normal form of lesbian 
love consists of reciprocal kissing”—in other words, beyond the scope of any law, 
gender-neutral or otherwise, that focused only on intercourse-like acts.  But Gerats and 
Toeplitz agreed that there was no need for a new version of § 175a to encompass women 
since the absence of intercourse-like sexual acts between women precluded the 
possibility of coerced sexual encounters.180  It is thus all the more surprising that the final 
1952 draft of the law was gender-neutral.181 
 For Klimmer, § 175 was in egregious violation of the constitutional guarantee of 
gender equality before the law, and he made sure that governmental officials were aware 
of this even after deliberations on the 1952 Penal Code draft had ended.  Whether men 
and women engaged in comparable forms of sexual behavior was immaterial; what 
mattered was that men were penalized for same-sex contacts while women were not.  
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Rudolf Reinartz, who headed the Department of Legislative Matters at the Ministry of 
Justice, was of a different opinion.  He was convinced that 
 
there is no connection between the basic principle of equal rights for men and 
women as pronounced by the constitution of the German Democratic Republic 
and the question of the punishment of same-sex intimacy. […] [Instead,] this 
stipulation is designed to ensure equal rights for men and women in political and, 
particularly, in economic life.  The fact that the currently valid version of the 
Penal Code does not threaten punishment for same-sex intimacy between women 
does not at all lead to the conclusion that both sexes have the right to same-sex 
sexual acts on the basis of our constitution.182 
 
 
Reinartz did not elaborate upon the rationale for the differential treatment of men and 
women under the law when it came to same-sex sexual activity, presumably because he 
did not see any reason to question it.  Significantly, he did not believe that the presence 
or absence of criminal penalties necessarily connoted a “right to same-sex sexual acts” 
for members of either gender. 
 Klimmer vigorously rejected Reinartz’s circumscription of the scope of gender 
equality under East German law.  While Klimmer admitted that “political and particularly 
economic rationales might have been deciding factors in introducing the article of the 
constitution devoted to the equality of the sexes, this basic principle of equality is also 
intended to apply to the equal treatment of all matters of life by the law.”183  As he 
reminded Reinartz: 
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How else but with the basic constitutional principle of equality can one overcome 
the old capitalist-patriarchal view of the woman as a working servant and the Nazi 
ideology of the woman as a reproductive machine, both of which are based upon 
the sociological differences between the sexes?  Pointing to the physiological 
differences between the sexes does not get to the heart of the matter either. […] 
As a matter of principle, it is only one’s relationship to one’s sexual partner that is 
at all relevant for criminal law.184 
 
 
In other words, if the government absolved itself of the responsibility to ensure equal 
treatment before the law for men and women when it came to same-sex sexual acts, then 
it could undermine the viability—or at the very least the consistency—of its efforts to 
ensure gender equality in the private sphere more generally.  Furthermore, Klimmer 
alerted Reinartz to the fact that he was calling into question not just the “right” to same-
sex sexual behavior, but also the right of citizens to make claims upon the state on the 
basis of the constitution’s ostensible commitment to gender equality on all fronts.  And 
even though Klimmer linked his campaign for the right to sexual self-determination with 
the SED’s aim to improve the social position of women, he reminded Reinartz that “the 
wording of [Articles 6 and 7 of the constitution] does not imply that only the legal 
provisions that are worse for women than they are for men should be changed and not 
vice versa.”185 
 The 1952 Penal Code reform commission ultimately decided upon the 
decriminalization of consensual same-sex sexual acts involving adult men—so-called 
“simple homosexuality” (einfache Homosexualität).186  In the place of § 175 was § 134, 
which called for a maximum period of seven years of incarceration for male and female 
homosexual acts involving coercion, profit, or legal minors.  § 134 thus replicated the 
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function of § 175a, but omitted reference to male prostitution or taking advantage of a 
relationship of dependence.  § 135 replaced the existing § 183 on exhibitionism, and 
specified punishment for the “unnatural satisfaction of the sexual drive” in a manner that 
infringed upon the “moral sensibilities of the working people.”187  This overlap of law 
and morality was alarmingly evocative of the Nazi emphasis on the “people’s healthy 
sensibility,” but the principle was selectively applied.  The weight of legal and moral 
opprobrium fell most heavily on “unnatural” sexual acts that attracted public notice.  
There had in fact been three versions of § 134 before the final version of the 1952 StGB 
draft was released.  Two iterations made reference to homosexual prostitution, and two 
formulations made use of gender-neutral language—but only the gender-neutral language 
made it to the final draft.188 
 Sensing a lull in legislative momentum, Klimmer hoped to expedite the process of 
reform by appealing to all thirteen political parties’ and mass organizations’ delegations 
as well as all sixteen members of the Legal Committee in the Volkskammer in late 1952 
and early 1953. Although he only heard back from six of the parliamentary contingents 
and from individual committee members rather than the Legal Committee as a whole, the 
responses that he did receive were generally supportive of his stance or at the very least 
expressive of a willingness to forward Klimmer’s recommendations.189 
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Hilde Benjamin assumed the position of Minister of Justice in 1953 when her 
predecessor, Max Fechner, was ousted from office due to his ostensible support for the 
June 17th uprising and his alleged homosexual acts.190  While she had been supportive of 
decriminalizing consensual private same-sex sexual acts involving men during the Penal 
Code reform commission meetings leading up to the 1952 StGB draft, the repeal of § 175 
was clearly not one of her highest priorities.  She had been “of the opinion [already in 
1950] that there are now more important matters for public discussion than § 175.”  She 
thus saw “no need to share with [Klimmer her] opinion on this question, since [Klimmer] 
ostensibly [wished] to make use of it in public discussion.”191  As far as the general 
public was concerned, Benjamin preferred to remain agnostic on the issue of 
homosexuality’s criminal status.  In an effort to overcome Benjamin’s stonewalling, 
Klimmer made an unsuccessful appeal directly to SED First Secretary and head of state 
Walter Ulbricht in March 1954 to “‘occupy himself with the question of homosexuality 
and do what he can to expedite the attainment of a progressive resolution of the 
issue.’”192  Klimmer even wrote to Vladimir Semyonov, the High Commissioner of the 
USSR in Germany, in June 1953 because of a directive that had been issued by the 
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Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in the USSR to revise criminal legal statutes.  He hoped 
to compare his stance regarding the legal status of homosexuality with that of his Soviet 
colleagues, but he apparently did not receive a response.193 
Beyond political calculations, another brake on the process of legal reform was 
ongoing uncertainty about the relationship between socialist jurisprudence and morality.  
Walter Orschekowski, Director of the Institute for Criminal Law at the Karl Marx 
University in Leipzig and a leading member of the Penal Code reform committee devoted 
to sexual offenses, contradicted himself within the space of a single missive.  On the one 
hand, Orschekowski affirmed the congruence of law and prevailing moral standards.  On 
the other hand, he conceded Klimmer’s point that “the liability to punishment of certain 
acts cannot depend upon the morality of the class that is dominant at any given time, even 
though our laws must always conform to the moral views of the dominant class.”194  In 
other words, while all statutes had to be grounded in morality, not all moral standards 
should necessarily manifest themselves in law.  While Orschekowski ultimately agreed 
with Klimmer that sexual acts should be punishable only if they harmed legitimate 
individual or collective interests that were not defined by morality alone, he felt the need 
to defend the East German populace against Klimmer’s insinuation that their moral 
standards were regressive: 
 
To be sure, certain views and traditions stemming from outdated social orders still 
exert influence, albeit only to a degree and generally without great efficacy.  The 
“sin of bodily lust” has long been refuted or restricted by certain religions.  Our 
citizens consider sexual relations between men and women to be fundamentally 
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natural.  Moral censure applies only to those relationships that are contrary to 
legal and customary forms.195 
 
 
Even as Orschekowski challenged the notion that laws should be based on hegemonic 
moral standards, he implied that these standards could serve as a foundation for 
legislation because they emanated from a salutary valuation of heterosexual unions rather 
than small-minded prudishness.  While Orschekowski believed the law could serve as the 
basis for the articulation of moral norms, he neglected to explain its weight relative to 
that of custom, or indeed, what “custom” actually meant in a newly minted socialist 
society. 
 Benjamin reconvened the Penal Code reform commission on August 20, 1958.  
Just a few months later, no less an authority than Minister of Health Max Sefrin 
encouraged Klimmer to share his expertise with the Penal Code reform commission.196  
But Sefrin’s encouragement did not constitute a formal invitation, and such an invitation 
was not forthcoming from the commission itself.  Instead, the subcommittee entrusted 
with formulating sex crime statutes consulted in 1958 with two Leipzig-based doctors, 
Professor Hirschberg and Dr. Weigel.  Both Hirschberg and Weigel effectively 
functioned as surrogates for Klimmer, since they advocated for decriminalization because 
“real homosexuality is not a crime [Verbrechen], but a genetic predisposition [Anlage]” 
and because it was so “uncommon.”197  And Klimmer certainly did not give up putting 
pressure on governmental officials.  In 1959, he tried to enlist the support of Dr. Kurt 
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Hager, who led the doctors’ commission at the Politburo, by noting that “[w]e 
progressive doctors should not shy away from this important societal responsibility”—
namely, bringing about the repeal of § 175.198 
 This new round of deliberations resulted in a setback for Klimmer’s cause in that 
the Penal Code reform commission reversed the decision that its predecessor had reached 
in 1952.  While the subcommittee devoted to sexual offenses once again recommended 
repeal of § 175 in October 1958, the Penal Code reform commission as a whole voted by 
a margin of eleven to six in favor of retaining criminal penalties for “simple” 
homosexuality in 1959.199  While the subcommittee members were not made aware of the 
rationale behind this vote, they took note of the fact that the commission was following 
their recommendation to reduce the maximum period of incarceration for “real” 
homosexuality to two years (with a five-year sentencing ceiling for severe cases).  They 
took this as a tacit admission on the commission’s part of the decreased social danger 
posed by consensual same-sex sexual acts.200  For his part, Renneberg observed that “[i]t 
is already the case that we do not punish a considerable proportion of homosexual acts.  
What matters is singling out the instances that are really harmful to society.”201 
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 There are a number of reasons for the commission’s altered stance during the late 
1950s and early 1960s.  For one thing, the West German Penal Code draft that emerged 
in 1962 after eight years of deliberations retained a statute equivalent to § 175; this might 
have pushed East German lawmakers in a similar direction, even as they supposedly 
disavowed “bourgeois” jurisprudence.202  Some commission members might have 
deemed an emphasis on the inviolability of sexual privacy to have been one of these 
“bourgeois tendencies,” especially as the Soviet Union issued a new Penal Code of its 
own in 1960.203  Foot-dragging continued to play a role as well.  Klimmer’s longtime ally 
Dieckmann advised Klimmer to be patient since the Volkskammer was too busy devising 
the Seven-Year Plan and commemorating the GDR’s tenth anniversary to consider 
reforming § 175 at the time.204 
 Perhaps most significant was the fact that the proponents of decriminalization had 
not succeeded in convincing their opponents that revoking § 175 would not result in the 
dangerous spread of homosexual conduct.  Gerats, a supporter of decriminalization, felt 
that the main task at hand was to “determine the qualifiers that render homosexuality a 
punishable offense”—in other words, to devise a new version of § 175a.205  For military 
attorney Schille, however, the search for appropriate qualifiers was a spurious exercise.  
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He noted that military commanders would greet an alteration of the law with incredulity 
since they viewed it as a necessary bulwark against the proliferation of sexual behavior in 
an all-male environment.206  Dr. Wieck warned of the existence of a club for 
homosexuals in Dresden “into which very labile types can sneak and whose members are 
among the most vigorous proponents of repealing § 175.”  In the face of such impunity, 
Wieck warned that “[h]omosexuals should not be given a carte blanche to do as they 
please [Ein richtiger Freibrief sollte den Homosexuellen nicht in die Hand gedrückt 
werden].”207 
 Faced with this climate of opinion, Klimmer reached out to Karl-Heinz Mehlan, 
Director of the Institute for Social Hygiene at the University of Rostock, who was not 
directly involved in the Penal Code deliberations but who undoubtedly exerted influence 
by virtue of his academic stature.  Like Wieck, Mehlan was adamant that “it is not 
possible to reconcile opening the floodgates [Tür und Tor zu öffnen] to homosexual acts 
with the principles of socialist morality”; as far as he was aware, “such excessive 
permissiveness [Freizügigkeit] does not exist in the jurisprudence of other socialist 
countries.”208  Mehlan’s concerns emanated not only from his understanding of socialist 
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legal and moral principles, but even more so from his belief that “[i]t is difficult to devise 
a well-founded rationale for altering the law without knowing the extent and spread of 
homosexuality in the GDR.  If you strive to achieve this goal, it would be necessary first 
to conduct such surveys.”209  For Mehlan, then, decriminalization was contingent upon 
demonstrating not only that “real” homosexuals constituted a biological minority, but 
also that this minority was small enough not to pose a “threat” to society through the 
untrammeled spread of homosexual conduct under a more “permissive” legal framework.  
Mehlan seemed blithely unaware of the fact that Klimmer had tried in vain to establish 
precisely the kind of Institute for Sexual Research that would have enabled him to gather 
empirical data regarding the size of the homosexual population in East Germany. 
 Klimmer endeavored to convince Mehlan that his fears regarding the potential 
proliferation of homosexual relationships were unfounded: 
 
I have no idea why the spread of homosexuality in the GDR should be any 
different than it was earlier in Germany and is today in other countries.  It would 
certainly be very interesting for scientific purposes to conduct surveys about the 
prevalence of homosexuality in the GDR, but this is not necessary for a well-
founded rationale to change the law.210 
 
 
Like his ally Renn, Klimmer pointed to a different danger, namely the likelihood that if 
the FRG were to decriminalize homosexual acts before the GDR did, East German gay 
men would flee to West Germany in droves and thereby jeopardize the ongoing project of 
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building socialism.  Klimmer tried to convince Mehlan that this kind of mass exodus 
constituted a much greater “threat” than the prospect of the spread of homosexual 
behavior, since it was in the GDR’s own self-interest not to squander the enthusiasm or 
labor power of any of its citizens.211  But Klimmer also posed a more fundamental 
challenge to Mehlan’s conceptual framework.  While he agreed with Mehlan on the need 
to punish adults who had sexual relationships with underage youth, Klimmer insisted that 
“consensual homosexual acts between adults that do not take place in public are most 
certainly not against the principles of socialist morality, or at the very least pose no 
danger to society, and the latter factor should be definitive when it comes to the prospect 
of punishment.”212  In other words, Klimmer conceived of a socialist morality that was 
compatible with the “bourgeois” notion of an inviolable sexual private sphere. 
Dr. Lykke Aresin, one of the GDR’s foremost sexual counselors, lost herself in a 
web of contradictions as she sought to justify her premonition that the repeal of § 175 
would cause “the number of homosexuals [to] increase markedly.”  While she considered 
a propensity towards homosexual conduct to be a latent potentiality in every man, she 
also counseled that “one should not necessarily apply the law in a strict fashion.”  
Selective enforcement, however, would presumably have had a deleterious impact upon 
the government’s ability to keep homosexual conduct in check.  The law did not need to 
apply to female homosexuality, in Aresin’s estimation, because “a woman generally does 
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not stay with a female partner as soon as she has the opportunity to get a male partner.”  
But she also was certain that most men who engaged in same-sex sexual acts in prison 
resumed having carnal relations with women when they were released—an observation 
that contravened her certitude regarding the dangerous resilience in men of an acquired 
propensity for same-sex sexual acts.213 
 Klimmer continually argued that it was unjust to expect “real” homosexuals to 
remain abstinent in order to avoid running afoul of the law.  This was because of the 
distinction he upheld between a blameless homosexual orientation on the one hand and 
potentially blameworthy homosexual conduct on the other hand.  Since bisexuals, for 
instance, were capable of satisfying their sexual drive by engaging in heterosexual sex, 
their legal accountability for same-sex sexual acts was contingent upon the relative 
weight of their heterosexual and homosexual inclinations.  According to this logic, 
heterosexuals who did not have a sexual disorder could be held legally accountable for 
engaging in homosexual conduct since they did not have to engage in such behavior to 
satisfy their sexual drive.214  Hirschberg implicitly ventriloquized Klimmer in the reform 
commission by observing that “[w]e do not want to condemn real homosexuals, but we 
are also not prepared to tolerate everything associated with them.  Is it not possible to 
encompass and punish all who are not truly homosexual with other laws?”215  Aresin, on 
contrast, felt that “real” homosexuals also had other options for satisfying their sexual 
drive, although she did not specify what these might be.  From her point of view, 
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“[h]omosexuals are unfortunate people to be pitied, but one must be able to demand that 
they restrain themselves, since the same is expected of us as far as our sexual drive is 
concerned.”216  She did not see any need to acknowledge that the kind of sexual restraint 
expected of homosexuals and heterosexuals who did not wish to cross the line into 
illegality was of a fundamentally different nature. 
 As in 1952, belief in the congenital origin of homosexuality did not necessarily 
connote unqualified—or any—support for decriminalization.  Lykke Aresin’s husband, 
Professor Norbert Aresin, shared Hirschberg’s stance regarding the congenital origin of 
homosexuality, but he also wanted to avoid “the danger that the populace might come to 
believe that homosexuality was tolerated” if the law were to be repealed.  But since the 
reform commission was supposed to draft legislation that would be suitable for later 
stages of socialist development that would no longer be conducive to the efflorescence of 
homosexuality, he was willing to entertain the notion that a law akin to § 175 might no 
longer be necessary—at some unspecified point in the future.217 
 Just five years after Schille had convinced the Penal Code reform commission of 
the danger posed by the potentially rampant spread of homosexual conduct throughout 
the ranks of the military, Benjamin insisted during a new round of Penal Code reform 
deliberations that “criminal penalties for homosexuality are not needed to protect the 
interests of the military.”218  What had changed?  Grau offers a number of explanations 
for this shift in the government’s stance.  By 1968, he argues, the SED had secured itself 
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politically and economically and thus felt prepared to undertake legislative reform.219  
This alleged self-confidence overrode the SED’s lingering concerns about the 
demographic consequences of decriminalization.220  Grau also maintains that by the mid-
1960s, there was a general consensus among East German doctors and jurists that a 
homosexual orientation had a biological basis and that homosexual conduct was thus not 
necessarily a consequence of moral depravity.  He also asserts that they had come to 
agree that individuals could not necessarily be held criminally accountable for violations 
of socialist morality, and that § 175 had in any event failed to meet its goal of reducing 
the incidence of same-sex eroticism.  Furthermore, it dawned on East German jurists that 
other countries had already decriminalized “simple” homosexuality without adverse 
consequences.221  But Grau himself shows that many jurists and doctors in the GDR 
already held these convictions throughout the 1950s.  Was the consensus regarding these 
factors really that much stronger during the 1960s than it had been in the 1950s?  And if 
so, how exactly does one explain the recrudescence of the spirit of legislative sex reform 
that had waned after its postwar high point in the late 1940s and early 1950s? 
 To address these questions, it is instructive to look at prosecution rates for 
homosexual offenses during the 1940s and 1950s.  Despite widespread concern about the 
upheaval in sexual mores and the spread of venereal disease in the immediate aftermath 
of the war, § 175 was not vigorously enforced in the SBZ.  There were 36 convictions in 
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1946, 46 in 1947, 22 in 1948, and 25 during the first half of 1949.222  By 1957, there were 
89 adult men and 20 youths convicted of violating § 175, while 265 adult men and 6 
minors were found guilty of § 175a-related (sections 1-3) infractions in the GDR.  
Prosecution rates had risen since the occupation period, but remained relatively 
modest.223  During the same year, 81 male adults and youths were found guilty of the 
criminal offense of homosexual prostitution (§ 175a, section 4), whereas 551 women 
were found to have violated restrictions that classified certain forms of heterosexual 
prostitution as a misdemeanor (§ 361).224  As these conviction rates reveal, East German 
authorities were enforcing § 175a with greater vigor than § 175. 
By 1958, numerous historians aver that “[t]he criminalization of [so-called] 
simple homosexuality effectively ended in the GDR” and that authorities continued to 
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enforce only § 175a.225  Why was this the case?  Already in the 1920s, Soviet legal 
theorist Evgeny Pashukanis had “rejected as ideological the central legal role of the 
‘bourgeois subject,’ the willing, rights-oriented individual” and sought to replace it with a 
focus on “social effect rather than individual intent or guilt.”226  This principle manifested 
itself in Article 6 of the Soviet Penal Code and in the promulgation in the GDR on 
December 11, 1957 of the Supplement to the Penal Code (Strafrechtsergänzungsgesetz, 
or StEG), which the reform commission had been considering since 1952.227  According 
to the StEG, an act did not warrant criminal punishment if it had no deleterious effects 
upon individuals, society, or the project of constructing socialism.  This exemption from 
punishment was applicable even if the act in question remained a criminal offense 
according to the letter of the law in the still extant “bourgeois” Penal Code. 
If this edict resulted in a rapid diminution in the number of § 175 prosecutions, 
and it would appear as if it did, then this turn of events constituted a supreme irony.  
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Klimmer, after all, had been advocating for decriminalization on the basis of the 
“bourgeois” concept of homosexual men as rights-bearing individuals.  But it took a 
measure that was supposed to dismantle the very concept of the “bourgeois” rights-
bearing individual in socialist jurisprudence to effectively grant gay men the “right” to 
engage in consensual same-sex sexual acts without facing the prospect of legal censure.  
This paradoxical outcome would only hold true if East German authorities had come to 
agree with Klimmer about the lack of harm to society posed by private homosexual 
conduct.  As the deliberations of the Penal Code reform commission during the late 
1950s revealed, no such unanimity existed.  And in retrospect East German jurists 
admitted that some offenses had retained their criminal status even though they were not 
harmful to society because they had “‘traditionally’ been characterized as a crime” in the 
“historical legal consciousness of the working people.”228  Consequently, it would have 
been “harmful to declare suddenly that such an act is no longer a crime.”  If the StEG had 
rendered § 175 effectively moot, after all, then why did the Penal Code reform 
commission vote to retain the law in 1959?229 
It would appear as if the implementation of § 175 apparently did not come to a 
full stop in 1957.  At the very least, it was not common knowledge that the StEG had 
rendered the prosecutorial implications of the statute largely moot.  Klimmer expressed 
his displeasure that some individuals were still facing § 175 prosecutions in late 1958: 
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I do not know the accused, and I condemn their frequently changing sexual 
partners and their having sex with each other.  But I also disapprove of the fact 
that five people have been detained for months for violating § 175, not § 175a, as 
the investigation unfolds, and that § 175 cases are still being brought to trial in 
this day and age.  Perhaps the atmosphere is more progressive in Berlin, but in the 
rest of the GDR there will still be many such cases.  There are also heterosexuals 
who frequently have sex with changing partners, and their behavior is not liable to 




While Klimmer admitted that the promiscuity of the defendants was far from laudable, he 
also blamed the lingering influence of Dressler and Naundorf’s overly facile equation of 
law and morality for the classification of these men’s behavior as a criminal offense.  
 The StEG was but one component of an unfolding debate among jurists and 
governmental officials regarding the role of criminal law in the ongoing project of 
building socialism.  There was an increasing recognition on the part of jurists that crimes 
were not necessarily a manifestation of counter-revolutionary class-based antagonism 
directed towards society as a whole.  Despite the rallying cries against “bourgeois” 
tendencies at the 1958 Babelsberg conference, the 1960s witnessed a return to a more 
conventional criminological focus on the impact of crimes on individuals.231  With the 
exception of the “qualified” cases of homosexuality involving profit, coercion, or adult-
youth contacts, the impact of homosexual conduct on individuals was negligible and its 
origin was rooted in biology, not ideological backwardness.  It was thus increasingly 
untenable to maintain that “simple” homosexuality accorded with socialist 
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jurisprudence’s understanding of what constituted a criminal offense.232  Significantly, 
this was reflected in the new Czechoslovak Penal Code of 1961, which retained criminal 
penalties only for same-sex sexual acts that involved legal minors, the acceptance or 
furnishing of payment, a relationship of dependence, or disturbing the peace—and East 
German jurists took note of this development.233 
According to the State Secretary for Higher and Vocational Education, no other 
set of East German laws had been drafted with the involvement of so many 
criminologists, psychologists, psychiatrists, and pedagogical experts.234  In other words, 
in the wake of Ulbricht’s New Economic System (NÖSPL), which placed a premium on 
the value of (social) scientific knowledge for socialist governance and economic policy, 
jurists might have been inclined to assign greater weight to expert opinion than to the 
previously much vaunted “moral views of the working people.”235  East German 
lawmakers were doubtlessly also aware of the profound influence exerted in West 
Germany by a 1963 book called Sexualität und Verbrechen (Sexuality and Crime), in 
which the FRG’s foremost legal and sexological experts provided a scathing critique of 
the 1962 West German Penal Code draft’s conflation of moralizing censure with criminal 
law.236 
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It is noteworthy that a November 1963 position paper from the Penal Code 
subcommittee devoted to sexual offenses characterized a homosexual orientation as a 
“biological,” but not a “medical” or “psychiatric” problem.  This was an important 
distinction.  While Orschekowski’s endorsement of decriminalization in the late 1950s 
had been accompanied by his expectation that doctors would be able to alter a 
homosexual orientation, he was far less sanguine about the possibility of a cure by 
1963.237  Most significantly, the research group adopted Klimmer’s, Toeplitz’s, and 
Weber’s stance that even if private, consensual homosexual conduct did not meet with 
the moral approbation of the “working people,” there was no reason to subject it to 
criminal penalties since it did not have any harmful consequences for society.238 
But it is crucial to bear in mind that despite Grau’s assertion to the contrary, there 
was still no consensus regarding the primacy of biological explanations for the etiology 
of homosexuality.239  Just as earlier rounds of deliberations had revealed that belief in the 
congenital origin of homosexuality did not automatically connote support for 
decriminalization, the shift towards support for decriminalization in the 1960s did not 
necessarily entail an abandonment of the seduction hypothesis or an unqualified 
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general explanatory framework that material conditions determine the quality of human life could be easily 
adapted to the apparently ‘material’ facts of biology and the necessity of biological solutions.”  Grossmann, 
Reforming Sex, 74-75. 
 
 214 
endorsement of the genetic basis of same-sex sexual behavior.240  Because Penal Code 
reform commission members believed that “the sexual maturation process can be delayed 
and engaging in homosexual acts can also endanger or thwart the normal course of 
sexual, moral, and character development [even] for young people over the age of 
eighteen,” they agreed in 1964 to set the age of consent for the new law at twenty-one, 
even though the legal age of majority was eighteen.241 
Hinderer opined that “[i]f we extend criminal penalties for same-sex sexual acts to 
women, then we will only provoke discussions in public that would distract people from 
the main issue.  The cases that are pertinent to criminal law involve protecting youth.”242  
But the 1963 research group was critical of the differential treatment of men and women 
under the existing law and called for new legislation that would encompass male and 
female offenders and victims in cases of same-sex “seduction” involving adults and 
youth.243  Thus the decriminalization of male consensual same-sex sexual acts occurred 
alongside the introduction of criminal penalties for women who engaged in homosexual 
behavior that transgressed against individual or societal interests.   
                                                 
240 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 2148 (section of file: Unterkommission IV—Straftaten gegen die 
Persönlichkeit), Straftaten gegen die Persönlichkeit (Vorlage der Unterkommission IV für die 5. Sitzung 
der StGB-Kommission am 17./18. Januar 1964), 22 of document.  By 1970, Klimmer claimed that “[t]he 
notion that one can be seduced into homosexuality stems in large part from homosexuals themselves.  They 
brought up this contention of their own volition in court cases” because they thought it might have 
exculpatory implications.  In other words, the resilience of the seduction hypothesis was at least partially 
attributable to courtroom strategies for outmaneuvering a law designed to prevent homosexual seduction.  
SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Sonderdrücke, Rudolf Klimmer, “Zur Frage des Schutzalters bei 
homosexuellen Handlungen,” Medizinische Klinik.  Wochenschrift für Klinik und Praxis 65, no. 36 
(September 4, 1970), 1603-1606 in the original, 1-11 in transcript, here 2-3. 
241 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 2148 (section of file: UK IV: Straftaten gegen die Persönlichkeit), 
Straftaten gegen die Persönlichkeit (Vorlage der Unterkommission IV für die Sitzung der StGB-
Grundkommission am 17./18. Januar 1964), 22 of document.  The age of protection for § 175a offenses had 
been set at twenty-one in the GDR since 1950; Kowalski, Homosexualität in der DDR, 36. 
242 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 2148 (section of file: UK IV: Straftaten gegen die Persönlichkeit), 
Protokoll über die 5. Sitzung der StGB-Kommission am 17./18. Januar 1964, MdJ, HA Recht, Berlin, 
February 18, 1964, 14 of document. 




 In 1967, Dr. Manfred Hausmann contributed an article to Der Kreis about the 
impending decriminalization of male homosexuality in East Germany.  He informed the 
journal’s international homophile audience that “[t]he new Penal Code of the GDR builds 
upon the latest scientific findings and constitutes extremely significant progress.  As we 
have learned, Dr. Klimmer’s book Die Homosexualität […] was made available to the 
Ministry of Justice and the commission responsible for Penal Code reform.”244  The 
implication was that Klimmer’s campaign had not been in vain even though he had never 
been offered a seat at the proverbial table.  Klimmer expressed frustration at the many 
setbacks that he encountered during the course of his campaign, but he acknowledged 
that “[t]he minimum sentence of six months was eliminated from the final version [of § 
151, the law that replaced both § 175 and § 175a], and the possibility of probation was 
added.  So I did accomplish something after all.”245  Klimmer was decidedly less 
sanguine, however, about the societal ramifications of the elimination of § 175: “Nothing 
has actually changed for homosexuals since the reform of the paragraph.  There are no 
                                                 
244 SchA, Klimmer NL, Publikationen von Dr. med. Rudolf Klimmer über Homosexualität, Manfred 
Hausmann, “Strafrechtsreform in der DDR,” Der Kreis 35, no. 3 (1967), 6.  The Bolsheviks in the 
immediate aftermath of the October Revolution of 1917 had also relied upon scientific authority to justify 
decriminalization; they had come to accept that “the male homosexual might be a harmless human 
variant—or an anomaly medicine might correct.”  Dan Healey, “Unruly Identities: Soviet Psychiatry 
Confronts the ‘Female Homosexual’ of the 1920s,” in Gender in Russian History and Culture, 1800-1990, 
ed. Linda Edmondson (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 116-138, here 124. 
245 Derra, “Sexualforscher in der DDR,” 20.  § 151 classified male and female same-sex sexual activity 
between an adult and a legal minor under the age of eighteen as a criminal offense.  This meant that East 
German women could be penalized for same-sex sexual activity for the first time.  It is also important to 
bear in mind that the age of consent for opposite-sex sexual encounters remained at fourteen.  The Penal 
Code reform commission might have rejected the notion of “homosexual ‘seduction’ as ‘absurd’ [by 1968,] 
[…] [b]ut [it] still felt the need to ‘protect’ those between 14 and 18” from same-sex seduction without 




homosexual periodicals and no homosexual bars.  The state of affairs is depressing.”246  
Decriminalization of consensual homosexual acts did not connote governmental tolerance 
of same-sex sexual activity, and societally enforced taboos remained very much in place 
after 1968.247  But the same could be said about the decriminalization of homosexual 
conduct in most other European countries at the time.  During the 1960s, the government 
began providing financial support for the research of endocrinologist Günter Dörner into 
the possibility of preventing the development of a homosexual orientation by adjusting 
the hormonal balance in utero.  Klimmer’s tepid and belated critique of Dörner was 
particularly striking given his earlier stance on the impossibility of devising a cure for a 
homosexual orientation.248 
Klimmer would have been heartened to learn that respect for sexual privacy 
ultimately played a decisive role in East German legislators’ decision to overturn § 175.  
                                                 
246 Derra, “Sexualforscher in der DDR,” 20.  While this was in large part due to the SED’s ban on 
autonomous activism, it also was intended to mitigate “the presumably negative consequences of any 
‘popularization’ of homosexuality” that might have accompanied decriminalization.  Grau, “Sozialistische 
Moral und Homosexualität,” 119.  Evans agrees that “[d]ecriminalization had hardly challenged the social 
stigma that the heteronormative gaze attached to the allegedly deleterious impact of same-sex acts on 
fragile adolescent sexuality and the maintenance of family-based male social roles,” but she nonetheless 
contends that “efforts at controlling sexual desire backfired in significant ways, enabling subcultural self-
determination and emboldening citizens after 1968 to take the regime to task for failing to live up to the 
spirit of the new law.”  Evans, “Decriminalization,” 564, 554. 
247 Hans Szewczyk, “Die Begutachtung der Zurechnungsfähigkeit” (1966), 48 as quoted by Kowalski, 
Homosexualität in der DDR, 35.  A similar point has been made in Evans, “Decriminalization,” 561; 
Joachim S. Hohmann, ed., Sexuologie in der DDR (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1991), 20; Grau, “Sozialistische 
Moral und Homosexualität,” 104; McLellan, Love in the Time of Communism, 118. 
248 Florian G. Mildenberger, “Socialist Eugenics and Homosexuality in the GDR: The Case of Günter 
Dörner,” in After The History of Sexuality: German Genealogies With and Beyond Foucault, eds. Scott 
Spector, Helmut Puff, and Dagmar Herzog (New York: Berghahn, 2012), 216-230.  “Klimmer, who knows 
Dörner personally, states that Dörner is basically uninterested in sexuality and only makes his extravagant 
claims in order to receive research funding.”  Steakley, “Gays under Socialism,” 18; Kowalski, 
Homosexualität in der DDR, 38, fn 1.  As late as 1976, Klimmer continued to hedge in his assessment of 
Dörner’s findings: “There is probably something to Dörner’s research, but I seriously doubt that its 
implications can be generalized and applied to all gay men.”  Derra, “Sexualforscher in der DDR,” 20.  
Klimmer’s awareness of a long history of unsuccessful experiments involving the role of embryonic 
development, family history, hormones, and brain structure in the etiology of a homosexual orientation 
might have influenced his response to Dörner’s work.  SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: HE-DDR, Rudolf 
Klimmer, “Die Homosexualität,” April 30, 1947, 5 of document. 
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As Hans Szewczyk, Professor of Psychology at the Charité in East Berlin, commented in 
retrospect: 
 
In the discussion of the new Penal Code promulgated in 1968, legislators 
recognized the necessity of staying out of the private lives of citizens and 
subjected only those sexual acts to criminal penalty that imperiled human 
development, such as rape or the homosexual seduction of youth.  Trends in 
sexual offenses since then have confirmed the legislators’ wisdom.  Sexual 
misconduct (Fehlverhalten) cannot be overcome with punishment, but instead 




From this perspective, it becomes easier to understand why the 1968 Penal Code imposed 
harsher criminal penalties for heterosexual prostitution.  At first glance, the “progressive” 
approach to homosexuality and the “repressive” stance towards prostitution would seem 
to have been at odds with one another.  But if viewed from the standpoint of the 
perceived need to respect the private sphere in the GDR, they were in fact quite 
compatible: prostitution required more stringent regulation precisely because it was a 
public phenomenon, whereas consensual same-sex sexual acts that remained within the 
confines of their practitioners’ four walls seemed less threatening to society as a whole.250 
 
The Resonance of Klimmer’s Ideas in West Germany 
                                                 
249 Hans Szewczyk, “Die Entwicklung des Sexualverhaltens,” Deine Gesundheit 12 (December 1983), 356-
359, here 357. 
250 The harsher stance regarding heterosexual prostitution in the 1968 Penal Code constitutes a decisive 
shift from the opinion professed during the late 1950s by the research group on sexual offenses, which 
judged same-sex prostitution more harshly: “One cannot equate homosexual and heterosexual prostitution.  
Whereas the latter involves partners having sex in a manner of which we approve (the only thing of which 
we do not approve is how and by what means the partners enter into a sexual relationship), the former 
entails sexual acts that in their form are contrary to the views of the working people and on top of that are 
not based upon a sexual deviation [Verirrung] on the part of the male prostitute.”  BArch Berlin-
Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 2376, Die Sexualverbrechen (Bericht der Leipziger Unterkommission für die StGB-
Grundkommission am 20. Februar 1959), 5 of document, 546 of archival file. 
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 Klimmer also sought to influence the course of Penal Code reform in West 
Germany, most likely because he hoped that a change in West German policy regarding 
homosexuality would place pressure upon the GDR to follow suit.  In some ways, this 
task was an easier one.  In addition to the existence of the DGfS as an umbrella 
organization for West German sexologists, the impetus to reform § 175 received support 
at national conferences of West German jurists and lawyers in 1951 and 1953, 
respectively.251  Klimmer implored the organizers of the International Conference of 
Jurists that met in Brussels in October 1953 and in Vienna in 1954 to do the same.252 
 As with his efforts in East Germany, Klimmer made the dissemination of his own 
writings the lynchpin of his campaign and cast a wide net in order to reach as many 
potentially influential supporters of his cause as possible.  None other than the West 
German Minister of Justice Thomas Dehler (1897-1967) had read Klimmer’s 1950 Neue 
Justiz article regarding the penalization of homosexuality “with interest” and would take 
Klimmer’s views into account during the course of Penal Code reform deliberations.253  
As a member of the Free Democratic Party (FDP), Dehler was presumably more open to 
decriminalization than were his more socially conservative Christian Democratic 
governmental coalition partners.  And even though only about a year had transpired since 
the founding of the FRG in May of 1949 and the prospect of unification did not seem 
impossible, it is noteworthy that the West German Minister of Justice would have been 
willing to consult an East German legal periodical not merely to keep tabs on the tenor of 
                                                 
251 Schäfer, Widernatürliche Unzucht, 82-86.  The leadership of Karl Siegfried Bader, Director of the 
Institute of Criminology at the University of Freiburg, was decisive in fostering these developments. 
252 Grau, “Ein Leben im Kampf,” 59. 
253 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Auszüge aus Briefen, letter from Thomas Dehler, Bundesminister der Justiz, 
Bonn, to Rudolf Klimmer, Dresden, June 22, 1950. 
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discussion in the GDR but indeed to serve as a potential basis for conceptualizing the 
nature of West German Penal Code reform.  Dehler’s willingness to consider Klimmer’s 
point of view is particularly striking given that the Federal Supreme Court 
(Bundesgerichtshof) had just confirmed the continued validity of the Nazi versions of § 
175 and § 175a and rejected the argument that § 175 contravened the constitutional 
guarantee of the free development of one’s personality.254 
 Despite the societal opprobrium faced by homosexuals at the time, Dr. Günter 
Less, an Associate Judge (Oberlandesgerichtsrat) at the State Supreme Court in 
Erlangen, believed in 1950 that “resistance to such a repeal [of § 175]—in contrast to § 
218 [the law that criminalized abortion]—would be much less pronounced than is 
commonly assumed.”  Since Less was convinced that Germans were ultimately more 
likely to consider abortion than homosexuality to be intrinsically harmful to society, he 
considered it “all the more [regrettable] that legislative bodies are not making any attempt 
to undertake reform [of the law].” 255  Unlike Klimmer, Less explicitly associated the 
quest to eliminate legal intrusions into private, consensual sexual life with the attempt to 
allow women to make reproductive decisions unfettered by analogous forms of legal 
proscription.  Klimmer’s failure to do likewise is curious since opposition to both § 175 
and § 218 had been key features of pre-1933 sex reform.  Moreover, legislators in the 
various regional governments that made up the Soviet Occupation Zone passed a panoply 
of laws that reflected a willingness to consider loosening legal restrictions on abortion.  
But since these statutes were primarily intended as a response to the epidemic of rape of 
                                                 
254 Schäfer, Widernatürliche Unzucht, 116; Herzog, “Sexuality, Memory, Morality,” 250. 
255 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Auszüge aus Briefen, letter from Günter Less, Oberlandesgerichtsrat, 
Erlangen, to Rudolf Klimmer, Dresden, March 6, 1950. 
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German women by Soviet soldiers, Klimmer presumably did not consider their 
promulgation as an auspicious precedent for reforming other sex crime laws.256  While 
Klimmer was eager to point out the injustice of penalizing male but not female 
homosexuals, he did not explicitly equate gay men’s right to sexual self-determination 
with women’s right to reproductive decision-making.  But when it came to the 
importance of having legal provisions regarding homosexuality reflect the constitutional 
guarantee of gender equality before the law, Klimmer and Less were in full agreement.  
Later that same year, Less reported to Klimmer that he and others had submitted a 
position paper to the West German Bundestag arguing for the incommensurability of § 
175 with the Constitution’s guarantee of the unfettered development of one’s personality 
and condemnation of legal discrimination on the grounds of gender; Less’s support of 
Klimmer’s cause thus went beyond epistolary concurrence alone.257 
As in the GDR, some high-ranking West German officials were far less 
sympathetic to Klimmer’s appeal, whether because they disagreed with his stance or 
because they felt that there were more pressing matters demanding their attention.  In 
1952, for instance, Klimmer reached out to Gustav Heinemann, former Federal Minister 
of Internal Affairs and future Minister of Justice and President of the FRG, but 
Heinemann professed ignorance about § 175: “[E]ven though I am a lawyer, I have spent 
the bulk of my vocational life in mining and did not experience any such things in that 
capacity.”  Apparently, Heinemann shared the view of many in the SED that a working-
                                                 
256 Atina Grossmann, “Pronatalism, Nationbuilding, and Socialism: Population Policy in the SBZ/DDR, 
1945 to 1960,” in David E. Barclay and Eric D. Weitz, eds., Between Reform and Revolution: German 
Socialism and Communism from 1840 to 1990 (New York: Berghahn, 1998), 443-465, here 453. 
257 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Auszüge aus Briefen, letter from Günter Less, Oberlandesgerichtsrat, 
Erlangen, to Rudolf Klimmer, Dresden, August 3, 1950. 
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class milieu like the mining industry was devoid of the taint of homosexual conduct.  
Heinemann expressed no interest in immersing himself in the topic given that all of his 
time and efforts were devoted to the Emergency Association for Peace in Europe 
(Notgemeinschaft für den Frieden Europas).258 
 When Klimmer learned that efforts to reform the Penal Code were underway in 
West Germany in 1953, he wrote to the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe in the 
hope of influencing the course of the discussion.  He received nothing more than a formal 
acknowledgment of receipt of his missive.259  The Bundestag’s Criminal Law 
Commission rebuffed his overtures in 1956 as well.260  When the Federal Constitutional 
Court needed an expert witness for a seminal 1957 trial regarding the constitutionality of 
§ 175, it turned to Giese instead.  Despite his earlier support for decriminalizing 
consensual same-sex sexual acts among men, Giese did not use his testimony to try to 
convince the judges that Paragraph 175 should be abolished or even significantly 
reformed.  Instead, he emphasized that the biological differences between women and 
men translated into profoundly different sexual tendencies, making it far more likely that 
male homosexuals would cross the line that separated innocuous “deviance” from 
dangerous “perversion.”261  Since he presumed that the maternal instinct was sufficient to 
                                                 
258 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Briefe prominenter gesellschaftlicher Vertreter über § 175 und 
Homosexualität, letter from Gustav Heinemann, ehemaliger Bundesminister des Innern der BRD, to Rudolf 
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year for Heinemann.  After having left the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), he founded his own 
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in the way of electoral support, Heinemann dissolved it in 1957 and joined the SPD.  Jörg Treffke, Gustav 
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prevail over any degree of same-sex sexual temptation for women, Giese felt that it was 
necessary to preserve criminal penalties for men, who were more likely to be seduced 
into engaging in homosexual conduct and to self-identify as homosexual thereafter.  
Giese believed that punishment could “support [a homosexual man] on the path to self-
control” even as he also recognized that the all-male environment of prison made one run 
“the risk of strengthening the preference for the same sex.”262 
 By the late 1960s, however, West German policymakers could not help but notice 
the impetus towards decriminalization in the GDR.  West German jurist Ernst-Walter 
Hanack mentioned the East German reform to his colleagues at a conference in 
September 1968 with the unstated implication that the FRG should follow suit.  While the 
repeal of § 175 in the GDR was certainly not the only reason why the West German 
Penal Code of 1969 no longer contained a statute akin to § 175, it provided a precedent 
for a paradigm shift in a century’s worth of German jurisprudence regarding 
nonprocreative sexual acts.263  Indeed, Josie McLellan maintains that one of the reasons 
why the East German government assented to the decriminalization of consensual adult 
homosexual acts was because of its desire to be “‘world-leading,’” in this regard as in 
many others.264  East German governmental officials, however, were not particularly 
keen to draw attention to the magnitude of this reform.  When Klimmer submitted articles 
for publication in East German periodicals that were intended to influence the course of 
                                                                                                                                                 
251-284, here 267; Heineman, What Difference Does a Husband Make?, 230-231; Grau, “Im Auftrag der 
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West German and Austrian Penal Code reform in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
Professor Karl Leonhard, co-editor of Psychiatrie, Neurologie und medizinische 
Psychologie, told him that positing the GDR as more advanced than its capitalist 
neighbors when it came to sexual jurisprudence would not enhance East Germany’s 
standing in the international community.265 
 
Conclusion 
Klimmer’s campaign to eliminate legal and societal discrimination against gay 
men demonstrates that “[t]here were always groups and individuals in the GDR who were 
prepared to embrace Rosa Luxemburg’s maxim that true freedom meant the freedom to 
think differently.”266  Klimmer managed to negotiate participation in disparate social 
worlds.  He kept one foot in the SED state-socialist system that frequently sought to 
marginalize him, and another in a hidden world of men-loving men who deemed 
Klimmer to be their “den mother” (Landesmutter).267  But it was perhaps precisely 
because of Klimmer’s situatedness in a relatively inconspicuous polyclinic that he could 
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risk sending missives marked by a surprising degree of importunity and directness to 
governmental officials without having been subject to the kind of legal or professional 
sanctions endured by his compatriots in the FRG and the U.K.268  In lifting the veil of 
silence from Nazi persecution against gay men, Klimmer forced the VVN to grapple with 
the meaning of non-political victimization for its self-ascribed antifascist stance.  When 
confronted with SED jurists who insisted on the congruence of morality and law and the 
necessity of protecting youth and society at large from supposedly harmful homosexual 
acts as pillars of socialist jurisprudence, Klimmer reminded them that these ideas were 
instead hallmarks of the “bourgeois” and National Socialist legal legacies they were 
seeking to overcome.  Paradoxically, moving beyond these bequeathals would entail the 
perpetuation of the “bourgeois” distinction between the public realm and an inviolable 
private sphere for consensual sexual activity—at least when it came to homosexual 
conduct. 
By revoking § 175 in 1968, the SED belatedly revived the legacy of progressive 
sex reform of its KPD predecessor and conceded a place for the respect of (homo)sexual 
privacy in socialist jurisprudence.  Since the reform received little in the way of publicity 
and was not accompanied by a shift in governmental rhetoric on homosexuality, however, 
the SED’s ability to lay claim to a sexual conservatism that would appeal to the presumed 
philistinism of the “working people” remained undiminished.  Whether in the repeal of § 
175 that dared not speak its name or in the clandestine influence that Klimmer exerted 
                                                 
268 SchA, Klimmer NL, folder: Briefwechsel Dr. Klimmer + Originaltext der Grabrede für Dr. Rudolf 
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over the Penal Code reform process, “progressive” sex reform could have a place in the 
GDR as long as it remained invisible.
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CHAPTER 4. THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF GENDER EQUALITY: 




“West Germans knew that marital status should divide women, even if it did not always 
do so.  East Germans knew that marital status did not have to divide women, even if it 
usually did.” (Elizabeth Heineman)1 
 
  
 When addressing the unintended consequences of the government’s legal and 
rhetorical commitment to gender equality (Gleichberechtigung) in the GDR, existing 
scholarship has typically pointed to the failure of the SED to overcome entrenched 
patterns of gender inequality within and beyond the home.2  Even though female 
workforce participation reached historically unparalleled heights in the GDR and the 
SED continually exhorted workers of both sexes to enhance their vocational 
qualifications, many women were unable to advance beyond jobs with lower levels of 
remuneration.  Few women reached the upper echelons of the SED’s own party 
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apparatus—and this was but one manifestation of the discrepancy between the party’s 
rhetorical celebration of gender equality and its failure to abide by its own principles in 
practice.  The problem was not confined to the world of work and formal politics: 
attaining parity in the gendered distribution of childrearing and housework 
responsibilities in the domestic realm remained an elusive goal as well. 
 Even though governmental officials frequently proclaimed that gender equality 
had been a fait accompli practically from the founding moments of the GDR, the amount 
of internal dissent about what such equality would entail was more extensive than 
scholars have heretofore acknowledged, especially when it came to non-work-related 
topics.  The lack of a clear-cut ideological playbook for gender roles in the socialist 
family provided discursive space for disparate viewpoints.  In its official 
pronouncements, the SED considered the removal of the legal and societal opprobrium 
attendant upon unwed motherhood as an important step in the path towards gender 
equality.  One significant legal instantiation of gender inequality had been the divergent 
age of marital consent for men and women ever since the establishment of civil marriage 
by Chancellor Otto von Bismarck in 1875.  Whereas the Civil Code (Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch, or BGB, devised in 1900 and still in effect in postwar West Germany), the 
1938 National Socialist marriage law, and the occupying Allies’ February 20, 1946 
Control Advisory Law (Kontrollratsgesetz) Number 16 had all set the age of marital 
consent (Ehemündigkeitsalter) at sixteen for women and twenty-one for men, § 1 of East 
Germany’s Marriage Ordinance (Eheverordnung, or EheVO), which went into effect on 
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November 29, 1955, set the age of nubility at eighteen for both men and women.3  This 
reform was part of a larger transformation in which women’s standing under civil law 
would no longer be contingent upon their marital status, as had been the case under the 
BGB of 1900.4  While many observers have criticized the SED for having failed to abide 
by its rhetorical commitment to gender equality, the new age of marital equality was an 
important instance in which the regime backed its promise of equality not merely with 
words, but with the power of the law. 
 This reform did not meet with universal approbation, as this chapter will reveal 
through a detailed analysis of epistolary correspondence between East German citizens 
and officials at the Ministry of Justice during the 1950s and 1960s.5  Resistance to the 
                                                 
3 The BGB’s provisions on marriage ((§§ 1303-1322) allowed young women under the age of sixteen to 
receive a waiver with their fathers’ permission, but they did not extend this option to young men who 
wished to marry before turning twenty-one.  The law did, however, allow men to submit a petition to be 
designated as a legal adult at the age of eighteen instead of twenty-one and thereby circumvent the 
prohibition on “underage” marriage.  See Gabriele Czarnowski, Das kontrollierte Paar: Ehe- und 
Sexualpolitik im Nationalsozialismus (Weinheim: Deutscher Studien Verlag, 1991), 67.  § 3 of the 
Kontrollratsgesetz Number 16 continued to allow young women to receive a waiver to marry below the 
official age of marital consent with the consent of their parents or legal guardians; see BArch Berlin-
Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1335, Band 2, letter from Herbert Wächtler, Ministerium der Justiz (hereafter MdJ), 
Berlin, HA Gesetzgebung, to Genosse Händler, Ministerium für Volksbildung in Berlin, Abt. 
Jugendhilfe/Heimerziehung, December 20, 1957, 152 of archival file; BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 
9743, Aktenvermerk, Sachbearbeiter Göhring, Rat des Kreises Neuhaus am Rennweg, Abteilung Innere 
Angelegenheiten, Bevölkerungspolitik und Personenstandswesen (hereafter PSW), March 18, 1957, 
unpaginated; Ute Schneider, Hausväteridylle oder sozialistische Utopie?: Die Familie im Recht der DDR 
(Cologne: Böhlau, 2004), 203.  According to Schneider, the GDR’s Family Law Code reform commission 
had advocated raising the age of marital consent to eighteen for women already in 1951.  After prompting 
from Soviet authorities in 1953, the measure appeared in the 1954 draft of a new Family Law Code 
(Familiengesetzbuch, hereafter FGB) and became one of its most talked-about provisions.  See Schneider, 
Hausväteridylle, 168, 203-204. 
4 Indeed, “[i]ndependent single women did not have a fixed place in the German social order” under the 
BGB of 1900.  See Catherine L. Dollard, The Surplus Woman: Unmarried in Imperial Germany, 1871-
1918 (New York: Berghahn, 2009), 24.  
5 Article 33 of the GDR’s Constitution and § 17 of the Law for the Protection of Mother and Child and the 
Rights of Women stipulated the legal equality of children born in and out of wedlock.  De facto legal 
inequality stemmed from the fact that a child born out of wedlock had only a biological relationship with 
her or his father, whereas a child born in wedlock had both legal and societal advantages conferred upon 
her or him by virtue of being part of a legally recognized family from birth: BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, 
DO1 14398, Bericht über die Ergebnisse der Diskussion zum Entwurf des FGB auf der Arbeitstagung im 
MdJ, October 19, 1954, 24-25 of document. 
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destigmatization of unwed motherhood was more widespread in the populace than the 
SED was willing to admit.  Savvy petitioners not infrequently recast their opposition to 
nonmarital parenthood in more “ideologically correct” terms that they thought would find 
greater resonance among East German officials, who typically upheld the constitutional 
guarantee of equality for children born in and out of wedlock even when they harbored 
personal qualms about it.  Eliminating the disadvantageous legal status for children born 
out of wedlock was a goal that the East German government shared with both its Weimar 
and National Socialist antecedents, although the SED did not make explicit mention of 
this continuity.6 
The archival record of correspondence between citizens and governmental 
officials that forms the source base for this chapter is admittedly more likely to reveal the 
viewpoints of the aggrieved than those of the contented.  That said, it is still striking how 
the stipulation in § 1 of the GDR’s 1955 Marriage Ordinance that both prospective 
spouses had to be at least eighteen years of age in order to get married sparked a flurry of 
correspondence from aggrieved parents and from underage marital aspirants.  In raising 
the age of consent for women embarking upon marital unions, the government intended 
to prevent hastily contracted marriages that all too often ended in divorce.  In the spirit of 
abiding by the stipulated equality of men and women before the law, officials sought to 
ensure that young women were able to provide fully informed consent to marital unions 
rather than having typically older male partners or parents offer such consent on their 
                                                 
6 In 1944, Stalin eliminated equality for children born in and out of wedlock; the fact that the GDR did not 
follow his lead demonstrates that the GDR did not necessarily follow the USSR’s example as far as family 
law was concerned.  See Schneider, Hausväteridylle, 32. 
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behalf.  It would no longer be the father’s role to “give away” his daughter in marriage.7  
The idea was that marriages to which the female partners offered fully informed consent 
would prove to be more resilient and equitable.8 
For many of these young women, however, it seemed as if the state had usurped 
the role of parents and fiancés in dictating the terms under which prospective brides could 
contract a marriage.  This perception would ostensibly lend credence to Ute Schneider’s 
contention that family law reform led to a “de-differentiation” (Entdifferenzierung) of 
state, family, and society in the GDR.  Her own account, however, provides numerous 
examples in which this was not the case.9  For instance, Schneider has identified the 
ongoing salience of the “bourgeois” public-private divide in East Germany as one of the 
“limits of dictatorship” (Grenzen der Diktatur), and that even the new “socialist” family 
law ultimately served to reinforce this divide.  In other words, the legal tools that were 
supposed to enable further state intervention into familial life also made manifest the 
limits of the possible scope of such intervention.10  In light of this aspect of Schneider’s 
argument, it is all the more curious that she does not call more strongly into question her 
adherence to the idea that state and society collapsed into one another in the East German 
polity. 
                                                 
7 By way of comparison, it took until 1957 for the West German Bundestag to end husbands’ authority over 
their wives and grant wives considerable property rights.  Even at this point, however, the Bundestag 
reaffirmed the husband’s role as the sole legal representative of his family and the supremacy of paternal 
authority in childrearing decisions.  Heineman, What Difference Does a Husband Make?, 148. 
8 The number of divorces in the GDR dropped from 49,860 in 1950 to 23,167 in 1958, but the divorce rate 
remained high when compared with that of comparable countries.  Harsch, Revenge of the Domestic, 204; 
Lothar Mertens, Wider die sozialistische Familiennorm: Ehescheidungen in der DDR 1950-1989 (Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1998).  For more on divorce law in the GDR, see Chapter 5. 
9 Schneider, Hausväteridylle, 264, 267.  Schneider has adopted the term Entdifferenzierung from a 
monograph that has been very influential for practitioners of East German history: Sigrid Meuschel, 
Legitimation und Parteiherrschaft in der DDR: Zum Paradox von Stabilität und Revolution in der DDR, 
1945-1989 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992).  
10 Schneider, Hausväteridylle, 351-352. 
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The implementation of family law reform instead highlighted key differences of 
opinion between state and society regarding the tenor of family life under socialism.  
Many women did not agree with the SED that waiting to get married, especially when a 
child was on the way, constituted a form of female self-empowerment.  Officials had 
expected some parents and male relatives to cling to old marital norms out of the desire to 
protect their “traditional” prerogatives, but they did not believe that young women would 
so frequently consider it in their own interest to do so as well. 
Leonore Ansorg and Renate Hürtgen highlight the “myth” of female emancipation 
in the GDR by criticizing those scholars who blame the “failure” of the state’s 
emancipatory policies on the backward and patriarchal behavioral patterns on the part of 
both men and women in domestic life.  Ansorg and Hürtgen reject this tendency to blame 
East Germans themselves for being insufficiently enlightened to carry out the 
government’s goal of achieving gender parity: “It is not the contradiction between legal 
or political developments and their unrealized potential that led to a lack of emancipation 
in the GDR, but rather the very contradictory nature of this possibility or claim itself.”11 
Was the emancipation of East German women doomed from the start?  According 
to Donna Harsch, “[i]nternal documents [from the Occupation Zone period of 1945-1949] 
confirm that ‘proletarian anti-feminism’ survived the Third Reich: women were assumed 
to be apolitical at best, retrograde at worst; religious and under clerical sway; and 
blinkered by short-term, family-bound concerns”—in other words, Harsch makes the 
argument about the purported backwardness of the East German people that Ansorg and 
                                                 
11 Ansorg and Hürtgen, “Myth of Female Emancipation,” 168. 
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Hürtgen have refuted.12  From Harsch’s interpretive vantage point, improving East 
German women’s socialist consciousness was not just a matter of strengthening their 
level of engagement with the formal political process.  SED officials equated political 
backwardness with an exclusive focus on familial considerations at the expense of other 
priorities.  Since they considered the family a female domain, they also believed that 
overcoming women’s political backwardness was essential to overcoming the resilience 
of atavistic moral standards on familial life and sexual mores.  In other words, East 
German “proletarian anti-feminism” assumed that women were guilty until proven 
innocent when it came to espousing outmoded political and religious ideals about family 
life.  But as Mark Fenemore has noted, figures like relationship advice book author 
Rudolf Neubert who sought to overcome such obsolete attitudes more often than not 
found themselves thwarted by the petty-bourgeois mindset of other East German men: 
 
In his autobiography, Neubert makes clear that he faced an uphill struggle in 
trying to challenge the “old male dominance” of the 1950s and 1960s.  He 
received much criticism from functionaries who (paradoxically) accused him of 
being a petit bourgeois for wanting to explore issues of “domestic living 
arrangements, the distribution of burdens in the household or even techniques of 
loving” that they considered to be “beneath” what a socialist should be striving 
for.13 
                                                 
12 Donna Harsch, “Approach/Avoidance: Communists and Women in East Germany, 1945-9,” Social 
History 25, no. 2 (May 2000), 156-182, here 157. 
13 Mark Fenemore, Sex, Thugs and Rock ‘n Roll: Teenage Rebels in Cold-War East Germany (New York: 
Berghahn, 2007), 26; see also Mary Fulbrook, The People’s State: East German Society from Hitler to 
Honecker (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 141.  Such attitudes were not unique to socialists in 
the GDR; as Geoff Eley has noted about the European socialist milieu more generally, “Though the 
socialist tradition consistently upheld an ideal of women’s emancipation, and explicitly linked the franchise 
to a broader program of economic reform, in a combination of women’s productive employment and 
socialized services, in practice socialists equally consistently assimilated women’s interests to the ideology 
of the male breadwinner and the family wage, within a model of the male headed household and the 
respectable working-class family.  Because socialists participated in this way in gendered languages that 
remained hegemonic, they were capable of both advocating the advancement of women, while 
simultaneously enjoining the continuing forms of women’s subordination.”  Geoff Eley, “From Welfare 





The tendency to characterize East German women in particular as petty-bourgeois 
philistines also stems from the assumption held by Ute Schneider that progress towards 
gender equality was an intrinsic part of the process of modernization that spanned the 
Cold War divide.  As Schneider has argued, the difference between the GDR and the 
Soviet Bloc on the one hand and western Europe including the FRG on the other was not 
so much the trend towards gender equality as it was the pace at which it was implemented 
and the inexorable linkage between emancipation and female workforce participation in 
the socialist states.14  While there certainly were commonalities in changing patterns of 
gender roles and relations throughout Europe at the time, what Schneider calls the 
“pressure of modernization” (Modernisierungsdruck) does not explain why, or even 
whether, this “pressure” existed in the first place. 
Whether the result of the “pressure of modernization” or not, the SED’s legal 
codifications regarding gendered expectations of marital life unwittingly provided young 
women with newfound motivation to turn to the state as an adjudicator between different 
levels of government and as an arbiter between competing norms regarding marriage.  
While the number of complaints regarding the new age of marital consent would 
eventually diminish in number, albeit not nearly as quickly as officials claimed, the 
provocative nature of the Marriage Ordinance’s § 1 prompted citizens to resort to 
petitions (Eingaben) to articulate their (dis)satisfaction with the new law’s apparent 
disregard for previously sacrosanct norms regarding gender and sexuality.  The popular 
                                                                                                                                                 
Women: Europe between the Two World Wars, eds. Helmut Gruber and Pamela M. Graves (New York: 
Berghahn, 1998), 516-546, here 520. 
14 Schneider, Hausväteridylle, 346-347. 
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reaction to the change in marriage law would have longer-term consequences than the 
particular details of the disagreement over the optimal age of nubility; indeed, citizens’ 
letters established the basis for a semi-public forum in which the contours of a 
multivalent East German “cultural language” of sex could take shape. 
 Opposition to the new age of marital consent could, but did not necessarily, 
coexist with an acceptance of governmental paternalism.  A linguistic trope that recurred 
in many missives indicated an apparent willingness on the part of some young women 
and men to accept the state’s self-ascribed parental authority, even if only for 
instrumental reasons.  These young appellants were apt to refer to President Wilhelm 
Pieck in particular as the “father of the country” (Landesvater).15  On the one hand, this 
kind of language constituted a holdover of the patriarchal authoritarian state 
(Obrigkeitsstaat) in which Germans had recourse only to the subject position of an 
obsequious supplicant who implored a potentially benevolent but also potentially 
arbitrary wielder of absolute power rather than that of an empowered citizen demanding 
the recognition of rights from a state that abided by the letter and the intent of the law 
(Rechtsstaat).  On the other hand, by appealing to Pieck to protect them from injustices 
meted out by ostensibly less empathetic branches of government, petitioners were 
implicitly articulating a right to marry that only a “father,” whether real or symbolic, 
                                                 
15 Paul Betts also maintains that Eingaben authors often referred to President Pieck as a benevolent 
patriarch, and I echo his contention that this was not necessarily a sign of obsequious deference to 
neofeudal and neotraditional forms of authority.  Paul Betts, Within Walls: Private Life in the German 
Democratic Republic (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 183, 188, 191; Ina Merkel and Felix 
Mühlberg, “Eingaben und Öffentlichkeit,” in “Wir sind doch nicht die Meckerecke der Nation”: Briefe an 
das Fernsehen der DDR, ed. Ina Merkel (Berlin: Schwarzkopf & Schwarzkopf, 2000), 11-46, here 19-21; 
Felix Mühlberg, Bürger, Bitten und Behörden: Geschichte der Eingabe in der DDR (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 
2004), 76, 79-83, 108, 202-203. 
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could protect. 16  Some complainants extended the familial metaphor even further by 
threatening to do something that was bound to hurt their “father’s” pride—namely, 
abscond to the FRG. 
 I am thus suggesting a reperiodization of the emergence of the concept of 
women’s rights, whether articulated implicitly or explicitly, in communication between 
citizens and the state in the GDR.  In her study of petitions submitted by East German 
women who appealed the denial of their requests for abortion, Donna Harsch observes 
that “talk about women’s rights was associated with an emerging self-confidence of 
citizens vis-à-vis the state,” and in her analysis, this self-confidence and rights-based 
discourse were products of the 1960s, not the 1950s.17  Yet even when women of the 
1950s used the language of what Sheila Fitzpatrick has called “supplicants” in their 
Eingaben, they could still advance the kinds of claims that “citizens” would be inclined 
to make, namely a right to marital self-determination.  This right was not infrequently 
exercised in a way that reinforced patriarchal or parental prerogative in determining the 
timing of a marital union.  But some women insisted on getting married while underage 
and pregnant not because they felt as if had to because of familial or societal 
expectations, but because they were inclined to do so of their own volition.  Thus 
women’s assertion of their right to an inviolable private sphere was integral not only to 
their self-perception as citizens of the GDR, but also to their emerging self-consciousness 
as women.  And it was precisely their yearning for self-determination in the intimate and 
                                                 
16 This was not unique to the GDR.  Soviet citizens’ petitions during the 1930s, for example, also included 
frequent references to government officials as “beloved father.”  Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Supplicants and 
Citizens: Public Letter-Writing in Soviet Russia in the 1930s,” Slavic Review 55, no. 1 (Spring 1996), 78-
105, here 92. 
17 Donna Harsch, “Society, the State, and Abortion in East Germany, 1950-1972,” American Historical 
Review 102, no. 1 (1997), 53-84, here 55-56, 71, 75; Betts, Within Walls, 114. 
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domestic realms that was not all that different from Rudolf Klimmer’s aspiration for 
autonomy in the private realm for gay men.  Challenges to the apparent dissolution of the 
divide between public and private under socialist jurisprudence could thus have a 
retraditionalizing motivation (in the case of asserting the importance of marital 
parenthood) or a progressive impetus (in the case of realizing the Weimar-era goal of 
homosexual emancipation). 
 Rethinking family law reform as providing a basis for making new kinds of 
claims upon the state allows one to approach the question of whether or not the GDR 
could be construed as a Rechtsstaat in the domain of gender and family as it was for 
some aspects of jurisprudence regarding sexual offenses (as I have explored in chapters 2 
and 3).18  While she would likely not characterize the GDR as a Rechtsstaat in any 
regard, Ute Schneider argues that the relationship between the Family Law Code 
(Familiengesetzbuch, or FGB) and the BGB was not exactly what SED rhetoric implied, 
namely socialist jurisprudence making a clean break with its bourgeois forbear.  In some 
respects, such as doing away with the previously customary alimony obligations, the 
FGB and Marriage Ordinance did more than the BGB to perpetuate the liberal tradition of 
law grounded in the recognition and protection of individual interests rather than of 
familial or collective rights.19  While Schneider contends that the family and collective 
ultimately took precedence over the individual in East German family law, this does not 
mean that individual rights were of no consequence at all.  Indeed, my argument about 
                                                 
18 The ascription of Rechtsstaat status applies to some of the content of family law reform rather than the 
way in which it was promulgated.  By preceding the official issuance of a new Family Law Code of 1965 
by ten years, the issuance of the Marriage Ordinance did not hew to the niceties of legislative 
proceduralism that are also a hallmark of a conventionally defined Rechtsstaat. 
19 Schneider, Hausväteridylle, 346-347. 
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the resilience of notions of individual rights in at least some aspects of socialist 
jurisprudence both reflects and is a consequence of the key importance of the private 
sphere in the GDR, ideological prognostications about its demise from both sides of the 
intra-German border notwithstanding.  As Paul Betts purports: 
 
For its part, the SED devoted a huge amount of state energy to integrating the 
private individual into the full machinery of GDR state and society, endeavouring 
to fully fuse I and We. […] Yet it is misleading to interpret these well-known 
developments as merely proof of the absence of privacy in the GDR; for if 
privacy really did not exist, then the state would not have gone to such 
extraordinary lengths to investigate it.  The deeper question is rather: why did the 
private sphere matter so much?20 
 
The SED’s selective recognition of individual rights in family law and perceived need to 
influence but still preserve the private sphere were thus two sides of the same coin.  And 
the articulation of individual prerogatives could take discursive forms with more 
communal connotations through the use of terms such as “reputation” (Leumund) and 
“honor” (Ehre).  It turns out that “traditional” notions such as these were remarkably 
compatible with more “modern” facets of socialist jurisprudence.21 
 The resilience of such “traditional” views also manifested itself in the SED’s 
failure to articulate a consistently progressive vision for masculinity in the promulgation 
of “socialist” familial norms.22  Despite the fact that the new age of marital consent 
                                                 
20 Betts, Within Walls, 5. 
21 Combining seemingly incompatible legal and popular concepts was nothing new in German legal 
practice, and reconciling the concept of honor with the rule of law was no exception.  Ann Goldberg has 
contended that in imperial Germany, “a hybrid legal culture [developed] that merged key liberal legal 
principles—the Rechtsstaat, legal equality, civil rights—with a jurisprudence that assumed and protected 
the social hierarchies and status differences embedded in the concept of honor.”  Ann Goldberg, Honor, 
Politics, and the Law in Imperial Germany, 1871-1914 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 19. 
22 Hildegard Maria Nickel, “Women and Women’s Policies in East and West Germany, 1945-1990,” in 
Social Transformation and the Family in Post-Communist Germany, ed. Eva Kolinsky (Basingstoke: 




would consign to unwed motherhood women who otherwise would have gotten married, 
“East Germany […] remained silent on whether fathers were necessary for children’s 
well-being.”23  Minister of Justice Hilde Benjamin did bring up the role of men in family 
law from time to time, but the focus of internal discussions and external communications 
remained almost exclusively on women, and this has continued to be the case in much of 
the historiography.24  Given the emergence of historical scholarship that has identified the 
recasting of the West German masculine ideal during the 1950s—as a citizen-soldier and 
breadwinner for his family, but also someone who sought “release, escape, and 
satisfaction” through consumerism—it is striking that scholars have devoted so little 
attention to the question of whether an analogous or different transformation of 
masculinity was occurring concomitantly in the GDR.25  To the extent that masculinity 
has been the subject of historical inquiry, it has typically been in studies of youth 
subcultures.  Fenemore, for instance, has observed that “[e]xaggerated notions (and 
performances of) masculinity were made to serve not just as a means of rebelling against 
SED rule, but also of upholding and conforming with it,” but he has not explained how 
and why East Germans would have instrumentalized “exaggerated” masculinity for such 
disparate purposes.26 
                                                                                                                                                 
Democratic Republic,” in Social Transformation, 37-56, here 39; Josie McLellan, Love in the Time of 
Communism: Intimacy and Sexuality in the GDR (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 14-15, 
82. 
23 Heineman, What Difference Does a Husband Make?, 228. 
24 Schneider, Hausväteridylle, 179. 
25 Uta G. Poiger, “A New, ‘Western’ Hero?: Reconstructing German Masculinity in the 1950s,” in The 
Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949-1968, ed. Hanna Schissler (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2001), 412-427, here 419, 422; Frank Biess, Homecomings: Returning POWs and the 
Legacies of Defeat in Postwar Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Robert G. Moeller, 
“Introduction” to “The ‘Remasculinization’ of Germany in the 1950s” forum, Signs: Journal of Women in 
Culture and Society 24, no. 1 (1998), 101-106. 
26 Fenemore, Sex, Thugs and Rock ‘n Roll, xii. 
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 What did not change in the partial transfer of “parental” decision-making 
prerogative from parents to the state was the fact that women still had to bear the brunt of 
the consequences of whether or not to marry when a premarital pregnancy came into 
being—and they still had to rely upon masculine authority figures to “help” them make 
the right decision about when and whether to marry.  Officials did not devote much 
thought to the ramifications of lowering the age of marital consent for men from twenty-
one to eighteen, despite popular protests that advocated keeping the age for men at 
twenty-one or even increasing it to twenty-five.  And for all of the emphasis placed upon 
the need for husbands and wives to enter into marriage as fully equal partners, there was 
little guidance as to how they might continue to be fully equal partners once married.  In 
other words, the SED’s desire for men and women to begin a marriage on an equal 
footing might not have meant as much to young women when it was linked exclusively to 
the seemingly arbitrary criterion of the age of legal majority.  As many petitioners noted, 
attaining the age of legal majority did not necessarily confer upon an individual the level 
of maturity required for a successful marital union.  It is for these reasons that a husband 
made more of a difference in the GDR of the 1950s than Elizabeth Heineman has 
acknowledged.27 
Elizabeth Heineman’s study of the differing valuation of marital status and 
maternal employment for women in East and West Germany has been very influential for 
my own thinking about the ways in which the Marriage Ordinance did or did not alter the 
                                                 
27 While the gendered demographic imbalance did not receive the kind of attention that it commanded in 
the FRG, this did not mean that citizens and governmental officials did not notice it; for every 100 
unmarried men aged 35 to 40 in the GDR around 1963, for instance, there were 633 unmarried women of 
the same age.  BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1445, Band 1, “Zu einigen Fragen der Familie in der 
DDR,” February 4, 1965, 15 of document, 15 of archival file, as cited from “Informationen zu aktuellen 
Problemen der Planung und Leitung der Volkswirtschaft, zur Rolle demographischer Fakten in der 
Planung, Information der DFD bei der Staatlichen Plankommission 1962/64. 
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status of unwed motherhood.  I have grappled in particular with the import of one of 
Heineman’s key insights, namely that “[t]he strictly controlled academy and media of 
East Germany supported tolerance for a wider range of models of motherhood [during the 
1950s] than did the uncensored media and scholarly community in the western state.”28  
According to her account, while dominant West German journalistic and academic voices 
contrasted the superiority of the housewife with the “harmful” or “pitiful” employed 
mother (whether married or unmarried), the East German media landscape “included 
applause for employed mothers and increased acceptance of single mothers, but […] also 
offered recognition to housewives.”29   
It is not clear to me that the relative silence about unwed motherhood in the GDR 
that Heineman has identified necessarily connotes “increased acceptance of single 
mothers,” especially if one looks beyond the realm of governmental policy.30  She has 
tempered her own argument on this count by noting that 
 
[t]he relative quiet on equal rights regardless of legitimacy, for example, not only 
reflected many party leaders’ discomfort with unwed motherhood but also helped 
minimize backlash among those uncomfortable with a radical shift in sexual 
mores.  Unwed mothers—most of whom would rather not have been in this 
category anyway—thus avoided resentment as the supposed beneficiaries of the 
destruction of a widely respected sexual order.31 
 
 
The silence regarding women standing alone—whether pregnant or not—could connote 
tacit acceptance of their presence in society, but it could also betray an implicit 
                                                 
28 Elizabeth D. Heineman, “Single Motherhood and Maternal Employment in Divided Germany: Ideology, 
Policy, and Social Pressures in the 1950s,” Journal of Women’s History 12, no. 3 (2000), 146-172, here 
146; Heineman, What Difference Does a Husband Make?, 228. 
29 Heineman, “Single Motherhood and Maternal Employment in Divided Germany,” 162. 
30 Heineman, “Single Motherhood and Maternal Employment in Divided Germany,” 155; Heineman, What 
Difference Does a Husband Make?, xiv, 9. 
31 Heineman, “Single Motherhood and Maternal Employment in Divided Germany,” 159; Heineman, What 
Difference Does a Husband Make?, 9. 
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recognition on the part of governmental officials that not all East Germans would react 
favorably to the destigmatization of unwed motherhood.32 
Heineman could conceivably link increasing acceptance of unmarried mothers in 
the GDR with newfound approbation for women in the workforce.  But she is actually 
quite skeptical of the East German state’s ability in the short term to influence economic 
decision-making through its materialist policies.33  Indeed, she goes so far as to aver that 
“ideology alone could not move women to act against what they believed was in their 
best interests, and [thus] public policies had only a slight effect on economic 
calculations.”34  Yet she curiously assumes the state’s ability to command discursive 
hegemony over women’s reproductive and marital decisions after only a very brief period 
of time.  One could say that Heineman does this for good reason since the rate of out-of-
wedlock births remained consistently higher in the GDR than in the FRG.35  But why 
would a strategy based in part on silence about the role of marital status in childbearing 
decisions succeed in enforcing ideological conformity while explicit and far-from-silent 
paeans to employed motherhood allegedly failed to have a similar impact upon economic 
decision-making?  The robust, even if circumscribed, debates spawned by § 1 of the 
Marriage Ordinance reveal that at least in some respects, East German officials and 
                                                 
32 As Heineman recognizes, conservative family policy would have been appealing to East German women 
as a guarantor of “material comfort” as well as “womanly honor” after the upheaval and mass rape by 
Soviet soldiers of the occupation period.  Heineman, What Difference Does a Husband Make?, 105.  She 
also acknowledges that “popular sexual conservatism” in the GDR “deplored […] the perceived sexual 
radicalism of Communist ideology.”  Heineman, What Difference Does a Husband Make?, 95. 
33 This skepticism on Heineman’s part is not entirely warranted, especially when one considers that the 
proportion of East German women in the workforce did increase quite substantially during the first decade 
of the GDR’s existence—from 49 percent in 1950 to 70 percent in 1960.  Stefan Wolle, Aufbruch nach 
Utopia: Alltag und Herrschaft in der DDR 1961-1971 (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2011), 219. 
34 Heineman, “Single Motherhood and Maternal Employment in Divided Germany,” 161-162. 
35 “East German rates of illegitimacy hovered between 13.1 percent and 13.3 percent from 1951 to 1957.  
Although they subsequently dropped to 9.5 percent in 1964, West German births outside marriage were 
already nearly this low (9.73 percent) in 1950, and they declined every year until they reached 4.99 percent 
in 1964”; Heineman, “Single Motherhood and Maternal Employment in Divided Germany,” 159-160. 
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citizens were anything but silent about the topic of unwed motherhood during the early 
years of the GDR. 
 After providing an analysis of the legal climate that led to the promulgation of the 
Marriage Ordinance, this chapter assesses the multifarious reactions and unintended 
consequences that the new age of marital consent engendered just before and during the 
years immediately following its implementation.  The chapter concludes with an 
evaluation of internal dissent regarding the advisability of this reform at various levels of 
government as well as an examination of the impact of popular discontent upon 
subsequent iterations of East German legal codifications regarding the age of marital 
consent. 
 
The Backdrop for the Issuance of the Marriage Ordinance in 1955 
According to the official explanation, the government promulgated the Marriage 
Ordinance in response to the Moscow Accords of September 20, 1955, which granted the 
GDR full sovereignty and concomitantly overturned the laws, directives, and orders that 
the Allied Control Council (Kontrollrat) had decreed during the immediate postwar 
period.36  With the invalidation of the Kontrollratsgesetz Number 16, the GDR 
effectively had no statutes governing marital practice, since the National Socialists had 
overturned the BGB’s provisions on marriage in 1938 and East German authorities saw 
no reason to restore them.  Given this legal vacuum, courts based their decisions in the 
interim on Articles 7 (which guaranteed the legal equality of the sexes) and 30 (which 
invalidated all provisions of the BGB that disadvantaged wives vis-à-vis their husbands) 
                                                 
36 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 14426, MdJ, Berlin, Konzeption für das FGB (ca. 1964), 2 of 
document; Schneider, Hausväteridylle, 112. 
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of the GDR’s Constitution of 1949.  They also took into account the September 27, 1950 
Law for the Protection of Mother and Child and the Rights of Women, with some 
additional guidance from Supreme Court (Oberstes Gericht) precedents.  But the 
Ministry of Justice admitted that this statutory hodgepodge did not provide “sufficient 
guidance for the resolution of individual issues” and made the GDR vulnerable to West 
German accusations that it was effectively a “lawless state” when it came to matters of 
the family.37  Indeed, Ministry of Justice official Hans Nathan warned the SED’s Central 
Committee that “‘[e]very court rules differently on the same questions [in family law],’ 
threatening the justice system with ‘chaos’ and a ‘crisis of confidence.’”38 
To fend off such allegations and to comply with the invalidation of 
Kontrollratsgesetz Number 16 by the Moscow Accords, the Presidium of the Council of 
Ministers (Ministerrat) issued a mandate on October 14, 1955 that set in motion the 
expedited drafting of the Marriage Ordinance; the goal was to have a new law in place by 
November 15, 1955.39  The Council of Ministers envisioned the Marriage Ordinance as 
only a stopgap measure before the comprehensive reform of family law; the new FGB did 
                                                 
37 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 2226, Band 1, draft of a Begründung for the EheVO, undated but 
apparently part of a November 1, 1955 draft of the ordinance, 1 of document, 34 of archival file.  Ute 
Schneider has attributed the SED’s reluctance to proceed with family law reform in the early 1950s to the 
GDR’s as-yet-uncertain relationship with the FRG, intra-party purges, signals from Soviet authorities to 
East German officials not to accelerate the pace of change, attempts on the part of the SED to assert its 
predominance within the block party system, and uncertainty regarding the “character” and “content” of 
socialist jurisprudence among its practitioners; see Schneider, Hausväteridylle, 102-103, 113, 349-350.  
Donna Harsch has argued that the Ministry of Justice was so taken aback by increasingly contentious 
discussions that “[f]or a decade [sic emphasis], the reform of family law completely disappeared from the 
SED’s agenda, although not from the MdJ’s legal practice.”   Harsch, Revenge of the Domestic, 205, 210. 
38 Harsch, Revenge of the Domestic, 204, quoting from SAPMO-BArch DY30 IV 2/13/99, Hans Nathan, 
MfJ an ZK SED, May 9, 1950. 
39 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 2226, Band 1, note from MdJ, HA Gesetzgebung, Berlin to 
Ministerium des Innern (hereafter MdI), Staatssekretariat für Innere Angelegenheiten, Berlin, Betreff: 
Verordnung über Eheschließung und Eheauflösung, November 1, 1955, 37 of archival file. 
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not appear until 1965.40  Legislation pertaining to marriage was evidently a much higher 
reform priority for East German legislators than other family-related legal matters. 
The new age of nubility made its first appearance in the 1954 draft of the FGB, 
which became the subject of an extensive orchestrated public discussion.41  Subjecting 
the draft to public scrutiny was supposed to be a reflection of the truly democratic nature 
of socialist jurisprudence.  In a moment of candor, however, Ruth Toeplitz, wife of 
Heinrich Toeplitz (who was president of the Supreme Court) and a member of the 
governing body of the Democratic Women’s League of Germany (Demokratischer 
Frauenbund Deutschlands, or DFD), admitted that the purpose of the public forums was 
not so much to elicit feedback as it was to explain the law and assist in the realization of 
its pedagogical goals.42 
Discussion participants allegedly objected more frequently to lowering the age of 
marital consent for men than to raising it for women.  Indeed, some opined that men 
                                                 
40 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 2226, Band 1, MdJ, Berlin, draft of a Begründung for the EheVO, 
undated but apparently part of a November 1, 1955 draft of the ordinance, 2 of document, 35 of archival 
file; BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 14426, Konzeption für das FGB (circa 1964), 3 of document.  
According to Ute Schneider, accounts like those of Klaus Schroeder (Der SED-Staat) and Hermann Weber 
(Geschichte der DDR) have not posited family law directives issued during the 1950s as precursors to the 
1965 FGB, despite copious evidence to the contrary.  For Schneider, the lengthy gestation of family law 
reform was a sign that East German jurists needed time for the “discursive appropriation” of the tenets of 
socialist civil and family jurisprudence.  See Schneider, Hausväteridylle, 4, fn 6.  Mike Dennis attributes 
the delayed introduction of the FGB to Hilde Benjamin’s admission when the FGB draft was first 
introduced in 1954 that “the socialization of the economy had not been completed and, in consequences, 
equality between the sexes could not be realized.”  Dennis, “Family Policy and Family Function,” 38. 
41 313,538 citizens participated in 6,117 forums devoted to discussing the FGB draft that year.  BArch 
Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 14398, Bericht über die Ergebnisse der Diskussion zum Entwurf des FGB auf der 
Arbeitstagung im MdJ, October 19, 1954, 1 of document.  Among the objections to § 1 of the Marriage 
Ordinance once it went into effect was that “the people did not have the opportunity to discuss this law 
before it went into effect.”  Given the scope of the public discussion of the 1954 FGB draft, this accusation 
was not entirely fair.  Nonetheless, even those who had attended the forums would have had reason to 
protest the lack of truly democratic input since they had not been given any indication that the provisions of 
the Marriage Ordinance might become law by decree a full ten years before the wholesale reform of the 
FGB.  BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 9743, letter from Beauftragte für PSW, Standesamt Suhl, to Rat des 
Kreises Suhl, Abt. Innere Angelegenheiten, PSW (Betrifft: § 1 der Eheverordnung vom 24. November 
1955), March 18, 1957, unpaginated. 
42 Schneider, Hausväteridylle, 272. 
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should only be allowed to marry at the age of twenty-five.  The prevalence of this 
recommendation contravened the official rhetoric of the Ministry of Justice according to 
which “socialist” views on the importance of gender equality in marriage had already 
achieved full popular acceptance: 
 
People have correctly recognized that an overly hasty decision to get married 
results in more unhappiness than giving birth out of wedlock, which was no 
longer considered a failing.  This is a sign of how extensively people’s 
consciousness has changed.  It is, however, unclear what views led people to call 
for an increase in the minimum age [for marital consent] for men.  The reasons 
given for doing so included the later onset of maturity for men and the need for a 
difference in age between spouses.  What was not widely known was that the 
minimum age of marriage had been legally established as eighteen since 1950.  
Many people also failed to understand that having the same age of marital consent 
for men and women was a necessary consequence of the equal status of men and 
women before the law and a reflection of the status of our youth in economic and 
political life.  Objections to this provision stem from a tendency to underestimate 
our youth, who have demonstrated their maturity with exemplary economic 
achievements, and from bourgeois attitudes that expected the man to dominate the 
woman in marriage.43 
 
 
This Ministry of Justice official thus postulated that citizens’ objections stemmed from 
misinformation or misunderstanding rather than a rejection of the principle behind 
equalizing the age of marital consent for men and women.  The official elided the fact, 
however, that women under the age of eighteen had gotten married in East Germany until 
the Marriage Ordinance went into effect at the end of 1955.  As late as 1954, 3,327 
seventeen-year-old East German women and 874 women under the age of seventeen 
married their fiancés.44  The official could not avoid admitting that East Germans’ 
                                                 
43 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 14398, Bericht über die Ergebnisse der Diskussion zum Entwurf des 
FGB auf der Arbeitstagung im MdJ, October 19, 1954, 6 of document; Schneider, Hausväteridylle, 203. 
44 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 2227, Band 4, Beschwerde-Referent Kutschke, Ergebnis der 
Gesuche auf Ausnahmegenehmigung von der Regelung des § 1 Eheverordnung, MdJ, Berlin, internal 




emphasis on the “need for a difference in age between spouses” constituted a holdover of 
the bourgeois assumption that marriage was a vehicle for men to enhance their economic 
and social status and acquire heirs for their property.  According to this view, men had to 
complete their education or vocational training before getting married and thus were 
typically older than their wives. 
Opposition to the new age of marital consent for women was more extensive than 
the chronicler of the 1954 FGB draft discussions was willing to acknowledge.  During a 
meeting in the Bezirk of Dresden, she or he claimed that “[t]here was unanimous 
endorsement of the idea that marriages should, as a rule, not be contracted until both 
members of a couple are eighteen.”  But discussion participants also felt that adhering to 
this age limit too strictly “does not sufficiently take into account the demands of practical 
life,” as evidenced by situations encountered in practice and the example of “other 
progressive countries, especially that of the Soviet Union.”  It was for this reason that 
Neubert, head of the Dresden Regional Administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
suggested that district councils should have the option of allowing women as young as 
sixteen to get married “in truly justified exceptional cases” before the age of marital 
consent had even been altered.45 
 Hilde Benjamin admitted that 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
2226, Band 3, MdJ, Berlin, HA Gesetzgebung, Betreff: Diskussion im Kollegium über die Analyse der 
Verfahren in Ehesachen, January 15, 1957, 5 of document, 272 of archival file; BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, 
DP1 SE 2226, Band 3, MdJ, HA Gesetzgebung, Berlin, Analyse über das Verfahren in Ehesachen im II. 
Halbjahr 1956, Auswirkung der Neufestsetzung der Ehemündigkeit (§ 1), December 18, 1956, 3 of 
document, 163 of archival file. 
45 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 14398, letter from Neubert, Leiter der Bezirksverwaltung Dresden-
Staatssekretariat für Innere Angelegenheiten, MdI, Abt. Bevölkerungspolitik/PSW, to MdJ, Berlin, October 
20, 1954, 1 of document. 
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[o]f course it took some time for the populace to become aware of the new 
minimum age for marriage that deviates from the BGB’s stipulations.  But the 
pronounced decline in the number of petitions received would seem to indicate 
that knowledge of the new rule had spread to a sufficient extent.46 
 
Even though she underestimated the extent of opposition to the new law, Benjamin 
recognized that the Ministry of Justice could not simply assume the existence of 
widespread support for the new age of marital consent.    It was for this reason that in the 
spring of 1956, Benjamin 
 
hosted a forum for exchanging “girl talk” about sex, the latest fashions and 
shopping. […] In answer to direct questions about age of marriage, abortion and 
divorce, she declared that having a child out of wedlock was “no longer a 
disgrace.”  Therefore, it was better for a teenage mother to wait until she was 
eighteen and to bring up the child on her own rather than being forced into a hasty 
marriage that she might later regret.47 
 
 
Benjamin’s relatively nonchalant attitude towards premarital motherhood contrasted with 
the tenor of many relationship advice manuals available to East Germans at the time.  
Like many of his peers, sexual advice manual author Klaus Trummer insisted that his 
ambivalence about premarital sexuality did not stem from a recrudescence of petty-
bourgeois (spießbürgerliche) reservations or prohibitions disguised in socialist garb.  He 
also rejected the notion that a woman had to be “‘innocent’ [‘unschuldig’]” upon 
becoming married as an unwanted relic of the bourgeois past.48  Still, there was no room 
for adolescent sexual experimentation in Trummer’s vision, since the ability to pursue 
                                                 
46 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 9742, letter from Hilde Benjamin, Minister der Justiz, to Karl Maron, 
Minister des Innern, February 13, 1957, Betr.: § 1 der Eheverordnung, 3 of document. 
47 Mark Fenemore, “The Growing Pains of Sex Education in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), 
1945-1969,” in Shaping Sexual Knowledge: A Cultural History of Sex Education in Twentieth Century 
Europe, eds. Roger Davidson and Lutz Sauerteig (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 71-90, here 
77-78. 
48 Klaus Trummer, ed., Unter vier Augen gesagt ...: Fragen und Antworten über Freundschaft und Liebe, 
3rd ed. (Berlin: Verlag Neues Leben, 1968), 189, 223. 
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“true love” in a responsible fashion only arose with the onset of legal adulthood, which 
was why the age of marital consent accorded with the age of majority—eighteen.49  
Young East Germans who had been raised in the spirit of preparation for “true love” 
would not, however, need moral or legal sanctions to force them to abide by its tenets.  
They recognized that sexuality was not an animalistic or merely procreative drive, but 
instead a facet of human existence that could best provide pleasure and fulfillment when 
it was under control.50  To prove the leftist origins of his sexual conservatism, Trummer 
alleged that 
 
[t]hose who believe that satisfying the [sexual] drive every day is as necessary as 
eating and drinking are quite mistaken.  Clara Zetkin described in her book My 
Recollections of Lenin how [Lenin] had grappled with the sexual problems of 
youth and consequently castigated the “glass-of-water theory” as un-Marxist and 
anti-social in the follow terms: “To be sure!  Thirst must be satisfied.  But would 
a normal person under normal circumstances wallow in a pile of excrement on the 
street and drink from a puddle?  Or even just [drink] from a glass whose rim has 
become greasy from contact with many lips?”51 
 
 
Eingaben as a Catalyst for the Moral Reevaluation of Premarital Cohabitation 
 With experts like Trummer casting marriage as the ineluctable gateway to sexual 
activity, it is not surprising that many youth who had not yet attained the age of legal 
majority would seek permission to marry despite the Marriage Ordinance’s stipulation 
that the government would not grant any exceptions to the age of nubility.  But the 
                                                 
49 Trummer, Unter vier Augen gesagt, 190; DP1 VA 2376, Thesen und Vorschläge für den strafrechtlichen 
Schutz von “Jugend und Familie,” Gesetzgebungskommission “Jugend und Familie,” Professor Lekschas 
and Professor Grathenauer, Halle, February 4, 1959, 10 of document, 480 of archival file.  Unlike 
Trummer, who did not approve of sexual encounters before the age of eighteen, fellow sex counselor 
Lothar Obgartel conceded that 17-year-olds might also be ready—albeit only in “exceptional situations 
[Ausnahmefall]”—for carnal experiences.  See Trummer, Unter vier Augen gesagt, 206. 
50 Trummer, Unter vier Augen gesagt, 190. 
51 Trummer, Unter vier Augen gesagt, 190-191. 
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Ministry of Justice sowed the seeds for the perception that officials might be flexible in 
implementing the new regulation by exempting couples including an underage partner 
from the provisions of the Marriage Ordinance if they had registered their intent to marry 
before the ordinance took effect on November 29th and if they married by the end of 
1955.52  Even when faced with numerous appeals to grant exceptions after this grace 
period had ended, however, officials proved unwilling to respond to public pressure to 
bend or change the law.53  From January 1, 1956 through November 30, 1956, the 
Ministry of Justice received fifty-six petitions requesting exceptions to the age of marital 
consent, while President Wilhelm Pieck’s Chancellery received as many as 800 such 
letters during the same timeframe.54 
In thirty-eight of the fifty-six letters that the Ministry of Justice received, 
petitioners explicitly mentioned pregnancy as the reason for the request, and in three 
additional cases, the young bride-to-be was pregnant for the second time.  In the 
remaining fifteen cases, the reasons for the request were “unclear.”  Five of the requests 
involved 16-year-old women, while the rest involved 17-year-old women.  Among the 
                                                 
52 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 9730, Internal Ministry of Internal Affairs memo from Hegen, 
Staatssekretär, to Karl Maron, Minister des Innern, November 30, 1955. 
53 In retrospect, East German family law expert Anita Grandke considers this inflexibility to have been 
misguided, especially in cases involving premarital pregnancy during the 1950s.  Anita Grandke, 
“Familienrecht,” in Die Rechtsordnung der DDR: Anspruch und Wirklichkeit, ed. Uwe-Jens Heuer (Baden-
Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1995), 173-209, here 182. 
54 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 2226, Band 3, MdJ, HA Gesetzgebung, Berlin, Betreff: Diskussion 
im Kollegium über die Analyse der Verfahren in Ehesachen, January 15, 1957, 5 of document, 272 of 
archival file; BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 2227, Band 4, Beschwerde-Referent Kutschke, Ergebnis 
der Gesuche auf Ausnahmegenehmigung von der Regelung des § 1 Eheverordnung, MdJ, Berlin, internal 
memo to HA I, December 3, 1956, 1 of document, 126 of archival file; BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 
9742, letter from Staatssekretär Hegen, MdI, to Karl Maron, Minister des Innern, January 24, 1957, 1 of 
document; Schneider, Hausväteridylle, 204.  Given that the Staatsrat and President Pieck received 102,331 
Eingaben on all subjects in 1956, this number was small but not inconsequential; see Merkel and 
Mühlberg, “Eingaben und Öffentlichkeit,” 14, drawing upon Felix Mühlberg, “Informelle 




rationales provided in these Eingaben besides impending childbirth were the need for 
spousal health insurance, “the salvation of reputation and personal honor” (die Rettung 
des volksüblichen Leumundes und der persönlichen Ehre), and a desire for more 
desirable living accommodations that would become available only upon marriage.55     
Local officials like Vogel of the Leipzig Regional Council (Bezirksrat) tended to 
echo the central government’s refrain that the number of complaints was declining 
precipitously.  Vogel saw the declining number of petitions as evidence of the success of 
educational efforts undertaken in tenants’ meetings, DFD meetings, and courts.56  Rather 
than assuming that this downward trend was the result of the rapid internalization of 
socialist norms, President Pieck’s Chancellery provided a far more pragmatic 
explanation: news was apparently spreading to lower-level functionaries and would-be 
petitioners that officials in Berlin were unwilling to grant exceptions.57 
But citizens’ awareness of the law and the rationale behind it could instead 
strengthen their will to defy it.  Indeed, some petitioners openly espoused their belief in 
the superiority of the “capitalist” statutes that the Marriage Ordinance replaced.  Rudi S., 
who was on the cusp of his twenty-third birthday, wished to marry his pregnant fiancée, 
Edda K., who was five months away from her eighteenth birthday; he was “a man of 
honor” and wanted to wed “out of respect for my bride.”  Rudi S. recognized that the 
Kontrollratsgesetz Number 16, which had allowed women as young as sixteen to get 
                                                 
55 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 2226, Band 3, MdJ, HA Gesetzgebung, Berlin, Analyse über das 
Verfahren in Ehesachen im II. Halbjahr 1956, Auswirkung der Neufestsetzung der Ehemündigkeit (§ 1), 
December 18, 1956, 1-2 of document, 162 front side-162 back side of archival file. 
56 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 9742, note from Vogel, Rat des Bezirkes Leipzig, Abt. Innere 
Angelegenheiten, PSW, to MdI, HA Innere Angelegenheiten, Hauptreferat PSW, March 19, 1957. 
57 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 9742, report by Frau Thaler, Leiter der Rechtsabteilung der 
Präsidialkanzlei des Präsidenten der DDR for Bergmann, MdI, Berlin, undated but presumably from shortly 
after May 10, 1957. 
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married with parental permission, was based on the precedent set by the “capitalist” 
BGB.  He nonetheless believed that it should be possible to grant an exception to § 1 of 
the Marriage Ordinance for an almost-adult woman in an advanced stage of pregnancy 
like his fiancée.58  In other words, even though Rudi S. acknowledged that underage 
marriage was a legacy of the capitalist past, he felt that at least in his and Edda K.’s case, 
this legacy of capitalist jurisprudence was more sensible and humane than its socialist 
successor.  Thus, even someone like Rudi S. who was aware of the importance the SED 
attributed to the “socialist” character of the Marriage Ordinance did not feel that it was 
out of place to remind the government of elements of the “capitalist” jurisprudential 
legacy that it should not have discarded entirely.   
The SED’s rigidity on this point was not even in line with the practice of other 
state-socialist countries, let alone capitalist ones.  The GDR was taking a harder stance on 
this issue than was the USSR, which set the age of marital consent at sixteen for young 
women and at eighteen for young men and allowed for exceptions to be granted for 
women as young as fifteen.59  East German family law was thus not a carbon copy of its 
Soviet counterpart.60  The distinctive features of East German jurisprudence did not 
prevent Germans on both sides of the border from purporting that Soviet authorities had 
foisted their legal apparatus in toto upon hapless East Germans, however.61  To counter 
accusations that East German family law was not sufficiently “German,” the SED averred 
                                                 
58 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 9743, letter from Rudi S. of Leipzig to President Wilhelm Pieck, 
August 13, 1956. 
59 Lauren Kaminsky, “Utopian Visions of Family Life in the Stalin-Era Soviet Union,” Central European 
History 44, no. 1 (March 2011), 63-91, here 68, drawing upon Elizabeth Wood, The Baba and the 
Comrade: Gender and Politics in Revolutionary Russia (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 51; 
Schneider, Hausväteridylle, 204, fn 71. 
60 Schneider, Hausväteridylle, 264-265. 
61 Heineman, What Difference Does a Husband Make?, 110. 
 
 252 
that its proposed reforms were long overdue for both Germanies and that the FRG would 
do well to follow its lead in codifying gender equality.62  By virtue of its divergence from 
the family law provisions of the BGB still valid in the FRG, the Marriage Ordinance 
constituted a bold attempt to assert the validity of the GDR as the legitimate German 
state. 
It was perhaps precisely because of this boldness that even some lower-level state 
functionaries considered the Marriage Ordinance to be a foreign imposition that was 
incommensurate with German norms.  An official from the civil registry office 
(Standesamt) in Suhl complained, “This was not a German law.  We Germans are 
western Europeans and a woman’s readiness for marriage (Ehereife) should be 
considered from this standpoint.”63  Even though East Germany was part of the Soviet 
Bloc, this local functionary did not hesitate in proclaiming the GDR’s cultural allegiance 
to capitalist countries in western Europe.  From this perspective, the Marriage Ordinance 
betrayed blind obeisance to the bidding of Soviet overlords—even though it differed from 
Soviet legal precedents in key respects—and thus did not fulfill its stated goal of 
reflecting the views of the populace.  West German family law, by contrast, was 
authentically German because it emanated from the BGB rather than the dictates of an 
occupying power. 
                                                 
62 Schneider, Hausväteridylle, 278. 
63 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 9743, letter from Beauftragte für PSW, Standesamt Suhl, to Rat des 
Kreises Suhl, Abt. Innere Angelegenheiten, PSW (Betrifft: § 1 der Eheverordnung vom 24. November 
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 Strategically minded East Germans who did not explicitly reject the Marriage 
Ordinance as intrinsically illegitimate made use of their knowledge of the rationale 
behind the law to craft “ideologically correct” arguments to justify their opposition to it.  
Petitioners who realized that bearing a child out of wedlock was not supposed to be a 
source of shame in the GDR tended to deemphasize premarital pregnancy as their 
primary reason for seeking an exception to the age of nubility.  For instance, Helga W., a 
seventeen-year-old writing in June 1957 who had been engaged since March of the same 
year, described her “biggest wish” as being able to marry her 31-year-old fiancé before 
she gave birth to their child in November, even though she was fully aware that “a single 
mother in the GDR has the same rights as other mothers do.”64  In other words, she was 
trying to preempt the anticipated response that giving birth out of wedlock would not 
impinge upon her child’s legal or social status.  Her resolve to marry remained firm 
despite the stipulation of legal equality for children born in and out of wedlock, and she 
hoped that President Wilhelm Pieck would support her in this decision. 
 The new age of marital consent thus prompted not only young women, but young 
men as well, to articulate their desire for marriage on their own terms rather than those of 
the Marriage Ordinance.  But only in relatively rare instances was the typical pattern of 
an adult prospective groom and underage prospective bride broken.  Instead of arguing 
that the prospective husband was “mature enough” to compensate for any deficit of 
maturity on the part of a prospective wife, Irene H. and Klaus W., both of whom were 
seventeen years old, sought to convince President Pieck that they were both “physically 
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and mentally very advanced for [their] age.”65  Whether unwittingly or not, this couple 
seems to have internalized the government’s message that marriage was an egalitarian 
partnership in which the maturity and consent of both partners mattered equally. 
 Heinz R., a legal adult who asked for an exception to the age of marital consent so 
that he could marry his underage girlfriend in 1960, was insistent that his motivation in 
doing so did not stem from an atavistic conception of marriage.  Instead, he argued, “I am 
not concerned with traditional customs here, but rather with the freedom to establish my 
familial life when and how I would like.”66 Heinz R. felt that the Ministry of Justice 
would be sympathetic towards his desire for familial self-determination.  He had, after 
all, received an ambiguously worded missive in October 1960 from Hugot, a Ministry of 
Justice spokesperson, who had written that “we have complete understanding for the fact 
that you are happy about the prospect of living together and you are not hindered in doing 
so”—verbiage that Heinz R. construed as official approval of premarital cohabitation .67 
But just a few months later, Gensch, another Ministry of Justice spokesperson, 
strenuously objected to Heinz R.’s intimation that anyone at the Ministry would have 
been inclined to condone premarital cohabitation.  Gensch insisted that the Ministry of 
Justice’s approval of cohabitation, like that of the housing agency, extended only to 
married couples, since “our state does not agree with or grant official recognition to the 
loose bond between man and woman that is often called a common-law marriage 
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(Kameradschaftsehe).”68  Heinz R. was thus doubly frustrated: he originally agreed to 
wait to get married until his girlfriend turned eighteen because he was led to believe that 
the government would at least provide them with an apartment in the meantime.  He then 
learned, however, that the government was not willing to provide them with an apartment 
that he knew to be available precisely because they were not married—even though it 
was only because of the government’s obstructionism that they had not been able to 
celebrate their nuptials in the first place.69 
 Despite Gensch’s protestations to the contrary, the Ministry of Justice in Berlin 
did not monolithically oppose premarital cohabitation—at least for those whom it 
deemed indispensable to the strengthening of socialism.  Such was the case with Hans-
Dietrich S.  Even though the director of the Priborn Machine and Tractor Station 
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(Maschinen-Traktoren-Station, or MTS) considered Hans-Dietrich S. to be an exemplary 
employee, he was not willing to let Hans-Dietrich share an apartment with his underage 
fiancée on MTS grounds.  The Ministry of Justice intervened to override this decision 
because the fiancée was only six months away from turning eighteen.  This rationale is all 
the more surprising given how frequently the Ministry denied permission to marry to 
young women who claimed that waiting until their actual eighteenth birthday should be 
viewed as little more than a formality since they were on the cusp of attaining the age of 
majority.  Given the couple’s plans to marry on the prospective bride’s eighteenth 
birthday, the Ministry considered Hans-Dietrich S.’s decision to live with her at the MTS 
prior to their nuptials as evidence of his “positive moral outlook,” even though the 
Ministry rejected similar requests from other couples who professed a similarly strong 
intention to get married as soon as it was legally acceptable to do so.70  Thus, in contrast 
to Heinz R.’s case, Hans-Dietrich S. received official approval of his request for 
premarital cohabitation as compensation for not being allowed to wed until his fiancée 
turned eighteen. 
For the sake of rewarding dedicated workers, officials in Berlin sometimes 
exhorted lower-level governmental officials to facilitate premarital cohabitation in 
defiance of legal provisions and societal norms.  The oft-invoked refrain in the 
historiography about the primacy of vocational identity and status in the GDR is therefore 
not lacking an empirical basis.  As Jennifer Evans has argued about the policing of sex 
crimes in the Wismut uranium mines during the 1950s: 
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For a régime saddled with production quotas, economic goals could complicate 
attempts to inculcate moral lessons in the sexual sphere, especially in cases 
involving same-sex infractions.  In other words, the materiality of hyper-
production impinged upon the discourse of respectability, providing 
circumscribed but illustrative opportunities for men to evade or at least limit the 
severity of legal intervention.71 
 
Dedication to the socialist project in the workplace in some instances justified deviations 
from socialist morality in the domestic realm.  Even if officials were willing to grant such 
exceptions only on a very limited basis, they did help set the stage for the emergence of a 
“cultural language of sex” that recognized premarital cohabitation not as a threat to 
socialist morality, but instead as an underpinning for stronger socialist marriages that 
reflected a “positive moral outlook” on the part of men and women alike. 
 
Expecting Better of Socialism 
 Most young couples in love, however, were not lucky enough to be able to rely 
upon their status as indispensable cogs in the East German economic apparatus to stake 
their claim to preferential treatment under family law.  This did not stop many of them, 
however, from espousing a sense of entitlement based upon the state’s rhetorical 
commitment to workers and young people.  It must have been surprising and frustrating 
to the SED how much of the opposition to the statute came from precisely the young 
“workers and peasants”—even those who were among the most politically committed—
who were supposed to serve as the bedrock of the East German state.72    
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Both 21-year-old SED member Werner V. and 16-year-old Helga P., who had 
already given birth to their first child and who was expecting a second child, appealed to 
the Arnstadt District Council for permission to wed so as to ensure Helga P.’s and their 
children’s financial well-being should anything happen to Werner V. during his military 
service.  Their tactic of asking why the state could not bend the law just this once for 
them reflected an ethos that pervaded many appeals relating to § 1 of the Marriage 
Ordinance.  But they simultaneously tried to make the case that their concern extended 
beyond their own immediate well-being to that of young people in the GDR in general: 
 
In school we learned that laws are not dogmas but instead guidelines for behavior.  
I think that anything that helps people and workers should be done and everything 
that hurts the working class should be rejected.  In this case, [granting an 
exception to the law] would help people—and young citizens in particular.73 
 
 
In other words, Werner V. believed that the state was obliged to grant him and Helga 
permission to marry if it was to live up to its frequently touted promises to help the 
working class and youth.  He did not go so far, however, as to question why a socialist 
state would have codified in law what he considered to be such ill-suited “guidelines for 
behavior” in the first place if it really had its citizens’ best interests at heart. 
 It fell to an official at the Erfurt Regional Council (Rat des Bezirkes) to inform 
Werner V. that if § 1 of the Marriage Ordinance did not apply to everyone in the same 
way, it would constitute a “violation of democratic jurisprudence (eine Verletzung der 
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demokratischen Gesetzlichkeit).”74  According to a frequently rehearsed historiographical 
and contemporaneous West German critique, the GDR did not deserve the title of a law-
bound state (Rechtsstaat) since it often implemented its own statutes arbitrarily or 
circumvented them entirely for the sake of political expediency.  In the case of the strict 
enforcement of the age of marital consent, many East Germans wished that local, 
regional, and national authorities would actually behave less like a Rechtsstaat and more 
like a benevolent overseer that was amenable to the entreaties of its charges and capable 
of recognizing when socialist jurisprudence did not constitute a faithful reflection of the 
views, moral and otherwise, of the populace.  
  Many petitioners sought to reframe the whole issue in pragmatic rather than 
moral terms.  In 1963, Elfriede K. and Martin K. sought permission for their underage 
pregnant daughter, Gisela, to wed, but they highlighted the advantages of having a child 
born into a “more secure” parental relationship rather than mention any lingering stigma 
they feared would attend the birth of a child out of wedlock.  From their standpoint, it 
was precisely because, and not in spite, of the “progressive” (fortschrittlich) attitude 
harbored by East German officialdom towards youth that it should have been willing to 
grant an exception to the age of nubility for them.75  In other words, Elfriede K. and 
Martin K. did not consider allowing the marriage of an underage bride to be a throwback 
to outmoded bourgeois marital practices that devalued the personhood of that bride, but 
instead a manifestation of the respect and support that the SED supposedly accorded to its 
youthful citizenry.  From the Ministry of Justice’s standpoint, however, the very fact that 
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parents were submitting an appeal on behalf of their daughter violated her right to make a 
fully informed decision about the timing of her own marriage.  
   
The Unintended Consequences of Women’s Empowerment 
SED officials were interested not only in the number of requests for an exception 
to § 1 of the Marriage Ordinance; they also wanted to know who was filing the 
petitions—i.e., prospective husbands, prospective wives, both members of a couple, or 
parents of either member of a couple.  Male partners speaking on behalf of both members 
of a couple filed the preponderance of petitions on the subject that were directed to high-
level governmental authorities.  70 percent of the petitions addressed to President Pieck 
revolved around pregnancy, but according to Ms. Thaler of the President’s Chancellery, 
arguments pertaining to pregnancy-related household and economic concerns took 
precedence over the fear of moral blemish stemming from giving birth to a child out of 
wedlock.76 
On the regional and local district level, however, the gender and age cohort 
profile of petitioners was quite different.  In fact, according to an August 1957 report, 
only in the Bezirke of Frankfurt/Oder, Schwerin, Neubrandenburg, and Karl-Marx-Stadt 
did an absolute majority of such complaints come from male petitioners between January 
1956 and mid-1957.77  A measure that was supposed to empower young women to make 
their own informed decisions as fully-fledged adults about the advisability of entering 
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into a marital contract was instead prompting them to call into question the desirability of 
precisely that mechanism of empowerment.  Arguably, however, by prompting underage 
women to advocate for their right to wed, the new provision induced them to contemplate 
whether or not marriage was the necessary correlate of premarital pregnancy.  In this 
sense, the SED did empower women to think about what it meant to enter into marriage 
rather than merely assume that marriage was their fate—even if the ultimate conclusions 
that many of these women drew were not what the SED had hoped would be the result of 
women’s heightened socialist consciousness.  In the longer term, however, the law’s 
uncoupling of marriage and pregnancy helped to transform the popular “cultural language 
of sex” regarding not only premarital cohabitation, but also unwed motherhood in the 
GDR. 
The underage would-be bride Erika W. assembled a bricolage of ideological 
principle, wisdom stemming from life experience, and knowledge derived from popular 
culture to contest the age of nubility on her own terms.  She rather cheekily noted that 
more advanced age in and of itself was no guarantee of spousal maturity or marital 
stability: 
 
Despite my youth, I allow myself to pass the following judgment: whoever does 
not have good character while young does not possess it at a more advanced age 
either.  I would like to remind you of the many broken marriages of older and 
elderly people during the war and afterwards as well.78 
 
 
Erika W. resented the condescending tone of the Ministry of Justice’s moral homily 
(Moralpredigt) in its response to her future mother-in-law Magdalene S.’s initial request 
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for an exemption from the law, and thus made clear that she was not merely a passive 
vehicle for the marital aspirations of her or her fiancé’s parents. 
Since Erika W. believed that youth in the GDR were being raised with a “liberal 
(freiheitlich)” mindset, they should be treated accordingly when it came to respecting 
their ability and right to make decisions about their own lives.  Erika W. compared the 
obstacles posed by East German governmental officials to the fulfillment of her “most 
human (das allermenschlichste)” of all desires to the attempts by obstructionist parents 
who sought to thwart a love affair between high school students in the 1952 Swedish film 
Because of My Hot Youth (Es geschah aus heißer Jugendliebe).  Finally, she sought to 
elicit sympathy for her status as a “refugee girl” (Flüchtlingsmädchen, an ethnic German 
who had presumably been displaced from her childhood home in east-central Europe) 
who was just trying to attain “orderly circumstances” (geordnete Verhältnisse) for her 
child by getting married.79  As was the case for virtually all such petitions, Erika W.’s 
appeal did not meet with official approbation.  Unlike in most cases, however, she 
managed to provoke the ire of Ministry of Justice official Kutschke, who deemed her 
letter to have been “impertinent (ungehörig)” in a conversation with Magdalene S., who 
traveled to the Ministry of Justice in Berlin in a renewed (and once again unsuccessful) 
attempt to secure permission for her son Joachim S. to marry Erika W.80 
The situation turned dire when Erika W. threatened to decamp for West Germany 
or even take her own life if she did not receive permission to marry prior to her 
eighteenth birthday.  In a response praised by Wiebach, the head of the Department of 
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Internal Affairs at the Halle District Council, for its “warm and hearty tone as well as 
tactful wording,” Schaefer, a spokesperson at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, sought to 
assuage the concerns of the potentially suicidal young woman with the following words: 
 
We thank you for the trust that you have placed in Prime Minister 
(Ministerpräsident) Otto Grotewohl.  Even if we are not able to provide you with 
the kind of assistance that you expect, we still hope that we can help you find a 
way out of your difficult situation.  We have even more reason to believe that this 
will be the case since it is apparent from your letter that you are certainly ready to 
understand the demands that are being made of everyone in our republic in this 
day and age.  We want to start by candidly stating that most working people do 
not consider giving birth out of wedlock to be morally objectionable, but they do 
object to the conclusions that you are drawing about it in your perplexed state.  
You would be doing an immense disservice to yourself and your child by fleeing 
to West Germany.  It is indisputable that we do much more for mothers and 
children [than West Germany does], and if you were on your own in West 
Germany, you might run the risk of no longer leading a proper life (die Bahn 
eines ordentlichen Lebens verlassen).  If you have ever loved your fiancé and the 




Schaefer thus reminded Erika W. that, as a single mother, she was far better off in the 
GDR than in the FRG, since the GDR’s more generous provision of services for unwed 
mothers would prevent her from having to resort to disreputable means of earning a 
living, as she would presumably have to do if she were to relocate to the FRG.  Yet 
shortly after reassuring Erika W. that she had nothing to fear about becoming a single 
mother in East Germany, Schaefer backtracked: 
 
We have to concede, however, that you are right when you say that the old 
morality persists across broad swaths of the rural population—even though many 
of these people are hypocrites.  But can we change outmoded attitudes if we give 
in to them?  Young people can only overcome this fusty morality if they proudly 
and honestly stand by their actions.  You cannot undo what has been done, and 
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your relatives will not allow themselves to be deceived about your pregnancy.  
We believe that the only viable way to counter all of this empty talk and these 
reproaches is for you and your fiancé to be brave and continue going through life 
together.  Our role as state functionaries who are worthy of your trust is to ask 
that local governmental bodies look after you.  You will thus find all the support 
that you need.82 
 
 
Schaefer was one of the few officials who was willing to admit to a prospective 
underage bride that changes in moral views regarding the status of unwed motherhood 
had not in fact kept pace with the equal legal status conferred to children born within and 
out of wedlock upon the issuance of the Law for the Protection of Mother and Child and 
the Rights of Women in 1950.  Given this state of affairs, however, Schaefer exhorted 
Erika W. and her fiancé to support one another as moral pioneers in the quest to combat 
atavistic attitudes in their community.  Raising the age of marital consent in the Marriage 
Ordinance had thus not been a transparent reflection of altered popular mores, as other 
SED officials asserted, but instead served as a catalyst for expediting popular acceptance 
of nonmarital parenthood—and young women like Erika W. were to play a key role in 
advancing this process on the local level. 
While the state would not accede to Erika W.’s desire for a premature marriage, it 
would without hesitation “look after” her and provide “all the support” (presumably both 
financial and moral) that she needed until she was old enough to tie the knot.  Schaefer’s 
reassuring words accord with the characterization of the GDR as a “welfare dictatorship” 
(Fürsorgediktatur); it was this aspect of SED rule that contributed to the retroactive 
characterization of East German citizenship in familial terms by some of those who had 




spent their formative and young adult years under SED rule.83  As Thomas Lindenberger 
has noted 
 
Ironically, it was the state-citizen relationship in the extra-familiar sphere which 
at the same time was articulated through an intensely familiaristic rhetoric.  The 
party and state posed and acted as “parents” taking care of their “children” thus 
undermining the symbolic and material autonomy of the “real” families.84 
 
There were definitely signs of this mindset in Schaefer’s language.  Like a concerned 
father, Schaefer concluded his missive by writing, “It would be a pleasure to learn in one 
year that you took our recommendations to heart and that you got married when the time 
was right.”85  But Schaefer’s ostensible encroachments upon familial autonomy stemmed 
from his desire to strengthen, not to weaken, the viability of a young marriage. 
For all of the creativity evinced by female petitioners who sought to marry before 
attaining legal adulthood, many others besides Erika W. did not hide the fact that they did 
not relish the prospect of unwed motherhood, especially when they felt that other women 
in a situation analogous to their own had been able to evade such a fate.  Indeed, some 
appellants were indignant that they did not receive exemptions from the law because they 
had heard of other couples that had been allowed to marry before a partner’s eighteenth 
birthday.  One such young woman was Rosemarie S., who sought permission to marry 
before turning eighteen on April 23,1957 and giving birth in March 1957.  Unlike other 
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petitioners who sought to make premarital pregnancy seem like less of a salient rationale 
for their desire for a premature marriage, Rosemarie S. made her displeasure at the 
prospect of single motherhood quite explicit: “Why are things made so hard for us and 
why must I give birth to a child out of wedlock. [sic punctuation] After all, exceptions to 
the rule were granted last year—why not in this case?”86  Rosemarie S. was presumably 
correct that underage marriages had been approved the previous year (1955), either 
before the Marriage Ordinance had taken effect or during the brief grace period when 
exceptions were still being granted, but she betrayed no awareness of the technicalities of 
the ordinance in her missive.  She also believed that the state should allow her to marry 
since, unlike many other women who became pregnant before entering the matrimonial 
state, the father of her child was still around and wanted to marry her.  From her 
perspective, why should she join the ranks of single unwed mothers when she could 
instead be a respectable, married one? 
A would-be 22-year-old husband, Werner Ka., accused the government of 
effectively rewarding male profligacy by making it more difficult for young men to 
marry their pregnant girlfriends.  He sought an exception to the prohibition against 
marrying his 17-year-old fiancée because “[a] man can act indifferently towards the fruit 
of free love (freie Liebe), but it is quite different for a woman.  I would not want a 
tragedy to occur as a result of this law.”  Aside from blackmailing the government into 
granting a marriage license so as to prevent his pregnant fiancée from committing a 
possible infanticide, Werner Ka. was arguing that their desire to marry did not stem 
merely from the need to avoid the societal censure of unwed parenthood.  Instead, he 
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argued that the very concrete consequence of “free love”—namely pregnancy—was 
fraught with greater emotional consequences for the female than for the male partner.87  
He could, of course, have reassured his fiancée that he would not leave her even if she 
bore a child out of wedlock, although he might have done this without mentioning it in 
his correspondence with governmental officials.  But in essence, he was calling upon the 
state to hold potentially cavalier men (like himself) to a heightened standard of 
responsibility that was put in jeopardy by the state’s failure to afford women sufficient 
protection from the vagaries of “free love.” 
 The desire for respectability was a frequently recurring theme in many missives 
pertaining to § 1 of the Marriage Ordinance, and it was not only women who clung to the 
“traditionalist” rejection of unwed parenthood as morally inferior to its marital 
counterpart, even though “proletarian anti-feminists” in the SED might have maintained 
otherwise.  Peter S. argued that as a fully trained teacher, he had a “secure living” with 
which to support his pregnant underage fiancée, Dietlind D., and the child they were 
expecting in March 1957.  Peter S. turned to President Pieck “because my fiancée and I 
rebuke ourselves every day for awaiting a child who will be born out of wedlock and 
thereby acquiring a bad reputation in our community and losing the trust and respect of 
our parents.”  In other words, Peter was calling upon the President to support him in his 
quest to uphold his and his future family’s respectability and overcome the excessively 
rule-bound obstructionism of local authorities.  Even though he and his fiancée were 
“rebuking” themselves for having gotten themselves into this situation in the first place, 
they felt as if their premarital pregnancy did not mean that they had completely 
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squandered their claim to respectability.  To this end, he employed the kind of obsequious 
language that, while not uncommon in other kinds of Eingaben, did not typically appear 
in letters from those seeking permission for an exception to the minimum age of 
marriage: Peter S. wrote to Pieck “in the hope of not having made an inappropriate 
request ([i]n der Hoffnung, keine Fehlbitte getan zu haben).”88  This could be construed 
as false modesty, since Peter S. clearly thought that his request was an appropriate one, 
yet his epistolary decorum might have also been a manifestation of his desire to be seen 
as respectable. 
 Some petitioners appealed to President Pieck to help them burnish the image of 
socialist familial life against the onslaught of West German propaganda that alleged that 
the SED was hostile to the family.  23-year-old Wolfgang H. sought President Pieck’s 
help in securing permission to marry his pregnant seventeen-year-old fiancée Erika A. 
because “I feel as if I am harming the reputation of our social order since I am currently 
compelled to live with my future in-laws.”  Wolfgang H. was concerned about the 
damage he was doing to “the reputation of our social order” in the eyes of fellow East 
Germans, but implicitly also from the perspective of West German critics who alleged 
that East German social policy was proving to be detrimental to the preservation of 
traditional familial norms and values.  For Wolfgang H., his personal respectability was 
inextricably bound with that of the East German social order as a whole, and it was for 
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this reason that he hoped President Pieck would see fit to intervene after local authorities 
had proven to be unresponsive to his appeal.89 
 Other appellants had a more expansive definition of respectability.  Ursula S.’s 
desire to marry so as to avoid the stigma of giving birth to a child out of wedlock served 
to remind President Pieck that widespread prejudices (and especially those of her own 
parents) against unmarried mothers had not simply disappeared overnight, as the SED’s 
propaganda about the legal equality afforded to children regardless of the marital status 
of their mothers was apt to proclaim.  But unlike Peter S. and Dietlind D., who felt 
obliged to write that they “rebuked” themselves “every day,” Ursula S. insisted that she 
and her fiancé led “virtuous lives” despite having engaged in premarital sexual 
intercourse.  Hers was a particularly poignant articulation of the emerging acceptance of 
sexual activity before marriage in the East German “cultural language” of sex.  Even 
more revealing, however, was her ostensible belief that Pieck would agree with her 
rationale for making an exception to the Marriage Ordinance, if only in her particular 
case.  The local authorities, after all, were preventing her from being able to continue to 
lead a “virtuous life,” and if they did not see the error of their ways, then presumably the 
President of the GDR would.90 
The underage would-be bride Helene W., like many others, assumed that 
President Pieck would be willing to bend the law to accommodate her premarital 
pregnancy: “In my opinion, one cannot and must not go by the letter of the law in such a 
case, since it goes without saying that being single and giving birth to a child is a disgrace 
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for me.”  The taint of her act would last for years, since “bad boys” would tease her child 
when he got older.91  At the same time, Helene W. felt that her punishment was not 
commensurate with her crime: “Have I really made such a huge mistake that I deserve 
such punishment?”  And if Pieck could not take pity on her, then perhaps he could do so 
for her mother, who had made the ultimate sacrifice after having lost her husband during 
the war: “[I]t was a severe blow for [my mother] when she learned that I will have a child 
at such a young age, but through consoling words and persuasion she calmed me down.  
No one can reproach me since my conduct is blameless—and this provides [my mother] 
with further consolation.”  Presumably the “blamelessness” of Helene W.’s conduct in 
her mother’s eyes lay not in getting pregnant in the first place, but in trying to rectify her 
transgression by getting married, since her mother had a nervous breakdown when she 
learned that her daughter would not in fact be able to wed until after her child was born.92 
Helene W. was more savvy than some of her compatriots in appealing to the 
sensibilities of East German officialdom on at least one count: instead of hoping to get 
married in order to secure her husband’s financial support, she instead emphasized that 
getting married would relieve her mother of the emotional burden that a loss of 
respectability would entail.  Her mother would consequently become well enough to take 
care of her child and thus enable Helene W. to further her vocational education later that 
year.93  For Helene W., getting married would allow her to avoid the supposedly outdated 
moral taint of premarital pregnancy and enable her to contribute more fully to the 
building of socialist society through her workforce participation. 
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 Some petitioners—and not just individuals from more rural, provincial areas—did 
not feel the need to disguise their “bourgeois” conception of marriage.  Hirsch, a 
functionary in the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ central Berlin office, took issue with 
prospective husband Hermann H.’s understanding of marriage that necessarily relegated 
the female partner to a domestic and dependent role.  Hirsch averred that marriages 
involving underage brides were conducive to making them dependent upon their adult 
husbands (ein bestimmtes Abhängigkeitsverhältnis), thereby abnegating the equality of 
the sexes.94  It is significant that Hirsch felt the need to explain this logic to the Zwickau 
District Council, which was in turn to impart the information to Hermann H.  Hirsch did 
not assume that local-level officials were sufficiently well-informed about socialist 
marital values so as to be able to defend the rationale behind § 1 of the Marriage 
Ordinance—even in the face of a defiant petitioner like Hermann H., who originally 
threatened to abscond to the FRG if he could not marry his underage bride in the GDR.95 
In his appeal to President Pieck, Joachim W. of Berlin-Pankow, for instance, 
noted that his pregnant underage fiancée Ursula K. “runs the household and I support her.  
We have everything that a married couple needs.”96  Joachim W. had apparently not 
absorbed the SED’s propaganda about the need for women to enter the workforce and not 
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simply rely upon their husband’s earnings for their financial sustenance.  Yet the fact that 
Ursula K. had already moved into Joachim W.’s apartment meant that their relationship 
did not have an entirely “traditionalist” cast.  When he tried to obtain a marriage license 
from the registry office in Berlin-Pankow, he was chastised for not having been “more 
careful” when having sex with his fiancée.97  While the registry office functionary did not 
condemn premarital sexual intercourse outright, he or she did assume that the male 
partner should have done more to prevent the eventuality of a premature pregnancy—it 
was he, and not Ursula K., after all, who was supposed to have been “more careful” and 
taken the leading role in birth control decision-making.98  Given the dearth of 
contraceptive options in the GDR at this time, being “more careful” presumably meant 
the practice of coitus interruptus. 
Joachim W.’s vision of premarital life thus adhered to a “traditionalist” model 
when it came to the gendered distinction between male public workforce participation 
and female private household labor, but deviated from that model when it came to 
premarital cohabitation and sexual activity.  But when he presented his mixture of 
“bourgeois” and “socialist” premarital behavior as grounds for securing a marriage 
license, the registry office functionary criticized him for his insufficiently “careful” 
sexual activity and not for his decidedly non-socialist view of marital harmony as being 
predicated upon “traditional” gender roles with respect to labor inside and outside of the 
home.  During the mid-1950s, it would appear that not all state officials were committed 
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to promoting all kinds of “socialist” marital values, which in the SED’s estimation would 
have also entailed condemnation of premarital sexual activity of any kind, whether 
“careful” or not.99 
Condemnation of premarital sexual activity was a higher priority for Dr. Helmut 
Ostmann of the Ministry of Justice, who worried that the barrier to carnal encounters for 
those under the age of eighteen would be much lower if legal minors knew that they 
could get married when their sexual encounters resulted in pregnancy.  In his estimation, 
raising the age of marital consent for women to eighteen was another way in which the 
SED could fulfill its goal of enforcing sexual propriety and restraint among young 
people.  Ostmann argued that granting exemptions from the law would 
 
foster a recklessly immoral attitude (eine leichtfertige moralische Einstellung) 
towards sexual intercourse.  It is the duty of parents, other guardians (Erzieher), 
and also of doctors to provide helpful advice to young people about their sexual 
problems.  Allowing for the possibility of premature, injudicious marriage (einer 
verfrühten unüberlegten Eheschliessung) would not provide the requisite 
educational guidance [to young people].100 
 
 
The State in Loco Parentis: A Curtailment of Female Empowerment and Familial 
Autonomy? 
                                                 
99 The FRG’s government was far less ambivalent in its condemnation of premarital sexual activity.  Since 
the Bundesgerichtshof opined in a 1954 decision that society’s moral codex set the tone for West German 
family law and that the only acceptable purpose of sexual intercourse was procreation, it upheld criminal 
prosecution of parents for procurement (Kuppelei) if they allowed their adult children to shared a bed even 
if their offspring were engaged to be married.  Sibylle Buske, Fräulein Mutter und ihr Bastard: Eine 
Geschichte der Unehelichkeit in Deutschland 1900 bis 1970 (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2004), 211. 
100 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1775, letter from Helmut Ostmann, Leiter der HA Gesetzgebung, 
MdJ, Berlin, to Chefarzt Dr. Wilhelm, Krankenhaus Fürstenberg-Havel, March 25, 1958, 2 of document, 
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For Ute Schneider, the Marriage Ordinance was merely one prong of paternalistic 
SED rule that sought to transform the young woman from a victim in need of protection 
(schutzbedürftiges Opfer) into an object of educational influence (Erziehungsobjekt).  
Instead of having her male family members treat her as not fully adult (unmündig), it was 
the state that arrogated to itself this patriarchal role.101  This usurpation of paternal 
authority by the state put some East German fathers in the unique position of trying to 
ward off the state’s paternalistic prerogative by asserting that their underage daughters 
were in fact mature enough to make their own decisions about such adult matters as the 
timing of their weddings—without governmental or parental intervention.102 
Werner Ku. of Berlin, writing on behalf of his underage daughter Gerdis Ku., felt 
that any minimum age for marital consent was necessarily an arbitrary one, since the 
mere fact of being eighteen years of age did not automatically confer maturity upon an 
individual: 
 
It is out of love for my daughter that I would like to help her take an auspicious 
and unencumbered step into a new phase of her life.  I am of the opinion that a 
young person who is 17 ¾ years old can certainly possess the moral, corporeal, 
and mental maturity that the new law expects of an eighteen-year-old.  The truly 
profound affection that both partners harbor for one another, their secure living 
situation, and their very open-minded attitude toward our society render 
meaningless any formalistic legal reservations about granting this couple 
permission to marry.103 
 
                                                 
101 Schneider, Hausväteridylle, 349. 
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Readiness for marriage was, in Werner Ku.’s mind, not so much a matter of legal 
adulthood as of maturity, sexual and otherwise—and he hoped that President Pieck would 
realize this even though the Registry Office in Berlin-Treptow and the Magistrate of 
Greater Berlin had not.  Yet Werner Ku. went further than most petitioners did: he 
invoked medical expertise to support his case, in the form of a doctor’s note from an 
internist working at the Berlin-Mitte District Council; this doctor was of the opinion that 
marrying on the desired date (January 19, 1957) would prevent Werner Ku.’s daughter 
from having to endure irritation (Aufregungen) that would be deleterious to her health.104  
It is noteworthy that this doctor apparently believed that her professional opinion might 
succeed in swaying President Pieck’s opinion in Werner Ku.’s direction, but his petition, 
like so many others, was rejected.105 
Helmut G. believed that both his underage daughter Annerose G. and her fiancé 
Heinz S. had a sufficiently “serious attitude” towards life to be ready for marriage—he by 
virtue of his age (twenty-four), and she by virtue of her pregnancy.  Their relationship 
was a “real life partnership (echte Lebenskameradschaft),” and because of this, Helmut 
G. believed that the state should allow them to become “a healthy cell of our democratic 
republic”; like other petitioners, Helmut G. did not shy away from making a link between 
individual bodies joined by marriage and the vitality of the social body.106  Bergmann of 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs sought to appeal to Helmut G.’s desire to advance his 
daughter’s best interests by noting that § 1 of the Marriage Ordinance protected young 
                                                 
104 Ibid. 
105 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 9742, letter from Rüdiger, Leiter der Abt. Innere Angelegenheiten, 
Magistrat von Groß–Berlin, PSW, to MdI, HA Innere Angelegenheiten, Berlin, March 21, 1957. 
106 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 9743, letter from Helmut G., Elsterberg, to MdI, Staatssekretariat für 
Innere Angelegenheiten, Berlin, Betreff: Ihr Schreiben vom 10. März 1956, Eheschließung meiner Tochter 
Annerose gem. meinem Gesuch vom 22. Februar 1956, May 3, 1956. 
 
 276 
brides from a “certain hegemony (eine gewisse Vormachtstellung)” that their older 
husbands might adopt towards them if they were not yet adults in the eyes of the law.107 
Bergmann tactfully chose to avoid mentioning that § 1 of the Marriage Ordinance 
was also supposed to protect young women’s autonomy from the intervention of 
solicitous parents like Helmut G. himself.  Thus, even as the statute was supposed to 
reflect the equal status of men and women in the GDR, it also constituted a tacit 
recognition that the resilience of older norms necessitated the vigorous application of 
legal protection to ensure that young women would not in fact have to cede their 
autonomy, legal or otherwise, to parental or spousal authority figures.  This was yet 
another instance in which socialist jurisprudence at least in principle did a better job of 
safeguarding what the SED took be women’s individual—as opposed to collective or 
familial—interests than “bourgeois” family law had done.  But this protection came with 
a price: women who were not yet legal adults would have to allow the state to make 
decisions about their marital prospects that would otherwise have been made by family 
figures or romantic partners, at least until they were eighteen years of age.  From the 
perspective of many underage women, then, § 1 of the Marriage Ordinance had not done 
anything palpable to expand their sphere of autonomy; if anything, it had reduced it for 
those young women who were in agreement with their parents and future husbands about 
the advisability of an underage marriage.  Ironically, the Ministry of Justice gave as one 
of its reasons for not granting exceptions to § 1 of the Marriage Ordinance the fact that 
doing so would effectively revoke the right of parents to exert decision-making power for 
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pregnant daughters who were, after all, still their legal dependents.108  The problem, 
however, was that these parents were invariably using their authority to convince their 
children to embark upon what the government considered to be ill-advised—and illegal—
marriages. 
 Some underage petitioners did not mind governmental figures acting in loco 
parentis—as long as officials were willing to exercise their authority to circumvent a law 
that infringed upon familial autonomy.  It was for this reason that numerous appellants, 
including Waldemar P. and Helga H., referred to President Pieck as the “father of the 
country (Landesvater).”109  In Waldemar P. and Helga H.’s estimation, Pieck, like the 
father of a young person desirous of marriage, should have been willing to exert his 
paternal authority and allow the dictates of respectability and familial integrity to prevail 
over the laws of the government.110  The prospective groom Siegfried S., who mistakenly 
believed that the West German age of marital consent for men (twenty-one) was still 
valid for East Germany, promised that if President Pieck were to grant his request to 
marry his bride (who had not yet turned eighteen years of age), then he would welcome 
Pieck as a guest at his wedding—the ultimate recognition of Pieck not only as the father 
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of the country, but as an honorary father to those young people whom he would hopefully 
take under his wing.111 
 While Pieck—or, more specifically, his underlings—ultimately proved 
unsympathetic to such entreaties, officials were decidedly more ambivalent about the 
applicability of the new age of marital consent when it contravened the customs of the 
Sorbian ethnic minority.112  In one case, the entire Sorbian community in the town of 
Neustadt/Hoyerswerda and its local government (Gemeindevertretung) rallied in support 
of a pregnant sixteen-year-old woman’s desire to marry her twenty-one-year-old male 
partner.  When told by the Cottbus Regional Council that there was no shame or 
disadvantage associated with giving birth out of wedlock or living together before 
marriage, two relatives of the couple retorted that “even if they [the would-be bride and 
groom] live together until they get married […] according to Sorbian customs, unmarried 
young people had the status neither of youth nor of married adults and were practically 
excluded from Sorbian social life as long as they remained unmarried.”113  The marriage 
ceremony, to be conducted in Sorbian and with participants wearing Sorbian attire, was a 
culturally significant event that marked the ceremonial induction of the bride into her in-
laws’ household, according to these relatives.  Still, it is noteworthy that this Sorbian 
couple felt that a marriage would only “count” as far as Sorbian custom was concerned if 
it had the imprimatur of official state approval.  The couple might, after all, have elected 
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to conduct an unofficial ceremony for the sake of upholding their customs if they 
encountered difficulty or opposition in securing permission from the government. 
Their appeal resonated with an official named Marschallek, who consulted with 
the regional Ministry of the Internal Affairs’ Department for Sorbian Questions in 
Bautzen.  If denying an underage woman permission to marry would consign her to a 
form of social death, then Marschallek wondered if there was a way to reconcile Sorbian 
custom with the new age of marital consent.  Did it make any difference whether the 
objections to the law were based upon Sorbian, or more generally religious, customs?  In 
the meantime, Schahn, an official at the Cottbus Regional Council, informed the 
petitioners about the ban on underage marriage as she would have done in any other 
instance.  But she also felt that officials in Berlin might have to give special consideration 
to the question of how and whether the Marriage Ordinance should be adapted to honor 
the customs of ethnic minorities like the Sorbians.114 
Local officials exhibited less flexibility when it came to the question of honoring 
religious particularism for ethnic Germans.  After Franz R. learned on March 27, 1957 
that he could not marry his underage bride, his mother went to the Wernigerode District 
Council to plead her son’s case.  Both her son and his wife-to-be wanted a religious 
marriage ceremony, and they feared that the church would not marry them if the fiancée 
had already given birth to a child.  Unlike in the case with the Sorbian couple, however, 
this couple’s desire to have a non-state-officiated wedding ceremony—while still 
receiving state recognition of the marriage—did not make state officials consider the 
possibility of allowing for a potential loophole in the law.  It would seem as if cultural 




specificity trumped religious difference as grounds for potentially adapting the law to 
individual circumstances.  This was not terribly surprising, given the tendentious 
relationship between the SED and Christian churches in the GDR during the 1950s.115  
Nonetheless, Wernigerode District Council officials claimed that they had successfully 
persuaded Franz R.’s mother to convince her son and his bride to wait until the latter 
turned eighteen to tie the knot—without explaining how they had persuaded her to 
overcome her religious scruples.116 
  
The Limits of Democratic Centralism 
Even though the Ministries of Justice and of Internal Affairs adopted a hard line 
about not granting exceptions to the age of marital consent, they also mandated strict 
adherence to § 6, section 1 of the Marriage Ordinance, which stipulated that a marriage 
was valid if a license was granted by a registry office even if the registry office’s decision 
to grant that marriage license had been in error—regardless of whether that error was 
intentional or not.117  The presumption underlying this legal provision was that the 
registry office functionaries should be better versed and more invested in upholding the 
new marriage law than couples intending to marry.  But this provision inadvertently 
provided a loophole for local officials who disagreed with the premise underlying the 
new age of marital consent, thereby exposing the limits of the “democratic centralism” 
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that ostensibly characterized East German governance.  Indeed, if the state was willing to 
legitimize some marriages that violated the letter of the law, then it was being 
disingenuous about the need for strict and uniform application of the age of marital 
consent.118 
Local governmental officials, whether out of ignorance of the new law or willful 
defiance of it, continually issued unauthorized exemptions from § 1 of the Marriage 
Ordinance.  In the region of Schwerin, for instance, five marriages were contracted in 
1956 that involved underage brides—one in April, one in July, one in November, and two 
in December—the last three occurring a full year after the Marriage Ordinance had taken 
effect.119  Schwerin was not alone in this regard: the region of Potsdam, for instance, 
reported two marriage licenses issued prematurely as late as November 1956.120  In the 
region of Halle, there were three marriage licenses issued to underage couples in July and 
December 1956.121  And an official by the name of Fechner in the town of Silberhütte 
told a father-in-law-to-be that the government would grant exceptions to § 1 of the 
Marriage Ordinance as late as March 1957, even after the government had denied so 
many requests for such exceptions on the local, regional, and national level.122 
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Given such attitudes on the part of at least some local officials, it is not surprising 
that some couples chose to “shop around” until they found a sympathetic registry office 
official.123  When one couple—one half of which was a 16 ½-year-old pregnant farmer’s 
daughter—did not receive permission to wed in Zschoppach, it approached a Cannewitz 
registry office official with the same inquiry just one week later; in both cases, the 
registry office functionaries felt compelled to consult with the Grimma District Council 
before issuing their final decision to the couple rather than rejecting their requests out of 
hand.  Despite the would-be spouses’ tenacity in trying to circumvent the Marriage 
Ordinance, they supposedly agreed (after their second futile attempt) that “following our 
laws was an absolute necessity and that their marriage would take place at the appropriate 
time.”124 
 This couple was far from alone in seeking to take advantage of bureaucratic 
capriciousness.  When Mr. C. failed in 1957 to obtain a marriage license for his underage 
daughter at the registry office in Poseritz, he convinced Becker, an official at the Rügen 
District Council, to override the registry office’s initial decision.  Following the advice of 
a colleague in his own office, the Poseritz official declined to abide by Becker’s 
injunction, however, and denied Mr. C.’s request a second time.   But the official 
apparently still harbored doubts about the wisdom of this decision, since she or he asked 
the Rostock Regional Council about the best course of action to pursue. 
                                                 
123 Hilde Benjamin opined that unlike other submitters of Eingaben, couples seeking an exemption from § 1 
of the Marriage Ordinance did not tend to migrate from one institution or agency to another to get what 
they wanted; the archival trail would seem to suggest otherwise.  See BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 
9742, letter from Hilde Benjamin, Minister der Justiz, to Karl Maron, Minister des Innern, February 13, 
1957, Betr.: § 1 der Eheverordnung, Anlage: Auszug aus dem Protokoll über die 1. Sitzung des Kollegiums 
des MdJ am Donnerstag, dem 10. Januar 1957, 4 of document. 
124 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 9742, Aktennotiz, Rat des Kreises Grimma, Abteilung Innere 
Angelegenheiten, PSW, January 26, 1956. 
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 The Regional Council directed the official to refrain from presiding over the 
marriage while Mr. C.’s daughter was still underage, and the official assumed that Mr. C. 
finally acquiesced to this decision since he did not show up at the registry office again.125  
Whether or not Mr. C. resigned himself to the law’s provisions, it is noteworthy that, like 
Mr. C., the Poseritz Registry Office functionary did some shopping around of his or her 
own, namely by appealing to officials at different levels of government to confirm or 
deny his or her own inclination to issue a marriage license.  The functionary would 
presumably not have bothered to ask whether she or he could issue a marriage license to 
an underage couple if she or he had not been prepared to do so if given the green light by 
higher-level authorities. 
Indeed, given the assumption on the part of many high-level governmental 
officials that support for socialist marital legal provisions would be virtually automatic, it 
is striking how frequently lower-level governmental officials—including those who did 
not have the power to grant marriage licenses—took the side of prospective underage 
brides who hoped to obtain an exemption from the law.  Dohna, the head of the National 
Front’s office in Gadsdorf, for instance, wrote to the Ministry of Internal Affairs on 
behalf of Christel L, who wanted to get married to her fiancé Günter O. before she turned 
eighteen and before she gave birth to her child.  Since both sets of parents supported this 
wish, and since Christel L. had been an active FDJ member whose diligence had resulted 
in her promotion to manager of the local retail store, Dohna argued that even though 
“[w]e are aware of the laws regarding marriage[,] […] [i]s there not a provision 
stipulating that an exception to the rule can be granted for extraordinary cases—
                                                 
125 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 9742, letter from Der Beauftragte für PSW, Rat der Gemeinde Poseritz, 
to Rat des Kreises Rügen, PSW, April 30, 1957. 
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especially since this is a woman who can be groomed to do much for our state and she is 
only a few months away from turning eighteen?”  Dohna did not seem to realize—or if he 
did realize it, he disagreed—that premarital pregnancy no longer constituted an 
“extraordinary case” as far as East German marital law was concerned, and that a store 
manager was apparently less crucial to the success of the socialist project than a worker 
at a Machine-Tractor Station.  He also felt that the government could only win over its 
constituents by being responsive to their concerns—and this was precisely what he, as a 
representative of the National Front, was trying to do: “The local office of the National 
Front would be happy to demonstrate to people that we care about their troubles and can 
help to resolve them.”126  In other words, for Dohna, the National Front was not merely a 
pro forma institutional manifestation of the GDR’s political unity and societal uniformity, 
but instead a vehicle for advocacy for individuals facing a government that was not 
always attuned to their concerns. 
Unsurprisingly, the Ministry of Internal Affairs did not prove amenable to 
Dohna’s appeal, and dismissed his arguments with its typical rhetoric about the lack of 
disadvantage associated with giving birth to a child out of wedlock and the need for an 
eighteen-year-old’s level of maturity in order for a marriage to be truly viable.  The 
Ministry thus expected Dohna to effect an about-face in his own opinion about the 
justifiability of Christel L.’s appeal and to convince all parties involved that “the rejection 
of their request was in their own best interests.”127  Instead of advocating on behalf of a 
                                                 
126 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 9742, letter from Dohna, Vorsitzender, Ortsausschuss der Nationalen 
Front, Gadsdorf, Kreis Zossen, to Hirsch, MdI, HA Innere Angelegenheiten, PSW, April 11, 1957. 
127 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 9742, letter from Bergmann, kommissarischer Leiter der HA Innere 
Angelegenheiten, MdI, to Ortsausschuß der Nationalen Front Gadsdorf, Kreis Zossen, Betreff: Beantragte 
Eheschließung des Frl. Christel L., geb. am 31. Dezember 1939, April 20, 1956. 
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politically dedicated would-be-bride, Dohna had to tell her that the state to which she had 
committed herself so fervently now deemed her consciousness to be backward in this 
regard and thus felt that it knew better than she did what was best for her.  Apparently, it 
did not matter to the Ministry of Internal Affairs whether Christel L.’s political ardor 
might diminish as a result. 
At least one registry office functionary who failed to abide by the new age of 
nubility and issued a premature marriage license appears to have paid for this mistake 
with his or her job.  While the documentation did not explicitly mention this as the reason 
for the termination of employment, in the absence of any other explanation, one can 
assume that it was a decisive factor.128  Sometimes, local officials who had violated § 1 of 
the Marriage Ordinance claimed—whether disingenuously or not, it is hard to say—that 
they had not done so intentionally.  Anders, an official at the Conradsdorf Community 
Council (Rat der Gemeinde) confessed to having officiated a wedding ceremony 
involving underage partners on April 6, 1957, and she admitted that she had been wrong 
to do so.  Her excuse was that her office was still using the old marital consent forms 
after the Marriage Ordinance took effect, and she simply forgot about the stipulations of 
the new law.  Apparently, word of her ostensible willingness to break the law had spread 
to at least one other underage couple from another municipality, and Anders wound up 
marrying them as well on May 22, 1957; she blamed a heavy workload for her repeat 
infraction.  Ironically, Anders claimed that her colleagues often accused her of being a 
“paragraph person” (i.e., someone who typically followed the rules too closely), and 
                                                 
128 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 9742, note from Hartung, Abteilungsleiter, Rat des Kreises 




given this reputation, the two violations of § 1 of the Marriage Ordinance were 
supposedly very much out of character for her.129  Whether Anders was truly contrite or 
not, a Freiberg District Council supervisor did not feel obliged to issue an apology on 
Anders’ behalf.130 
 
Officials’ Conflicting Opinions Regarding the Age of Marital Consent 
 Even as many Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Internal Affairs officials 
remained steadfast in their commitment to retaining the age of marital consent, they did 
wonder whether its implementation would exacerbate the problem of “flight from the 
republic” (Republikflucht).  The government’s unwillingness to grant exceptions to the 
rule prompted some East Germans to threaten to circumvent the law by getting married in 
West Germany, where women as young as sixteen years of age could receive a marriage 
license with their parents’ permission.131  Officials wondered whether East Germans 
would actually carry out this threat, whether they were successful in getting married in 
West Germany and on what legal basis, and whether they returned to the GDR soon after 
getting married in the FRG. 
 In 1950, the situation was reversed as far as the permissiveness of the age of 
marital consent was concerned: the GDR lowered the age of nubility for men from 
twenty-one to eighteen to reflect the new East German age of majority.  Since the age of 
                                                 
129 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 9743, letter from Anders, Beauftragter für PSW im Rat der Gemeinde 
Conradsdorf, to Rat des Kreises Freiberg, Abteilung PSW im Bezirk Karl-Marx-Stadt, May 25, 1957, 
unpaginated archival file. 
130 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 9742, note from Weigandt, Rat des Kreises Freiberg, Leiter der Abt. 
Innere Angelegenheiten, to Rat des Bezirkes Karl-Marx-Stadt, September 2, 1957. 
131 Interestingly, despite the lower age of marital consent in the FRG, “[i]n 1960, 30 percent of West 
German women marrying for the first time and 37 percent of all East German brides were not yet twenty-
one.”  Heineman, What Difference Does a Husband Make?, 235. 
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majority and default age of marital consent remained at twenty-one in the FRG, this East 
German reform would conceivably have provided West German men between the ages of 
eighteen and twenty-one with an incentive to decamp to the GDR in order to wed.  To 
prevent this from happening, the West Berlin Supervisory Agency for Registry Offices 
instructed its employees not to recognize marriages of West Berlin male residents 
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one that had been contracted at an East German 
registry office.  From the standpoint of East German authorities, however, the West 
Berlin agency’s position was untenable and thus could be disregarded.  The SED 
considered the minimum age of marital consent in the FRG to be an “impediment to 
marriage dependent upon precedent” (aufschiebendes Ehehindernis)—in other words, it 
could prevent a marriage from taking place, but did not apply retroactively to an “illegal” 
marriage once a functionary had approved it.  A less legalistic and more feisty statement 
of this principle could be found in July 1950 correspondence between East German 
officials: “We cannot grant agencies in a western separatist state that came into being by 
illegal means the right not to recognize [such marriages].”132 
 A torrential influx of young West German grooms into East Germany did not 
materialize.133  But the fear that East German couples would seek to circumvent § 1 of 
the Marriage Ordinance by going to the “western separatist state” was realized in several 
instances, such as when Gisela H. and Hans H. of Magdeburg absconded to the FRG to 
                                                 
132 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 7211, Sektion 152: Ehemündigkeit, letter from Landesregierung 
Brandenburg, HA Staatliche Verwaltung, to MdI, Berlin, July 29, 1950; BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 
7211, Sektion 152: Ehemündigkeit, letter from Landesregierung Brandenburg, HA Staatliche Verwaltung, 
to MdI, Berlin, July 10, 1950. 
133 This was not least because West German men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one could get 
married with parental permission.  Men under the age of eighteen and women under the age of sixteen 
could wed at the discretion of a West German guardianship court (Vormundschaftsgericht).  deNuys-
Henkelmann, “Wenn die rote Sonne abends im Meer versinkt,” 119. 
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get married before Gisela H. turned eighteen.134  Magdeburg Regional Council official 
Böge did not hesitate to scold the registry office functionaries in the West German town 
Bad Lauterberg im Harz for having married this couple on November 3, 1956, since 
neither had a permanent residence in the FRG and thus neither should have been subject 
to West German law.135  East German officials, Böge noted, would not allow West 
German men under the age of twenty-one to come to East Germany to get married, even 
though East German law allowed men and women who were at least eighteen years of 
age to get married.  And Böge feared that the Bad Lauterberg incident was not an isolated 
one: the Department of Internal Affairs at the Wernigerode District Council had 
determined that West German authorities were allowing East German citizens to wed in 
the FRG without special authorization even if their permanent residence was in the 
GDR.136 
 Hegen, State Secretary at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, openly questioned 
whether the inflexible application of § 1 of the Marriage Ordinance was appropriate for 
the geopolitical circumstances in which the GDR was operating.  Indeed, he warned that 
the threat to “democratic legality” posed by the Ministry of Justice’s unwillingness to 
grant exceptions to the rule was potentially more serious than any juridical problems that 
it feared in changing the law, even though altering the statute would provide an 
opportunity for critics of the regime to “defame” the East German government for having 
                                                 
134 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 9742, letter from Böge, Referent, Rat des Bezirkes Magdeburg, 
Abteilung Innere Angelegenheiten, to MdI, HA Innere Angelegenheiten, Betreff: Eheschließung der 
minderjährigen Gisela H. in Westdeutschland, March 18, 1957. 
135 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 9742, draft of letter, apparently from Böge, Rat des Bezirkes 
Magdeburg, Abteilung Innere Angelegenheiten, to Standesbeamten in Bad Lauterberg im Harz, November 
1956. 
136 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 9742, letter from Böge, Referent, Rat des Bezirkes Magdeburg, 
Abteilung Innere Angelegenheiten, to MdI, HA Innere Angelegenheiten, Betreff: Eheschließung eines 
Minderjährigen in Westdeutschland, November 27, 1956. 
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issued such a misguided provision in the first place.137  Hegen was not alone in harboring 
reservations about the consequences of § 1 of the Marriage Ordinance; his boss, Minister 
of Internal Affairs Karl Maron, apparently agreed with him.138  While the Ministry of 
Justice argued that the government should not be intimidated by citizens’ threats to 
decamp to the FRG, Hegen found this stance to be “totally wrong,” since GDR citizens 
were not just threatening to leave the GDR—they were actually doing so.139  Ultimately, 
however, neither Maron nor Hegen pushed to revoke the statute. 
 Hilde Benjamin reminded her colleagues that allowing for the possibility of 
granting exemptions from the law would open up a Pandora’s box of other problems.  If 
exceptions were to be granted, what would be the minimum age of consent for 
exceptional cases?  Did parents need to offer their consent before the state could grant 
someone under the age of eighteen permission to marry?  If a woman under the age of 
eighteen married, would her parents retain legal custody of her, or would custody be 
transferred to her legally adult husband?  If neither the husband nor the parents were 
granted custody of the underage bride, then these young women would have attained a 
path to the status of legal adulthood before turning eighteen that was effectively closed to 
men, very few of whom sought to marry while under the age of eighteen.  In the interest 
of gender equality, would not the government have to create a mechanism by which 
                                                 
137 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 9742, letter from Hegen, Staatssekretär, to Karl Maron, Minister des 
Innern, January 24, 1957, Betr.: Eheverordnung vom 24. November 1955, 2-3 of document; Schneider has 
made an analogous point, but in my view she underestimates the extent to which officials worried that the 
new age of marital consent would antagonize young couples.  Schneider, Hausväteridylle, 204. 
138 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 9742, letter from Hegen, Staatssekretär, to Karl Maron, Minister des 
Innern, January 24, 1957, Betr.: Eheverordnung vom 24. November 1955, 3 of document; BArch Berlin-
Lichterfelde, DO1 9742, letter from Karl Maron, Minister des Innern, to Sorgenicht, Leiter der HA 
Staatliche Organe beim ZK der SED, February 2, 1957, Betr.: Eheverordnung vom 24. November 1955. 
139 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 9742, letter from Hegen, Staatssekretär, to Karl Maron, Minister des 
Innern, January 24, 1957, Betr.: Eheverordnung vom 24. November 1955, 3 of document. 
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young men could also enjoy the benefits of having the legal status of someone of the age 
of majority before turning eighteen?  What organ of government would be responsible for 
issuing exceptions to § 1 of the Marriage Ordinance, and what circumstances besides 
premarital pregnancy might be considered valid reasons for allowing an underage 
prospective spouse to wed?  Would the government always have to bend the rules for any 
underage pregnant woman who wished to get married, and if not, what reasons could be 
given for approving a petition in some cases while denying it in others?140 
 Because of these considerations, Benjamin proclaimed that 
 
[i]t does not seem right to put an end to the educational success we have already 
attained just because a few people have asked us to grant exceptions to the rule.  
If an exception were to be allowed by the law, it would without a doubt be 




Here, Benjamin was not so much defending the merits of the new law as warning against 
the deleterious consequences of wantonly granting exceptions.  And she denied Hegen’s 
claim that the Ministry of Justice had been oblivious to the consequences of the potential 
discontent that § 1 of the Marriage Ordinance could foster: 
 
It is not true that the MdJ [Ministry of Justice] did not sufficiently consider the 
political ramifications of § 1 of the Marriage Ordinance.  We have been 
monitoring them for the past year.  The fact remains that to this day we have yet 
to find a compelling reason to alter § 1 of the Marriage Ordinance.142 
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Because of the indeterminate number of disgruntled couples whose appeals were 
rejected by regional or municipal authorities but who desisted from pursuing their 
grievances further with officials on the national level, Benjamin had to acknowledge that 
she might not be privy to the full extent of popular opposition to the new age of nubility.  
She was also not certain about what couples actually did after being denied permission to 
marry.  She was aware, for instance, of a fourteen-year-old girl with no vocational 
training who ran the household of a twenty-one-year-old man when his mother was in the 
hospital and became pregnant at the age of fifteen.  Benjamin empathized with the young 
woman’s plight, but felt that instead of having the Ministry grant an exception to the 
minimum age of marital consent, youth services should help her avoid the potentially 
disadvantageous consequences that refusal of permission to marry might entail.143  
Benjamin thus recognized that societal expectations and familial exigencies were not yet 
necessarily in sync with the law’s assumptions: “In any case, it does not suffice to deny a 
request for permission to marry by just alluding to the law without undertaking measures 
to lead the underage girl to the right path.”144 
Benjamin admitted the lack of unanimity within the Ministry of Justice’s own 
ranks regarding the inflexible application of § 1 of the Marriage Ordinance.  Kutschke, 
who reported directly to Benjamin, advocated lowering the age of marital consent for 
women to seventeen “since this was more in accordance with the previous regulation.  
The leap made by the Marriage Ordinance was too large.”145  No less an authority that 
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Heinrich Toeplitz, president of the Supreme Court, agreed with Kutschke.  This did not 
prevent Kutschke’s colleague Helmut Ostmann, however, from promptly dismissing 
Kutschke’s recommendation: 
 
In considering this question, one must take into account why capitalist law 
allowed girls to marry with the permission of their parents from the age of sixteen 
onwards; it was related to the status of women in marriage in a capitalist state.  
The equal status of the woman in a marriage, which we value so highly, plays 
absolutely no role in bourgeois views regarding marriage.  The suggestion to 
grant exceptions to the rule would practically result in the lowering of the 
minimum age for marriage, which would violate the principle established by the 
Marriage Ordinance.  It would be incorrect to relent and issue exceptions to the 
rule especially now that the petitions have been declining in number so 
precipitously and citizens have begun to come to terms with the regulation.146 
 
 
In effect, Ostmann was echoing Benjamin’s primary argument: if acceptance of the 
higher age of marital consent for women seemed to be gaining traction in the general 
populace, what would be the purpose of succumbing to allegedly reactionary demands for 
its retraction?  Professor Hans Nathan offered a more realistic assessment by noting that 
there were no statistical data at hand that would provide a definitive answer to the 
question of popular acceptance of the law, nor was there any evidence of “whether the 
principles established by the law were being contradicted by existing reality.”  His 
reservations about the empirical evidence notwithstanding, Nathan felt that there was no 
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reason to change the age of marital consent.147  By 1963, however, Nathan had changed 
his mind: he urged his colleagues to lower the age of nubility since “we are harming the 
development of young people by having it set at eighteen.”  But Hilde Benjamin 
remained steadfast in her opposition to altering the law.  Since “one can tell from the 
statistics that relatively few eighteen-year-olds are getting married,” she denied the 
existence of a pent-up demand for lowering the legal age threshold.148 
Ms. Rietzscher of the SED Central Committee’s Justice Department, however, 
held a more unequivocally sympathetic view of those who objected to the new provision 
already in 1957: “It is misguided […] to characterize people who request an exception to 
the rule as backward in their views.  These views will be around for a long time and 
should be taken into consideration in legal provisions.”149  Rietzscher’s candor in 
professing that the SED’s legal vision had leapfrogged popular attitudes did not result in 
a change in the law, but nonetheless constituted another instance in which a highly placed 
SED official questioned whether socialist jurisprudence was actually reflecting popular 
moral attitudes, as it was supposed to do.  She also felt that the overly restrictive 
application of the age of marital consent was fomenting the undesirable phenomenon of 
Republikflucht; if anything, the East German government should have been doing 
anything that it could to staunch the exodus of East Germans to the FRG rather than 
knowingly encourage it through its own policy initiatives.  Furthermore, Rietzscher 
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believed that the Marriage Ordinance was insufficiently attuned to the need to respect the 
culturally specific marital customs of the Sorbian minority.150 
Rietzscher’s larger point was that socialist jurisprudence had to be flexible in 
accommodating supposedly outmoded moral views when they did not threaten the larger 
goal of enhancing socialist consciousness.  In other words, the SED needed to pick its 
battles judiciously.  This recommendation stemmed from her rejection of the socialist 
faith in environmental determinism over behavioral patterns in socialist society; for her, 
“[s]ocietal influence over marriage is quite illusory,” even as she conceded that the DFD 
and FDGB might have a role.151  Despite her numerous reservations about the age of 
marital consent, however, Rietzscher ultimately demurred by noting that an alteration of 
§ 1 of the Marriage Ordinance was not “particularly urgent.”152 
Rietzscher was not alone in her criticism of the Ministry of Justice’s failure to be 
realistic about the pace of moral evolution in East German familial life.  Ewert, the editor 
of the GDR press agency’s weekly periodical Presse—Informationen, felt that Ministry 
of Justice official Herbert Wächtler had incorrectly assumed that changes in societal 
attitudes were keeping pace with reforms of marriage law.  Regarding an article authored 
by Wächtler that was to appear in the pages of Presse—Informationen, Ewert opined that 
 
[t]he whole issue of children being born out of wedlock is insufficiently 
explained.  Many citizens in our country have a false or at least unclear 
conception of precisely this issue.  For this reason alone, one cannot merely touch 
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upon this problem in the article, but instead one must provide a more detailed 
justification of why the birth of a child out of wedlock is not a moral taint [Makel] 
in our societal order—in contrast to views [about giving birth out of wedlock that 
exist] in a bourgeois state.153 
 
 
Thus, while Ewert shared Wächtler’s assumption that East German society was far more 
open to unwed motherhood than its West German counterpart was, he felt that there were 
still quite a few people in East German society who needed to be reminded of this. 
 Hans Einhorn, an official at the Ministry of Justice, was skeptical that the new age 
of nubility would remedy the problems that afflicted marriages involving young partners: 
 
One of the main arguments for not granting exceptions to the rule is that young 
marriages are particularly precarious.  It is illogical, however, to think that this 
applies only to marriages in which a seventeen-year-old girl receives permission 
to marry since these problems exist for young marriages in general.  The reason 
why people are against young marriages and believe that a reasonable age is a 
prerequisite for a solid marriage has nothing to do with our legal regulation.  If we 
were to assume that this was the case, then we would be overestimating the 
influence of the law.  Given the citizenry’s healthy views on this issue, there 
would be no danger in making it possible to grant exceptions to the rule.154 
 
Many petitioners, whether parents or marital aspirants, had made a similar argument in 
their Eingaben, namely that they were better judges of a young person’s readiness for 
marriage than a state functionary who inflexibly enforced the legal age of marital 
consent.  Einhorn was providing a strong endorsement of the ability of East Germans to 
                                                 
153 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 2226, Band 1, letter from Ewert, Chefredakteur, Presseamt beim 
Ministerpräsidenten, to Herbert Wächtler, MdJ, Berlin, March 14, 1956, 1 of document, 86 of archival file.  
The first programmatic statement that giving birth out of wedlock was not a Makel and should not confer 
legal disadvantages upon children can be found in § 17 of the 1950 Law for the Protection of Mother and 
Child and the Rights of Women; for a discussion of this, see BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 14426, MdJ, 
Berlin, Konzeption für das FGB, ca. 1964, 2 of document. 
154 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 9742, letter from Hilde Benjamin, Minister der Justiz, to Karl Maron, 
Minister des Innern, February 13, 1957, Betreff: § 1 der Eheverordnung, Anlage: Auszug aus dem 




make judicious decisions in this regard.  If the law was supposed to increase the chances 
that a young marriage would survive, then it should be attuned to individual 
circumstances rather than adhere to a dogmatic enforcement of orthodoxy.155  Ultimately, 
Einhorn’s argument that the new age of marital consent for women was not making a 
meaningful contribution to the stability of young marriages did not sway Benjamin’s 
opinion.  She would only be inclined to revisit the issue of amending § 1 of the Marriage 
Ordinance if the number of complaints were to increase.156 
Even though § 1 of the Marriage Ordinance remained unchanged despite 
considerable popular opposition and internal dissent, a revised FGB draft that appeared in 
1958 did contain a new provision, § 75, which constituted an implicit recognition on the 
part of Hilde Benjamin that children born out of wedlock did not in practice have the 
same status as their “legitimate” counterparts, even when their mothers subsequently 
married.  Under the old law, a child born out of wedlock could only acquire her or his 
mother’s husband’s name if the husband adopted the child after marrying the child’s 
mother.  According to the proposed § 75, a child could take on the new family name with 
the consent of her or his mother and the mother’s new husband without having to go 
through a formal adoption.157  § 75 reflected a suggestion made in a discussion of the 
                                                 
155 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 2226, Band 3, MdJ, HA Gesetzgebung, Berlin, Betreff: Diskussion 
im Kollegium über die Analyse der Verfahren in Ehesachen, January 15, 1957, 4-5 of document, 271 back 
side-272 of archival file. 
156 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 9742, letter from Hilde Benjamin, Minister der Justiz, to Karl Maron, 
Minister des Innern, February 13, 1957, Betr.: § 1 der Eheverordnung, Anlage: Auszug aus dem Protokoll 
über die 1. Sitzung des Kollegiums des MdJ am Donnerstag, dem 10. Januar 1957, 5 of document. 
157 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 14397, letter from Hilde Benjamin, Minister der Justiz, to Karl Maron, 
Minister des Innern, Betreff: Entwurf des FGB, April 22, 1958.  If the child was fourteen years of age or 
older, then she or he would also have to consent to the name change: BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 
14398, 1958 FGB-Entwurf.  § 75 actually constituted a retraction of the more “progressive” language of the 
1954 FGB draft, which stipulated that since giving birth out of wedlock was no longer considered immoral, 
a mother and her child born out of wedlock could thus retain her last name rather than adopting the name of 




previous FGB draft in Karl-Marx-Stadt in 1954 by registry office functionaries-in-
training, who had called for a name-changing provision that would signal to the outside 
world that a child born out of wedlock “really belong[ed] to the family” even if her or his 
mother’s new husband was not her or his biological father.158  On the one hand, making it 
easier for children born out of wedlock to adopt their mother’s new family name 
constituted a stage in the fulfillment of the 1950 Law for the Protection of Mother and 
Child and the Rights of Women’s promise of equality for children born in and out of 
wedlock, since these children would thus be indistinguishable (at least as far as their last 
name was concerned) from children born into the marriage.  On the other hand, the 
recognition that children who retained their mother’s maiden name after she married 
would also retain a sign of their “illegitimate” status meant that even after a mother 
married, her offspring born in and out of wedlock were still not seen as fundamentally 
equal by society at large. 
Benjamin’s suggestion did not meet with universal approbation at the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs.  An internal memo indicated discomfort with the way in which the 
proposed new wording of § 75, part 2 in the FGB draft echoed § 1706, part 2 of the BGB, 
since the latter legal provision had been drafted when children born in and out of wedlock 
were not yet legal equals.  One official opined, “In my opinion, there is no reason to 
uphold a provision that under bourgeois law was primarily designed to help conceal the 
fact that a child had been born out of wedlock.”  Another disagreed by noting that the 
                                                                                                                                                 
the “advantage” of communicating familial unity by adopting a common last name.  See BArch Berlin-
Lichterfelde, DO1 14398, Bericht über die Ergebnisse der Diskussion zum Entwurf des FGB auf der 
Arbeitstagung im MdJ vom 19. Oktober 1954, 27 of document. 
158 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 14398, letter from Max W. to Bezirksverwaltung Karl-Marx-Stadt-
Staatssekretariat für Innere Angelegenheiten, MdI, Abt. Bevölkerungspolitik und PSW, August 18, 1954. 
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point of giving the child the new family name was to ensure that others would view the 
family as a unified entity, although this official’s objection did not address the fact that 
the desirability of a family appearing to be a “unified entity” largely stemmed from the 
lingering taint of illegitimacy for family members bearing a different last name.  So as to 
avoid singling out children born out of wedlock and reproducing the logic of illegitimacy 
that underpinned the similar BGB provision, the first official felt that if retained in the 
final version of the FGB, § 75, part 2 should also apply to children born into previous 
marriages for whom a spouse had primary custody.159 
 On the cusp of the issuance of the new FGB in 1965, the perceived need to wed 
when an underage female partner was pregnant remained quite widespread in the GDR 
even after ten years of the rigid application of § 1 of the Marriage Ordinance.  The 
Ministry of Justice attributed the resilience of this supposedly obsolete point of view to 
the sense of responsibility that both partners typically felt for their as-yet-unborn child 
and the influence of parents of an older generation.  But officials were also chagrined to 
admit that even though the fertility rate in the GDR actually rose (from 16.7 per 1000 in 
1952 to 17.6 per 1000 in 1963), “an international comparison reveals that the desire to 
have children lags far behind the desire to marry in the GDR.”160  Despite the SED’s 
prodigious efforts to change popular attitudes about “illegitimate” children, “many young 
girls still view giving birth out of wedlock as a moral taint, and they also see this view 
confirmed by life experience”; indeed, “[i]t seems that many young women would rather 
                                                 
159 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 14398, MdI, HA Innere Angelegenheiten, Hausmitteilung, to MdI, 
Rechtsabteilung (Betreff: Stellungnahme zum Entwurf des FGB und des Einführungsgesetzes zum FGB), 
May 19, 1958. 
160 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1445, Band 1, “Zu einigen Fragen der Familie in der DDR,” 
February 4, 1965, 8 of document, 8 of archival file. 
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risk the prospect of divorce than giving birth to a child out of wedlock.”161  But according 
to a report on the discussion of the 1965 FGB draft, demands for granting exceptions to 
eighteen as the age of marital consent supposedly “played no role in the discussion and 
have not been mentioned in petitions for years,” even though such requests continued to 
be made at least until the early to mid-1970s.162 
 Despite the unwillingness of many Ministry of Justice officials to admit the extent 
of popular discontent, the objections to § 1 of the Marriage Ordinance (codified in § 5, 
section 4 of the new FGB) were not without impact.  § 28 of the Supplement Regarding 
the Implementation of the FGB stipulated for the first time that officials could grant 
exemptions from the rule, albeit only in “exceptional” cases.  This constituted a moment 
in which the supposedly impermeable apparatus of East German jurisprudence apparently 
proved amenable to the pressures of popular and internal dissent.163 
One such “exceptional” case took place in 1972, when Harald G., a member of 
the East German team that was to compete in the Munich Olympics, received permission 
to marry his fiancée Martina B. before she turned eighteen; the reason given for granting 
the exemption was that they had already had a child together.  Preserving the reputation 
of an East German Olympic athlete from potentially denigratory accusations about his 
personal life apparently was enough of a reason to suspend the law in this instance.164  
                                                 
161 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1445, Band 1, “Zu einigen Fragen der Familie in der DDR,” 
February 4, 1965, 4 of document, 4 of archival file. 
162 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 14425, MdJ, Berlin, Grundkommission zur Ausarbeitung des FGB, 
Begründung der Änderungen des Entwurfs des FGB, October 6, 1965, 3 of document. 
163 Grandke argues that few people took advantage of the possibility of an exemption because the provision 
was relatively unknown and because out-of-wedlock births had become more prevalent.  Grandke, 
“Familienrecht,” 182. 
164 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 3007, Band 1.304, letter from Major Harald G., Armeesportsklub 
Vorwärts Leipzig, Nationale Volksarmee, to MdJ, HA III, Berlin, Betr: Antrag von Frl. Martina B., July 14, 




Despite this new willingness to grant occasional exceptions to the rule, however, the 
Ministry of Justice continued to reject calls to lower the age at which women could 
legally marry.  And the GDR would not follow the example of Poland, which had been 
unique among European state-socialist polities in raising the age of marital consent for 
men, a reform for which there had also been popular support in East Germany.165 
 
Conclusion 
 In contesting the parameters of the age of marital consent, state officials and East 
German citizens were often speaking at cross purposes.  State officials on the national 
level were predominantly interested in strengthening the legitimacy of the GDR’s judicial 
system, and thus they suppressed their own inclination to jettison the new age threshold 
for marriage even when they harbored reservations about it and were confronted with 
ample evidence of popular opposition to the measure.  This consensus among officials in 
Berlin to abide by the status quo persisted even in the face of recalcitrant local 
functionaries who were apparently willing to bend the rules for some women under the 
age of eighteen to get married.  The freedom to marry could serve as a stand-in for the 
assertion of a larger set of freedoms against arbitrary and coercive state directives like the 
economic measures that had sparked the East German uprising on June 17, 1953.  But 
this yearning for freedom had a decidedly gendered dimension.  Both citizens and 
                                                                                                                                                 
1972, 46 of archival file.  If a prospective bride was deemed to be mature enough, she could now receive 
permission to marry her fiancé if he had a lengthy military service stint ahead of him; this had not been an 
officially sanctioned possibility under the Marriage Ordinance of 1955.  See BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, 
DP1 VA 3007, Band 1.304, letter from Lübchen, MdJ, Berlin, to Heuckendorf, BG Schwerin, June 20, 
1974, 177 of archival file. 
165 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 14425, MdJ, Berlin, Grundkommission zur Ausarbeitung des FGB, 
Begründung des Entwurfs des FGB, March 18, 1965, 2 of document; BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 




officials tended to overlook the fact that while the Marriage Ordinance limited young 
women’s access to the institution of marriage, it codified expanded access to wedlock for 
young men, who could now marry at the age of eighteen rather than having to wait until 
their twenty-first birthday.  While there were some voices during the discussion of the 
1954 FGB draft that called for the revocation of this change and the augmentation of the 
age of marital consent to twenty-five for men, these objections paled in comparison with 
the outcry generated by the new age of marital consent for women. 
Indeed, East Germans were not hesitant to remind officials that a governmental 
decree did nothing to eliminate the societal and familial attitudes that continued to 
stigmatize unwed motherhood.  And, like those who left the GDR for any number of 
other reasons, some of these couples were willing to vote with their feet.  The 
government’s overarching concern to enhance the birthrate and stem the exodus of East 
Germans to West Germany seemed to be at odds with a Marriage Ordinance that tempted 
at least some young East Germans to flee the GDR to take advantage of the lower age of 
marital consent for women in the FRG.  For a party that claimed to speak on behalf of the 
“moral views of the working people” (Moralanschauungen der Werktätigen), it was not 
exactly welcome news for the SED to learn that its values apparently conflicted with 
those of many East German “working people.”  But perhaps even more alarming was the 
fact that officials at both national and local levels of government argued with varying 
degrees of explicitness that the new age of marital consent for women went against a 




The desire of underage women for the freedom to marry on their own terms also 
served to reinforce the importance of the presence of married fathers in the lives of 
newborn children in the eyes of many East Germans.  In most Eingaben, the issue was 
framed around an underage woman’s right to marry, but the reason for her desire to 
marry was to secure a father for her child.  This was certainly not unique to the GDR of 
the 1950s, but neither should it be read merely as an atavistic adherence to “traditional” 
values.  The SED might have sought to remove the stigma of illegitimacy from children 
born out of wedlock, but it had not provided an alternative language for articulating the 
role of fathers in the lives of their non-marital children. 
 So what difference did a woman’s marital status make when it came to the 
evolution of societal attitudes and public policy in both Germanies during the 1950s?  
Given the absence of substantive reforms in family law until 1957 at the earliest in the 
FRG, the salient issue for West German “women standing alone” was their ability (or 
inability) to negotiate the various legal and societal obstacles that they faced.  But for 
West German governmental officials and public opinion shapers, however, the question 
was not how single women would adapt to an inhospitable sociopolitical landscape, but 
instead how an ostensibly unchanging society and government would adapt to the 
presence of so many unmarried West German women.  In East Germany, by contrast, it 
was precisely the novelty of governmental attitudes and policies towards single women 
and mothers that supplanted the relative numerical preponderance of unmarried women 
and war widows as the crux of the issue of “women standing alone.”  In other words, the 
question was not how East German society would adapt to the presence of a large number 
of single women, but instead whether unmarried women would come to accept changing 
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laws and societal expectations.  East German policies did not change because of the 
“surplus of women,” but the implicit perception of such a surplus certainly affected their 
implementation.166 
In arguing for the integral role played by conjugality in forming citizens in Third 
Republic France, Judith Surkis has maintained that “[i]n examining the sexualization of 
political subjects as an ongoing process rather than as a singular event, I emphasize how 
instability and incoherence were part of how gender and sexual norms were both 
elaborated and transformed.”167  An analogous process was underway during the 
formative years of the GDR.  By providing tantalizing clues about the texture of ongoing 
official and popular negotiations of marital norms both old and new, and by gesturing 
towards the ways in which propagandistic assertions of “socialist” expectations for 
marital life could be accepted, disputed, and transformed, the drafters of the Eingaben 
examined in this chapter contributed to the indeterminacy and contingency that 
characterized the elaboration of marital norms during the formative years of the GDR.  
As evidenced by the remarkable durability of § 1 of the Marriage Ordinance despite its 
continually contested status, the instability of the ongoing “sexualization of political 
subjects” did not shake the normative power exerted by the SED’s expectations for 
marital behavior, and, following Surkis’s argument, ultimately served to strengthen them.
                                                 
166 In 1950, women outnumbered men in the GDR by 2 million.  See Wolle, Aufbruch nach Utopia, 219. 
167 Judith Surkis, Sexing the Citizen: Morality and Masculinity in France, 1870-1920 (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2006), 7. 
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CHAPTER 5. MAKING WAY FOR “WINGED EROS?” DIVORCE LAW 
REFORM AND MARITAL INFIDELITY IN THE 1950s 
 
Divorce is nothing more than a declaration that a marriage has died and that its existence 
is little more than an illusion (Schein) and deception (Trug).” (Karl Marx)1 
 
You have to ask yourself the question: who benefits from the preservation of a marriage 
that exists in name only? (Henning, Primary Spokesperson for the East German Ministry 
of Justice, 1963)2 
 
 
Karl Marx and many East German officials agreed: it was futile to preserve a 
marriage that had lost its meaning for a couple.  But there was also a pronounced strand 
in socialist thought that sought to preserve marital unions not so much for their own sake 
as for their societal importance.  It was for this reason that Vladimir Lenin informed 
Clara Zetkin of his rejection of Alexandra Kollontai’s conception of nonmarital “free 
love” in the following terms: 
 
“The drinking of water [a reference to Kollontai’s alleged comparison of 
satisfying sexual desire to quenching thirst] is really an individual matter.  But it 
takes two people to make love, and a third person, a new life, is likely to come 
into being.  The deed has a social complexion and constitutes a duty to the 
community.”3 
 
                                                 
1 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 2227, Band 7, Rundfunkkommentar, Thema: Schutz der Ehe im 
sozialistischen Staat, planned for radio broadcast on September 9, 1957, quotation attributed to Karl Marx, 
6 of document, 58 of archival file.  The title of this chapter is inspired by “Make Way for Winged Eros,” 
Alexandra Kollontai’s seminal 1923 essay on sexual morality. 
2 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 0417, Band E3—664-1628/63, letter from Hauptreferent Henning, 
Ministerium der Justiz (hereafter MdJ), Berlin, to Ingrid B., Berlin, July 4, 1963, unpaginated. 
3 Quotation from Blanche Wiesen Cook, “Feminism, Socialism, and Sexual Freedom: The Work and 
Legacy of Crystal Eastman and Alexandra Kollontai,” in Women in Culture and Politics: A Century of 
Change, eds. Judith Friedlander, Blanche Wiesen Cook, Alice Kessler-Harris, and Carroll Smith-
Rosenberg (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 358-375, here 372. 
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These competing visions of the “social complexion” of the marital bond were at stake 
when the SED codified East German divorce law in the Marriage Ordinance 
(Eheverordnung, or EheVO) of November 24, 1955.  With the introduction of no-fault 
divorce, adultery no longer appeared in an officially sanctioned list of reasons to end a 
marriage—indeed, there was no longer any list at all.  As in the case of the new age of 
marital consent for women, the Marriage Ordinance’s divorce provisions exposed the 
fault lines in what was supposed to be an overarching consensus regarding the tenets of 
socialist marital morality. 
To the extent that historians have paid attention to the role of adultery in divorce 
proceedings, they have typically proceeded from the presumption of a sexual double 
standard that has been remarkably impervious to change regardless of geographical or 
temporal context.  A woman who committed adultery was subject to particularly harsh 
sanctions and an indelible moral taint because she violated norms that dictated female 
sexual modesty, subservience to her husband, and her obligation to provide her husband 
with heirs whose paternity would not be in doubt.  A man, by contrast, who engaged in a 
sexual dalliance committed a “‘regrettable but understandable foible’” since his healthy 
carnal appetite demanded satisfaction by consorting with prostitutes before marriage and, 
if unfulfilled during marriage, by having an affair with a mistress.4  The dominant 
                                                 
4 Anthony Giddens, The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love and Eroticism in Modern Societies 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 7, drawing upon Lawrence Stone, Road to Divorce: 
England 1530-1987 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Christina Simmons, Making Marriage 
Modern: Women’s Sexuality from the Progressive Era to World War II (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 8.  An exception to this general rule could be found during wartime: “public opinion [during 
the Second World War] did not uniformly censure adulterous wives [whose husbands were away at war].   
While some condemned adultery as a sign of a too-carefree life-style, others pitied women who passed their 
best years without their husbands and amidst the hardships of war.”  Elizabeth Heineman, What Difference 
Does a Husband Make? Women and Marital Status in Nazi and Postwar Germany (Berkeley: University of 




narrative presumes that this double standard began to lose purchase during the later 
twentieth century because of the influence of second-wave feminism and the removal of 
barriers to gender equality before the law in many Western societies.  But feminists did 
not fail to notice that the growing emphasis on the importance of sexual pleasure could 
actually reinforce the assumption of male sexual prerogative that underpinned the double 
standard.5 
 The GDR’s version of real-existing socialism was supposed to offer an alternative 
path for overcoming this double standard.  The regime’s commitment to gender equality 
(Gleichberechtigung) before the law and in terms of opportunities to participate in the 
workforce arguably could have provided women with the tools to overcome the 
surprisingly resilient remnants of the misogynistic “bourgeois” family model at home.6  If 
one views women’s resorting to the option of divorce as a sign of their ability to escape 
infelicitous marital arrangements, whether “bourgeois” in nature or not, then it would 
seem as if the SED succeeded, albeit not in the way that it would have liked.  While in 
the late 1950s, East German women were still more likely to object to divorce requests 
submitted by men, from the mid-1960s onwards, the situation was reversed: the 
preponderance of such objections (Gegenklagen) in divorce cases came from husbands 
                                                                                                                                                 
men had a stronger sexual drive than women did, but they did not consider this to be an acceptable excuse 
for promiscuous behavior on the part of men.  To cite but one example of such thinking: Klaus Trummer, 
ed., Unter vier Augen gesagt ... Fragen und Antworten über Freundschaft und Liebe, 3rd ed. (Berlin: 
Verlag Neues Leben, 1968), 187. 
5 Simmons, Making Marriage Modern, 4. 
6 West Germany had rendered wives and husbands equal in some, but not all, aspects of marriage in a 1957 
law that was the product of an arduous and contentious debate; full equality would have to wait until the 
1970s.  East Germany, by contrast, had mandated blanket legal equality on the basis of gender as part of the 
1950 Law for the Protection of Mother and Child and the Rights of Women. 
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who did not agree with their wives’ request for divorce.7  Most observers have attributed 
this trend to women’s increasing level of workforce participation and consequent 
economic autonomy.8 
 Lothar Mertens maintains that while the GDR fell short of its goal to meet the 
“world standard” in most respects, it most certainly could hold its own with the top 
contenders in the world when it came to its divorce rate; by the time of the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, only the United States, the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Great Britain surpassed 
the GDR in this regard.9  But this observation applies only to the last two decades of the 
GDR’s existence.  From 1956 to 1966, the incidence of marital dissolution remained 
relatively stable at about fifteen divorces for every 100 marriages, and the absolute 
number of divorces continually declined during the 1950s.10  By 1978, however, the rate 
doubled to thirty divorces for every 100 marriages and did not stop climbing until 1982, 
when a rate of forty divorces for every 100 marriages was reached.  This increase cannot 
be attributed to the relatively minor decline in the marriage rate over the same period; a 
juxtaposition of the two statistical trajectories reveals that “[a]bout twice as many couples 
chose to divorce in the 1980s as in the 1960s.”11  Even though the increase in the GDR’s 
divorce rate is of more recent provenance, it was already high relative to that of West 
                                                 
7 Lothar Mertens, Wider die sozialistische Familiennorm: Ehescheidungen in der DDR 1950-1989 
(Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1998), 41. 
8 Mertens, Wider die sozialistische Familiennorm, 78-79; Josie McLellan, Love in the Time of Communism: 
Intimacy and Sexuality in the GDR (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 82. 
9 Mertens, Wider die sozialistische Familiennorm, 13, drawing upon Dagmar Meyer, “Ehescheidung in der 
ehemaligen DDR,” Zeitschrift für Bevölkerungswissenschaft 17, no. 1 (1991), 33-47, here 33; Paul Betts, 
Within Walls: Private Life in the German Democratic Republic (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2010), 88. 
10 McLellan, Love in the Time of Communism, 54; Mike Dennis, “Family Policy and Family Function in the 
German Democratic Republic,” in Social Transformation and the Family in Post-Communist Germany, ed. 
Eva Kolinsky (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), 37-56, here 43. 
11 McLellan, Love in the Time of Communism, 54-55, quotation from 55.  Comparable figures can be found 
in Andrew I. Port, “Love, Lust, and Lies under Communism: Family Values and Adulterous Liaisons in 
Early East Germany,” Central European History 44, no. 3 (September 2011), 478-505, here 496-497. 
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Germany in the 1950s.  While the East German divorce rate dropped from 27.1 per 
10,000 inhabitants in 1950 to 14.3 per 10,000 in 1955, the rate of marital termination in 
West Germany declined from 16.9 per 10,000 inhabitants in 1950 to 9.2 per 10,000 in 
1955.12 
Dorothee Wierling associates the pervasiveness of divorce with the weakening of 
“informal,” non-governmental networks, of which the family unit was one.13  Observers 
at the time, however, offered a different explanation.  In 1966, GDR jurist Leonore 
Ansorg explained the high East German divorce rate as an unavoidable hurdle along the 
path to a new familial ethos, since men and women were increasingly unwilling to abide 
by spouses who remained beholden to obsolete marital mores.14  But already in the 
1950s, some couples chose to divorce at least in part because marriage manual authors 
were encouraging spouses to have high expectations for marriage.15  Among these 
                                                 
12 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, ed., Familienpolitik und Familienplanung in beiden deutschen Staaten (Bonn-
Bad Godesberg: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, 1977), 8.  By way of comparison, the divorce rate had been 8.9 
per 10,000 inhabitants in Nazi Germany in 1939—a figure that West Germany came very close to matching 
already in 1955.  Maria Höhn, “Frau im Haus, Girl im Spiegel: Discourse on Women in the Interregnum 
Period of 1945-1949 and the Question of German Identity,” Central European History 26, no. 1 (Winter 
1993), 57-90, here 77, endnote 76. 
13 Ralph Jessen, “Die Gesellschaft im Staatssozialismus: Probleme einer Sozialgeschichte der DDR,” 
Geschichte und Gesellschaft 21, no. 1 (1995), 96-110, here 108, drawing upon Dorothee Wierling, “Is 
There an East German Identity? Aspects of Social History of the Soviet Zone/German Democratic 
Republic,” Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte 19 (1990), 193-207, here 205. 
14 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1446, Vermerk über die Teilnahme an den 2. Rostocker 
Fortbildungstagen über Probleme der Ehe- und Sexualberatung vom 16. bis 18. Oktober 1966, veranstaltet 
von der Arbeitsgemeinschaft (hereafter AG) Ehe und Familie in der Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsschutz, 
Walter Krutzsch, MdJ, Sekretariat des Ministers, Berlin, October 24, 1966, 2 of document, 99b of archival 
file; Betts, Within Walls, 108. 
15 Johannes Huinink and Michael Wagner, “Partnerschaft, Ehe und Familie in der DDR,” in Kollektiv und 
Eigensinn: Lebensverläufe in der DDR und danach, eds. Johannes Huinink, Karl Ulrich Mayer et al. 
(Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1995), 145-188, here 153.  This development was not unique to the GDR; the 
British Commission on Marriage and Divorce, which met from 1951 until 1955, was one of many voices at 
the time that identified higher expectations—particularly regarding sexual fulfillment—as posing an 
increasing threat to the viability of many marriages.  See Claire Langhamer, “Adultery in Post-War 
England,” History Workshop Journal, 62, no. 1 (Autumn 2006), 86-115, here 90-92; for a retrospective 
argument about the precariousness of predicating marital success upon sexual satisfaction, see Niklas 
Luhmann, Love as Passion: The Codification of Intimacy, trans. Jeremy Gaines and Doris L. Jones 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986). 
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expectations was a growing emphasis that women in particular placed upon sexual 
fulfillment within marriage, as exemplified by their increasing willingness to cite sexual 
incompatibility as a rationale for divorce.16 
According to Paul Betts, the proportion of couples citing sexual 
incommensurability as grounds for divorce tripled from 1959 to 1972.17  He notes that 
“[w]hile some sexual history was discussed in late 1940s cases, there was a discernible 
move away from such questions in the 1950s.  By the mid-1960s, though, a couple’s 
sexual life became a key part of the court hearing.”  Betts attributes this phenomenon to 
factors that were at once transnational and specific to the GDR.  One of these was the 
 
changing nature of the East German family itself.  By the 1960s the GDR family 
was becoming what some describe as an island of consumerism and care, as the 
more traditional functions of the family—production, education, and even 
childraising—were increasingly assumed by the state.  This resulted in what has 
been called a “privatization of marriage,” in that marriage was being recast as a 
respite of comfort, intimacy, and close-knit family life.18 
 
 
But the East German family was not unique in becoming “an island of consumerism and 
care.”  What gave the “‘privatization of marriage’” a decidedly East German cast was the 
way in which the SED sought to arrogate to itself certain tasks associated with raising 
                                                 
16 Mertens, Wider die sozialistische Familiennorm, 61.  This also manifested itself in the increasing number 
of philandering wives.  Whereas in 1959, men were responsible for 76 percent and women for 24 percent of 
instances of adultery in divorce cases, by 1978 the balance had shifted to a 58 percent share for men and a 
42 percent share for women of instances of adultery.  See Mertens, Wider die sozialistische Familiennorm, 
60. 
17 Betts, Within Walls, 106-107; Dennis, “Family Policy and Family Function,” 44.  Betts and Mike Dennis 
cite a figure of 6 percent for sexual incompatibility in 1959 divorce cases, whereas one of my sources (as 
noted elsewhere in this chapter) cites 4.0-4.9 percent for cases between 1959 and 1962; see BArch Berlin-
Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 1491, Teil 2, Der erreichte Entwicklungsstand im Bereich der Familie und ihre 
fördernden und hemmenden Einflüsse auf die gesellschaftliche Weiterentwicklung, undated but perhaps 
from 1964, 15 of document, unpaginated archival file. 
18 Betts, Within Walls, 106-107. 
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and educating children, and to claim as a distinctly socialist achievement the affective 
bonds that advocates of companionate marriage had long touted. 
Also significant for the evolution of “socialist” marriage was the emergence of an 
East German “cultural language” of sex.  Betts opines that the rising incidence of sexual 
dysfunction as an inducement for divorce requests “does not denote necessarily less 
satisfying sex than before; instead, it registers a new language of sexual problems over 
the course of the 1960s, as divorce cases became a locus for women in particular to stake 
their broader claims about personal dissatisfaction on a range of levels.”19  Betts 
implicitly attributes the emergence of this “new language” to a top-down process.  In 
other words, since the state became more interested in learning about the sexual lives of 
its citizens during the 1960s, it provided the discursive parameters for the increasing 
articulation of sexual concerns by ordinary citizens.  This is not incorrect, but it overlooks 
the bottom-up impetus for sexual discourse that emerged before the 1960s.  Popular 
protest against the government’s apparent moral agnosticism regarding adultery was a 
significant factor in shaping an East German cultural language of sex from the mid-1950s 
onward.20 
 East Germans were responding not just to the Marriage Ordinance itself, but also 
to the criticism that it elicited from observers in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).  
Whatever the causes of East Germany’s high divorce rate might have been, it provided 
fodder for West German critics who fervently believed that “the East German 
government was intent upon dissolving the family in favor of collectivist institutions, 
                                                 
19 Betts, Within Walls, 107. 
20 In Chapter 4, I advance a complementary argument about the ways in which the new age of marital 
consent for men and women also enabled a multivalent “cultural language” of sex to emerge in the wake of 
the issuance of the Marriage Ordinance in 1955. 
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valorizing ideological fervor above enthusiasm for family life, and following the 
Bolsheviks’ example by embarking upon an ill-advised liberalization of divorce law.”21  
West German critics equated the issuance of the Marriage Ordinance with the 
politicization of marriage by the SED: 
 
According to the ordinance’s foreword, marriage is no longer the most intimate 
kind of relationship between a man and woman, but instead “a union based upon 
equal rights, mutual love and respect that serves the development of both spouses 
together and the purpose of raising children in the spirit of democracy, socialism, 
patriotism, and friendship between peoples.”  These political shibboleths make it 
evident that marriage [in the GDR] can only be considered under the rubric of an 
overall conception of politics.  A marriage is only valuable if it fosters the 
dominant ideology and worthless if it produces children with different ideological 
inclinations.  This is why it is possible to obtain a divorce when the marriage has 
lost its meaning for society—that is, when one of the spouses has “distanced 
himself from the dominant conception of the state and ideology.”  On the whole, 
one can discern that it has become much easier to dissolve a marriage.22 
 
                                                 
21 Robert Moeller expostulates that the oft-touted impregnability of the West German family and its status 
as a resolutely private domain beyond the reach of the state “embodied a critique of the ideological 
alternatives presented by National Socialism and East German communism.”  See Robert G. Moeller, “The 
Elephant in the Living Room: Or Why the History of Twentieth-Century Germany Should Be a Family 
Affair,” in Gendering Modern German History: Rewriting Historiography, eds. Karen Hagemann and Jean 
H. Quataert (New York: Berghahn, 2007), 228-249, here 237-238.  The Bolshevik regime in the USSR 
introduced the legal principle of automatic divorce at the demand of either spouse in 1917; in the wake of a 
traditionalist family law code draft in 1936 and a new divorce law that Stalin’s regime promulgated in 
1944, divorce became much more difficult and expensive to obtain as the maintenance of the nuclear 
family became a paramount concern of the state.  See Greta Bucher, Women, the Bureaucracy and Daily 
Life in Postwar Moscow, 1945-1953 (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 2006), 9-11; Lynn D. 
Wardle, “The ‘Withering Away’ of Marriage: Some Lessons from the Bolshevik Family Law Reforms in 
Russia, 1917-1926,” in The Family in the New Millennium: World Voices Supporting the “Natural” Clan, 
volume 1: The Place of Family in Human Society, eds. Scott Loveless and Thomas B. Holman (Westport, 
CT: Praeger, 2007), 257-295, here 265; Dan Healey, Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia: The 
Regulation of Sexual and Gender Dissent (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 197; Lauren 
Kaminsky, “Utopian Visions of Family Life in the Stalin-Era Soviet Union,” Central European History 44, 
no. 1 (March 2011), 63-91, here 70, 83-84.  Beginning in 1955, however, there is evidence that Soviet 
courts relaxed to some degree the standards for granting divorces even though the restrictive divorce law 
remained unchanged until 1965.  Peter Juviler, “Soviet Families,” in American and Soviet Society: A 
Reader in Comparative Sociology and Perception, ed. Paul Hollander (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall, 1969), 206-212, here 208-209. 
22 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 2226, Band 1, “Die politische Ehe,” an article ostensibly from Kraft 
und Licht (1956), published by the Berliner Stadtmission in Berlin-Tempelhof (West Berlin), 2 of 
document, 100 back side of archival file; Maria Hagemeyer, Zum Familienrecht in der Sowjetzone: Der 
“Entwurf des Familiengesetzbuches” und die “Verordnung über Eheschliessung und Eheauflösung, 2nd ed. 




West German observers also accused the SED of moral bankruptcy.  The East German 
Ministry of Justice complained that “[o]ur enemies have made use of our silence [on 
moral questions] to spread malicious slander such as the allegations that infidelity was no 
longer grounds for divorce, every man could have two wives, a married man could have 
his lover in his apartment until 10:00 p.m., and similarly nonsensical statements.”23  
Instead of mollifying moral qualms, the public discussions of the 1954 Family Law Code 
(Familiengesetzbuch, or FGB) draft might have actually exacerbated fears about the 
consequences of no-fault divorce.  For instance, some discussion leaders echoed West 
German allegations when they said that “‘[a]dultery is no longer grounds for divorce.’”  
This was “misleading when uttered in this unadorned fashion” (i.e., without concrete 
examples of what this would mean in practice) since none of the other previously 
sanctioned rationales for divorce was necessarily still grounds for divorce either.24 
With the exception of halfhearted early attempts to create workplace kitchens and 
laundries, the SED went out of its way to counter such charges by demonstrating its 
steadfast commitment to upholding the integrity of the nuclear family.25  The GDR’s 
divorce law required judges not only to ascertain the seriousness of the reasons for which 
couples sought divorce but also to make every conceivable effort to get them to reconcile 
(Aussöhnungsversuch), especially during the pre-trial hearing.26  The SED was intent on 
                                                 
23 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 14398, Bericht über die Ergebnisse der Diskussion zum Entwurf des 
Familiengesetzbuches (hereafter FGB) auf der Arbeitstagung im MdJ, October 19, 1954, 18 of document; 
Harsch, Revenge of the Domestic, 208, drawing upon SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/13/99, Bericht …, 
October 19, 1954, 469. 
24 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 14398, Bericht über die Ergebnisse der Diskussion zum Entwurf des 
FGB auf der Arbeitstagung im MdJ, October 19, 1954, 18 of document. 
25 Huinink and Wagner, “Partnerschaft, Ehe und Familie in der DDR,” 149-150. 
26 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 2226, Band 3, “Thesen zum Eheverfahren,” conference of heads of 




refuting the charge that it revived the ready attainability of divorce that had prevailed 
during the early years of Bolshevik rule in the USSR, although many East Germans 
agreed with West German observers that “it ha[d] become easier to obtain a divorce” in 
the GDR.27  The fact that high-level jurists within the Ministry of Justice and the 
Supreme Court could not agree among themselves about how readily divorce should be 
granted—especially when adultery and older spouses were involved—did not help to 
quell the rumor mill. 
All too easily lost in all of this was the fact that the party frequently viewed a 
marriage’s “meaning for society” not exclusively in “political” terms, but instead as an 
extension and reflection of its meaning to family members.  And while there were indeed 
divorces granted on ideological grounds in the GDR, far more prevalent were cases 
involving decidedly non-ideological instances of adultery.  Also overlooked in the midst 
of Cold War-related tensions was the fact that the Marriage Ordinance’s stipulation of 
no-fault divorce was not a revolutionary reform at least when it came to relatively recent 
                                                                                                                                                 
implementation of the November 24, 1955 Marriage Ordinance, 1 of document, 136 of archival file; Donna 
Harsch, “Sex, Divorce, and Women’s Waged Work: Private Lives and State Policy in the Early German 
Democratic Republic,” in Gender Politics and Everyday Life in State Socialist Eastern and Central 
Europe, eds. Shana Penn and Jill Massino (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 97-113, here 108.  The 
Aussöhnungsversuch was not unique to the GDR, but instead hearkened back to a nineteenth-century 
German legal practice anchored in the BGB and to the 1944 Soviet divorce law; see Betts, Within Walls, 
95, 97; Schneider, Hausväteridylle, 245. 
27 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 2226, Band 1, Analyse über Verfahren nach Erlass der EheVO, MdJ, 
Hauptabteilung (hereafter HA) Gesetzgebung, Berlin, July 28, 1956, 2 of document, 145 of archival file.  
From a statistical standpoint at least, divorce became easier to obtain during the decade and a half 
following the promulgation of the Marriage Ordinance; whereas 60 percent of East German divorce cases 
resulted in a divorce being granted in 1958, this percentage rose to 68 percent by 1969.  Betts, Within 
Walls, 100.  In Elizabeth Heineman’s estimation, East and West Germany were more similar than different 
when it came to the relative difficulty of obtaining a divorce: “[Despite the legal stipulation of no-fault 
divorce,] East German courts granted divorce reluctantly.  West Germany maintained precisely the same 
uneasy truce in the 1950s: it declined to eliminate no-fault divorce, but would-be divorcees encountered 
hostile judges.”  Heineman, What Difference Does a Husband Make?, 194.  According to Andrew Port, the 
East German government’s abandonment of the guilt principle in favor of the ruin principle “could 
potentially ease divorce by eliminating the need to demonstrate fault […] [but it also] made the termination 
of marriage theoretically more difficult by eliminating any absolute grounds for divorce.”  Port, “Love, 
Lust, and Lies under Communism,” 490-491. 
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German jurisprudence, since the Nazi regime had introduced a version of no-fault divorce 
in 1938.28  But it was perhaps precisely because the SED itself trumpeted the Marriage 
Ordinance as “new” and “socialist” that even its relatively more timeworn provisions 
seemed to be more novel than was actually the case. 
 Unlike West German observers at the time, historians have tended to be decidedly 
skeptical about the SED’s claims regarding the revolutionary “socialist” transformation 
of marital and familial life in the GDR.  As Eric Weitz postulates, the SED 
 
sought to connect the identity of the DDR not specifically to the heroic 
progressive tradition, but to certain values and ideas long condemned in party 
circles as representative of “bourgeois” culture.  The SED propagated in particular 
a social conservatism defined by such key terms as “Sauberkeit” (cleanliness, 
moral virtue), “Anständlichkeit” (propriety, moral rectitude), and that holy trinity, 
“Ordnung, Fleiß und Sparsamkeit” (order, diligence, and thrift).  These terms 
stood in marked contrast to the disruptive elements of proletarian militancy that 
had characterized the KPD [German Communist Party] of the Weimar Republic. 
[…] Amid the revolutionary claims of the SED, the effort to appropriate 
“Bürgerlichkeit” [a bourgeois way of life] lent a profoundly conservative and 
traditional tone to DDR society, one that, especially in the 1950s, bore remarkable 
parallels to the tenor of West German society.29 
 
 
Along similar lines, Patrick Major avers that 
 
[i]n its sexual prudery, too, the party’s petit-bourgeois moralising struck a chord 
with 1950s’ reconstruction society [in the FRG], searching for security.  Whether 
this is peculiarly German is open to debate, but it is instructive that officials felt 
the need to invoke secondary virtues such as cleanliness in defence of their “big 
idea” of socialism.”30 
                                                 
28 Andrew Port explicitly compares Nazi and SED divorce law policy by observing that “the 1955 reform 
underscored the fact that political considerations, coupled with a purported concern for the effects of 
divorce on society as a whole, took clear precedence over the individual concerns of those involved, just as 
they had under National Socialism.”  Port, “Love, Lust, and Lies under Communism,” 492. 
29 Quotation from Eric Weitz, Creating German Communism, 1890-1990: From Popular Protests to 
Socialist State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 372; Stefan Wolle, Aufbruch nach Utopia: 
Alltag und Herrschaft in der DDR 1961-1971 (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2011), 212. 
30 Patrick Major, “Introduction,” in The Workers’ and Peasants’ State: Communism and Society in East 





Neither Major nor Weitz has acknowledged sufficiently how state socialism could serve 
as a vehicle for philistine, petty-bourgeois moral scruples and for more “progressive” 
visions of a sexually fulfilling companionate marriage. 
Herbert Marcuse presaged the current historiographical consensus that “[t]he 
praise of the monogamic family and of the joy and duty of conjugal love recalls classical 
‘petty-bourgeois ideology.’”31  But he also observed that “there is evidence of official and 
semi-official ridicule and protest [in Communist societies of such norms], and of 
widespread private transgression.”32  The SED’s appropriation of Bürgerlichkeit was 
ultimately selective and typically cloaked in rhetoric designed to hide its non-socialist 
origins, and thus afforded a relatively wide berth not only for the “ridicule” and 
“transgression” of the party’s ostensibly petit-bourgeois values, but also for their defense 
by ordinary citizens. 
Indeed, the SED had to defend itself against a wave of accusations that by 
granting judges significant leeway in determining acceptable rationales for divorce, it had 
ceded the ground of adjudicating socialist morality to the whim of individual judges.33  
Furthermore, a host of voices both within and outside of the government wondered aloud 
whether the GDR’s new divorce law was actually rewarding the behavior of older men, 
in particular, who sought to abandon aging spouses in favor of younger partners.  While 
this phenomenon and its condemnation were certainly not unique to the GDR, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
University Press, 2002), 1-19, here 15; Jens Gieseke, “Ulbricht’s Secret Police: The Ministry of State 
Security,” in Major and Osmond, eds., The Workers’ and Peasants’ State, 41-58, here 42. 
31 Herbert Marcuse, “The Principles of Communist Morality,” in American and Soviet Society: A Reader in 
Comparative Sociology and Perception, ed. Paul Hollander (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1969), 
46-50, here 49. 
32 Marcuse, “Principles of Communist Morality,” 49. 
33 Hagemeyer, Zum Familienrecht in der Sowjetzone, 14. 
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difficult dance of balancing “socialist” rhetoric and “bourgeois” mores resulted in some 
GDR-specific articulations of the midlife marital crisis and the ways in which courts 
responded to it.  Ute Schneider has argued that existing scholarship has ignored the self-
perceived victimhood of East German women of a certain age who because of divorce or 
the passing of their spouses had to enter the workforce during the 1950s.  In doing so, 
they had to alter their self-conception as women—from individuals who were provided 
for to individuals who needed to provide for themselves.34  Drawing upon Eingaben 
written by these women and their estranged spouses during the aftermath of the formal 
introduction of no-fault divorce in the GDR in 1955, I seek to make a decisive 
contribution to fill this research lacuna.  In fixating on the relatively high divorce rate in 
the GDR, historians have tended to focus on numerical evidence at the expense of 
unearthing the cultural meanings assigned to marital infidelity in the GDR. 
After describing key antecedents to the Marriage Ordinance in modern German 
divorce law, I examine the ramifications of the Marriage Ordinance for East German 
divorce statistics and the declining prevalence of alimony arrangements during the 1950s 
and 1960s.  I then explore the widespread perception that the Marriage Ordinance made 
divorce easier to obtain.  After prodding from no less influential a figure than Minister of 
Justice Hilde Benjamin, the Supreme Court issued a directive that was supposed to lead 
to a more consistent application of the law.  Given the dissent among high-level jurists at 
the Ministry of Justice and on the Supreme Court about how to move from fault-based to 
no-fault divorce, however, it is not surprising that jurisprudential practice in divorce cases 
would be anything but uniform.  This lack of uniformity in the adjudication of divorce 
                                                 
34 Schneider, Hausväteridylle, 106-107, 351. 
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cases only served to augment misgivings about judges’ preparedness and willingness to 
translate the tenets of socialist morality into the practice of everyday life.35  Even though 
socialist law was supposed to be a transparent reflection of socialist morality, Benjamin 
recognized that the actual process by which mores became laws was a nebulous one in 
need of scholarly explication. 
In the meantime, however, the Ministry of Justice had to convince aggrieved 
spouses that the Marriage Ordinance did not in fact reward adulterers by making it easier 
for them to obtain a divorce, especially when those adulterers happened to be SED 
functionaries.  It was difficult, however, for the government to convince older wives in 
particular that it was “on their side” when it simultaneously had to persuade them to 
relinquish their understanding of marriage as a lifelong source of financial support that 
obviated the need for workforce participation.  Despite optimistic prognoses about the 
efficacy of attempts by brigades to resolve marital conflict, there was deeply rooted 
skepticism about the advisability of such forms of societal intervention from the outset.  
The chapter concludes by evaluating the extent to which the 1965 FGB represented a 
continuation of or departure from prevailing understandings of divorce case jurisprudence 
and socialist familial morality. 
 
Legal Precedents for East German Divorce Law 
                                                 
35 Donna Harsch believes that the imputation of judges’ impartiality “was unfair, at least in the case of 
family-court judges.  Family courts sat in provincial cities, surrounded by everyday life and popular 
opinion.  By 1956, moreover, every third family-court judge was a woman.  For these reasons, local judges 
very often decided in favor of a wife-defendant and denied a divorce petition.”  The Supreme Court, 
however, “overturned many lower-court rulings and approved the divorce.”  Harsch, “Sex, Divorce, and 
Women’s Waged Work,” 104-105, drawing upon Friederike Kluge, “Gedanken einer Richterin zu Artikel 
48 Familiengesetz,” Neue Justiz 4 (1949), 16-17; Neue Justiz 7 (1953), 57; BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 
VA 387, Bl. 130, Landesregierung Mecklenburg, Schwerin to MdJ, October 13, 1950. 
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 During the nineteenth century, divorce in the conglomeration of German-speaking 
states that coalesced into the German nation in 1871 had been regulated by the General 
Prussian State Law (Allgemeines Preußisches Landrecht) of 1794 and also influenced by 
the French Code civil.  The new Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, or BGB) of 1900 
allowed for divorce only in cases of mental illness or if a spouse was at fault for ruining a 
marriage according to the “guilt principle” (Verschuldensprinzip); the attribution of fault 
had to accord with the law’s list of acceptable grounds for divorce.  This legal 
codification posited marriage as a private matter and did not make the dissolution of a 
marital bond contingent upon the meaning (or lack thereof) of a marital relationship for 
the state or society at large.36  But since clear assignation of paternity was in society’s 
best interest, Paragraph (§) 1592 BGB stipulated that widows and divorced women had to 
wait at least ten months until they remarried so that a new husband would not be held 
responsible for children who had been fathered by the previous husband.37 
 During the Weimar era, both the Union of German Women’s Associations (Bund 
deutscher Frauenvereine, or BDF) and the KPD called for jettisoning the 
Verschuldensprinzip in favor of the “ruin principle” (Zerrüttungsprinzip), whereby 
assessing the extent of marital ruin mattered far more than determining whether a spouse 
had been guilty of bringing about that ruin.38  In its 1938 marriage law, the National 
Socialist regime reformulated the Zerrüttungsprinzip for its own ends.  It loosened the 
strictures on granting divorce even as it placed new emphasis on the larger societal 
                                                 
36 Gabriele Czarnowski, Das kontrollierte Paar: Ehe- und Sexualpolitik im Nationalsozialismus 
(Weinheim: Deutscher Studien Verlag, 1991), 79-80. 
37 Czarnowski, Das kontrollierte Paar, 68. 
38 Betts, Within Walls, 91; Anita Grandke, “Familienrecht,” in Die Rechtsordnung der DDR: Anspruch und 
Wirklichkeit, ed. Uwe-Jens Heuer (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1995), 173-209, here 183. 
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implications of the marital bond.  As part of the regime’s quest to enhance the birth rate 
among the racially “desirable,” judges could grant divorces in cases of “‘premature 
infertility’” or a spouse’s “‘refusal to procreate.’”  The Zerrüttungsprinzip (as defined by 
Nazi family law) dictated that if a couple had been living apart for at last three years and 
if their marriage “had ‘irretrievably’ broken down,” then divorce was warranted.  By 
1941, 21,293 men and 6,648 women had taken advantage of this new provision to 
dissolve their marriages.39  At the same time, however, the Nazi regime no longer 
recognized adultery as automatic grounds for divorce—a decisive break from the BGB’s 
Verschuldensprinzip.  The context in which infidelity occurred, along with juridical 
discretion, were paramount in determining how adultery would affect the outcome of 
divorce proceedings.40 
 Both National Socialist and SED divorce law proceeded from the principle that it 
was important to dissolve marriages that had lost their meaning for the larger society; 
National Socialist policy, however, was far more explicit as to why: because divorce 
could actually facilitate the fulfillment of the regime’s demographic goals.41  Since 
divorced partners would ideally remarry and provide the “people’s community” 
(Volksgemeinschaft) with children that would not be born in unhappy marriages, judges 
under National Socialism could reduce or waive a husband’s obligation to pay alimony to 
his former wife if he remarried and had children with a new wife.  While Lisa Pine 
believes that the “facilitation of divorce […] did not stem from liberalistic ideals or from 
                                                 
39 Lisa Pine, Nazi Family Policy, 1933-1945 (Oxford: Berg, 1997), 18, drawing upon Gabriele Czarnowski, 
“‘The Value of Marriage for the Volksgemeinschaft’: Policies Towards Women and Marriage Under 
National Socialism,” in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany: Comparisons and Contrasts, ed. Richard Bessel 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 94-112, here 107-108. 
40 Betts, Within Walls, 92. 
41 Betts, Within Walls, 92. 
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any attempt on the part of the regime to ameliorate the position of private individuals,” 
disgruntled spouses who found it easier to dissolve their marital bonds thanks to the Nazi 
reform of divorce law certainly might have perceived the regime’s intentions as such.42  
Indeed, the Nazi regime lifted the BGB’s ban on remarriage for adulterous spouses as 
part of the 1938 marriage law, and this revocation remained in effect throughout the 
Occupation Zone period and under SED rule as well.43   
While explicitly pronatalist language would not find its way into East German 
divorce law, an amended version of the National Socialist espousal of the 
Zerrüttungsprinzip and its embrace of no-fault divorce did.44  Ironically, no-fault divorce 
was thus the thread that linked Weimar-era KPD and SPD family law reform proposals, 
the Nazis’ 1938 marriage law, and SED policy after the issuance of the Marriage 
Ordinance in 1955.45  The Zerrüttungsprinzip remained in § 48 of the Allies’ Control 
Council Law (Kontrollratsgesetz) Number 16 of February 20, 1946; the Marriage 
Ordinance of 1955 echoed the logic of the Zerrüttungsprinzip even if it no longer made 
use of the term.46  But there was discontinuity in another aspect of divorce law: while 
both the Nazi marriage law and the Marriage Ordinance instituted no-fault divorce, § 42 
of the Kontrollratsgesetz Number 16 called for fault-based divorce in an echo of the 
BGB’s divorce provisions.47 
                                                 
42 Pine, Nazi Family Policy, 18, drawing upon Czarnowski, “‘Value of Marriage,’” 109. 
43 Schneider, Hausväteridylle, 214. 
44 Czarnowski, Das kontrollierte Paar, 96. 
45 Heineman, What Difference Does a Husband Make?, 194. 
46 Christiane Kuller, Familienpolitik im föderativen Sozialstaat: Die Formierung eines Politikfeldes in der 
Bundesrepublik 1949-1975 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2004), 52; Schneider, Hausväteridylle, 91, 
238-252; Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, ed., Familienpolitik und Familienplanung, 52; Huinink and Wagner, 
“Partnerschaft, Ehe und Familie in der DDR,” 148. 
47 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 1077, folder II-1725/51, Amtsgericht Kaltennordheim, Ra 11/50, 




 In its very first paragraph, the Marriage Ordinance defined marriage as 
 
a lifelong partnership entered into by a man and a woman that is based upon 
equality, mutual love, mutual respect for each spouse’s personal growth, and 
raising children in the spirit of democracy, socialism, patriotism, and friendship 
between peoples. […] The workers’ and farmers’ power of the GDR serves to 
protect and strengthen the development of healthy marriages and families.  A 
thoughtless (leichtfertig) attitude towards marriage contradicts the moral views of 
the working people.48 
 
 
The legal framework for no-fault divorce was articulated in § 8 of the Marriage 
Ordinance: 
 
A marriage can only be dissolved when there are serious grounds for doing so and 
when a court, after a thorough investigation, has determined that the marriage has 
lost its meaning for the couple, for their children, and for society. In reaching this 
determination, however, the court must take into consideration whether a divorce 
would impose undue hardship upon one of the spouses and whether the well-
being of the children would contravene the approval of a divorce.49 
 
 
According to § 13 of the Marriage Ordinance, an ex-wife could be entitled to alimony 
payments, albeit only for a period of two years; policymakers considered that this interval 
would provide her with enough time to (re-)enter the workforce.  § 14, section 1, 
                                                                                                                                                 
German courts began observing the BGB’s Verschuldensprinzip as a mere formality, and thus operated 
under a de facto no-fault divorce system; see Inga Markovits, Gerechtigkeit in Lüritz: Wie in der DDR das 
Recht funktionierte (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2006), 98; Betts, Within Walls, 93.  According to Donna Harsch, 
the Nazis actually made use of a hybrid of the Verschuldensprinzip and the Zerrüttungsprinzip in their 
divorce trials rather than a purely fault-based or no-fault approach; see Donna Harsch, Revenge of the 
Domestic: Women, the Family, and Communism in the German Democratic Republic (Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), 205; Schneider, Hausväteridylle, 240. 
48 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 9730, MdJ, Berlin, Verordnung über Eheschliessung und Eheauflösung, 
November 1, 1955, 1 of document. 
49 Ibid., 4 of document; this point is echoed by Port, “Love, Lust, and Lies under Communism,” 491.  
Schneider maintains that the emphasis on the need for a “thorough investigation” adhered to a precedent set 
by the 1944 Soviet law on divorce; Schneider, Hausväteridylle, 242, 243.  While West German courts did 
not launch detailed investigations of the causes of marital ruin out of respect for couples’ privacy, East 
German courts believed that these inquiries needed to be as extensive as possible so as to tailor the most 
effective forms of societal intervention to preserve whatever could be salvaged in a given marriage.  See 
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, ed., Familienpolitik und Familienplanung, 57-58. 
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however, did allow for a continuation of alimony payments beyond the two-year limit in 
cases of exceptional hardship.50  Many aggrieved women were not happy about the fact 
that the state was effectively absolving husbands of their responsibility to provide 
financial support for ex-wives who had reached middle or advanced age and who were 
not willing or qualified to seek gainful employment.51  Thus National Socialist and SED 
divorce law resulted in a similar outcome but with very different rationalizations.  Under 
the Nazi regime, relieving husbands of the burden of long-time alimony payments was 
supposed to foster procreation in a new marriage.  For the SED, it was intended to 
encourage women to enter the workforce and abandon the “bourgeois” notion of marriage 
as a “pension institution” (Versorgungsanstalt) in which the financial obligations of 
spouses to one another would last beyond the existence of the marriage itself.52  The SED 
                                                 
50 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 9730, MdJ, Berlin, November 1, 1955, Verordnung über 
Eheschliessung und Eheauflösung, 5 of document; BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 14427, MdJ, HA II, 
Referat Statistik, Berlin, Repräsentativerhebung zur Unterhaltszahlung des Mannes an die geschiedene 
Ehefrau, October 23, 1964, 1 of document; BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 3566, vols. 1-2, letter from 
Walter E., Schmalkalden to MdJ, Berlin, Abt. Rechtsprechung, March 28, 1962, 12 of document.  A West 
German article maintained that the possibility of offering any alimony at all, even if only for a two-year 
period, was an attempt to appease the churches: BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 2226, Band 1, 
“Hochzeit machen: ein Spiel?”, Kraft und Licht 41, no. 25 (June 17, 1956) [published by the Berliner 
Stadtmission, Abt. Verlag “Kraft und Licht,” Berlin-Tempelhof (West Berlin)], 2 of document, 100 back 
side of archival file.  Donna Harsch discusses the Lutheran Church’s opposition to the proposed FGB draft 
in 1954: Harsch, Revenge of the Domestic, 205-206.  Rendering alimony obsolete—or at least a rare 
exception to the rule—was a product of both principle (ensuring gender equality) and economic exigency; 
see Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, ed., Familienpolitik und Familienplanung, 53-54. 
51 Hagemeyer, Zum Familienrecht in der Sowjetzone, 11.  Grandke admits that principle often trumped 
empathy when it came to alimony decisions for ex-wives who had been financially dependent upon their 
husbands, but she insists that East German women came to accept the more stringent alimony provisions.  
Grandke, “Familienrecht,” 186-187. 
52 While the term Versorgungsanstalt stemmed from the pen of August Bebel, it was the Supreme Court 
(Oberstes Gericht, hereafter OG) that in 1950 provided the initial parry in the war against marriage as 
Versorgungsanstalt in East Germany; see Schneider, Hausväteridylle, 247 and Markovits, Gerechtigkeit in 
Lüritz, 107.  Lothar Mertens has argued that moving beyond the model of marriage as a Versorgungsanstalt 
was a characteristic not only of the GDR, but of industrializing twentieth-century societies with rising 
female workforce participation rates more generally.  Mertens, Wider die sozialistische Familiennorm, 9.  
This did not prevent voices from both the GDR and FRG from decrying the limitations on alimony imposed 
by the Marriage Ordinance; see Schneider, Hausväteridylle, 164.  For its part, the West German 
Constitutional Court made a point in 1959 of affirming the ongoing validity of the principle of the 




did not mind if husbands who were relieved of alimony payments devoted their income to 
new marriages and new children, but they did not make this an explicit tenet of their 
policy in the way that the Nazis had done. 
 The Marriage Ordinance did succeed in reducing the number of divorced East 
German women who received alimony from their ex-husbands, albeit not quite as 
drastically as one might expect.  By 1958, 81.4 percent of divorce cases in the GDR 
involved no alimony payments, and this number increased to 86.1 percent by 1962.  But 
while the percentage of ex-wives who were granted alimony for more than the two-year 
“grace period” declined from 6.1 percent in 1959 to 0.3 percent in 1962, the number of 
ex-wives receiving alimony for up to the two-year legal limit actually increased 
somewhat from 11.7 percent in 1958 to 13.6 percent in 1962.  Despite this, the Ministry 
of Justice proclaimed that “[t]he notion that financial ties should be broken when a 
marriage must be dissolved has spread quite quickly.”53 
Despite all the debate about whether divorce was easier or harder to obtain as a 
result of the Marriage Ordinance, the absolute number of divorces in the GDR did not 
change much as a result, at least in the short term: there were 25,736 divorces in East 
Germany in 1955 as opposed to 24,649 in 1963.54  But the Ministry of Justice was still 
not pleased to learn that by 1963, every sixth child in the GDR had divorced parents or 
                                                                                                                                                 
marital union while men provided a paycheck.  Even though the court decreed that husbands could no 
longer prevent their wives from working outside the home, it failed to dispute the notion that wives who 
chose to enter the workforce retained full legal responsibility for all household responsibilities.  Heineman, 
What Difference Does a Husband Make?, 150. 
53 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 1491, Teil 2, MdJ, Berlin, Der erreichte Entwicklungsstand im 
Bereich der Familie und ihre fördernden und hemmenden Einflüsse auf die gesellschaftliche 
Weiterentwicklung, undated but circa 1964, 21 of document; BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 14427, MdJ, 
HA II, Referat Statistik, Berlin, Repräsentativerhebung zur Unterhaltszahlung des Mannes an die 
geschiedene Ehefrau, October 23, 1964, 2 of document. 
54 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1445, Band 1, “Zu einigen Fragen der Familie in der DDR,” 
February 4, 1965, 13 of document, 13 of archival file. 
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had been born out of wedlock, and the number of children under the age of six who were 
affected by the dissolution of young marriages was also on the rise.55  Adultery 
constituted one of the most frequently cited catalysts for divorce: between 1959 and 
1962, a husband’s infidelity was the cause of 18.8 to 24.4 percent of all divorces, a wife’s 
philandering led to 7.5 to 8.1 percent of divorces granted, and cases in which both 
spouses had committed adultery made up 5.0 to 6.2 percent of all divorces; sexual 
incompatibility that did not necessarily drive spouses to other partners was the root cause 
in an additional 4.0 to 4.9 percent of approved divorces.56 
Although the total number of divorces did not fluctuate very much during this 
period, even the Ministry of Justice could not ignore the fact that in some parts of the 
country, the proportion of divorces granted was rising relative to that of divorce requests 
denied after the issuance of the new statute.  One urban district court 
(Stadtbezirksgericht) in particular had acquired a reputation for being “‘overly willing to 
grant divorces’” (scheidungsfreudig), while elsewhere regional courts (Bezirksgerichte) 
were overturning a considerable proportion of district court (Kreisgericht) decisions that 
rejected divorce requests on the basis of what the regional courts deemed to be an 
incorrect or overly rigid application of the tenets of the Marriage Ordinance: “Such 
discrepancies in juridical practice serve neither to make legal decisions more reliably 
                                                 
55 Ibid., 17 of document, 17 of archival file. 
56 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 1491, Teil 2, Der erreichte Entwicklungsstand im Bereich der 
Familie und ihre fördernden und hemmenden Einflüsse auf die gesellschaftliche Weiterentwicklung, 
undated but perhaps from 1964, 15 of document, unpaginated archival file.  Among the most common non-
adultery-related causes of marital dissolution were a husband’s excessive alcohol consumption (10.6 to 
11.8 percent between 1959 and 1962) and “other causes” (21.3 to 37.2 percent between 1959 and 1962). 
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uniform (Rechtssicherheit) nor to foster the development of unitary views regarding the 
essence of marriage in a socialist state.”57 
Citizens did not hesitate to let the government know when they believed that 
judges were not adhering to the Marriage Ordinance’s injunction to prioritize the 
preservation of troubled marriages.  As late as 1963, divorce case defendant Harry S. 
wondered whether it was really as easy to obtain a divorce in the GDR as the West 
German propagandists said that it was.  He had, after all, done nothing to ruin his 
marriage, and yet the Bitterfeld District Court granted his wife Liselotte S.’s request for 
divorce over his objections: 
 
I cannot understand the principles that guided the court’s decision, since I am 
aware that our government, following the spirit of socialism, is of the opinion that 
it is more important to uphold marriages than to dissolve them.  [Our government] 
also decisively refutes the view that under socialism divorces are granted as if on 
an assembly line.  I made this viewpoint my own and defended it vigorously 
whenever I heard an opinion to the contrary.  Now that this decision has been 
issued, should I simply adopt “another opinion” and throw my own overboard?  
This is one thing I cannot bring myself to do!58 
 
 
In Harry S.’s estimation, allowing “unfounded accusations” to replace “real reasons for 
granting a divorce will only serve to increase the desire for divorce [Scheidungslust] of 
such people in the future and thus do a disservice to our state.”59  While he was far from a 
disinterested observer of his own divorce case, Harry S. cast his concern for his personal 
fate as part of his solicitude for the fate of the reputation of East German socialist 
                                                 
57 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 2227, Band 6, MdJ, Berlin, Analyse (regarding the implementation 
of the Marriage Ordinance’s divorce provisions), undated but presumably from 1957, 1 and 2 of document, 
128 front side and back side of archival file. 
58 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 0415, letter from Harry S., Sandersdorf to MdJ, Berlin, March 26, 
1963, 2 of document. 
59 Ibid., 5 of document. 
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jurisprudence.  From his standpoint, the Bitterfeld District Court was providing additional 
fodder for the hostile West German propaganda apparatus.  This kind of criticism was 
bound to attract the attention of Ministry of Justice officials.  Given the courts’ role as 
educators and not simply as enforcers of socialist familial morality, uneven 
implementation of the principles of the Marriage Ordinance called into question not only 
the reliability of East German jurisprudence, but also the uniformity of socialist moral 
principles.  Judicial practice was, after all, supposed to reflect and shape the “moral views 
of the working people” (Moralanschauungen der Werktätigen).60 
Long before Harry S. expressed his concerns, Minister of Justice Hilde Benjamin 
had recognized the inconsistent application of the Marriage Ordinance’s divorce 
provisions and called upon the Supreme Court to provide clarity.  She was aware that 
some courts continued to rely upon the Verschuldensprinzip despite the introduction of 
no-fault divorce and made the issue of Zumutbarkeit (i.e., whether a wife could be 
reasonably expected to handle the financial repercussions of a divorce) rather than the 
degree of marital ruin the primary basis for their decisions in divorce cases.  While § 8 of 
the Marriage Ordinance stipulated that judges were to take both factors into account, the 
latter consideration was always to take precedence over the former.  Benjamin 
acknowledged that moving from the list of rationales for divorce (absolute 
Scheidungsgründe) in § 41 of the Kontrollratsgesetz to a more holistic inquiry into the 
                                                 
60 Schneider, Hausväteridylle, 347-348. 
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state of a marriage as stipulated by the Marriage Ordinance “has caused particular 
difficulties for the courts.”61 
The Ministry of Justice had already issued a directive of its own regarding divorce 
trial procedure on February 7, 1956, but Benjamin felt that it was not sufficient to remedy 
the problem.62  The Supreme Court shared Benjamin’s concern that lower-level courts all 
too often did not conduct thorough investigations in divorce cases and thus were 
effectively rubber-stamping spouses’ allegations of “‘serious’” grounds for divorce 
without determining how serious they really were.63  For this reason, the Supreme 
Court’s Directive Number 9 of 1957 exhorted judges not to make their decisions in 
divorce cases solely on the basis of the conduct of a wayward spouse, but instead to 
consider that conduct as part of a more comprehensive investigation that took into 
account the interests of the couple, the couple’s family, and society at large.  The 
Supreme Court thus did its part to quell the perception that East German courts were all 
too ready to grant divorce requests.64  
 In one respect, however, Benjamin’s stance on divorce law was more lenient than 
that of the Supreme Court.  Benjamin believed that courts should preserve a marriage 
threatened by adultery if there were underage children born to the married couple and the 
                                                 
61 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 2227, Band 6, letter from Hilde Benjamin, Minister der Justiz, to 
OG, May 16, 1957, Betreff: Entwurf eines Antrages auf Erlaß einer Richtlinie des Plenums des OG der 
DDR über Eheauflösung und das Verfahren in Ehesachen, 2 of document, 2 of archival file. 
62 Ibid., 10 of document, 10 of archival file.  Even before the Marriage Ordinance went into effect, judges’ 
insufficient grasp of divorce trial protocol had already been a concern for Ministry of Justice officials; in 
1952, FGB reform commission members drafted an extensive delineation of divorce case procedure to 
assist them; see Schneider, Hausväteridylle, 244. 
63 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 2227, Band 6, letter from Hilde Benjamin, Minister der Justiz, to 
OG, May 16, 1957, Betreff: Entwurf eines Antrages auf Erlaß einer Richtlinie des Plenums des OG der 
DDR über Eheauflösung und das Verfahren in Ehesachen, 14 of document, 14 of archival file. 
64 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 3566, vols. 1-2, Abschrift: BG Gera, III. Senat, III BF 101/61, F 
187/61, March 5, 1962 appeals court decision overturning KG Pößneck’s decision, which had granted 
Joachim S.’s divorce request, 4 of document, 9 of section of archival file; Harsch, Revenge of the Domestic, 
220-221; Port, “Love, Lust, and Lies under Communism,” 491, fn 42. 
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non-adulterous spouse remained committed to the marriage.  But if the adulterous 
spouse’s marriage-like relationship (eheähnliches Verhältnis) had produced any children, 
then perhaps a divorce would be warranted after all, especially if the marriage had 
produced no children or if the marital children were already adults.65  The Supreme Court 
tempered Benjamin’s stance in its Directive Number 9, which decreed that divorce was 
only warranted when a spouse had children with someone other than his or her spouse 
and the extramarital affair was serious and could be expected to lead to marriage.  
Otherwise, the Supreme Court opined, the interests of the children born within the 
existing marriage had to come first.66 
 When it came to divorce cases prompted by a short-lived adulterous fling, the 
Supreme Court’s Directive Number 9 dictated that such a relationship was not sufficient 
grounds on its own to split up a marriage of long standing that was otherwise problem-
free.67  The court was not condoning male infidelity as a peccadillo, as “bourgeois” mores 
allegedly would have done, but instead called upon spouses to forgive one another for 
what it deemed to be relatively minor marital transgressions.  In effect, however, the 
                                                 
65 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 2227, Band 6, letter from Hilde Benjamin, Minister der Justiz, to 
OG, May 16, 1957, Betreff: Entwurf eines Antrages auf Erlaß einer Richtlinie des Plenums des Obersten 
Gerichts der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik über Eheauflösung und das Verfahren in Ehesachen, 5 
and 8 of document, 5 and 8 of archival file.  This logic was potentially of Soviet origin.  In the wake of the 
new 1944 Soviet divorce law, which called for “serious grounds” to be presented as a justification for 
divorce, courts in the USSR “‘were inclined to grant divorces if the unfaithful partner had actually set up a 
new de facto partnership and if a child had been born to it.’”  See Kaminsky, “Utopian Visions of Family 
Life,” 85-86, quoting from Sheila Fitzpatrick, Tear Off the Masks!  Identity and Imposture in Twentieth-
Century Russia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 256-258.  The rationale in the USSR was 
that these serious extramarital affairs had had the status of unregistered partnerships under the previously 
valid divorce law; even though unregistered partnerships were no longer considered to be legally equivalent 
to marriages as per the 1944 law, in practice courts continued to grant them de facto legal recognition even 
after 1944, according to Kaminsky. 
66 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 2227, Band 6, MdJ, Berlin, Helmut Ostmann, “Die Richtlinie Nr. 9 
des Obersten Gerichts,” August 21, 1957, 14 of document, 122 of archival file. 
67 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 2227, Band 6, Richtlinie des Plenums des Obersten Gerichts der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik über die Voraussetzungen der Ehescheidung nach § 8 der 




directive was positing the inverse of the old Verschuldensprinzip.  Instead of using the 
determination of guilt as a way to assign blame for the ruin of a marriage and issue a 
divorce ruling accordingly, guilt was a reason not to grant a divorce for a spouse whose 
adulterous lapse (Fehltritt) was relatively inconsequential and whose marriage had thus 
not yet lost its meaning for the couple, the couple’s children, or society. 
 Like the new age of marital consent, no-fault divorce did not go unnoticed in the 
orchestrated public discussions of the FGB draft in 1954.  Indeed, Donna Harsch has 
maintained that “[n]o provision provoked as much contention […] as the revision of 
divorce law and, especially, the elimination of the guilt principle or any absolute grounds 
for divorce.”68  Older women in particular who were afraid that younger women would 
break up their marriages by seducing their husbands were particularly ardent proponents 
of retaining the Verschuldensprinzip and an itemized list of rationales for divorce that 
would include adultery.  Some even advocated maintaining the status of adultery as an 
offense liable to criminal prosecution (§ 179 of the Penal Code) and increasing the 
maximum prison sentence to thirty years.69 
 The Ministry was certainly critical of the “outmoded attitudes” that led these older 
women to believe that they were entitled to perpetual financial support from their 
                                                 
68 Harsch, Revenge of the Domestic, 208.  Harsch believes that “[t]he emotions roused by the proposed 
reforms seems odd.  The breakup of ‘older’ marriages comprised, at most, 15 percent of a relatively low 
and declining divorce rate in 1954.  Considered in a gendered context, however, the anxiety of older wives 
does not look irrational.  East German women still felt strongly that a husband enhanced their status.”  
Harsch, “Sex, Divorce, and Women’s Waged Work,” 102-103 (quotation from 103). 
69 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 14398, Bericht über die Ergebnisse der Diskussion zum Entwurf des 
FGB auf der Arbeitstagung im MdJ, October 19, 1954, 18 of document; Harsch, Revenge of the Domestic, 
208, drawing upon SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/13/99, Bericht …, October 19, 1954, 467, 469, 471; 
Schneider, Hausväteridylle, 249, 252; Port, “Love, Lust, and Lies under Communism,” 491.  These East 
German women were in good company in demanding the criminalization of marital infidelity; no less an 
authority than the Archbishop of Canterbury wondered in 1959 whether penal sanctions would be 




husbands.  But equally “outmoded” were the “moral views” that led spouses—and 
especially husbands—to believe that they could be philanderers without consequence.70  
The impulse to condemn both the adulterous husband and the covetous wife is but one 
example of why historians would do well to avoid describing the SED’s attitudes towards 
marital infractions as either wholly “petty-bourgeois” or “progressive.”  The Ministry of 
Justice insisted that courts could exert moral judgment without making a divorce 
contingent upon the guilt or fault of a particular spouse.71  The primary way to go about 
doing this was to 
 
find a way for judges to satisfy the populace’s desire for the moral condemnation 
of adultery and to exert an educational influence over bad spouses.  When 
questioning witnesses to determine whether a marriage had lost its meaning for 
the couple, their children, and for society at large, we must of course identify and 
reprimand the spouse who flagrantly violated the expectations of society as far as 
mutual love and respect [in a marriage] are concerned.72 
 
 
In other words, the courts were not supposed to ascertain “blame” or “fault” in order to 
grant a divorce, but this should not stop them from castigating blameworthy spouses, 
both for the sake of upholding the moral character of socialist jurisprudence and of 
addressing the emotional needs of wronged spouses.  Since “[t]he concordance of 
morality and law must be upheld in divorce trials no matter what,” 
 
[t]he populace is right to resist the notion that our democratic courts would adopt 
an indifferent attitude towards moral infractions in marriages—even though the 
notion [that this would occur] is an erroneous one.  The appearance that 
thoughtless attitudes [towards marriage] are tolerated [by the courts] would be 
                                                 
70 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 14398, Bericht über die Ergebnisse der Diskussion zum Entwurf des 
FGB auf der Arbeitstagung im MdJ, October 19, 1954, 19 of document. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid., 20 of document. 
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Given that preserving the courts’ reputation as upholders of marital integrity was of the 
utmost importance, the author of the Ministry of Justice’s report on the discussion of the 
FGB draft admitted that it might sometimes be necessary to retain the 
Verschuldensprinzip at least rhetorically, if not in a legally binding way, by assigning 
guilt or blame to a particular spouse for the dissolution of a marriage.  
 Despite this widespread reluctance to abandon the Verschuldensprinzip, the 
Ministry of Justice report author purported that the proposed Family Law Code had met 
with the populace’s “joyous agreement,” which drowned out the relatively few negative 
voices.  This virtual unanimity allegedly demonstrated “the meaninglessness of the 
Western agitation against our divorce law” that was attempting to turn popular opinion 
within the GDR against the proposed reforms.74   Despite this propagandistic 
whitewashing, the report author also claimed that she or he did not want to ignore or 
minimize the importance of domestic objections and concerns because of his/her 
conviction that “[t]he courts can only fulfill the lofty educational responsibilities 
imparted to them by the new family law if they are aware of the state of the populace’s 
consciousness and—as the judges’ conferences revealed—if they are willing to recognize 
and overcome weaknesses in their own level of consciousness (Bewußtsein).”75  As the 
substance if not the generally upbeat tone of this report revealed, the process of 
                                                 
73 Ibid., 20 of document. 
74 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 14398, Bericht über die Ergebnisse der Diskussion zum Entwurf des 
FGB auf der Arbeitstagung im MdJ, October 19, 1954, Anlage: Vorschlag zur Behandlung des 
Scheidungsrechts, 3 of document. 
75 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 14398, Bericht über die Ergebnisse der Diskussion zum Entwurf des 
FGB auf der Arbeitstagung im MdJ, October 19, 1954, 32 of document. 
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overcoming these deficiencies in “consciousness” would prove to be an uphill battle—for 
both “ordinary” citizens and a good number of judges alike. 
Even some East Germans who supported the FGB draft did not do so for the right 
reasons, in the Ministry’s estimation, such as those who welcomed the prospect of 
“‘making getting a divorce easier’ since this would help younger women find husbands 
given the deficit of men (Männermangel)!”76  This constituted a small, but significant, 
acknowledgment that the SED had not entirely silenced discussion of the “problem” of 
“women standing alone” in the GDR, even if discussion of the issue was more muted and 
circumscribed than in the FRG.77  Benjamin herself felt compelled to explain in a Neue 
Justiz (New Justice) article that “the problems that single women experienced in trying to 
find husbands could not be solved at the expense of existing marriages.”78 
 Benjamin was thereby echoing the Ministry of Justice’s official stance that the 
new divorce law would strengthen families since it reflected “the moral views and 
expectations of the vast majority of the population not only of the German Democratic 
Republic, but of Germany as a whole.”79  Even as the SED was preparing to differentiate 
its family law from that of the FRG, it was still doing so on behalf of all Germans, and 
not just on behalf of the “workers and peasants” who constituted the vanguard of the East 
German polity.  Introducing fundamental reforms in family law was yet another way in 
                                                 
76 Ibid., 19 of document; Harsch, Revenge of the Domestic, 209, drawing upon SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 
2/13/99, Bericht…, October 19, 1954, 47; DP1 VA 1, 1954-55, 1923, Bericht …, October 19, 1954, 16-17. 
77 Elizabeth Heineman has argued that this “problem” was extensively discussed in the FRG but completely 
ignored in the GDR; see Heineman, What Difference Does a Husband Make?, xiv.  For more on 
Heineman’s argument, see Chapter 4. 
78 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 14398, Bericht über die Ergebnisse der Diskussion zum Entwurf des 
FGB auf der Arbeitstagung im MdJ, October 19, 1954, 19 of document. 
79 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 14398, Bericht über die Ergebnisse der Diskussion zum Entwurf des 
FGB auf der Arbeitstagung im MdJ, October 19, 1954, Anlage: Vorschlag zur Behandlung des 
Scheidungsrechts, 4 of document. 
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which the GDR tried to prove itself to be the “better Germany,” and it hoped that despite 
the pervasiveness of Cold War propaganda, West German citizens would also come to 
hold this view. 
 There was also a pragmatic dimension to the new divorce law, which would “help 
make marriage and family life a source of pleasure in and enthusiasm for gainful 
employment” and, by extension, ensure the success of “our fight for freedom as a 
nation.”80  Such assertions regarding the primacy of workplace identity as well as the link 
between the strengthening of family life and national self-assertion would seem to 
confirm the imputed primacy of work and of politics in the GDR, especially given the 
concern of East German authorities in the 1950s to ensure a sufficiently robust and 
committed workforce while the border with West Germany was still quite porous prior to 
the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961.  Such concerns could take precedence over 
the need for socialist jurisprudence to provide moral condemnation of adultery, as in the 
case of a young couple whose wish for a divorce was granted so as to ensure their energy 
and enthusiasm for building socialism even though they had both engaged in extramarital 
affairs:  
 
It is not in the interest of our society to wear people down by preserving ruined 
marriages and thus inhibiting and curbing their enthusiasm for work.  The 
dissolution of these young people’s marriage will allow both of them to build a 
new life.  After clearing things up (klare Verhältnisse), they will be without 
emotional burdens and thus able to devote themselves to their work and to the 
building of socialism in our state.81 
                                                 
80 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 14398, letter from Unterabteilungsleiter Muth, Staatssekretariat für 
Innere Angelegenheiten, Abt. Bevölkerungspolitik, to MdJ, Berlin, Anhang: Begründung zum Entwurf des 
FGB, September 21, 1954, 58 of document. 
81 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 2227, Band 6, letter from [inscrutable name], Hauptinstrukteur i.V. 
des Leiters der Justizverwaltungsstelle (hereafter JVSt) Rostock, to Minister der Justiz Hilde Benjamin, 




 Despite instances like this one in which guilt or blame seemed to play no role at 
all in the decision to grant a divorce, the author of the 1954 report on the discussion of 
the FGB draft proved to be prophetic about the resilience of the guilt principle in divorce 
cases.  Some courts, like the Eisleben District Court, still relied upon the 
Verschuldensprinzip as long as one year after the promulgation of the Marriage 
Ordinance.82  Indeed, some judges’ decisions left the impression of the existence of an 
unwritten marital penal code (Ehestrafrecht) that itemized the infractions for which a 
divorce would not be granted—effectively an inversion of the old marriage law’s listing 
of the reasons for which a divorce could be approved.83  This is not terribly surprising, 
since the Marriage Ordinance actually contained remnants of the Verschuldensprinzip in 
its own provisions.  For instance, if a woman was found to be at fault in the ruin of a 
marriage, then her request for alimony could be denied on this basis, according to § 18 of 
the Marriage Ordinance.84  While her guilt would not be the primary factor in deciding 
whether or not the divorce was granted, the court could wield its financial cudgel to 
penalize her for her marital transgressions.  From her standpoint, the determination of her 
guilt would still exert a decisive influence over the outcome of her divorce trial.  And 
whether a request for a divorce was approved or not, the spouse who was found to be 
                                                 
82 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 2226, Band 2, letter from Jahn, JVSt Halle/Saale, to MdJ, HA II, 
Berlin, Betreff: Überprüfung der Ehesachen für die zu erstattende Analyse über die Eheverfahren in der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik von Hauptinstrukteur Knecht und Oberinstrukteur Barwinsky, 
December 1, 1956, 5 of document, 92 of archival file. 
83 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 2226, Band 2, MdJ, Berlin, Bericht über die vom Bezirksgericht 
(hereafter BG) Halle/Saale durchgeführte Stützpunktbesprechungen, November 7, 1956, 8 of document, 
128 of archival file. 
84 Ibid., 10 of document, 130 of archival file. 
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primarily responsible for the ruin of a marriage could be made to bear the majority or all 
of the court costs associated with a trial.85 
 Adherence to the Verschuldensprinzip might also have been a reaction to the fact 
that “[w]ith the elimination of specifically enumerated reasons for granting a divorce, the 
justifications given for court decisions take on new meaning.”86  This “new meaning” 
derived from the overriding educational purpose of socialist jurisprudence.  But it also 
meant that since the details of divorce case rulings now depended more on judges’ 
discretion than ever before, they were subjected to much closer scrutiny on the part of 
judicial administrators and divorce litigants alike.87  All of this was taking place not long 
after the ferment of denazification in the legal profession during the Occupation Zone 
period, when many Volksrichter (people’s judges) had entered the profession with a 
minimal amount of training.88  This dearth of professional experience on the part of 
Volksrichter might have made them even more vulnerable to accusations by defendants 
and plaintiffs that they were enforcing their own moral standards rather than socialist 
ones, particularly in cases involving adultery. 
                                                 
85 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1335, Band 2, letter from Hauptreferent Herbert Wächtler, MdJ, HA 
Gesetzgebung, Berlin, to Karl Schlott, Auerbach/Vogtland, August 20, 1957, 139 of archival file. 
86 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 2226, Band 1, Anweisung für die Durchführung des Eheverfahrens 
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considerably.”  See Betts, Within Walls, 96. 
88 Hermann Wentker, “Justiz und Politik in der DDR,” in Bilanz und Perspektiven der DDR-Forschung, 
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 336 
Even before the government promulgated the Marriage Ordinance, the author of 
the Ministry of Justice report on the 1954 FGB discussion harbored reservations about 
the readiness of East German judges to implement its provisions: 
 
[w]hat is truly novel about the new divorce law is that it gives judges much 
greater leeway, but also more responsibility and the task of educating couples 
when deciding cases. […] If the judges had recognized the full significance of the 
new demands placed upon them by the law, then their discussions [at judges’ 
conferences] would have proceeded differently.  They would not, for instance, 
have felt it necessary to ask the unnecessary question of whether the new law 
made getting a divorce easier or harder, nor would they have grappled with terms 




A particularly recalcitrant group of judges of Magdeburg went so far as to call for the 
retention of the Verschuldensprinzip in the new East German family law.90 While the 
question of whether the new provisions would make getting a divorce easier or harder 
was at the forefront of potential divorcees’ concerns, the Ministry of Justice did not think 
that this should have also been the case for judges.  The Ministry thus naïvely ignored the 
fact that the judges would be contending on an everyday basis with the popular 
perception that divorce had become easier to obtain. 
 Concern about judges’ ability to fulfill their responsibilities did not abate once the 
Marriage Ordinance went into effect.  As the GDR’s Supreme Court noted in 1957: 
  
The implementation of the law effectively depends on a judge’s societal and 
moral knowledge and sets high expectations for his socialist consciousness and 
life experience.  If a judge is not clear about the meaning of marriage for our 
social order, and if he does not approach divorce cases with the requisite firmness 
                                                 
89 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 14398, Bericht über die Ergebnisse der Diskussion zum Entwurf des 
FGB auf der Arbeitstagung im MdJ, October 19, 1954, 17 of document. 
90 Ibid., 16 of document. 
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of character, then he will not be able to issue decisions that meet the demands of 
Article 30 of the Constitution and the Preamble of the Marriage Ordinance.91 
 
 
The Ministry of Justice expected judges to be conversant with the tenets of socialist 
morality.  Given the contested nature of this moral codex, however, providing judges 
with such expansive interpretive power—and linking that interpretive power not only to 
supposedly objective criteria such as the degree of socialist consciousness but also to 
decidedly more subjective criteria such as character and moral knowledge—made them 
all the more vulnerable to popular challenges to their rulings in divorce cases regarding 
the moral valence of adultery. 
 An important criterion for assessing the educational efficacy of socialist 
jurisprudence was the maturity of the judges who administered it.92  The three judges in 
the family court of Berlin-Treptow, for instance, were young and thus deemed to have a 
limited amount of life experience.  One of them, Judge Narr, was “not even married,” and 
thus presumably less qualified than her married peers to be a credible espouser of 
socialist expectations regarding marriage.93  Indeed, the Magistrate of Greater Berlin’s 
legal department questioned Judge Narr’s suitability as a family court judge not only 
because of her single status, but also because “by her own admission [she] sometimes 
was at a loss for words during divorce cases because she could not understand the 
problems at hand.”  In the Magistrate’s judgment, she and her colleague Judge Brumme 
                                                 
91 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 2227, Band 6, MdJ, Berlin, Helmut Ostmann, “Die Richtlinie Nr. 9 
des Obersten Gerichts,” August 21, 1957, 3 of document, 111 of archival file. 
92 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 2226, Band 3, MdJ, Berlin, Notizen zur Diskussion im Kollegium 
über die Analyse des Eheverfahrens, January 11, 1957, 3, 6 of document, 266, 267 back side of archival 
file. 
93 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 2226, Band 3, Überprüfung der Eheverfahren im Stadtbezirksgericht 
Treptow, Magistrat von Groß-Berlin, Abteilung Justiz, Hauptreferat Recht, November 23, 1956, 1 of 
document, 1 of archival file. 
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had enough practical, if not life, experience, and thus could have done a much better job 
of carrying out their professional duties.94 
The Marriage Ordinance’s stipulation of no-fault divorce did not prevent Judge 
Narr from improperly granting at least one mutually consensual divorce (einverständliche 
Ehescheidung) in which the parties had agreed in advance upon who was at “fault” for 
the demise of their marriage.95  The Ministry believed that the introduction of no-fault 
divorce would be quite popular because under the previously valid Verschuldensprinzip, 
divorcing couples sometimes had to devise a spurious rationale that might have accorded 
with the letter of the law but did not necessarily reflect the actual reason for the ruin of a 
marital relationship.96  In principle at least, couples would no longer have to reach a 
disingenuous agreement about the “guilty” party in order to improve their chances of 
getting a divorce.  But Judge Narr apparently accepted a couple’s assignation of “guilt” 
on face value, and thus did not fulfill her responsibility to conduct her own investigation 
into the state of the marriage.  She went so far as to counsel a spouse to “‘admit to 
something’” so as to make it “‘easier to grant a divorce,’” thereby violating the Ministry 
of Justice’s injunction to privilege the preservation of marriages over their termination 
whenever possible.97 
                                                 
94 Ibid., 7 of document, 4 of archival file. 
95 Ibid., 3 of document, 2 of archival file. 
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Verfahren in Ehesachen im II. Halbjahr 1956, January 4, 1957, 12 of document, 183 of archival file. 
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Also of concern to the Ministry of Justice was the fact that Judges Narr, Brumme, 
and Klier seldom criticized the behavior of spouses, even though such critique was 
supposed to be a prominent feature of socialist jurisprudence.  When they did censure 
spousal misconduct, these judges typically used stock language regarding the couple’s 
thoughtless (leichtfertig) approach to marriage or the fact that a couple’s behavior 
contradicted “the views of the working people” (Anschauungen unserer Werktätigen).  
Judges Narr, Brumme, and Klier might have intended the formulaic invocation of the 
“moral views of the working people” to serve an exhortative purpose.  They thwarted this 
goal, however, by failing to provide contextually specific explanations of how exactly a 
given marital partner’s conduct had violated prevailing mores or indeed what these mores 
entailed.98  Even when they rejected a request for a divorce, Judges Narr, Brumme, and 
Klier often did not provide the spouses in question with advice about how to restore the 
viability of their marriage so as to reduce the likelihood that they would file for divorce 
again in the future.99  Socialist morality was supposed to be the bedrock of East German 
jurisprudence, but it could not serve this function if it took the form of formulaic 
invocations. 
 
How Exactly Was Socialist Morality to Be Translated into Law? 
With the kind of candor that did not make its way into official public 
pronouncements, Hilde Benjamin bewailed to her colleagues the fact that “there exists no 
                                                 
98 Judges Narr, Brumme, and Klier were far from the only members of their profession to receive this 
criticism.  For another example, see BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 2226, Band 2, letter from 
Hauptinstrukteur Venhues, JVSt Neubrandenburg, to MdJ, HA II, Berlin, Betreff: Überprüfung der 
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clarity and certainty regarding moral views of love and marriage” and that “contact with 
philosophers should be made accordingly.”100  Such contact was only in its nascent stages 
as late as January 1957, more than one year after the issuance of the Marriage Ordinance, 
when Benjamin asked Ministry of Justice spokesperson Herbert Wächtler to ascertain the 
extent to which the findings of East German philosophy professors regarding socialist 
morality had practical applicability for the legislative process.101  In February 1957, 
Benjamin informed Matthäus Klein, Deputy Director and Professor of Philosophy at the 
Institute for Social Science at the Central Committee of the SED, that she and her 
colleagues had read with “great interest” Klein’s publications in the periodical Einheit.102  
Even though socialist jurisprudence was supposed to reflect socialist morality, Benjamin 
believed that this process could stand to benefit from greater scholarly mediation given 
the dearth of empirical evidence regarding the dynamics of family life in the GDR. 
According to Klein, the process of adopting socialist moral values was often the 
unconscious result of workplace and societal interactions at first.  For this reason, “[i]t 
[was] an important responsibility for the progressive part of the working class—the 
                                                 
100 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 2226, Band 3, MdJ, HA Gesetzgebung, Berlin, Betreff: Diskussion 
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Marxist-Leninist party—to make this process a conscious [sic underline] one for the 
working people through its ideological and educational efforts.”103  This was necessary 
because “[t]he moral consciousness of the working masses—like their class 
consciousness—has in no way reached the level of their moral practices [sic underline] in 
society.”104  As a result, 
 
There are still a lot of people who are very much oriented towards the past in their 
moral thinking and behavior and who have not yet grasped that they are living in 
the world of socialism; others accept socialism, but believe that they can work on 




 Once East Germans realized the superiority of socialist moral tenets, they would 
abandon their outmoded capitalist attitudes.  A fully fledged socialist moral 
consciousness was both the (eventual) product of as well as the inspiration for the 
ongoing struggle to strengthen socialist society, since “[t]he ethical values of a 
developing socialist society are not a finished product right from the start, but instead are 
continually realized, expanded, and improved by people’s productive (schöpferisch) 
behavior,” and this was characteristic of marital and familial values as well.106  Klein did 
not feel obliged to explain why the catalog of socialist familial values did not have a 
specifically socialist cast, as they included “fidelity, honesty, respect for the other spouse, 
tact, being considerate, a communal spirit (Gemeinschaftsgeist), readiness to sacrifice,” 
                                                 
103 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 2227, Band 7, Thesen zum Referat des Genossen Matthäus Klein 
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among many others.107  Despite this acknowledged overlap between “bourgeois” and 
socialist mores, Klein diagnosed a persistent lag between socialist moral practice and 
consciousness, as a result of which every SED member “must always strive to meet the 
norms of socialist morality in his societal and personal life so as to serve as an example to 
others.”108  The process of moral acculturation was by no means a peripheral one; indeed, 
“[e]ducating people to become new socialist persons is […] to a decisive extent a 
question of educating them about socialist morality.”109 
Socialist jurists were supposed to promulgate socialist morality in their capacity 
as marital counselors of last resort.  In theory, pre-trial hearings were supposed to provide 
judges and lay assessors with the opportunity to draw upon socialist morality to 
strengthen frayed marital bonds, but these hearings often did more to rekindle 
longstanding arguments between spouses than to bring them closer to the point of 
reconciliation.110  Despite the Marriage Ordinance’s emphasis on the importance of 
averting divorce through rapprochement, the proportion of ostensibly successful instances 
of reconciliation was quite small relative to the total number of divorce cases.111  Out of 
29,840 divorce requests in the GDR during the second half of 1956, courts approved 50.9 
percent, rejected 18.2 percent, and terminated 25 percent when spouses withdrew divorce 
filings of their own accord.  Only in 5.6 percent of divorce cases did efforts at 
reconciliation during a pre-trial hearing (4 percent) or before the onset of a postponed 
                                                 
107 Ibid., 13 of document, 14 of archival file. 
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trial (1.6 percent) prove to be successful.112  The proportion of approved divorce requests 
grew in the ensuing years, from 54.8 percent in 1957 to 63.8 percent in 1962.113 
The Ministry of Justice’s desire to foster reconciliation between spouses 
notwithstanding, it was also intent upon overcoming mendacious instances of 
“forgiveness” (Verzeihung) in which the spouse primarily responsible for the long-term 
disintegration of the marriage would “often take advantage of certain situations or states 
of mind to convince the other spouse to have sexual intercourse so that everything that 
had happened beforehand was forgiven and thus inadmissible in a divorce trial.”  By 
denying that sexual activity on its own signified the resolution of marital conflict, the 
courts sought to ensure that spousal reconciliation would be sincere.114  In practice, 
however, many judges continued to consider recent sexual intercourse as a sign of 
reconciliation between spouses, and thus did not operate according to the spirit of the 
new law.  This was yet another instance in which the affective dimension of a marital 
relationship took precedence over “political” considerations in East German judges’ 
determination of marital viability. 
In 1957, for instance, a judge in the Erfurt-Mitte District Court denied a wife’s 
request for divorce because her husband had continued to have sexual intercourse with 
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her; the judge took this as a sign that he had forgiven her for her extramarital affair, even 
though he too wanted a divorce.  Karwehl, a court administrator for the region of Erfurt, 
disagreed with this decision because he was certain that the reference to “forgiveness” 
(Verzeihung) was part of a broader tendency on the part of courts to invoke “old-
fashioned terms” (althergebrachte Ausdrücke) and continue to issue rulings in the spirit 
of the Verschuldensprinzip.  In this case, for instance, the judge had decided that if the 
husband had forgiven the wife for her marital infraction, then she was not responsible 
(schuldig) for ruining the marriage; grounds for divorce—at least by the standards set by 
the Verschuldensprinzip—were thus not at hand.  Karwehl admitted that 
 
[c]ontinued sexual intercourse is doubtlessly a sign that marital disputes or even 
adultery might not necessarily constitute serious grounds for granting a divorce.  
But [he also believed that] only if the court had actually determined that these 
were not serious grounds would it have been acceptable for it not to grant the 
divorce that both parties wanted.115 
 
 
Karwehl was agnostic as to whether ongoing marital sexual intercourse was necessarily a 
sign of spousal reconciliation.  But he was certain that the existence of sexual activity 
would not suffice in and of itself to override other “serious grounds” for granting a 
divorce, especially when doing so would accord with the wishes of both spouses.  If the 
existence of sexual activity within a marriage did not necessarily reveal the state of that 
marriage, then how would East German courts assess the implications of extramarital 
sexual affairs for the viability of a marital union? 
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Was the New Divorce Law Too Kind to Adulterers, or Not Kind Enough? 
Donna Harsch aptly notes that 
 
[i]n the fanfare about divorce law, married women vented their fears that the 
courts, single women, and their own husbands were ready to cast them to the 
wind.  The public manifested much sympathy with the virtuous, loyal older wife 
victimized by a philandering, abandoning husband and a predatory, younger 
rival.116 
 
It was not only the public that felt this way, however.  Although infidelity was no longer 
necessarily sufficient grounds for granting a divorce under the Marriage Ordinance, East 
German courts were not immune to popular sentiment when it came to expressing 
sympathy for the plight of the “virtuous, loyal older wife.”  In a 1957 divorce case, for 
instance, the Prenzlau District Court sought to preserve a marriage in which a wife was 
willing to take back her philandering husband.  The court declared the husband’s female 
lover (who obstinately refused to end the affair) to be worthy of “societal rebuke” 
(gesellschaftlicher Tadel),” since “it was her duty to remind him of his marital duties and 
not allow him to become further estranged from his wife.”117  As in many other East 
German divorce cases, it was women’s duty to teach husbands about the perils of 
adultery and to absolve them of its consequences, with these responsibilities falling to the 
adulterous female partner and the wife, respectively.   
According to the logic that prevailed in this case, without goading from both of 
the women in his life, a philandering husband would not be able to recognize the 
importance of marital fidelity.  It was the adulterous woman who bore the brunt of the 
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blame for “involv[ing] herself in another person’s marriage and foment[ing] strife in a 
married couple.”118  In this sense, the gendering of the purveyors of socialist marital 
morality was not any different than that of its “bourgeois” counterpart, since both moral 
codes were predicated upon the assumption that men’s eyes would invariably wander if 
women did not keep them in check. 
 However much sympathy that older wives might have elicited from East German 
judges, there was a fair amount of debate at the Ministry of Justice as to whether the 
generally agreed upon need to discipline wayward spouses necessarily precluded granting 
their requests for divorce.  Ministry spokesperson Wächtler challenged what he 
understood to be the widespread misinterpretation of § 8 of the Marriage Ordinance—and 
not just by lower-level district courts.  He criticized the Dresden Regional Court for 
having upheld on appeal a district court decision that rejected a request for divorce by a 
philandering husband who was already living with his new partner and whose wife had 
no interest in living with him again.  Wächtler opined that “[i]n this case, the court’s 
educational influence over the parties [to be achieved by denying the philandering 
husband a divorce] is no longer the most suitable means for bringing the couple back 
together.”  The larger significance of Wächtler’s intervention was his contention that if a 
marriage had lost its meaning for a couple and for the couple’s children, then it had 
effectively lost its meaning for society as well—and no amount of socialist 
jurisprudential influence was going to change that.119  Wächtler was confident that the 
new divorce law did not stand in the way of ending an irrevocably broken marriage even 
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when a spouse’s disregard for the marital union warranted moral condemnation.120  Given 
the SED’s desire to refute widespread accusations that the Marriage Ordinance had made 
divorce too easy to obtain, this was quite a risky stance for Wächtler to take, since courts 
following his interpretation of the law would have been even more likely to grant divorce 
requests than was already the case.   
It is thus not surprising that Kurt Schumann, President of the Supreme Court, 
would wonder whether granting divorce requests more freely would effectively reward 
adulterous husbands for their heedlessness: 
 
[i]n general, a marriage is in good shape until the husband has an affair.  He 
leaves his family as a result of his affair to live with the other woman and refuses 
to return to his wife.  [State Prosecutor Kirnse] did not think that it was right to 
grant divorces in such cases since it would give Ehebrecher the opportunity to 
break up marriages and [thereby] sanction the thoughtlessness [of the husband].121 
 
 
In Schumann’s estimation, “[i]f a man has a thoughtless attitude towards his marriage, he 
needs to be educated [erzogen].  The court’s responsibility to educate [erzieherische 
Aufgabe] cannot be ignored.”122  Dr. Heiland, Senior Judge at the Leipzig Regional 
Court, adopted an even more stringent stance.  If a marriage had lasted for many years 
before the onset of a spouse’s sexual peccadilloes, and if the divorce would harm the 
interests of the other spouse or of underage marital children, then Heiland was certain 
that a divorce should not be granted “even when the spouse seeking a divorce declares 
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that he would not return to his family under any circumstances, and his return was in fact 
not to be expected.”123 
Heiland prioritized the preservation of marital unions in the face of seemingly 
irreconcilable differences because he distinguished between the degree of their objective 
disintegration and their ongoing viability and significance for the immediate family and 
society.  In exalting a marriage’s significance for society over its meaning for the 
spouses, he seemingly confirmed the allegations of those who criticized the political 
instrumentalization of marriage by the SED.  Even as he disregarded the wishes of the 
spouse who was desirous of ending a marriage, however, he made it clear that society’s 
interest in a marital union and that of the slighted spouse were more or less equivalent.  In 
other words, a marriage was valuable to society and the state when it ensured that those 
who upheld the tenets of socialist morality would not have to suffer at the hands of those 
who disregarded them.  The goal of the Marriage Ordinance, after all, was to serve as an 
educational tool for improving marital morality in society at large, and if some spouses’ 
“unconditional, but legally unjustifiable” yearnings for divorce had to be rejected along 
the way in order to serve as a cautionary example for other couples experiencing marital 
discord, then so be it.124  Heiland acknowledged that 
 
[s]pouses seeking a divorce will likely oppose this stance by saying that denying a 
divorce on these grounds ignores the ‘reality’ that a marriage in which the spouses 
lived separately has lost its meaning.  This stance, however—as far as I can tell 
from my own experiences—accords with the opinions of the masses and of most 
district courts.125 
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In other words, Heiland felt that divorce law should serve as a vehicle for preserving 
marriages so as to avoid rewarding marital misconduct, and that doing so was in society’s 
interest not least because of the weight of popular opinion.  He admitted, however, that 
further discussion about the implementation of § 8 of the Marriage Ordinance would be 
necessary. 
Despite Schumann’s and Heiland’s objections, there were other judges on the 
Supreme Court who agreed with Wächtler.  Senior Justice (Oberrichter) Hans Rothschild 
believed that when “some courts denied the existence of serious reasons for granting a 
divorce when the husband who had separated himself from his family was the one who 
was also seeking a divorce,” they were effectively reverting to the Verschuldensprinzip 
by penalizing the spouse who was “guilty” of having precipitated the ruin of a marriage.  
Supreme Court Senior Justice Löwenthal and State Prosecutor Ms. Fröhbrodt joined 
Rothschild and Wächtler in arguing that granting divorces even to profligate husbands 
was not necessarily at odds with East German jurisprudence’s educational objectives, 
since “[t]he accusation of thoughtlessness could apply only to a man who had multiple 
affairs and not to a man who had a relationship with one woman with whom he had been 
living for years.  Preserving a disrupted marriage just for educational reasons (aus 
erzieherischen Gründen) is not right.”126  From this perspective, a divorce could be 
granted if a spouse had a flippant attitude towards a particular marital arrangement, but 
not if she or he espoused a similar view about the institution of marriage in general, i.e., 
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if she or he had been married and unfaithful numerous times.127  In other words, splitting 
up a marriage as a result of a one-time adulterous infraction would not compromise the 
educational function of socialist jurisprudence, but fostering the genesis of a new species 
of serial adulterers certainly would. 
The disagreement thus revolved around how East German jurisprudence could 
ensure that exhortative language and judicious decisions were not mutually contradictory 
in judges’ handling of divorce cases.  Ministry of Justice official Dr. Ostmann proposed a 
compromise: husbands who left their wives and were looking for easily approved 
divorces needed to be educated by the courts to abandon their careless attitude towards 
marriage, but if a husband had what a court determined to be a compelling reason to 
leave his wife, then perhaps his marriage was in fact so ruined that his desire for a 
divorce was not entirely unwarranted.128 
The controversy surrounding the implementation of this aspect of divorce law 
might have stemmed in part from the fact that state functionaries and SED were not 
always moral exemplars in their own marriages.129  A state functionary by the name of 
Erich B. had had at least three adulterous affairs during the course of his marriage even 
though 
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he knows that it is particularly functionaries of our state who must serve as role 
models (Vorbild) for all other citizens in their professional and personal lives.  
Practicing what one preaches, rather than preaching alone, is the only thing that 
will win over those who are still skeptical about socialism.130 
 
 
His wife, Johanna B., had stayed with him after his initial bout of infidelity ten years 
earlier in 1946 so as to preserve his reputation as a morally irreproachable “functionary in 
our young, democratic state.”131  This was the primary reason for which the Halle 
Regional Court overturned the decision of the Köthen District Court, which had initially 
granted Erich’s request for divorce.  According to the Halle Regional Court’s logic, 
expecting a woman who had sought to protect the reputation of a philandering, but 
politically orthodox, husband to suffer the indignity of divorce at an advanced age would 
have constituted a form of unreasonable hardship (unzumutbare Härte).  The 
consequences of marital infidelity were not merely personal, but also reflected upon the 
moral integrity of the socialist project as a whole—especially when an SED member was 
involved.   
 One male SED member experienced a midlife marital crisis with a distinctly 
socialist twist, and he was not alone in this regard.  Instead of seeking a new spouse 
merely because she was younger and more attractive, he wanted to divorce his wife of 
twenty-seven years because of her lagging socialist consciousness.  From the perspective 
of husbands like this one, the oft-decried “politicization” of East German marriages had 
apparently failed, since a good number of older wives had yet to experience the kind of 
political epiphany necessary to retain the interest of their invariably more politically 
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savvy spouses.  In other words, the sociopolitical meaning ascribed to marriage by the 
SED could also serve as a convenient excuse for men who sought to attenuate their 
adulterous indiscretions with unimpeachable political motivations.132 
This cynical instrumentalization of ideological rhetoric did not prove to be an 
effective strategy in the courtroom, however.  Despite the SED’s inclination to reward 
ideological ardor in other contexts, the Gräfenhainichen District Court did not grant this 
man’s request for a divorce, and Jahn, head of the Court Administration Center in Halle, 
considered this decision to be an exemplary one.133  Jahn and the Gräfenhainichen 
District Court were not alone in their skepticism of political incommensurability in 
marriage as the motivation for an extramarital affair.  Heiland excoriated functionaries 
for their unwarranted sense of superiority (Überheblichkeitsvogel) in such cases, and 
Mühlberger, director of the Karl-Marx-Stadt Regional Court, opined that “[t]he wife who 
is attacked for being politically backwards is often quite progressive (fortschrittlich).”134  
In other words, political backwardness had joined bad housekeeping and sexual frigidity 
as potentially spurious excuses that philandering husbands provided to justify their 
extramarital affairs in front of divorce case judges.135 
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Moving Beyond the Notion of Marriage as a ”Pension Institution?” 
Even with the Marriage Ordinance’s limitation on the duration of alimony 
payments, the Ministry of Justice had hoped that women would welcome the new divorce 
provisions.  With the BGB’s stipulation of fault-based divorce, a husband who had ruined 
a marriage by having an affair could convince his wife to file for divorce as the wronged 
spouse and place the blame on him in return for his guarantee of a generous alimony 
settlement.  After a couple had come to such an agreement, the divorce trial itself was a 
mere formality.  In the short term, this arrangement allayed the wife’s financial concerns.  
If her ex-husband remarried about a year later, however, he would typically try to get his 
alimony payments reduced or eliminated in light of the financial burden that he incurred 
by starting a new family—and this, from the viewpoint of the Ministry of Justice, would 
constitute a more severe psychological blow for the wife than never having received any 
alimony at all.  Financially strapped housewives would beg to differ, but for the SED, the 
principle of not allowing philandering husbands to buy themselves out of a marriage 
(Abkauf) was more important than the misgivings of women who were hesitant about 
entering the workforce.136 
Socialist marriage was not, after all, supposed to be a pension institution 
(Versorgungsanstalt) in which employed husbands provided financial support for their 
non-employed wives—or ex-wives, for that matter—in perpetuity.  Although the 
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Ministry of Justice official who assessed the discussions of the FGB draft in 1954 
believed that “even in marriages of long standing divorce is sometimes justified,” s/he 
was far from unsympathetic to the concerns of older women about the implications of no-
fault divorce.  S/he recognized “the healthy core” of their moral objections to the law’s 
ostensible tolerance of their older husbands’ philandering, and pointed out that courts 
would no longer consider spouses living apart for at least three years necessarily as 
grounds for divorce, as had been the case under National Socialist divorce law.137  This 
change in policy would make it significantly harder for philandering spouses to leave 
their families, since they could no longer count upon the nonmarital household 
automatically receiving the official imprimatur of a family court judge. 
This reform withstanding, attendees at a 1956 Attorneys’ Collegium directors’ 
convention came to the consensus that marriages of long standing should not be 
preserved only to ensure older wives’ financial well-being.  The lawyers assembled did, 
however, believe that ex-wives should be entitled to more than just two years’ worth of 
alimony payments.138  They thus hoped to counteract the phenomenon of older women 
who did not file for divorce due to financial concerns even when they acknowledged that 
their marriages were unsalvageable.139 
Spouses intent upon preserving troubled marriages, whether out of unflagging 
emotional affinity or more pragmatic exigencies, were certainly not unique to the GDR, 
but their dissatisfaction took on a particular valence because of the Marriage Ordinance.  
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Under § 48, section 2 of the 1946 Kontrollratsgesetz, a wife had been able to prevent her 
philandering husband from ending a marriage by offering a “justified objection” 
(berechtigter Widerspruch) to her husband’s request for a divorce, but under the 
Marriage Ordinance, this was no longer a formal part of divorce case procedure.  Spousal 
objections—or, for that matter, the lack thereof—were not supposed to prejudice judges’ 
determination of the advisability of granting a divorce in any given case.  Some women, 
however, found a way to circumvent the absence of such a provision in the new law.  
According to a lawyer by the name of Pollack, “word is spreading among women that the 
way for them to thwart their husbands’ success in obtaining a divorce” was to say that 
they felt that their husbands would return to them, even if they did not really believe—or 
want—this to be the case.140  Some judges were inclined to deny a divorce request on this 
basis alone, and thus violated the Marriage Ordinance’s stipulation that such decisions 
should only be reached after the objective determination of the overall state of a 
marriage. 
This strategy might very well have been an effective one, since even the Supreme 
Court was not of a single mind regarding the advisability of terminating marriages of 
long standing.  In one 1956 case, it ruled that the prospect of “unreasonable hardship” for 
the ex-wife should not constitute an obstacle to divorce since she would presumably be 
able to secure a livelihood on her own.  But in another case during the same year, the 
Supreme Court ruled that the likelihood of “unreasonable hardship” should be reason 
enough not to grant a divorce since an older woman would experience difficulty in 
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integrating herself into the workforce.141  The question of “unreasonable hardship” thus 
became central to the East German judicial system’s efforts to balance the concerns of 
older wives with the ideological injunction to dispense with the notion of marriage as a 
“pension institution.” 
In advocating against the de facto perpetuation of the Verschuldensprinzip in East 
German jurisprudence, Senior Justice Rothschild of the Supreme Court argued (as noted 
earlier in this chapter) that courts could grant a spouse’s wish for divorce even if she or 
he was the party that was at fault for having disrupted a marriage.  But this by no means 
meant that Rothschild felt that courts should necessarily grant divorce requests under 
such circumstances—merely that they should have the juridical discretion to do so.  If 
ending a troubled marriage would entail “unreasonable” financial hardship for an ex-
spouse, then Rothschild believed that it should not be done.  For Rothschild, a marriage 
that provided material sustenance for a faithful spouse and thus allayed her fears of the 
prospect of material deprivation at an advanced age had not in fact lost its meaning for 
the couple or for society.142 
Heiland spoke even more directly to the value of long-standing marriages for 
socialist society when he commented that 
 
[i]t is of course easier and more agreeable to pay off one’s family in order to live 
together with one’s younger lover, but doing this does not serve the building of 
socialist society or fulfill the responsibilities of marriage, which include a stage of 
proving oneself and providing mutual assistance in old age.143 
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Marriage might no longer have been a “pension institution” under socialism, but this did 
not absolve spouses of the obligation to provide one another with mutual support, 
financial and otherwise, into the twilight years of a marriage, according to Heiland.  He 
also criticized court decisions that assumed that it would be easy for older women to find 
work given the supposedly favorable economic situation of the GDR; he urged judges 
instead to assess this on a case-by-case basis.  Older divorced wives did not just face the 
prospect of financial hardship and the 
 
“taint that comes with being a divorcée,” but the loss of deeper values associated 
with equal rights (Gleichberechtigung) that should not be ignored.  The 
occasionally invoked mantra that “the defendant [wife who objects to her 
husband’s filing for divorce] will sooner or later come to terms with the facts of 
the matter” does not constitute a solution to this problem!144 
 
 
In other words, Heiland accused the East German judicial system of having been overly 
glib in consigning the marriage-as-“pension institution” to the historical dust heap at a 
time when older ex-wives in particular had not been privy to the advantages of socialist 
gender equality during their upbringing and vocational socialization that would have 
facilitated their belated entry into the paid workforce.  Despite her greater willingness to 
grant divorces to spouses in long-term marriages, even Hilde Benjamin had expressed a 
similar concern in 1954, namely that inflexible adherence to the stance that marriage 
should never be a “pension institution” “‘gives rise to the impression that equality [in the 
domestic realm] has already been achieved.’”145  But Heiland’s position, unlike that of 
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Benjamin, was not contingent upon the achievement of full gender equality.  Instead, 
Heiland felt that older husbands owed their wives a debt of faithfulness not merely for the 
preservation of a relationship, but for the sake of socialist marital morality itself.146 
By contrast, Heiland’s version of socialist morality demanded that courts dissolve 
marriages of only brief standing if there was a lack of “mutual love and respect” from 
their inception, since such marriages had never fulfilled the personal and societal criteria 
for a viable marriage and had thus never been meaningful to the couple or to society.147  
Even though this was the opposite of his recommendation regarding the advisability of 
ending marriages of long duration, it was also a controversial stance.  In 1956, a court 
administrator for the region of Neubrandenburg excoriated the Neustrelitz District Court 
for having granted a divorce because “the parties [had] been married for less than a year 
and thus it [was] not possible for them to have comprehended the meaning of 
marriage.”148  According to this logic, the administrator pointed out, any newlyweds’ 
marriage could be dissolved merely by virtue of its relatively brief duration. 
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From Heiland’s perspective, however, his recommendation that courts terminate 
meaningless short-term marriages while preserving meaningful long-term ones stemmed 
from the same unimpeachable moral logic.  A marriage’s meaning for society did not 
stem primarily from demographic concerns or the degree of a couple’s ideological 
compatibility, but instead to a significant degree from the emotional viability of the 
marital bond.  From Heiland’s perspective, the expectation that older spouses would 
assist one another was not merely a legal one, but the culmination of an affective bond 
cultivated during many years of marital cohabitation. 
Justice Rothschild’s and Heiland’s interpretation of the law was not without its 
adherents at lower levels of the East German judicial apparatus.  The Dresden District 
Court and Dresden Regional Court Administration in late 1956 agreed with them that if 
financial hardship was the likely outcome of granting a divorce, then the marriage in 
question had not in fact lost its meaning for the couple or for society.149  In effect, these 
courts operated according to the assumption that taking the prospect of “unreasonable 
hardship” into account in a divorce case did not amount to perpetuating the notion of 
marriage as a ”pension institution.”  Hilde Benjamin and many members of the Supreme 
Court strenuously disagreed, even though they did not downplay the importance of 
“unreasonable hardship” entirely.  Ministry of Justice officials aligned with Benjamin felt 
obliged to remind the Dresden judges and court administrators that a spouse could not 
“retain possession” of (ersitzen) her or his spouse by virtue of the longevity of a marriage 
                                                 
149 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 2226, Band 2, letter from Taubert, Leiter der JVSt Dresden, to MdJ, 
HA II, Berlin, Betreff: Überprüfung der Eheverfahren im Bezirk Dresden, November 24, 1956, 3 of 
document, 100 of archival file. 
 
 360 
as one could with a piece of property.150  From the standpoint of these functionaries, the 
judges in Dresden had forgotten that marriage as a “pension institution” was supposed to 
be a thing of the past. 
Senior Justice Heinrich of the Supreme Court urged East German judges to 
ascertain the degree to which a marriage had lost its meaning for a couple, children, and 
society as stipulated by § 8 of the Marriage Ordinance in conjunction with the prospect of 
“unreasonable hardship.”  In other words, courts could not disaggregate the two issues, 
especially when doing so resulted in the expectation of “unreasonable hardship” taking 
precedence over serious and legitimate reasons for acceding to a request for divorce.  For 
Heinrich—as for his fellow Justices Schumann, Kleine, and Löwenthal on the Supreme 
Court and Minister Benjamin herself—concern for the financial well-being of a spouse 
did not in and of itself legitimate the preservation of an otherwise untenable marriage.151 
The anti-“pension institution” officials at the Ministry of Justice also hoped that 
courts would not consider the question of “unreasonable hardship” only in financial 
terms.  These officials argued that forcing spouses to remain in a non-viable marriage 
constituted more of an “unreasonable hardship” than any pecuniary difficulties that might 
result from the dissolution of an already frayed marital bond.  In a 1956 district court 
divorce case decision that the Ministry of Justice deemed to be exemplary, a husband 
(Arno M.) viewed his 40-plus-year-long marriage as ruined while his wife (Dorothea M.) 
did not, and the court surmised that Dorothea had ulterior motives for wanting to remain 
married.  The district court thus explored the extent of the financial hardship to which 
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Dorothea would be subject only after it had determined that the marriage was indeed so 
ruined (zerrüttet) that serious reasons existed for splitting it up as defined by § 8 of the 
Marriage Ordinance.152  In this case, the dominant view prevailed, namely that the 
prospect of financial adversity for an ex-wife was not sufficient to prevent the granting of 
a divorce if the degree of marital ruin warranted it. 
Many adulterous husbands who were dissatisfied with courts that rejected their 
pleas for divorce were more than willing to speak to this issue.  In objecting to the 
Leipzig-South District Court’s decision to deny his request for a divorce, Alfred T. asked 
what was more immoral: a wife clinging to a meaningless marriage because she selfishly 
expected lifelong sustenance from her spouse, or an adulterous husband like himself who 
was just trying to clear things up (klare persönliche Verhältnisse)?  Alfred T. had 
apparently taken to heart the official rhetoric about marriage no longer being a “pension 
institution”: 
 
The question necessarily arises in conjunction with this affair: what is immoral 
behavior, and what constitutes a violation of morals and ethics?  Have I not been 
seeking to attain a solution to this situation and moral purity since 1956, when the 
senselessness of this marriage became readily apparent?  Is not the defendant [i.e., 
his wife] violating all moral standards when she fails to recognize the need to end 
a marriage that has become meaningless and thereby prevents the attainment of 
moral clarity [klare Verhältnisse]?153 
 
 
For Alfred T., adultery was not the cause of his marital problems, but instead a 
means of escaping from a marriage that had already been on the verge of collapse.  He 
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was convinced that finding another female partner was the only way that he could lead a 
life “in honor and dignity,” and an action undertaken with this kind of motivation “can in 
no way be considered immoral.”154  Holding Alfred T. financially responsible for his 
wife’s ongoing financial well-being by preserving the marriage was more harmful to 
society than the dissolution of the marriage would be, since “[i]n my capacity as a 
working person [werktätiger Mensch], I will demonstrate that I can meet the socialist 
state’s expectations for my personal, societal, and professional life once the bond of a 
marriage that exists in name only no longer constitutes a hindrance to my doing so.”155  
Alfred T.’s moral logic must have been convincing, since the Leipzig Regional Court 
overturned the Leipzig-South District Court’s decision on April 12, 1963 and granted his 
request for a divorce.156 
But there were still key officials at the Ministry of Justice who remained receptive 
to the objections raised by aggrieved older wives.  Eight years after the Marriage 
Ordinance had gone into effect, Ministry of Justice spokesperson Grzegorek reassured 
divorce case defendant Margarete S. that the law did not in fact reward philandering 
husbands looking to abandon their aging wives in favor of younger women: 
 
You can see that the law sets the bar high for granting a divorce in order to protect 
the interests of aging wives; a divorce will not be granted just because a husband 
suddenly begins a relationship with a younger woman.  If a divorce is to be 
                                                 
154 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 0415, Stellungnahme zur unberechtigten Abweisung meiner Klage 
auf Ehescheidung durch das KG Leipzig-Süd (where Alfred T. had filed for divorce on August 3, 1962), 4 
of document. 
155 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 0415, letter from Alfred T., Senftenberg, to KG Leipzig-Süd, July 
24, 1962, 3 of document. 
156 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 0415, letter from Grass, Direktor des BG Leipzig, to MdJ, Berlin, 
May 6, 1963, unpaginated.  Hagemeyer believes that East German courts were inclined to grant divorces in 
such cases because the state had an interest only in “healthy” marriages and did not necessarily care which 
spouse had been at fault for making a particular marital union “unhealthy.”  Hagemeyer, Zum 
Familienrecht in der Sowjetzone, 16. 
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granted, evidence of the marriage’s ruin needs to be found—and the desire of one 
spouse to abandon the marriage does not suffice on its own as evidence.157 
 
 
Revealingly, Grzegorek made no mention whatsoever of older women clinging to 
meaningless marriages out of financial concerns, nor did she categorically condemn the 
notion of marriage as a Versorgungsanstalt when she wrote that “[i]t is thus not the case 
that an aging woman who clung faithfully to her marriage would be at the mercy of the 
wishes of the other spouse.”158  This might have stemmed from her recognition that a 
significant number of East German women believed that the new law did not protect their 
interests as women: “‘Most likely only men were involved in the drafting of the new 
[divorce] laws, since these laws have been made only for men.’”159 
Margarete S. was not alone in asking for Hilde Benjamin’s protection not only 
from the husband who had cheated on her, but also from the male lawmakers who could 
not understand the predicament of a woman in her situation—as Benjamin presumably 
could.  Women like Emma K., whose husband had left her after forty years of marriage, 
were even more explicit in articulating a concept of gendered rights that they believed 
should be protected by law: “I too am part of the GDR and of the German working class 
and assume that I am also entitled to equal rights for women.”  She also reminded the 
Ministry of Justice that Walter Ulbricht had declared marriage to be a lifelong bond in 
which both partners had equal rights and had exhorted East Germans with the Ninth 
                                                 
157 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 0417, Band E3—664-1628/63, letter from Hauptreferentin 
Grzegorek, MdJ, Berlin, to Margarete S., Oelsnitz, November 29, 1963, unpaginated. 
158 Ibid. 




Commandment of Socialist Morality to live a “clean and decent life and to respect one’s 
family.”160 
 
The Intervention of Societal Forces: An Effective Marital Prophylactic or Mere 
Meddling? 
The East German judicial system was to serve not only as a barometer of marital 
ruin, but also as a prophylactic against it.  A key way in which the personal was to 
become political in the GDR was the widespread application of the SED’s panacea of 
“societal influence” (gesellschaftliche Einwirkung) with the goal of preventing divorce. 
The Ministry of Justice prognosticated in 1954 that 
 
[t]here are signs that people are no longer just idly standing by out of lurid 
curiosity when a married male colleague has an affair with a female colleague.  
Instead, there are indications that in such cases colleagues recognize their duty to 
point out the reprehensible nature of such behavior.161 
 
There was, however, a fair amount of ambivalence about the efficacy of such intervention 
on the part of the brigades themselves, family court judges, and even high-level officials 
in Berlin.  Like the building of socialism more generally, the attempt to realize brigades’ 
purported potential was a perpetual work-in-progress that was often more effective in 
generating rhetoric than in accomplishing anything else.  Historians are not the only ones 
to have pointed out that socialist brigades were imperfect vehicles for the dissemination 
                                                 
160 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 3566, vols. 1-2, letter from Emma K., Loburg, to MdJ, Berlin, May 
2, 1962, 28 of a section of archival file. 
161 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 14398, Bericht über die Ergebnisse der Diskussion zum Entwurf des 
FGB auf der Arbeitstagung im MdJ vom 19. Oktober 1954, Anlage: Vorschlag zur Behandlung des 
Scheidungsrechts, 2 of document. 
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of official ideology and the promulgation of socialist morality.162  Jurists sometimes 
bewailed the inefficacy of brigades in averting marital conflict even as they excoriated 
their colleagues for not sufficiently involving brigade members as mediators and 
witnesses in divorce cases.163  The Ministry of Justice complained in 1965 that “[t]he 
influence of brigades on family life has gone down in recent years,” although it would 
have been hard-pressed to identify a golden age during which such influence had been 
more pervasive or efficacious.  Since there was a fine line between judicious societal 
intervention and mere meddling, Walter Ulbricht felt obliged to insist that it was not the 
intention of the East German state to meddle unnecessarily in the intimate sphere of 
familial life.164   
Officials attributed the inefficacy and inadequacy of intervention by brigades to a 
number of factors.  For one thing, they had to admit that such intervention was bound to 
fail if it was unwelcome, and this was all too often the case: 
 
Many still cling resolutely to the view that marriage is a private sphere in which 
no one can intervene.  This view, which has existed for centuries, can only 
                                                 
162 Thomas Reichel, “‘Jugoslawische Verhältnisse?’—Die ‘Brigaden der sozialistischen Arbeit’ und die 
‘Syndikalismus’-Affäre (1959-1962),” in Herrschaft und Eigen-Sinn in der Diktatur.  Studien zur 
Gesellschaft der DDR, ed. Thomas Lindenberger (Cologne: Böhlau, 1999), 45-73, here 73; Harsch, “Sex, 
Divorce, and Women’s Waged Work,” 108; Grandke, “Familienrecht,” 184; Port, “Love, Lust, and Lies 
under Communism,” 494, fn 52. 
163 Mertens, Wider die sozialistische Familiennorm, 31-32.  According to Harsch, “[t]he ‘work collective’ 
typically responded with bewilderment to the order to interfere in a colleague’s private life. […] A survey 
of divorce records concluded that collective mediation was typically ‘unsuccessful.’ […] Typically, [a 
workplace collective] was comprised of men who, according to a Justice report, ‘do not recognize the 
necessity of confronting outmoded bourgeois views of marriage and family.’”  Harsch, “Sex, Divorce, and 
Women’s Waged Work,” 108, drawing upon Wilhelm Heinrich, Elfriede Göldner, and Horst Schilde, 
Richter am Obersten Gericht, “Die Rechtsprechung der Instanzgerichte in Familiensachen,” Neue Justiz 
(1961), 778 and Gerhard Häusler, “Aufgaben des Rechtsanwalts im Eheverfahren,” Neue Justiz (1963), 
373. 
164 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1445, Band 1, MdJ, Berlin, “Zu einigen Fragen der Familie in der 
DDR,” February 4, 1965, 13 of document, 13 of archival file; Schneider, Hausväteridylle, 191, fn 42.  
Ulbricht’s concern for balancing efficacious societal influence with a respect for familial autonomy 
manifested itself in the practice of the government as a whole, which “pushed for but never insisted on 
collective intervention.”  Harsch, “Sex, Divorce, and Women’s Waged Work,” 109. 
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This perception persisted among many brigade members as well: 
 
[i]n general, socialist brigades are not fully aware of the extent of their 
responsibility to ensure the development of socialist morality in familial life.  It is 
often overlooked that the process of developing a new morality for familial life 
does not proceed without conflict, but that these conflicts do not necessarily have 
to result in heated arguments. […] In general, behaviors learned during the 
socialist work process, such as camaraderie, willingness to help others, a sense of 
duty, respect for other people, selflessness, and willingness to sacrifice, gradually 
manifest themselves in familial life as well.  This new attitude towards work must 
necessarily clash with behavioral patterns in familial life that stem from earlier 
times.  It is the responsibility of socialist collectives to make this process a 
conscious one.  Socialist brigades can thus do their part in what all of society must 
do: ensure the proper socialization (Vergesellschaftung) of individuals and 
families.  It is this responsibility that both justifies and obligates collectives to 
intervene in the interest of families.166 
 
 
In other words, brigades were supposed to serve as the transmission belt that would 
convey socialist values from the workplace to the domestic realm, but they were not 
necessarily well suited for doing so.167  The “relationship of work and home was [to be] 
one of complementarity, not competition,” since workplace brigades drew upon “‘typical 
                                                 
165 BArch Berlin Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 1491, Teil 2, MdJ, Berlin, Der erreichte Entwicklungsstand im 
Bereich der Familie und ihre fördernden und hemmenden Einflüsse auf die gesellschaftliche 
Weiterentwicklung, undated but circa 1964, 18 of document. 
166 BArch Berlin Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 1491, Teil 2, MdJ, Berlin, Der erreichte Entwicklungsstand im 
Bereich der Familie und ihre fördernden und hemmenden Einflüsse auf die gesellschaftliche 
Weiterentwicklung, undated but circa 1964, 18 of document. 
167 As Harsch points out, “[i]t is noteworthy that this method of ‘saving’ marriage was almost never 
prescribed by urban family judges, but often by judges in rural districts.  Yet it was in the countryside [in 
particular] that marital conflict often arose from ‘an understanding of male/female relations that is still far 
from socialist.’”  This mindset was presumably not limited to spouses in troubled marriages, but instead 
espoused by other collective members as well.  Harsch, “Sex, Divorce, and Women’s Waged Work,” 108.  
As Betts observes, “[t]here were even instances—first starting in the 1960s, but present in the 1970s and 
1980s—in which citizens voiced their objections about having their colleagues and neighbours involved in 
their painful private lives.  The effect was to leave couple’s [sic] private lives relatively alone, implying a 
new respect (or perhaps indifference) towards the private sphere.”  I contend that this skepticism about the 
advisability and efficacy of societal intervention in domestic matters predated the 1970s.  Betts, Within 
Walls, 112-114, quotation on 114. 
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family structures and modes of behavior,’” as Annegret Schüle has argued.168  While the 
Ministry of Justice proclaimed the existence of a “dialectical relationship 
(Wechselverhältnis) between workplace and familial morality,” it would appear as if the 
dialectic was not living up to its name, since “[t]he struggle for socialist morality in the 
workplace does not automatically create the conditions for positive familial morality.”169 
 A brigade’s involvement in an individual’s familial life could take numerous 
forms, 
 
including small-group and large-group conversations [Aussprachen], transferring 
someone to a different job, and consulting with parents. […] The socialist brigade 
intervenes out of the need to protect its own honor, such as when it seeks to break 
up so-called factory marriages [Betriebsehen] and other unclean (unsauber) 
relationships. […] Sometimes brigades demand that a member clear things up 
(klare Verhältnisse) and feel that divorce is the only way to do this.  But this 
means that the brigade is simply shifting the decision-making burden to a court.170 
 
 
By invoking brigade members’ presumed desire to protect their sense of honor, this 
report author was implicitly acknowledging they would require a more personal form of 
motivation than ideological exhortations alone.  But she or he also admitted that brigade 
members might not only act to try to prevent divorce, but also potentially to encourage it.    
 
The New 1965 Family Law Code: More of the Same, or a New Beginning? 
                                                 
168 Moeller, “The Elephant in the Living Room,” 238, quoting from Annegret Schüle, “Die Spinne”: Die 
Erfahrungsgeschichte weiblicher Industriearbeit im VEB Leipziger Baumwollspinnerei (Leipzig: Leipziger 
Universitätsverlag, 2001), 232. 
169 BArch Berlin Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 1491, Teil 2, MdJ, Berlin, Der erreichte Entwicklungsstand im 
Bereich der Familie und ihre fördernden und hemmenden Einflüsse auf die gesellschaftliche 
Weiterentwicklung, undated but circa 1964, 20 of document. 
170 Ibid., 19 of document.  It was not uncommon for the SED party apparatus to mete out punishments to 
adulterous spouses outside of a courtroom setting, such as revoked party membership or impediments to 
vocational advancement; see Wolle, Aufbruch nach Utopia, 213. 
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 The chronically high divorce rate and the inability of socialist pedagogical 
influence to mitigate it did not prevent the Ministry of Justice from boasting that “[m]any 
West German visitors to the GDR are impressed by every [East German] family’s secure 
prospects for the future and by the clean and orderly relationships between people that are 
an expression of the great moral superiority of our social order.”  Codifying the Marriage 
Ordinance’s provisions as part of the new 1965 Family Law Code was part of the East 
German government’s attempt to ensure that West Germans would continue to be 
impressed by the alleged superiority of East German family law.  This claim to 
superiority ironically stemmed from the FGB’s goal of preserving marriages through 
moral pedagogy—an attribute supposedly lacking in its West German counterpart.171  
Even though Article 6 of the West German constitution stipulated that marriage and 
family were subject to special protection by the state, the FRG’s family law provisions 
did not even once specify the duties of the state and society to families, according to the 
East German Ministry of Justice’s critique.172 
 For Paul Betts, however, the 1965 FGB represented a decisive shift in socialist 
jurisprudence in which the SED sought to extricate itself from its self-assigned obligation 
to place a socialist imprimatur upon the East German marital relationship: 
 
                                                 
171 In fact, an alteration of family law (Familienrechtsänderungsgesetz) in 1961 actually made divorce 
more difficult to obtain in West Germany; see Sibylle Buske, Fräulein Mutter und ihr Bastard: Eine 
Geschichte der Unehelichkeit in Deutschland 1900 bis 1970 (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2004), 211; Christian 
de Nuys-Henkelmann, “‘Wenn die rote Sonne abends im Meer versinkt…’: Die Sexualmoral der fünfziger 
Jahre,” in Sexualmoral und Zeitgeist im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, eds. Anja Bagel-Bohlan and Michael 
Salewski (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1990), 107-145, here 115. 
172 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1445, Band 1, MdJ, Berlin, Zentrale Kommission zur Leitung und 
Koordinierung der Familiengesetzbuchdiskussion, “Die Nationale Bedeutung des 
Familiengesetzbuchentwurfs und die Lage der Familie in Westdeutschland,” February 1965, 2-3 of 
document, 22 back side to 23 front side of archival file.  
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According to the famed paragraph 24 of the [1965 FGB], a marriage could only 
be dissolved if ‘it has lost its meaning for the spouses, the children and therefore 
also for society.’  Compare this language with [paragraph 8 of] the 1955 Marriage 
Ordinance, which held that divorce could only be granted if the marriage ‘had lost 
its meaning for the spouses, the children and for society.’  The semantic 
difference at first may seem negligible, yet the clause ‘therefore also for society’ 
(und damit auch für die Gesellschaft) was quite novel and far-reaching.  For it 
implied that the primary meaning of the marriage rested with the couple itself, not 
with society, thereby challenging the subordination of marriage to social 
imperatives found in the 1955 Marriage Ordinance.  Legally, it suggested that the 
concerns of the spouses trumped that of the state, opening the door towards 
separating private domestic problems from state expectations.173 
 
The semantic difference is indeed a significant one, but it does not necessarily indicate 
that the 1965 FGB brought about a fundamental change in the way in which East German 
courts had been construing a troubled marriage’s “meaning for society” since the 
issuance of the Marriage Ordinance in 1955.  What had mattered to Wächtler of the 
Ministry of Justice and to many judges in determining a marriage’s value to society as 
early as 1956 was first and foremost its viability as far as a couple and a couple’s children 
were concerned—despite the 1955 Marriage Ordinance’s more explicit discursive linkage 
of marriage to broader societal imperatives than was the case in the 1965 FGB.  The 
FGB’s altered language thus did not augur a fundamental change in jurisprudential 
practice, but instead reflected the direction that influential interpreters of the law had 
already taken.  Jurists and citizens alike pushed open “[t]he door towards separating 
private domestic problems from state expectations” earlier than Betts has maintained. 
 As a whole, the FGB reflected more continuity than discontinuity when it came to 
divorce law.  The Ministry of Justice felt that the Marriage Ordinance’s provisions had 
proven themselves and “still correspond[ed] with the political and economic situation of 
                                                 
173 Betts, Within Walls, 107-108; McLellan, Love in the Time of Communism, 81; Port, “Love, Lust, and 
Lies under Communism,” 495; Grandke, “Familienrecht,” 195-196. 
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the GDR and the state of its ideological development.”174  Significantly, the Ministry 
decisively rejected calls in 1965 to offer more generous provisions for alimony for 
divorced wives who had not participated in the workforce while married.175 
Where the FGB differed more starkly from existing legal precedent was in its 
elimination of an explicit condemnation of spouses who felt that their “thoughtless” 
(leichtfertig) attitude towards marriage should not prevent them from being able to obtain 
a divorce.  While the March 1965 FGB draft of § 24, section 1 had retained this 
condemnation, the October 1965 version of the Code was silent on this subject even 
though Anita Grandke, one of the GDR’s foremost authorities on the family, strongly 
believed that such moral censure was still necessary. 176  Instead, drafters of the new law 
believed that § 1 of the FGB would achieve the same goal by emphasizing spouses’ 
obligation to adopt a responsible attitude towards marriage and family.177  Even though 
the rhetorical means had changed, the ends remained the same: family law was supposed 
to constitute a transparent reflection of socialist norms.  In explaining the intertwining 
(Verflechtung) of family law and morality in the 1965 FGB, the Ministry of Justice 
opined that 
 
[t]he state cannot achieve many of the ethical norms for behavior contained in the 
[FGB] draft with compulsory measures.  Instead, these norms are directed 
towards citizens’ consciousness and provide societal forces with guidance [for 
                                                 
174 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 14425, MdJ, Berlin, Grundkommission zur Ausarbeitung des FGB, 
Begründung des Entwurfs des FGB, March 18, 1965, 2 of document. 
175 Ibid., 5 of document.  This was despite the partial rehabilitation of the guilt principle by the 1965 FGB, 
according to which spouses’ moral failings would factor into alimony decisions.  Port, “Love, Lust, and 
Lies under Communism,” 495. 
176 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 14426, MdJ, Berlin, Protokoll der 8. Sitzung der FGB-
Grundkommission am 17. November 1964, November 20, 1964, 3 of document. 
177 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 14425, MdJ, Berlin, Grundkommission zur Ausarbeitung des FGB, 
Begründung der Änderungen des Entwurfs des FGB, October 6, 1965, 6 of document. 
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enforcing them].  In this way, the characteristic educational function of socialist 
law becomes readily apparent.178 
     
In theory if not necessarily in practice, East German jurisprudence embodied the 
transformation that Norbert Elias has identified for Western societies more generally, 
namely the shift from external compulsion to internalization of social discipline.179  
Officials who worked on the FGB draft in 1964 expressed confidence that East Germans 
were increasingly “observing socialist moral dictates of their own free will” and using 
them as guidelines for their feelings and actions.180  From the SED’s perspective, the 
move away from compulsory measures was precisely what made a socialist polity like 
the GDR distinct from, rather than analogous to, its capitalist counterpart.  The FGB’s 
ostensible privileging of self-policing over coercion was in line with the larger goals of 
socialist jurisprudence; while “[b]ourgeois laws were about protecting citizens from the 
state,” Hilde Benjamin opined, “our laws are about protecting citizens through the state.  
This needs to be made clear.”181 
Apparently, this dynamic was insufficiently clear to Auschrat, a member of the 
Free German Trade Union Federation’s (Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, or 
FDGB) Federal Executive Board (Bundesvorstand) who had the temerity to suggest that 
the FGB was not as well-suited as it could have been to fulfilling its educational 
objectives: “The regulations regarding marriage could stand further elaboration especially 
                                                 
178 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DO1 14425, MdJ, Berlin, Grundkommission zur Ausarbeitung des FGB, 
Begründung des Entwurfs des FGB, March 18, 1965, 1 of document. 
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as far as the relationship between state, society, and family was concerned, since this 
needs to be constantly rethought.”  At least within the confines of a ministerial meeting, 
Benjamin was willing to admit that “[w]e cannot fully meet these expectations since we 
currently lack sufficient research on family life.”182  Thus, even the vanguard of the 
workers’ and peasants’ state did not yet fully understand the obstacles to harmonious 
family life that persisted in socialist society. 
 
Conclusion 
 Many East German women during the 1950s and 1960s did not appreciate the 
socialist vision of gender equality if it meant calling into question the role of the husband 
as a provider for his wife during and after a marriage.  The dominant point of view in the 
SED dictated that even marriages of long standing should be dissolved if they existed “in 
name only” regardless of the financial consequences for the spouses involved.  But it was 
difficult for East German legal experts to overlook the fact that adulterous husbands 
might view this policy as a carte blanche to abandon their aging wives in favor of 
younger, more attractive, and supposedly more “politically advanced” partners.  Given 
the limitations placed upon alimony payments, such husbands would no longer even have 
to “buy” their way out of their marriages as had been the case in the past, when wives 
would have expected generous alimony settlements in exchange for their willingness to 
dissolve a marital bond.  Under the GDR’s new divorce law, adulterous husbands could 
and did obtain divorces and live with or marry their adulterous partners without being 
                                                 
182 Ibid., 6 of document.  An important impetus for discussing marital and sexual issues more openly and 
extensively was the SED’s 1963 Youth Communiqué (Jugendkommuniqué), which identified “true love” as 
a prerogative of socialist youth; see Wolle, Aufbruch nach Utopia, 216. 
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burdened by long-term legal obligations to continue to provide sustenance for their ex-
wives.183  But even those officials who sympathized with the plight of older women 
unaccustomed to workforce participation did not recommend changing the divorce law’s 
provisions regarding alimony.  Instead, they felt that the full educational and punitive 
weight of socialist jurisprudence should come down upon adulterous spouses by inducing 
them to recognize their responsibility—both personal and societal—to return to their 
faithful spouses.   
 As in the case of couples seeking to obtain an exception to the age of marital 
consent, those who complained that divorce was too easy for adulterous spouses to obtain 
were imputing to the state a failure to uphold the standards of marital respectability and 
fidelity that were supposedly the bedrock of socialist familial morality.  Given the 
amount of discretion that judges could exercise in determining justifiable grounds for 
ending a marriage, divorce cases became a litmus test by which to ascertain the 
populace’s trust in the ability of East German jurists to administer justice impartially, or 
at least not to substitute their own morality for “socialist” morality.  Even though the 
absolute number of divorces remained quite steady during the first eight years after the 
issuance of the Marriage Ordinance, the proportion of divorce trials that resulted in the 
split-up of a marriage—as opposed to an alternative outcome that would result in the 
preservation of a marital union—did increase.  West German propaganda about the 
supposed hostility of East German socialism to familial integrity further enhanced the 
widespread perception within the GDR that the introduction of no-fault divorce was 
facilitating the dissolution of marital bonds.  The Ministry of Justice did its best to 
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counteract this impression by encouraging a hostility to divorce (Scheidungsfeindlichkeit) 
in jurisprudential practice from the 1950s through at least the early 1960s.184  But the 
smugness of some SED members and governmental officials who felt that they were 
above the need to abide by the state’s moral injunctions regarding their private lives was 
apt only to add fuel to the fire of popular discontent. 
 Mertens has contended that by introducing the new criterion of “meaning for 
society” in the assessment of marital viability, the SED sought to emphasize the 
subordination of the marital bond to the state’s interest in fostering enthusiasm for work 
and demographic growth.185  While Mertens has not gone so far as to maintain that 
“meaning for society” routinely took precedence over the other two criteria, namely 
“meaning for the couple” and “meaning for the couple’s children,” he has not explored 
the various ways in which “meaning for society” was construed in jurisprudential 
practice.  He thus allows his readers to assume that the implementation of the Marriage 
Ordinance’s divorce provisions enabled the SED’s goal of collapsing state, societal, and 
familial interests into a single, undifferentiated entity to become social reality. 
I would argue, however, that in many (albeit certainly not all) East German 
divorce cases, the criteria of “meaning for society” and “meaning for the couple and/or 
children” became more or less synonymous in practice, and that this interpretation of the 
law held sway for a number of jurists from the moment of the Marriage Ordinance’s 
inception rather than only with the introduction of the FGB in 1965.  Since the Marriage 
Ordinance did not explicitly define what it meant by “meaning for society,” judges often 
                                                 
184 Mertens, Wider die sozialistische Familiennorm, 30, drawing upon Gesine Obertreis, Familienpolitik in 
der DDR 1945-1980 (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1986), 232ff. 
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assumed that if a marriage had lost its meaning for a couple and/or the couple’s children, 
then it had lost its meaning for society—and, by extension, the state—as well.  It was 
precisely because of the extensive leeway that judges had in reaching this determination 
on a case-by-case basis that socialist views on marriage could encompass petty-bourgeois 
prejudices and progressive open-mindedness all at once.  Even Hilde Benjamin had to 
admit that the process of codifying socialist marital morality was an ongoing work-in-
progress.  It was not immediately apparent even to lawyers at the highest levels of the 
East German government whether an older wife who sought to preserve a troubled 
marriage deserved praise for her commitment to the “socialist” vision of marriage as a 
lifelong bond or condemnation for her perpetuation of an outmoded understanding of 
marriage as a primarily financial arrangement. 
 The judicial sleight of hand enabled by the Marriage Ordinance’s rhetorical 
prioritization of political and collective interests served to mask a synecdochic 
relationship between the personal and the political whereby the former not infrequently 
took precedence over the latter.  This tendency might account at least in part for East 
German demographic patterns during the 1970s and 1980s that observers identified after 
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.  Eva Kolinsky has argued that while “motherhood and 
employment were there to stay and constituted the core of women’s life-course 
planning[,] [p]artnerships, by contrast, were comparatively fragile and more readily 
replaced by single parenthood from the outset or after a break-up.”186  The precipitous 
rise in the East German divorce rate from 1965 onwards was not merely the result of the 
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courts’ declining Scheidungsfeindlichkeit,187 but also of the fact that the frequently 
maligned “politicization” of marriage as a social institution in the GDR was actually 
marked by the salience of interpersonal affective considerations in the determination of a 
marriage’s “political” valence.   
Second-wave feminists in North America and western Europe have popularized 
the slogan “the personal is political,” but they did not have exclusive purchase on this 
idea.  Indeed, the mapping of the personal onto the political had already been a facet of 
marital morality as articulated by East German officialdom and citizens alike during the 
1950s.  I have thus traced back to the mid-1950s what Paul Betts has characterized as a 
distinctive feature of East German society that only emerged during the 1960s: 
 
To be sure, the 1960s liberalization of divorce as a constitutive element of a 
rejuvenated women’s movement found expression across the industrialized world 
at the time.  But given the cold war setting, the lack of any real public sphere, and 
the SED’s ideological support of sexual equality, GDR divorce courts became the 
arena in which the feminist crusade of the “personal is the political” took on its 
most popular and potent expression. […] More than anywhere else in the GDR, 
divorce courts brought the private sphere to public attention, revealing both the 
hopes and limits of the socialist project as a full-scale revolution of social 
relations, as well as the determination on the part of East German citizens to 
define and defend private life.188 
 
This process did not entail a conflation of the personal and political in which the mapping 
of the political onto the personal caused the latter to disappear in significance.  Nor was it 
yet another symptom of the dissolving of socialist society into the state one couple at a 
time.  Instead, it constituted an implicit recognition of the importance of interpersonal 
affective bonds as a building block (die kleinste Zelle) of capitalist and socialist polities 
                                                 
187 Mertens, Wider die sozialistische Familiennorm, 44. 
188 Betts, Within Walls, 115. 
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alike.  And it was the Marriage Ordinance of 1955 that West German observers criticized 
for having reduced East German familial life to yet another transmission belt for socialist 
ideology that actually hastened the proliferation of a “cultural language” of sex—a 




CHAPTER 6. A PALIMPSEST OF THE WEIMAR SEX REFORM MOVEMENT?  
RELATIONSHIP COUNSELING DURING THE 1960s 
 
“When the doctor has nothing more to say, the socialist must take his place.” (Wilhelm 
Reich, 1929)1 
 
The Peanuts cartoon character Lucy van Pelt is known for her largely futile 
attempts to attract advice seekers other than her habitual visitor, Charlie Brown, to a 
spartan booth from which she offers “psychiatric help” for five cents.  The East German 
government, which had been largely averse to the remnants of the Weimar-era sex reform 
movement, was poised in the mid- to late 1960s to revive one of its most salient 
legacies—providing an institutional forum for imparting knowledge about sexuality, 
family planning, and felicitous married life.  But East German officials would likely have 
empathized with Lucy’s plight given the quite modest success of their efforts.  While the 
number of clinics increased quite rapidly as per the stipulation of the new Family Law 
Code (FGB) of December 20, 1965, the number of advice seekers at many counseling 
centers did not.  As Atina Grossmann has observed for the immediate postwar period, 
“after twelve years of interventionist Nazi racial hygiene programs, women were as 
suspicious of state-provided sex and procreative advice as they were of the 
recriminalization of abortion.”  This chapter will demonstrate that reservations about 
                                                 
1 Wilhelm Reich, “Erfahrungen und Probleme der Sexualberatungsstellen für Arbeiter und Angestellte in 
Wien,” Der sozialistische Arzt 5 (1929), 98-102, here 101-102, as quoted in Karl Fallend, Bernhard 
Handlbauer, Werner Kienreich, Johannes Reichmayr, and Marion Steiner, “Psychoanalyse bis 1945,” in 
Geschichte der deutschen Psychologie, eds. Mitchell Ash and Ulfried Geuter (Opladen: Westdeutscher 
Verlag, 1985), 113-145, here 131-132. 
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premarital counseling and marital therapy lingered among East German citizens and 
lower-level governmental functionaries alike.2 
In hearkening back to the palimpsest of the Weimar sex reform movement, the 
SED largely ignored the ways in which relationship counseling had undergone a drastic 
shift in priorities under the discriminatory and genocidal form of Bevölkerungspolitik 
(population policy) promulgated by the National Socialist regime.  Neither “ideological” 
nor “scientific” approaches to counseling had been untainted by Nazism’s nefarious 
intentions.  Counselors nonetheless set themselves the task of convincing a wary 
populace that East German marriage counseling was “something quite different from the 
forced counselling and eugenic restrictions on marriage imposed by the Nazis.”3  Because 
of the need to overcome this legacy, efforts to develop a workable amalgam of socialist 
ideology on the one hand and scientific expertise on the other in East German 
relationship counseling were particularly fraught. 
Conflicting methodologies and goals in marital therapy and premarital education 
were not unique to the GDR.  Relationship counseling centers originally emerged from 
the ferment accompanying the development of the sciences of the self around the turn of 
the twentieth century.4  Also influential were the concomitant rise of the welfare state and 
the profession of social work, feminist activism around questions of motherhood, debates 
about contraception and abortion, demographic concerns, eugenics, social hygiene, and 
                                                 
2 Atina Grossmann, “Pronatalism, Nationbuilding, and Socialism: Population Policy in the SBZ/DDR, 1945 
to 1960,” in Between Reform and Revolution: German Socialism and Communism from 1840 to 1990, eds. 
David E. Barclay and Eric D. Weitz (New York: Berghahn, 1998), 443-465, here 457. 
3 Annette Timm, “Guarding the Health of Worker Families in the GDR: Socialist Health Care, 
Bevölkerungspolitik, and Marriage Counselling, 1945-1970,” in Arbeiter in der SBZ-DDR, eds. Peter 
Hübner and Klaus Tenfelde (Essen: Klartext, 1999), 463-495, here 488. 
4 The term “sciences of the self” is inspired by Greg Eghigian, Andreas Killen, and Christine Leuenberger, 
“Introduction: The Self as Project: Politics and the Human Sciences in the Twentieth Century,” Osiris 22, 
no. 1 (2007), 1-25. 
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advice literature published by such internationally renowned figures as Ellen Key, Marie 
Stopes, and Theodor van de Velde.  Scholars have typically focused on the imbrication of 
marital counseling with the demographic and eugenic concerns of population policy, and 
on the ways in which relationship counseling provided a vector for the welfare state’s 
exertion of social control along Foucaultian lines.5 
 The palimpsest of Weimar-era relationship counseling had many authors whose 
concerns were not limited to population policy or social control.  Building upon the 
establishment of the League for the Protection of Mothers (Bund für Mutterschutz) by 
Helene Stöcker in 1905 and the founding of the Institute for Sexual Research (Institut für 
Sexualwissenschaft) by Magnus Hirschfeld in 1919, psychoanalyst Wilhelm Reich, a 
member of the SPD, and Dr. Marie Frischauf, a member of the KPD, launched the 
Socialist Society for Sexual Counseling and Sexual Research (Sozialistische Gesellschaft 
für Sexualberatung und Sexualforschung) in 1928.  By 1929, they had established six 
counseling centers, published sexual education brochures in large quantities, and 
                                                 
5 Important works for the German context include Atina Grossmann, Reforming Sex: The German 
Movement for Birth Control and Abortion Reform, 1920-1950 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); 
Annette F. Timm, The Politics of Fertility in Twentieth-Century Berlin (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010); Annette F. Timm, “The Legacy of Bevölkerungspolitik: Venereal Disease Control and 
Marriage Counselling in Post-WWII Berlin,” Canadian Journal of History/Annales canadiennes d’histoire 
33 (1998), 173-214; Cornelie Usborne, The Politics of the Body in Weimar Germany: Women’s 
Reproductive Rights and Duties (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992); Alfons Labisch, 
“‘Hygiene ist Moral—Moral ist Hygiene’: Soziale Disziplinierung durch Ärzte und Medizin,” in Christoph 
Sachße and Florian Tennstedt (eds), Soziale Sicherheit und soziale Disziplinierung: Beiträge zu einer 
historischen Theorie der Sozialpolitik (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986); Kristine von Soden, Die 
Sexualberatungsstellen der Weimarer Republik 1919-1933 (Berlin: Edition Hentrich, 1988); Young-Sun 
Hong, Welfare, Modernity, and the Weimar State, 1919-1933 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1998); Paul Weindling, Health, Race, and German Politics between National Unification and Nazism, 
1870-1945 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 424-429; Gabriele Czarnowski, Das 
kontrollierte Paar: Ehe- und Sexualpolitik im Nationalsozialismus (Weinheim: Deutscher Studien Verlag, 
1991); Egbert Klautke, “Rassenhygiene, Sozialpolitik und Sexualität: Ehe- und Sexualberatung in 
Deutschland 1918-1945,” in Von Lust und Schmerz: Eine historische Anthropologie der Sexualität, eds. 
Claudia Bruns and Tilmann Walter (Cologne: Böhlau, 2004), 293-312. 
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organized public lectures on the topic of sexuality.6  Other left-wing purveyors of sexual 
counseling including Max Hodann, Friedrich Wolf, and Else Kienle also established 
clinics beyond the purview of the state during the 1920s and focused their efforts on 
dispensing contraception and advocating for the decriminalization of abortion.  As 
Edward Ross Dickinson points out, “while most of the medical establishment opposed 
the widespread use of contraceptives [during the 1920s], the popular movement [for more 
widespread reliance upon birth control] garnered critical support from radical socialists 
within the medical profession.”7  It was because of this support that Stöcker was able in 
1928 to convene the first seminar to provide training in contraceptive methods for doctors 
working in sexual and marital counseling.8 
There remained, however, a profound ambivalence about birth control even on the 
left, since the “adoption of contraceptive techniques by proletarians could easily lead 
them to a resigned acceptance of the capitalist system.”9  For his part, Lenin believed that 
women wanted to have numerous children regardless of the political context in which 
they found themselves and that use of contraception signaled not so much acceptance of 
capitalist oppression as it did the emulation of “‘bourgeois defeatism.’”10  Like skeptics 
                                                 
6 Karl Fallend, Bernhard Handlbauer, Werner Kienreich, Johannes Reichmayr, and Marion Steiner, 
“Psychoanalyse bis 1945,” in Geschichte der deutschen Psychologie, eds. Mitchell Ash and Ulfried Geuter 
(Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1985), 113-145, here 131. 
7 Dickinson, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy,” 42-43. 
8 Czarnowski, Das kontrollierte Paar, 90. 
9 Gert Hekma, Harry Oosterhuis, and James Steakley, “Leftist Sexual Politics and Homosexuality: A 
Historical Overview,” Journal of Homosexuality 29, nos. 2-3 (1995), 1-40, here 14.  Weimar-era lay sex 
reform leagues lamented the fact that “[c]learly, lay sex reform’s major appeal was the services—
information and products—it provided, and not the opportunity for political organization.”  Grossmann, 
Reforming Sex, 23. 
10 Blanche Wiesen Cook, “Feminism, Socialism, and Sexual Freedom: The Work and Legacy of Crystal 
Eastman and Alexandra Kollontai,” in Women in Culture and Politics: A Century of Change, eds. Judith 
Friedlander, Blanche Wiesen Cook, Alice Kessler-Harris, and Carroll Smith-Rosenberg (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1986), 358-375, here 373. 
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across the political spectrum, some on the left also worried that use of birth control might 
result in a “harmful loss of self-discipline and social responsibility.”11 
Germans of a politically more conservative bent had quite different priorities 
when it came to relationship counseling.  Indeed, as early as 1922, the Prussian welfare 
ministry called for compulsory premarital health assessments to prevent the birth of 
purportedly genetically compromised children.  While such exams remained voluntary 
for the duration of the Weimar Republic despite repeated legislative attempts to make 
them mandatory, eugenically oriented marital counseling did become more widely 
available; between 1926 and 1930, for instance, welfare ministry officials established 200 
counseling centers in Prussia.12  This eugenically informed strategy, however, proved to 
be an “abject failure,” since 
 
[t]he majority of those who sought out the counseling clinics were not affianced 
couples concerned about the quality of their prospective offspring, but unmarried 
couples seeking advice on and assistance with fertility control.  These were, in 
other words, people who wanted to avoid having babies at all.  In fact, since many 
eugenicists believed that the forethought required for fertility limitation was 
evidence of mental and hence eugenic superiority, the counseling clinics could 




In fact, demand for birth control was so great that some state-run counseling centers 
joined their private left-wing counterparts in dispensing contraception, despite the 
                                                 
11 Hekma, Oosterhuis, and Steakley, “Leftist Sexual Politics,” 14. 
12 Dickinson, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy,” 11-15; Czarnowski, Das kontrollierte Paar, 26, 74-75. 
13 Dickinson, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy,” 14.  Along similar lines, Egbert Klautke argues that 
Weimar-era counseling centers run by sex reformers who distributed contraception were more popular that 
their more eugenically focused state-run counterparts.  Klautke, “Rassenhygiene, Sozialpolitik und 
Sexualität,” 302.  See also Ilona Stölken, “‘Komm, laß uns den Geburtenrückgang pflegen!’: Die neue 
Sexualmoral der Weimarer Republik,” in Sexualmoral und Zeitgeist im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, eds. Anja 
Bagel-Bohlan and Michael Salewski (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1990), 83-105, here 99, 101-102; 
Grossmann, Reforming Sex, 10-11. 
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former’s avowedly pronatalist orientation.14 Thus the popularity of contraceptive advice 
in GDR counseling centers was certainly not without historical precedent.  Curiously, 
Paul Betts has maintained that “German marriage counselling centres were originally 
creatures of the Weimar Republic’s political conservatives, who believed that public 
health and well-being trumped individual interests, a view that often dovetailed with the 
advocacy of eugenics and racial hygiene at the time.”15  This analytical vantage point 
ignores the prominent role played in Weimar-era relationship counseling not only by left-
wing doctors, but also by religious institutions with motivations that cannot be subsumed 
under right-wing eugenic thought. 
 Like historians who have studied the relationship between modernity, social 
control, science, eugenics, and genocide in the German context more generally, scholars 
who have focused on relationship counseling have sought to discern elements of 
continuity and discontinuity at the key historical turning points of 1933 and 1945.  
Michelle Mouton argues that despite the commonly held goals of fostering families and 
encouraging procreation during both the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich, the 
racialist orientation of Nazi-era family policy represented a more fundamental break from 
its forebear than other scholars, intent upon demonstrating lines of continuity particularly 
                                                 
14 Czarnowski, Das kontrollierte Paar, 74.  Michelle Mouton reminds us, however, that the number of birth 
control-dispensing doctors in state-run clinics remained small: “[f]ar from making sex reformers’ clinics 
obsolete [during the Weimar era], doctors in the state clinics largely obeyed their mandate and refused to 
distribute (or discuss) contraceptives, so many women preferred lay clinics that provided contraceptive 
information.”  Michelle Mouton, From Nurturing the Nation to Purifying the Volk: Weimar and Nazi 
Family Policy, 1918-1945 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 45.  On this point, Mouton is in 
concurrence with Atina Grossmann, who contends that “[i]t mattered whether one went to a state-sponsored 
eugenic counseling center and did not get birth control advice, or went to a sex reform-oriented center and 
walked home with a diaphragm or spermicidal suppositories, even if both those actions were justified in a 
similar language embedded in the motherhood-eugenics consensus.”  Grossmann, Reforming Sex, 75. 
15 Paul Betts, Within Walls: Private Life in the German Democratic Republic (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 102. 
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in terms of eugenic thought before and after 1933, have acknowledged.16  But she also 
maintains that a significant degree of continuity did exist in the extent to which 
implementation of family policy on the local level could mitigate its ultimate impact.  In 
her pioneering study of the development of relationship counseling into the post-1945 
era, Annette Timm has demonstrated that where “legal latitude” existed, the local 
provision of health and welfare services in the nascent GDR continued to exert a decisive 
influence over the contours of family policy even as the procreative imperative of 
centrally directed population policy remained strong.17 
But to what extent were social discipline and population policy the overriding 
factors in prompting the proliferation of relationship counseling centers in the GDR 
beginning with the issuance of the new Family Law Code in 1965?  Periodical articles, 
discussions among state officials, surveys of potential advice seekers, and reports on the 
establishment and activities of marital and family counseling centers (Ehe- und 
Familienberatungsstellen, or EFB, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice) and 
marital and sexual counseling centers (Ehe- und Sexualberatungsstellen, or ESB, under 
the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health), both of which were (ideally) supposed to exist 
in every district of the GDR, certainly reveal pretensions to social control and the 
existence of demographic concerns.  From the SED’s perspective, ensuring a high birth 
rate was of great importance because “[w]ith a minimal expenditure in money and effort” 
it would offer “proof of the superior security, happiness and fecundity of the socialist 
state.”18  But as Donna Harsch has pointed out, “[t]he pro-natalist impulse had not died 
                                                 
16 Mouton, From Nurturing the Nation to Purifying the Volk, 3, 15, 18. 
17 Timm, “Legacy of Bevölkerungspolitik,” 179; Timm, Politics of Fertility, 3, 239. 
18 Timm, “Guarding the Health of Worker Families,” 483. 
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but it had experienced a mutation: the ‘reasonable’ decrease in the number of births from 
1963 to 1969 was 79 percent!”19  The EFB was not supposed to be a short-term 
appendage of the local court or a superficial panacea for marital discord; instead, the SED 
intended it to be the primary institutional venue for helping the populace develop 
“socialist” familial relationships.20  According to Paul Betts, “marriage counselling 
centers [along with East German family courts] became places ‘to mediate between the 
private realm of sexuality and the more public function of families in the socialist 
state.’”21  
To be sure, the GDR was a polity in which terms like “asociality” and “social 
hygiene” had much greater purchase than “sex reform” did.22  The SED’s loudly 
trumpeted antifascism did not, apparently, entail a commitment to reviving institutions 
such as Magnus Hirschfeld’s Institute for Sexual Science, which had been among the first 
targets of the Nazi government’s destructive zeal in 1933.23  And given the massive 
exodus particularly of younger East Germans before the building of the Berlin Wall in 
1961 and the decidedly lackluster birthrate thereafter, the SED had good reason to be 
                                                 
19 Donna Harsch, “Society, the State and Abortion in East Germany, 1950-1972,” American Historical 
Review 102, no. 1 (February 1997), 53-84, here 81. 
20 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1757, Ministerium der Justiz (hereafter MdJ), Hauptabteilung 
(hereafter HA) IV, Berlin, Bericht über den Stand der Bildung und Tätigkeit der Ehe- und 
Familienberatungsstellen in den Bezirken und Kreisen, January 16, 1969, 11 of document, 124 of archival 
file, emphasis in the original. 
21 Betts, Within Walls, 114. 
22 Annette Timm points out that the GDR was alone in the Soviet Bloc in creating an institutional 
framework for the discipline of social hygiene, which had been banned in the Soviet Union in 1941.  Soviet 
authorities had deemed it superfluous given the USSR’s triumph over social inequality.  For the SED, 
however, harnessing the Weimar-era tradition of left-wing social hygiene “helped legitimate the goals of 
[its own] population policy and hide any similarities with Nazi goals or means.”  Timm, “Guarding the 
Health of Worker Families,” 471-472. 




worried about the GDR’s demographic future.24  In October 1965, Dr. Lungwitz 
projected that the GDR’s population would increase only incrementally from 17.25 
million in 1970 to 17.67 million in 1980 and that only after 1980 would East Germany 
have a “normal population structure.”25  But one can also discern a host of other 
preoccupations and aspirations that are not reducible to a “primacy of demographic 
concerns.”26  Indeed, it is striking how infrequently demographic concerns manifested 
themselves in the conceptualization and implementation of East German relationship 
counseling.  In this particular aspect of policy, “even more important than demography 
was the regime’s abiding anxious desire to bind young people emotionally to the socialist 
project.”27 
By catering to prospective visitors’ needs and desires rather than merely serving 
as a transmission belt of socialist familial dogma, state-run relationship counseling 
centers could foster popular affinity for other facets of SED rule.  As the legacy of 
progressive sex reform of the 1920s had demonstrated, marital counseling was most 
popular when it met the demand for contraceptive advice and devices—and this 
continued to be the case in East Germany.  As with the decriminalization of consensual 
adult male same-sex sexual acts, then, the influence of progressive sex reform endured 
                                                 
24 A 1965 comparison with Bulgaria, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Great Britain, Poland, 
Sweden, and the Soviet Union showed that the GDR had the lowest number of births in excess of deaths 
(3.8 per 1000 members of the population); see BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1445, Band 1, “Zu 
einigen Fragen der Familie in der DDR,” February 4, 1965, 7 of document, 7 of archival file. 
25 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1445, Band 2, Beyer, Vermerk betr. 1. Rostocker Fortbildungstage 
über Probleme der Ehe- und Sexualberatung vom 22. bis 24. Oktober 1965, MdJ, HA Recht, Berlin, 
October 27, 1965, 3 of document, 119 of archival file. 
26 The term “primacy of demography” is inspired by Timothy Mason’s coinage “the primacy of politics.”  
See Timothy Mason, Nazism, Fascism and the Working Class, ed. Jane Caplan (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995). 
27 Dagmar Herzog, Sex after Fascism: Memory and Morality in Twentieth-Century Germany (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 187. 
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even when it was not explicitly acknowledged as such.28  And the legacy of the Weimar-
era relationship between sex reform, sexology, and left-wing politics also manifested 
itself in intra-governmental East German turf wars between proponents of ideological as 
opposed to medical forms of counseling. 
 Donna Harsch has posed the question of historical continuity and discontinuity in 
relationship counseling in a way that forces one to look beyond the fulcrum of 1945.  She 
has suggested that the revival of marriage counseling in the GDR during the mid-1960s 
was an “individualistic elixir” intended to address the failure of intervention on the part 
of such “societal forces” (gesellschaftliche Kräfte) as neighbors and brigade members at 
the workplace in saving marriages: 
 
Over time, East German “healthcare consumers” drove marriage counseling 
toward greater individualization, professionalization, and specialization than the 
regime originally envisioned.  Though the mix of methods used to “fix” troubled 
marriages remained more communal, traditional, and state-directed than in the 
West, the state’s understanding of marital conflict became less ideological, 
moralistic, and social, and more pragmatic, individual, and psychological.29 
 
While Harsch has argued that it was East German “‘healthcare consumers’” who pushed 
marital counseling away from collective and towards “individualizing” methods, any 
“individualization” that took place also reflected to a significant extent the intentions of 
high-level officials.  While official documents referred to counselors as being members 
of a collective, counseling sessions themselves were typically supposed to be one-on-one 
unless consultation with a spouse or a counselor with a different kind of expertise was 
                                                 
28 For more on the role of progressive sex reform in shaping East German scientific and policy debates 
about the legal status of homosexuality, see Chapters 2 and 3. 
29 Donna Harsch, Revenge of the Domestic: Women, the Family, and Communism in the German 
Democratic Republic (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 290. 
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warranted.30  To be sure, ESB and EFB counselors never dispensed entirely with 
collective intervention as a therapeutic tool.31  Rather than adhering to a clear dichotomy 
between “individualized” and “collective” approaches to marital therapy, however, many 
counseling centers drew upon methods that spanned this divide. 
It was thus not the case that “modern,” individualizing courses of treatment 
usurped “traditional,” communal forms of intervention, as Harsch has argued, but instead 
a specifically East German conception of the expert’s role in mediating relationships—
between the sexes, within the family, and among members of a collective—was 
emerging.  This phenomenon stemmed to a significant extent from what Greg Eghigian 
has called the “psychologization of the socialist self” that began in the GDR during the 
late 1950s.32  The key shift that Eghigian has identified was the recognition on the part of 
East German authorities that socialist ideology on its own would not suffice in bringing 
about the ideal societal conditions that supposedly only socialism could produce.  As a 
                                                 
30 BArch, DP1 VA 1446, Entwurf von Richtlinien über die Arbeitsweise und die Organisation von Ehe- 
und Sexualberatungsstellen in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, AG Ehe und Familie in der 
Sektion Hygiene und Gesundheitsschutz der Frau der Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsschutz (hereafter GfG) 
in der Deutschen Gesellschaft für die gesamte Hygiene, September 26, 1966, 7 of document, 196 of 
archival file.  Some counseling centers like the EFB in Zwickau, however, provided consultations involving 
the entire counseling collective as a rule and only granted one-on-one counseling sessions upon the request 
of advice-seekers; see BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1757, Kuckoreit, Direktor des Bezirksgerichts 
(hereafter BG) Karl-Marx-Stadt, to MdJ, HA IV, Berlin, Betreff: Ehe- und Familienberatungsstellen, 
September 9, 1968, 2 back side of document, 70 back side of archival file; Lykke Aresin, Sprechstunde des 
Vertrauens: Fragen der Sexual-, Ehe- und Familienberatung, 2nd ed. (Rudolstadt: Greifenverlag, 1968), 
22. 
31 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1757, Band 5, Bericht über den Erfahrungsaustausch der in den 
Ehe- und Familienberatungsstellen tätigen juristischen Mitarbeiter aus den Bezirken Frankfurt/Oder, Halle 
und Karl-Marx-Stadt, July 1970, 10 of document, 198 of archival file. 
32 Greg Eghigian, “The Psychologization of the Socialist Self: East German Forensic Psychology and Its 
Deviants, 1945-1975,” German History 22, no. 2 (2004), 181-205.  For Stefan Busse, the rehabilitation of 
psychology as a discipline that was useful rather than hostile to socialism occurred with the more general 
valorization of professional expertise under the New Economic Plan (NÖSPL) of the 1960s; see Stefan 
Busse, Psychologie in der DDR: Die Verteidigung der Wissenschaft und die Formung der Subjekte 
(Weinheim and Basel: Beltz Verlag, 2004), 303.  For Betts, this newfound appreciation for social scientific 
knowledge also coincided with “the emergence of the family as an object of state intervention” in the mid- 
to late 1960s; Betts, Within Walls, 184. 
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report designed to lay the groundwork for expanding the network of counseling centers 
pointed out, “[t]he development of the socialist family does not spontaneously take place 
on the basis of socialist relations of production.”33  And even though educating the 
populace was one of the primary goals of socialist jurisprudence, the new FGB could not 
“automatically solve all marital and familial problems” on its own either.34 
The Ministry of Justice nonetheless sought to put a positive spin on this 
prognosis; it expressed confidence that “[n]ot all conflicts are negative phenomena; 
indeed, some constitute signs of the struggle to establish new kinds of familial 
relationships.”35  The role of the psychological professional in the GDR was thus 
paradoxically to draw upon a “bourgeois” legacy of expert knowledge about sexual and 
marital behavior to wean the populace away from outdated “bourgeois” attitudes about 
intimate relationships.36  The East German relationship counselor was to do so in a way 
that cultivated East German laypersons’ trust in both a seemingly non-ideological form of 
                                                 
33 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1445, Band 1, “Zu einigen Fragen der Familie in der DDR,” 
February 4, 1965, 13 of document, 13 of archival file.  East German authorities were thus rediscovering the 
insight of Lenin, namely that socialist consciousness did not manifest itself spontaneously, but instead had 
to be cultivated through education and propaganda over time; see Busse, Psychologie in der DDR, 227.  
But Busse argues that the East Germans went further than Lenin in recognizing that education and 
propaganda would not suffice unless they had a scientific basis; Busse, Psychologie in der DDR, 230. 
34 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1445, Band 2, “‘Gut beraten in die Ehe,’ Wir beenden unsere 
Leseraussprache ‘Heiraten—aber wann?,’” Neues Deutschland-Gespräch mit Dr. Alfred Geißler, Rostock, 
Neues Deutschland, supplement no. 33, August 14, 1965, 4 of document, 92 of archival file. 
35 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1445, Band 1, “Zu einigen Fragen der Familie in der DDR,” 
February 4, 1965, 2 of document, 2 of archival file. 
36 Psychologically informed relationship counseling did not immediately take root in West Germany, either.  
According to Annette Timm, it was the influence of both Weimar-era sexology and American psychology 
that proved to be pivotal in gradually allowing psychological marital counseling to take precedence in West 
Berlin over its eugenic counterpart.  Timm, The Politics of Fertility, 255-256.  While the question of 
whether to administer premarital health exams of a eugenic nature did come up from time to time in East 
German sources from the 1940s and 1950s, often in connection with a desire to prevent the spread of 
syphilis from mother to child, the issue was essentially moot in the GDR by the late 1950s, if not earlier. 
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expertise and the providence of socialist humanism courtesy of the ideologically stalwart 
SED.37   
The “psychologization of the socialist self” was not merely a top-down project, 
and relationship counselors often served as its public face.  One of the most popular 
books ever published in the GDR was Siegfried Schnabl’s relationship advice manual 
Mann und Frau intim (Man and Woman Intimately).38  By 1972, the Ministry of Justice 
saw to it that the library of every district court (Kreisgericht) had a copy of Mann und 
Frau intim and expected that all judges involved in EFB counseling would have read it.39  
Schnabl also ran a popular counseling center at the Erlabrunn Miners’ Hospital.  The 
popularity of Schnabl’s counseling, whether delivered in person or in written form, 
demonstrates that the “psychologization of the socialist self” was catalyzed by a change 
in governmental priorities and selectively apportioned popular demand.  In relationship 
counseling as in other facets of life in the GDR, “the fact that SED ideology perpetuated 
the myth of perfect harmony between state objectives and individual behavior actually 
                                                 
37 The inclination to fuse medical expertise with ideological dictates was not merely a sign of the SED’s 
hegemonic pretensions.  It also had an important precedent in the German sex reform movement of the 
1920s.  As Atina Grossmann perspicaciously argues, “in [Weimar] Germany, medicalization was not 
entirely synonymous with professionalization, insofar as most of the professionals involved were radicals 
on the margins of their own medical establishment and understood themselves to be working in the service 
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with medicalization.”  Grossmann, Reforming Sex, 44.  In a state-socialist polity such as the GDR, 
however, doctors would presumably no longer have had any motivation to become politically radicalized 
for the reasons that had mobilized doctors working under capitalism—or at least this was what the SED 
would have liked to think.  The synthesis of medicine and politics would thus have to become a matter of 
routinized conviction rather than emotionally charged activism. 
38 Siegfried Schnabl, Mann und Frau intim: Fragen des gesunden und des gestörten Geschlechtslebens, 5th 
ed. (Berlin: Verlag Volk und Gesundheit, 1972 [1969]).  The observation regarding its popularity comes 
from Herzog, Sex after Fascism, 203. 
39 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 3007, Band 1.3561, draft of letter from MdJ, Berlin to Lykke 
Aresin, Universitäts-Frauenklinik in Leipzig, undated but ostensibly from 1972, unpaginated document, 19 
back side of archival file. 
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created space for debate and negotiation about the formulation and implementation of 
specific policies.”40  
This chapter begins with an account of relationship counseling in the GDR prior 
to the issuance of the FGB in 1965, with an emphasis on the role played by abortion law 
and the status of sexual pedagogy.  On the eve of the rapid expansion of the network of 
EFBs and ESBs during the mid- to late 1960s, the Ministry of Justice took the pulse of 
public opinion and thus was able to anticipate many of the problems that marital therapy 
clinics would face, but it was all too often powerless to rectify them.  This was because 
the SED’s self-ascribed responsibility to impart socialist familial morality exposed a 
paucity of trust on the part of the populace and revealed the difficulties of mediating 
between the public and private realms under state socialism.  The most popular 
counseling centers succeeded in satiating the desire for outlets of sexual discourse and 
exerted a decisive influence on the changing climate of professional opinion that 
preceded the decriminalization of abortion and free distribution of contraception on 
March 9, 1972.  The next section examines the ways in which disputes over professional 
preeminence between the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Justice and the 
recalcitrance of local officials averse to fulfilling their responsibilities to support local 
counseling centers demonstrated the limits of “democratic centralism” in practice.  
Despite these quandaries, the SED pointed to the network of ESBs and EFBs as a point of 
pride both domestically and internationally and used them as a platform for securing the 
GDR’s entry into a family planning network that transcended the Cold War divide.  The 
1970s and 1980s witnessed both retrenchment and innovation on the part of the GDR’s 
                                                 
40 Timm, Politics of Fertility, 259. 
 
 392 
relationship counselors as they sought to keep the spirit of sex reform alive in a climate of 
increasing financial austerity. 
 
Relationship Counseling in the GDR Prior to 1965 
In an effort to counteract the rapid spread of venereal disease during the 
tumultuous aftermath of the Second World War, military authorities and the German 
Central Administration for Healthcare in August 1946 directed health officials in the 
Soviet Occupation Zone to establish marital and sexual counseling centers.41  Many of 
these clinics ceased operation during the early 1950s, however, due to the rapidly 
declining demand for their services.42  One reason for this decline may have been the 
rapidly dwindling availability of legal abortion once the GDR was formally established in 
1949.  In response to the large number of rapes of East German women by Soviet soldiers 
during the occupation period, authorities in 1946 revoked the draconian National 
Socialist anti-abortion law of 1941 and partially suspended enforcement of § 218 (the 
anti-abortion statute that predated Nazi rule) to allow for abortions on the basis of a 
selective application of the “social indication” beginning in 1947.43  In other words, 
                                                 
41 Timm, “Guarding the Health of Worker Families,” 486. 
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Democratic Republic,” in Gender Politics and Everyday Life in State Socialist Eastern and Central 
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carrying to term a pregnancy that resulted from an act of violence perpetrated by 
someone of non-German ethnicity was effectively (re)interpreted as a form of social 
hardship, even if authorities did not make the rationale behind this interpretation 
explicit.44  This was far from a return to the more progressive legislative climate of the 
Weimar government, which had mitigated punishments for women by converting 
abortion from a crime into a misdemeanor in 1926 and issuing a Supreme Court decision 
in 1927 that permitted some forms of abortion for medical reasons.45  And even this slight 
expansion in the definition of legally permissible abortion came to an end with § 11 of 
the 1950 Law for the Protection of Mothers and Children and the Rights of Women.  
Concerns about population growth overrode memories of the KPD’s endorsement of 
abortion law reform during the 1920s and early 1930s, and induced party stalwarts to 
reverse their earlier position on the issue.46  For instance, while Käthe Kern had sought to 
overturn § 218 during the Weimar era, it was now her job as head of the GDR’s 
Department for Mothers and Children at the Ministry of Health to convince East German 
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women that abortion should only be allowable under a very limited set of 
circumstances.47  
From 1950 onwards, the responsibility for approving the termination of 
pregnancies for medical or eugenic reasons fell to commissions that each comprised three 
physicians, a representative of the Department for Mothers and Children, and a member 
from the Democratic Women’s League of Germany (Demokratischer Frauenbund 
Deutschlands, or DFD).  East German doctors in the 1950s drew upon “rehashed versions 
of arguments used by the Weimar and Nazi medical establishments: every abortion 
debased the general health of any woman, and, worst of all, could cause infertility.”48  
Consequently, the GDR “had one of the lowest rates of legal abortion in the 
industrialized world,” and by the 1960s, even SED officials intimated that the abortion 
commissions of the 1950s had been implementing the law too strictly.49 
In 1952, Kern noted that “[s]ince marital and sexual counseling centers are not in 
high demand, we do not intend to establish any new counseling centers.”50  She 
consequently directed her colleagues to remove mention of ESBs from the brochure 
distributed to couples seeking to wed (Merkblatt für Eheschliessende).51  By 1953, the 
Department for Mothers and Children was planning to integrate most ESBs into 
gynecological clinics, venereal disease treatment clinics, and counseling centers for 
pregnant women (Schwangerenberatungsstellen), although some popular marital 
                                                 
47 Harsch, “Society, the State, and Abortion,” 59. 
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50 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DQ1 5144, directive from Käthe Kern, Leiterin der HA Mutter und Kind, 
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counseling centers would remain open to dispense advice pertaining to marital and sexual 
life “especially with regard to contraception.”52  By the late 1950s, however, the few 
extant counseling centers had trouble attracting visitors because they had a limited supply 
of contraceptives at their disposal.53 
Population policy concerns did play a role in the lackluster commitment to 
contraceptive-distributing counseling centers during the decade leading up to 1965.  Dr. 
Glaaß of the State Hospital in Potsdam, for instance, worried about the demographic 
consequences of collapsing ESBs into pregnancy counseling centers.  Since so many 
female ESB visitors sought contraception, they would introduce an uncomfortable 
dynamic in waiting room banter if they mingled with pregnancy counseling center 
visitors who desperately wanted to have a child.  Glaaß resented ESB visitors for 
cavalierly suppressing the fertility that others struggled to achieve, and he feared that 
ESB visitors’ supposed aversion to pregnancy—as deduced from their desire for birth 
control—would “rub off” on women who actually did want to be or become pregnant.  
Furthermore, since ESBs were supposed to appeal to both genders while pregnancy 
counseling centers were by definition limited to a female clientele, Glaaß empathized 
with “[h]usbands [who] would presumably rarely be willing to go to a waiting room full 
of pregnant women.”54  The decentralized marital and sexual counseling centers that 
survived into the 1960s were typically sustained by the independent initiative and 
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passionate commitment of gynecologists and social hygienists who sought to keep alive 
the spirit of Weimar-era sex reform.  In 1965, such centers still existed in, among other 
places, Halle, Berlin-Mitte, Leipzig, Rostock, Magdeburg, Greifswald, and Stralsund.55   
Governmental neglect of relationship counseling prior to 1965 also reflected a 
broader disregard for sexual pedagogy despite the SED’s overarching commitment to 
education (Erziehung) as a vehicle for the creation of socialist personhood.  No less an 
authority than Leipzig ESB co-director Dr. Lykke Aresin retroactively provided a 
scathing indictment of the GDR’s lack of commitment to sexual pedagogy: “Sexual-
ethical education and preparing youth for relationships have received extremely short 
shrift in the past and have been more or less left to their own devices (dem Selbstlauf 
überlassen).”56  For example, when Dr. Hans-Joachim Simmross tried to secure 
permission to publish a lecture entitled “Sexual Education and Upbringing” 
(Geschlechtliche Aufklärung und geschlechtliche Erziehung) in 1954, Dr. Friedeberger of 
the Central Institute for Medical Education (Zentralinstitut für medizinische Aufklärung) 
in Dresden informed him that there were no plans to publish any tracts pertaining to 
sexual pedagogy.  Simmross considered this decision to be “more than strange (mehr als 
eigenartig),” since it revealed that “the highest authorities were not aware of the pressing 
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need for such a brochure.”57  The main theme of Simmross’ lecture was the need to tear 
away the shroud of silence regarding the delicate issue (heikle Frage) of sexuality and 
integrate sexual education into the overall upbringing of a child.  It would seem as if the 
Stalinist ethos that had “made Soviet sexual enlightenment literature superfluous by 
making sublimation [of sexual impulses] mandatory” had survived Stalin’s death in the 
GDR.58  But just one year later, Head of State Walter Ulbricht echoed the gist of 
Simmross’ appeal.  In May 1955, Ulbricht “asked the editors of the daily newspaper 
Junge Welt [Young World] what was stopping them from broaching issues of sexuality: 
‘Are you scared of it or what?  You can’t argue that most young people are unconcerned 
by these issues.  Why don’t you talk about such problems in your articles?’”59 
Simmross sought to strengthen his case by noting that he had based his lecture 
upon an exhaustive combing of the German-language sexological literature and the 
writings of Soviet educator Anton Makarenko, presumably to show his good-faith effort 
to bring together the best of both worlds in terms of “Western” and “socialist” 
pedagogical thinking.  He also solicited suggestions for improvement from the Ministry 
of Health that would hopefully make it consider his speech more suitable for publication.  
Simmross was understandably flummoxed by the fact that “[i]f one does not consider it 
necessary to publish a sex education brochure, why does one expect school authorities to 
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Hautkrankheiten in Leipzig, to MfG, Berlin, HA Wissenschaft und Aufklärung, Berlin, June 22, 1954, 1st 
page front side of document, unpaginated archival file. 
58 Fenemore, “Growing Pains,” 81, drawing upon Frances L. Bernstein, The Dictatorship of Sex: Lifestyle 
Advice for the Soviet Masses (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2007). 
59 Fenemore, “Growing Pains,” 75. 
 
 398 
arrange for speeches to be given about sexual education?”60  By 1965, however, 
complaints about the inadequacy of sexual education in the GDR were coming from 
within the Ministry of Justice itself.  Officials there noted that while “there are occasional 
sexual education campaigns in the press,” the schools and FDJ did nothing to prepare 
youth for marriage, and families were not doing their part either.61 
During an eight-week-long reader forum in the newspaper Neues Deutschland 
(New Germany) in 1965, many discussion participants expressed their belief that “sex 
education should primarily be an education for social responsibility.”62  Along similar 
lines, Dr. Alfred Geißler, head of the ESB affiliated with the University of Rostock, 
averred that “sex education is not [supposed to be] a course on sexology, but instead [is] 
designed to educate people to be [good] relationship partners” and to internalize socialist 
moral norms.  As Julian Carter has observed about sexual pedagogy in the United States, 
the goal in the GDR was apparently to “teach sex without inadvertently introducing 
students to desire” in the hope that “education could influence behavior but that both 
knowledge and its consequences could be controlled and contained.”63  Despite 
widespread wariness about the potential consequences of greater candor about sexual 
matters, the Ministry of Justice’s sexual pedagogical vision ultimately proved to be less 
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conservative than Geißler’s comments would lead one to believe.  Officials hoped that 
EFBs would highlight not only the moral quandaries posed by premarital sexual 
relationships and the dangers of hereditary diseases that might complicate a marriage’s 
procreative prospects, but also the use of contraception and the erotic dimension of 
intimate relationships.64 
 
Gauging Popular Receptivity to Relationship Counseling in the 1960s 
 The Ministry of Justice’s stance on sexual pedagogy might have been the result of 
its awareness of the pent-up desire for less “repressed” sexual discourse combined with 
its fear that East Germans would hesitate to turn to EFBs to resolve marital problems.  
During the public discussion of the FGB draft in 1965, the Ministry of Justice thus sought 
to assess the level of popular interest in relationship counseling.  The five percent of 
discussants who spoke out against the creation of a network of relationship counseling 
centers touched upon matters of professional expertise and trust.  They felt that there 
were not enough qualified counselors to go around, that the personal idiosyncrasies of 
spouses would prevent outsiders from ascertaining the truth about marital conflicts, and 
that people would stay away from counseling centers if they lacked confidence in them.65  
Subsequent experience would reveal their predictions to have been quite accurate. 
 Taking the pulse of popular opinion about relationship counseling did not only 
occur in the context of the FGB draft discussion.  A 1965 questionnaire encompassing 
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792 respondents from Berlin, Halle and Leipzig sought to ascertain whether there was 
any interest in premarital counseling as opposed to counseling for marital crises.  The 
Ministry of Justice did not presuppose that the counseling center would necessarily be the 
first place that people would turn to for assistance and thus asked whether current or 
prospective spouses would rely upon parents, books, resources at school, newspapers, 
television or radio programs, friends, lectures about marriage and sexuality, or each other 
instead.  Given the fact that many counseling centers would be established in 
municipalities with relatively small populations, officials wondered whether respondents 
would prefer to seek advice from a counselor who knew them personally and if they 
would opt for one-on-one or group counseling.66  These questions revealed an openness 
to combining “individualistic” with “collective” forms of therapy rather than an 
assumption that one approach would necessarily supersede the other.     
The survey results, broken down by marital status, showed that while 86.1 
(divorced individuals) to 95.7 percent (individuals married for at least twelve years) of 
respondents thought that it would be useful to establish marital and family counseling 
centers, only 36 (unmarried and not in a serious relationship) to 51.7 percent (individuals 
married for five years) of respondents felt that they knew someone who could benefit 
from a counseling center’s assistance in overcoming marital problems.  An even lower 
proportion of those surveyed—25.3 (individuals married for at least twelve years) to 46.4 
percent (unmarried and in a serious relationship)—could envision themselves visiting a 
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counseling center to resolve their own current or future sexual problems in marriage.67  
Thus, respondents’ recognition of the “need” for relationship counseling did not 
necessarily mean that they were prepared to rely upon it themselves.  Given the regime’s 
concern about the persistently elevated divorce rate, officials could hardly have ignored 
the fact that 42.2 (individuals married for at least twelve years) to 56.3 percent 
(unmarried and not in a serious relationship) of those questioned would be inclined to 
consult an EFB for advice about the role of family law in mitigating spousal conflict.  
They would not, however, have been pleased by the fact that the percentage of 
respondents who would seek advice for these reasons was higher among divorced and 
never married individuals than it was for all categories of married individuals.68 
Among the most prevalent motivations of those who actually did go to 
relationship counseling centers were the desire for assistance in dealing with the infidelity 
of a spouse, sexual disorders (like frigidity), contraception, and alcoholic and abusive 
spouses.69  Relationship counselor Rudolf Neubert noted that usually the only people who 
visited a counseling center “before they were forced to do so by necessity and harm” 
were those who wanted information about contraception.70  This posed a conundrum for 
state officials: they were not thrilled about the fact that the primary motivation for many 
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non-crisis-driven visits to counseling centers was access to contraception, but since they 
were desirous of increasing the volume of visits, by what means other than offering 
contraception would they be able to do so?   
In the hope of encouraging more young people to join the ranks of advice seekers, 
the marital counseling center in Cottbus held a youth forum in April 1965 that was 
attended by 200 sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds who were invited to pose questions 
anonymously.  Their quite candid queries included: “Is there love at first sight?”; “Should 
one have sex before marriage?”; “Why does one become aroused by kissing?”; “Is it O.K. 
to masturbate, and does it cause any harm?” and “Can a man have relationships with 
more than one woman at once?”—all of which were duly answered by the counselors.71  
These youth would not be satisfied with the obfuscating injunction to “clean” and 
“decent” relations between the sexes that had been promulgated by Walter Ulbricht in the 
Ten Commandments of Socialist Morality in 1958 as part of a heavy-handed attempt to 
define characteristics of the “socialist personality.”  Despite such initiatives, youthful 
visitors were in perpetually short supply, and the proliferation of counseling centers after 
the FGB went into effect did little to change this.72 
Thus even before the rapid proliferation of counseling centers began, the Ministry 
of Justice had enough information at its disposal to be able to anticipate many of the 
reservations that citizens would have about seeking out relationship therapy.  It 
nonetheless proved to be ill equipped in overcoming them.  Report after report pointed to 
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the fact that most counseling centers suffered from a dearth of visitors, contrary to 
Dagmar Herzog’s assertion that East Germans “flocked to” them.73  At a time when many 
East German governmental reports increasingly contained platitudes that bore a distant (if 
any) relationship to “real” societal circumstances, judicial authorities were remarkably 
forthright about the shortcomings of the GDR’s grandiose experiment in relationship 
counseling.  Behrends, Deputy Director of the Rostock Regional Court, berated his 
district-level judicial colleagues for having drafted updates about the status of EFB 
formation that were overly optimistic; in his estimation, having a location, a counseling 
collective, and regular consultation hours in place did not in and of themselves constitute 
a success if there was no logistical follow-up.  Yet even these supposedly “optimistic” 
colleagues could not help but note that the number of cases handled by most EFBs was 
modest (bescheiden) and frequently on the decline.74 
In an attempt to diagnose the problems that continually plagued the network of 
EFBs and ESBs, Jan Bretschneider, a doctoral student under the tutelage of Professor 
Rolf Borrmann at the Friedrich Schiller University in Jena, proposed in November 1967 
to distribute surveys to counseling centers to provide empirical findings for his 
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counseling centers “were expanded” after the mid-1960s.  While it is true that the number of centers did 
increase as per the stipulation of the 1965 FGB, his summation ignores the impediments that advocates of 
enhanced sexual counseling opportunities continued to face.  Greg Eghigian, “Was There a Communist 
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6 (2002), 364-368, here 366. 
74 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1757, Band 5, letter from Behrends, Stellvertretender Direktor des 
BG Rostock, to Einhorn, Direktor der HA III [sic—should be IV], MdJ, Berlin, Betreff: Vorschlag einer 
gemeinsamen Ratsvorlage des Bezirksarztes, des Bezirksschulrates, des Direktors des BG, der 
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Rostock, July 13, 1970, 3 of document, 221 of archival file. 
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dissertation, “Problems of Sexual Morality and Possibilities of Influencing it from the 
Perspective of Marital and Sexual Counseling.”  Einhorn of the Ministry of Justice 
ultimately granted Bretschneider permission to administer his questionnaire, albeit with 
suggestions for improvement that hewed closely to the recommendations of Professor 
Anita Grandke, the doyenne of family research in the GDR who led the Research Group 
“The Woman in Socialist Society” at the German Academy of the Sciences in Berlin.  
Given official reticence to make sexuality the primary focus of East German relationship 
counseling, Einhorn urged Bretschneider not to focus just on moral and sexual problems, 
but on all of the issues that counseling center staff had to address.75  These included the 
efficacy and scope of outreach to the broader community; he thus urged Bretschneider to 
ascertain not whether, but instead how frequently EFB counselors gave lectures or held 
forums and marital education seminars.  From Einhorn’s standpoint, organizing public 
events was not merely an aspirational goal for counselors, but instead a pressing 
desideratum.76  As far as visitors to counseling centers were concerned, Einhorn was 
interested not only in their age and reasons for seeking advice, but also their gender; he 
thus directed Bretschneider to inquire whether husbands or wives typically sought out 
                                                 
75 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1446, unnumbered volume (5 in sequence), letter from Einhorn, 
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archival file. 
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counseling, and which spouse was predominantly responsible for causing marital 
problems.77 
 Officials who monitored EFB attendance did not explicitly articulate any 
suspicion they might have harbored that East Germans did not come to EFBs because 
they considered them to be transmission belts for the inculcation of socialist ideological 
precepts for familial life that they were more inclined to reject than embrace.  But 
officials did note that EFBs had trouble attracting visitors for reasons that were not 
unique to an East German citizenry that was potentially skittish about or hostile to state 
intervention in “private” affairs.  Walter Krutzsch, a Ministry of Justice official, realized 
that “there are still great reservations that must be overcome.  People are afraid to become 
fodder for gossip and doubt that there is really help [for their problems].”78  This fear was 
particularly pronounced among rural residents, who consequently visited counseling 
centers in more densely populated areas, if at all.79  Jurist Hanns Teucher pointed out that 
if an EFB in a smaller municipality were housed in a building with numerous types of 
offices, then the reason for visiting said building would be less immediately apparent to 
curious fellow community members.80 
                                                 
77 Despite having received official approval for his project, in 1974 Bretschneider completed a dissertation 
about the attainment of pedagogical goals in East German biology and chemistry classes instead. 
78 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1446, MdJ, Berlin, Protokoll über die Fachtagung der 
Familienrichter (in Erfurt) am 22. November 1966 zu dem Thema: Erfahrungsaustausch über Ehe- und 
Familienberatungsstellen, 9 of document, 132 of archival file. 
79 Ibid.; BArch, DP1 VA 3007, Band 1.3561, Silbernagel of BG Halle (Saale), Überblick über Stand der 
Bildung und der Tätigkeit der Ehe- und Familienberatungsstellen und der dabei aufgetretenen Probleme, 1 
of document, 75 of archival file; BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1446, Band 4, Deine Gesundheit 
article (draft?) sent as an enclosure with a letter from Hildegard Hesse, Deine Gesundheit editorial staff, to 
MdJ, Berlin, February 1, 1968, 12 of document, 23 of archival file. 
80 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1446, unnumbered volume (5 in sequence), Dipl.-Jur. Hanns 
Teucher, “Die Wirksamkeit der wissenschaftlichen Ehe- und Familienberatung weiter erhöhen!  
Vorschläge zur vorbeugenden Behandlung von Eheproblemen auf der Grundlage der Gamologie [his term 
for the interdisciplinary study of marriage, based on the Greek word “games” for marriage] durch 




To inspire trust in potential advice seekers, officials repeatedly emphasized the 
importance of confidentiality in counseling sessions, but this guarantee was hard to 
maintain when counselors felt obliged to call upon spouses’ neighbors and colleagues to 
intervene in marital disputes.  Given the circumscribed scope of openly expressed dissent 
during the public discussion of the 1965 FGB draft, it is striking that one-third of 
discussants were skeptical of or hostile to the idea of involving “societal forces” in the 
resolution of familial conflict.81  But the practice continued nonetheless.  In 1966, for 
instance, a counselor in Sömmerda met with a woman whose husband was having an 
adulterous affair with a female colleague.  The husband said that he would not be able to 
tear himself away from his lover as long as they worked in the same place, and thus the 
Sömmerda EFB obtained another job for the husband, who thereupon returned to his 
family.82 
Typical of such interventions was the counselor’s rather pat treatment of the 
emotional dynamics of this adulterous situation and his failure to address why this man’s 
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Ehe- und Familienberatungsstellen in den Bezirken und Kreisen, January 16, 1969, 6 of document, 119 of 
archival file. 
81 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1445, Band 2, MdJ, Bericht über die Diskussion zum Entwurf des 
FGB, [dated August 20, 1965 in table of contents, but October 6, 1965 in text of report], 31 of document, 
62 front side of archival file. 
82 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP 1 VA 1446, Protokoll über die Fachtagung der Familienrichter [from 
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Familienberatungsstellen, 11 of document, 134 of archival file. 
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initial working environment had not been sufficiently imbued with socialist morality so 
as to prevent him from having an adulterous affair in the first place.  It is striking that the 
counselor did not see any contradiction between upholding the principle of confidential 
counseling and intervening in such a way that would make it difficult to hide the couple’s 
predicament.  He was also rather naïve in his expectation that the key to dissolving a 
sexually charged emotional attachment was changing one’s working environment, 
although he was not alone in this belief as workplace transfers (usually organized by 
courts or workplace brigades) were a fairly common response to illicit affairs between 
colleagues.  At least according to official statistics, however, confidentiality was not 
necessarily among advice seekers’ foremost concerns: by 1970, fewer than 10 percent of 
EFB visitors in the regions of Frankfurt an der Oder, Halle, and Karl-Marx-Stadt wished 
to remain anonymous, and the number of anonymous advice seekers, when recorded, 
tended to be even lower elsewhere.83  But the reluctance of many East Germans to visit 
an EFB in the first place seems to speak to a greater concern for confidentiality than these 
statistics would indicate. 
By March 1967, EFBs throughout East Germany attracted an average of four to 
five visitors per month; this number remained quite low even though many new 
counseling centers had had more than a year to become known in their communities.  
Only about three or four EFBs managed to attract more than twenty visitors per month.84  
There was an incessant refrain in governmental reports that municipal authorities, 
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workplace administrators, and counselors were not doing enough to publicize the 
existence and methodologies of counseling centers, but in the case of the city of Erfurt—
to provide but one example—recurrent publicity apparently was not sufficient to 
stimulate interest.  The Erfurt EFB, which had been founded in July 1964, attracted no 
more than ten visitors during its initial year of operation—and some of these visitors had 
problems that its counselors were not qualified to address.  Consequently, the EFB shut 
down, only to be reopened because of the 1965 FGB’s requirement that every district 
have its own EFB.85  And the situation in Erfurt was by no means unique.  Despite an 
exemplary publicity campaign in the town of Niesky—regular notices in the press, a 
lecture series featuring doctors, jurists, and psychologists, and a brochure that 
emphasized counselors’ extensive professional and life experience and their respect for 
visitors’ confidentiality—the local EFB was not able to avoid the all-too-common fate of 
an almost complete lack of visitors.86 
As Lykke Aresin emphasized in the title of her book on matters pertaining to 
sexual and marital counseling, Consultation Hour of Trust (Sprechstunde des 
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Vertrauens), it was imperative that counselors not only have impeccable professional 
credentials, but also the life experience and community respect that would enable them to 
earn the trust of the general population.87  This was most certainly the case for EFBs that 
were sustained by the initiative of a sole counselor, since they typically unraveled when 
the counselor became indisposed.  In Großenhain, for instance, an EFB was founded in 
October 1967, but when the local district court judge who had apparently been the motive 
force behind the counseling center became ill, the EFB effectively became dormant just a 
few months later, in January 1968.  Something very similar occurred, albeit over a period 
of a few years (1965 to 1967) rather than months, at the EFB in the rural outskirts of 
Dresden.88  The EFB “counseling collective” was all too often a collective of one. 
The question arose as to whether EFBs should be part of the state apparatus, or 
nominally autonomous societal institutions operating with the help and support of the 
state.  The Ministry of Justice decided that the latter option would constitute “the most 
favorable strategy for countering the reservations still expressed by some segments of the 
population.”89  While the distinction was in practice a formal one, this constitutes a 
surprisingly explicit admission that East Germans might not have been inclined to entrust 
their private problems to an institution that had no ostensible degree of autonomy from 
the state.90  Although the town of Dessau initially established an EFB to comply with the 
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Family Law Code, for instance, it lacked an official ESB as of 1968 given the widespread 
belief that people with sexual problems in need of medical attention would feel more 
comfortable directly seeking out a doctor whom they knew and trusted rather than 
visiting public institutions (öffentliche Stellen) for this purpose.91  Even though East 
German doctors worked in state-run clinics, these clinics were perhaps less readily 
identifiable as appendages of the government than a network of counseling centers 
ushered into existence in a blaze of propagandistic fanfare would have been. 
At other times, however, officials did not expend any effort in attempting to 
disguise the EFB as being anything other than a state institution.  As the pamphlet of a 
district-level marital counseling commission stated, “Our state has trust in you, so you 
should trust it and its institutions!”92  Yet another strategy entailed the cultivation of trust 
on the basis of the integrity and professionalism of the counselors themselves.  A 
brochure for the Berlin-Pankow counseling center stated: “You can be full of confidence 
in presenting your problems to doctors, psychologists, teachers, youth social workers, and 
jurists, who will advise you with delicacy and tact.”93  The populace, for its part, proved 
to be quite selective in according trust to marital counselors. 
Fundamentally, the issue of trust spoke to the widespread perception that the SED 
was intent upon eroding the distinction between public and private.  In Chapter 4, 
drawing upon a key insight of Paul Betts’, I demonstrated how the disjuncture between 
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popular attitudes and reforms in East German family law could actually serve to highlight 
rather than undermine this distinction.94  Like family law judges, relationship counselors 
were to draw upon a variety of tools, including but not limited to socialist jurisprudence, 
that would infringe upon the inviolability of the private sphere in order to strengthen it, 
albeit with the goal of fortifying socialist society as a whole by means of its constituent 
elements. 
 A reader of Neues Deutschland objected to state-orchestrated relationship 
counseling because she firmly believed that “what happens within the four walls of one’s 
home is a private matter” and thus should not be the subject of societal or governmental 
intervention.  Dr. Geißler made a point of reassuring other Neues Deutschland readers 
that the distinction between public and private would remain intact: 
 
 Society’s concern about marriage and family does not involve looking 
through the keyhole of the bedroom, as one of your female readers feared.  
Society’s concern consists first and foremost in establishing favorable 
social, cultural, and material conditions for the development of marriage 
and family.  Society concerns itself with the intimate sphere only to the 
extent that it provides those who have problems in this domain with access 
to professional counseling and help.  A counselor would never intervene in 
the affairs of a married couple without being invited to do so.  These 
doubts and this lack of trust will quickly dissipate due to the intelligent, 
discreet, and tactful implementation of marital counseling.95 
 
 
Family law judges who discussed family counseling at a conference in Erfurt in 1966 
echoed this sentiment.  They expressed their belief that East Germans should be free to 
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make their own decisions about marriage and family, and that EFBs were not intended to 
curtail the scope of this freedom.  Instead, the judges’ goal was to enable people to make 
more informed decisions, but they did not lose sight of the fact that imparting socialist 
ethics for family life through the EFBs was part of a “larger ideological struggle” against 
the unrelenting influx of pernicious influences from the capitalist world.  The judges 
recognized that their task was not merely an ideological one.  When citizens were 
inclined to blame their own personal failings on what they perceived to be the 
shortcomings of the state, counselors were advised to draw upon their tact, empathy, and 
expert knowledge to devise the most appropriate pedagogical and psychological 
approaches to counseling such individuals.96 
 Because of widespread misgivings about governmental encroachments upon 
familial life, many couples only turned to an EFB or ESB as a crisis resolution center of 
last resort—in other words, when they found themselves embroiled in serious conflicts 
that were no longer amenable to resolution.  The Ministry of Justice hoped that EFBs 
would instead serve the prophylactic function of preventing marital disputes and 
educating spouses about their responsibilities to one another and to society at large—
preferably before a couple’s nuptials even took place.97  But if the EFB was supposed to 
inspire prospective spouses to seek out premarital counseling and couples to address 
marital conflict in a more timely fashion, however, it more often than not found itself in 
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the position of a spurned suitor.  For this reason, one observer opined, “[t]he purpose of 
counseling as stipulated by the Family Law Code has not yet been achieved.”98 
 Some East Germans did attribute a quasi-judicial function to the EFB—namely, 
as a court of appeals.  A state official noted that the few visitors who did come to the EFB 
in Eilenburg treated it as a “complaint center in charge of supervising other agencies 
(übergeordnetes Beschwerdeorgan)”; in other words, they visited the EFB only if they 
did not get what they wanted from the district court, youth services department, or 
housing office.  For this subset of advice seekers, the EFB assumed the purpose that the 
epistolary petitions known as Eingaben were supposed to serve: providing a means by 
which citizens could seek redress for their grievances with governmental officials.  This 
perception was not likely to have lasted for very long, however, since the EFB in 
Eilenburg invariably referred visitors back to the organs of government that had not 
satisfactorily responded to citizens’ requests or concerns in the first place, and after 
months of attracting no visitors at all, the Eilenburg EFB effectively ceased operation.99 
In areas marked by a particularly strong allegiance to the Catholic Church such as 
the town of Heiligenstadt, in which no one had visited its EFB during the course of 1966, 
Ministry of Justice officials speculated as to whether or not a priest should be invited as a 
member of the counseling collective, provided that a suitable candidate could be found 
who would not seek to place the EFB “under the orbit of ecclesiastical control” (in das 
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Schlepptau der Kirche).100  In Magdeburg, and perhaps elsewhere as well, the churches 
remained quite active in providing counseling: “Many young people, especially those of 
Catholic faith, go to their priest to obtain premarital counseling as a matter of 
principle.”101  The relationship between ecclesiastical and governmental counseling was 
not necessarily an antagonistic one, however; Heuckendorf, the director of the Schwerin 
Regional Court, was struck by the fact that churches, especially in the district of Güstrow, 
were actually referring advice-seekers to the local EFB.102 
 
Thinking, and Speaking, Sex 
 
Officials’ and counselors’ concerns about the unwillingness of East Germans to 
accept the intervention of state institutions in their intimate lives were tempered by 
ambivalence about the extent to which the populace seemed to be craving an outlet for 
sexual discourse.  On the one hand, counselors such as Lykke Aresin invoked the 
lingering influence of “capitalist” conceptions of sexual shame, gender inequality, and 
prudishness as reasons why otherwise thoroughly modern East Germans would need to 
have an outlet to discuss problems related to their intimate lives.103  Indeed, the tenor of 
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many relationship advice manuals betrayed a fundamental distrust of East Germans’ 
ability to internalize socialist moral norms regarding marriage, family, and sexuality.104 
On the other hand, relationship therapists like Rolf Borrmann (and even Aresin 
herself) complained that intimate life had not yet received sufficient attention in socialist 
society, and that interpersonal relationships informed by socialist principles would not 
develop without the existence of outlets for sexual discourse like EFBs and ESBs.  After 
all, why else would the need to establish a comprehensive network of counseling centers 
have seemed so pressing?  For Borrmann and other purveyors of relationship advice in 
the GDR, attitudes towards love, sexuality, marriage, and family were inextricably 
intertwined with the development of socialist convictions, character traits, and behavioral 
patterns.105  But this developmental process was unfolding at an agonizingly languid 
pace.  As late as 1988, Lykke Aresin and Erwin Günther, director of the dermatological 
clinic at the Friedrich Schiller University in Jena, reiterated the frequently made call for 
the “education of the educators” (Erziehung der Erzieher).106  Aresin and Günther noted 
that: 
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that the very genre of the book that he wrote was a symptom of the transitional period (Übergangszeit) that 
would become superfluous once socialist conceptions of sexual and married life had been fully absorbed by 
East Germans.  But he also saw the establishment of a comprehensive network of ESBs as one potential 
antidote to this situation.  See Rudolf Neubert, Fragen und Antworten zum Neuen Ehebuch (Rudolstadt: 
Greifenverlag, 1961), 158, 223. 
105 Rolf Borrmann, Jugend und Liebe: Die Beziehungen der Jugendlichen zum anderen Geschlecht, 3rd rev. 
ed. (Leipzig, Jena, and Berlin, 1966), 5. 
106 This phrase stems from, among other manuals, Borrmann, Jugend und Liebe, 163.  Bewailing the 
ignorance and prudishness of those who should be imparting sexual knowledge to the rising generation and 
of earlier professional experts was certainly not limited to the GDR; see Carter, “Birds, Bees, and Venereal 
Disease,” 241.  In the East German context, it constituted an admission that parents and educators who 
were supposed to promulgate socialist values in all aspects of life on behalf of the SED did not have a 
sufficient grasp of those values themselves.  But critiquing others’ reluctance to address sexual matters 





Parents, teachers, university instructors, and other educators have still not 
overcome their hostility [towards sexuality]; some apparently think that since 
everyone can speak freely about sexuality, they need not do so themselves.  But 
more than 100 years ago Friedrich Engels opposed prudishness and two-faced 
morality by writing: “It is about time that German workers—if nobody else—
become accustomed to speaking dispassionately about activities in which they 
themselves are engaging on a daily or nightly basis—about natural, indispensable, 
and particularly pleasurable matters.107 
 
 
If Friedrich Engels could not provide sufficient incitement to sexual discourse, who 
could? 
Despite the fact that many experts bewailed the populace’s lack of willingness to 
discuss sexual matters openly and freely, the experience of the most popular centers 
revealed that sexuality was all that many East Germans wanted to talk about when they 
sought counsel.  Lykke Aresin emphasized that when someone engaging in “abnormal 
sexual behavior” came to an ESB, she or he was hoping for “sympathetic assistance” 
rather than “moral judgment.”108  For instance, Aresin acknowledged that gay men were 
more likely than lesbians to suffer from “societal hostility that is rooted in Christian 
conceptions of morality,” and that they would thus need more assistance in overcoming 
the negative consequences of ostracization.  Like psychiatrist Rudolf Klimmer, she found 
the efficacy of hormonal and psychotherapeutic “cures” for those whose homosexuality 
was an inalterable facet of their psyche to be dubious, and consequently recommended 
that a gay man who had married a woman in the hope of changing his sexual orientation 
                                                                                                                                                 
cohort of professionals seeking to bolster the status of their own expertise: “[j]ust as the social hygienists 
triumphed over ‘silence,’ Margaret Sanger denounced those who had gone before as coy, while Kinsey 
described them all as unscientific moralizers.”  H. G. Cocks, “The Growing Pains of the History of 
Sexuality,” Journal of Contemporary History 39, no. 4 (2004), 657-666, here 661. 
107 Lykke Aresin and Erwin Günther, “Einleitung,” in Sexualmedizin: Ein Leitfaden für Medizinstudenten, 
3rd ed., eds. Lykke Aresin and Erwin Günther (Berlin: Verlag Volk und Gesundheit, 1988), 11-12, here 11. 
108 Aresin, Sprechstunde des Vertrauens, 24-25. 
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should get a divorce.  This did not mean, however, that counselors should not touch upon 
the ethical dimensions of non-normative sexual behavior at all.  The counselor had the 
responsibility to ascertain whether a self-proclaimed homosexual man was really 
attracted to men, or whether the attraction or the sexual encounters were occasional or 
situational in nature.  If this were the case, then the counselor’s role was to inform the 
individual in question that he would “return” to heterosexuality once the possibility of 
being intimate with an opposite-sex partner presented itself.  Aresin implicitly alluded to 
the fact that consensual same-sex sexual acts between men were no longer illegal, but she 
emphasized that the “seduction of youth” would still meet with the full condemnation of 
the law.  And even as the therapist was to refrain from exercising judgment, she or he 
also had the duty to ascertain whether the homosexual male patient felt “like a man or a 
woman” and whether he preferred “penetrative or receptive intercourse.”  Aresin 
provided no guidance as to the ethical—or even the clinical—implications of these 
findings.109 
The ESB at the Gynecological Clinic of the University of Leipzig attained its 
popularity in no small part due to its reputation for offering sexual therapy, and for many 
visitors, “sexual therapy” meant family planning services.  Lykke Aresin noted that 
demand for contraception had increased dramatically during the 1960s and that about 50 
                                                 
109 Aresin, Sprechstunde des Vertrauens, 88-90.  Klimmer noted that “[h]omosexuals of course also came 
[to his ESB in Dresden], in part out of fear of legal persecution, and in part due to sexual misery, since it 
was difficult for them to establish contact with like-minded individuals in a city like Dresden.  Also among 
the visitors were younger men who were not sure whether they were homosexual and did not want to be.”  
Schwules Archiv und Museum Berlin, Klimmer Nachlass, folder: Sonderdrücke von wissenschaftlichen 
Arbeiten Dr. Klimmer/Diverse Zeitungsartikel über Dr. Rudolf Klimmer, Thomas Derra, “Sexualforscher 




percent of visitors to her clinic sought birth control.110  The Leipzig ESB was certainly 
not alone in this regard.  In the region of Karl-Marx-Stadt, roughly 40 percent of visitors 
came to counseling centers to seek some kind of sexual advice; officials estimated this 
proportion to be even higher in Berlin and the region of Erfurt.111 
The “education of the educators” when it came to sexual matters was to begin 
with counselors themselves.  The initiative for this training came not from the Ministry of 
Justice-run EFBs, but instead from the Ministry of Health-affiliated ESBs.  At the First 
Continuing Education Conference for ESB counselors in October 1965, Professor Karl-
Heinz Mehlan, Director of the Institute for Social Hygiene at the University of Rostock, 
was joined by Professor Ernst Kraußold, Director of the Gynecological Clinic at the 
University of Greifswald, and Professor Norbert Aresin of Leipzig in calling for more 
funding for research on contraceptives, including birth control of the hormonal variety.  
But they were concerned about the side effects of Ovosiston, the trade name for the Pill 
in East Germany.112  Mehlan sought to change the popular sobriquet for Ovosiston from 
the “anti-baby pill” to the “desired child pill” (Wunschkindpille); this attempt at 
                                                 
110 Aresin, Sprechstunde des Vertrauens, 45-46.  Of the 884 visitors at Norbert and Lykke Aresin’s 
counseling center in 1964, 47.8 percent came to inquire about contraception, 10.7 percent about female 
sexual disorders, 9.8 percent about general sexual disorders, 9.3 percent about marital conflicts that 
stemmed from sexual disorders, 6.4 percent about male sexual disorders, 5.3 percent about pregnancy 
counseling, and 4.3 percent about other problems.  See BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1445, Band 3, 
report on the Leipzig Eheberatungsstelle, unpaginated archival file.  A secondary source lists the same 
percentage breakdown for problems brought to the Aresins’ attention, but tabulates only 838 visitors during 
1964: Joachim S. Hohmann,  ed., Sexuologie in der DDR (Berlin: Dietz, 1991), 77, 79. 
111 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1446, Bericht über den Stand der Bildung und der Tätigkeit der 
Ehe- und Familienberatungsstellen in der DDR, MdJ, Berlin, March 7, 1967, 6 of document, 152 of 
archival file.  The officials were right—from 1968 to 1969, about 64 percent of visitors to the Berlin-Mitte 
counseling center came for reasons related to sexuality—20 percent for contraception, 22 percent because 
of marital infidelity, 9 percent because of female sexual frigidity, 5 percent for male impotence, 5 percent 
for other kinds of sexual dysfunction, and 3 percent for an abortion.  Timm, “Guarding the Health of 
Worker Families,” 492; Harsch, “Sex, Divorce, and Women’s Waged Work,” 111. 
112 The GDR began importing the Dutch hormonal contraceptive Lyndiol in 1962 and initiated domestic 
production of the Pill in 1965.  Hahn, Modernisierung und Biopolitik, 246. 
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“rebranding” was indicative of the ambivalence towards birth control harbored even by 
one of the most ardent proponents of family planning in the GDR at the time.113  
According to Stefan Wolle, East German proponents of family planning cast it not so 
much as a means of enhancing personal reproductive choice as a way of scheduling 
childbearing so that it would not conflict with couples’ vocational training and workforce 
participation.114 
During the mid-1960s, these experts, at least in their public statements, felt that 
the Pill should only be available by prescription to address a medical necessity or 
alleviate social hardship.  But no medical reason was compelling enough for these 
foremost East German experts on family planning to entertain the notion of prescribing 
Ovosiston to women under the age of twenty-one or even to women over the age of 
twenty-one for more than two years at a time.115  While Mehlan, Kraußold, and Norbert 
Aresin feared that unfettered access to hormonal contraception would have deleterious 
                                                 
113 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1445, Band 2, Beyer, Vermerk betr. 1. Rostocker Fortbildungstage 
über Probleme der Ehe- und Sexualberatung vom 22. bis 24. Oktober 1965, MdJ, HA Recht, Berlin, 
October 27, 1965, 3 of document, 119 of archival file; Harsch, “Society, the State, and Abortion,” 65.  The 
term Wunschkind was also quite prevalent in West German discussions of family planning at the time; 
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, ed. Familienpolitik und Familienplanung in beiden deutschen Staaten (Bonn-Bad 
Godesberg: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, 1977), 34.  But “anti-baby pill” was part of the contraceptive 
discourse in the FRG as well.  Christian de Nuys-Henkelmann, “‘Wenn die rote Sonne abends im Meer 
versinkt…’: Die Sexualmoral der fünfziger Jahre,” in Sexualmoral und Zeitgeist im 19. und 20. 
Jahrhundert, eds. Anja Bagel-Bohlan and Michael Salewski (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1990), 107-145, 
here 118.  For a history of the Pill in the FRG, see Eva-Maria Silies, Liebe, Lust und Last: Die Pille als 
weibliche Generationserfahrung in der Bundesrepublik (1960-1980) (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2010); 
for a history of the relative input of women and men in making contraceptive decisions in the United 
Kingdom see Kate Fisher, Birth Control, Sex, and Marriage in Britain 1918-1960 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006). 
114 Stefan Wolle, Aufbruch nach Utopia: Alltag und Herrschaft in der DDR 1961-1971 (Berlin: Ch. Links 
Verlag, 2011), 217.  But this was not an exclusively East German phenomenon, since “[t]he distribution of 
the pill [sic lowercase] was strictly controlled [in many countries] until the early 1970s by doctors who 
associated pill prescription with population control and eugenics, rather than with sexual freedom.”  Cocks, 
“Growing Pains of the History of Sexuality,” 662. 
115 At this time, most of the hormonal contraception produced in the GDR was intended for export.  
According to Harsch, “[b]efore 1970, Ovosiston was prescribed almost exclusively to women with a 
medical indication against pregnancy.”  Harsch, “Sex, Divorce, and Women’s Waged Work,” 109. 
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societal consequences, they were also concerned that restricting access too much might 
lead to the development of a black market.116  And despite his misgivings about hormonal 
contraception, Kraußold was not terribly enthusiastic about the alternatives either: 
 
Abstinence can only ever be a temporary remedy.  Use of the rhythm method can 
provide sufficient protection against unwanted pregnancy, albeit only within 
limits.  In our region, the most common method is coitus interruptus, the efficacy 
of which is disputed; hence it is not advisable from a medical standpoint.117 
 
 
 Other experts were more sanguine about the availability and efficacy of existing 
birth control methods.  Förster, the head of the Research Center for WTZ 
Pharmaceuticals in Radebeul, was surprised by Kraußold’s contention that the 
availability of indigenously produced contraceptives, such as spermicides, was 
“insufficient,” and he also noted that the East German version of the Pill was proving to 
be quite popular.118  Ultimately, participants at the 1965 conference came to the 
consensus that “rejecting modern forms [of contraception] like oral contraceptives and 
intrauterine pessaries is just as inappropriate as using only modern contraceptives to the 
exclusion of traditional methods.”119 
 In practice, the supply of contraceptives at counseling centers was not necessarily 
keeping up with demand during the mid-1960s.  The EFSB in Berlin-Lichtenberg 
witnessed an explosion in the number of gynecological cases from 177 in 1966 to 698 in 
                                                 
116 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1445, Band 2, Beyer, Vermerk betr. 1. Rostocker Fortbildungstage 
über Probleme der Ehe- und Sexualberatung vom 22. bis 24. Oktober 1965, MdJ, HA Recht, Berlin, 
October 27, 1965, 4 of document, 120 of archival file. 
117 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DQ1 3458, Berichterstattung über die Durchführung von medizinisch-
wissenschaftlichen Veranstaltungen in der DDR, Formblatt Nr. 6 (nur für den Dienstgebrauch), Rostock, 
June 1, 1966, 3 of document, unpaginated archival file. 
118 Ibid., 4 of document, unpaginated archival file. 
119 Ibid., 17 of document, unpaginated archival file. 
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1968, whereas the number of psychiatric or neurological cases (110 in 1966, 187 in 
1968), legal cases (sixty-nine in 1966, 109 in 1968), and psychological or pedagogical 
cases (fifty-seven in 1966, 105 in 1968) grew much more modestly.120  Despite the 
dramatic increase in the number of gynecological cases, the number of prescriptions 
issued by the EFSB for Ovosiston grew in a rather restrained fashion from seventy-three 
in 1966 to 115 in 1968; the number of intrauterine pessaries dispensed grew from none in 
1966 to twenty in 1968.  Thus, the EFSB was rather reluctant to give out contraceptives 
despite the fact that the number of visitors requesting an abortion went from “N/A” in 
1966 to 103 in 1968.121 
Attendees at the 1967 Third Continuing Education Conference in Rostock for 
ESB counselors learned that the East German government was looking into intrauterine 
pessaries as a less costly alternative to hormonal contraception.  To counter the objections 
of the sizable number of East German doctors who considered pessaries to be “taboo” in 
the mid-1960s, conference organizers pointed out that one million women worldwide 
were making use of IUDs and that more recent experiments involving the Gräfenberg 
ring did not replicate the “bad experiences” of the 1930s.122  Yet the GDR’s own efforts 
to assess the efficacy of pessaries had not exactly produced stellar results.  Experiments 
with IUD usage in Leipzig had yielded a 40 percent failure rate because of women’s 
inability to tolerate the presence of the pessaries in their bodies, as opposed to a failure 
                                                 
120 The acronym EFSB denoted a hybrid counseling center resulting from the merger of an ESB and an 
EFB. 
121 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1757, Jahresbericht 1968 der EFB [sic] Berlin-Lichtenberg, sent by 
Ms. Müller, Stadtbezirksgericht Berlin-Lichtenberg, to Karl-Heinz Eberhardt, MdJ, HA IV, Berlin, April 9, 
1969, unpaginated document, 166-167 of archival file. 
122 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DQ1 3458, Berichterstattung über die Durchführung von medizinisch-
wissenschaftlichen Veranstaltungen in der DDR, Formblatt Nr. 6 (nur für den Dienstgebrauch), Rostock, 
June 1, 1966, 3, 7-8 of document, unpaginated archival file. 
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rate of 10 percent in a Czechoslovakian study.  Because of these hesitations about both 
the Pill and intrauterine pessaries, ESB counselors at the 1967 conference ultimately took 
home the message that “an ideal contraceptive does not yet exist.”  Also, East Germany’s 
family planning practices were presumably subject to greater international scrutiny since 
the GDR’s Society for the Protection of Health had become a member of the International 
Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) in 1967 and the leader of that Society, none other 
than Karl-Heinz Mehlan, was on the IPPF’s board.123 
 During the years leading up to the legal mandate for the free distribution of 
contraception and legalization of first-trimester abortion in 1972, there was an uneven, 
but nonetheless profound, shift in professional opinion regarding the potential drawbacks 
of Ovosiston.  Even though Lykke Aresin and her husband prescribed the Pill primarily 
to women who suffered from illness or who already had a large number of children, she 
expressed surprise in 1968 at how much “freer and more alive to sexual experiences” 
they became—a reaction that she did not expect on the part of women who had received 
the Pill for reasons of hardship.124  If the Pill could elicit this kind of sexual abandon from 
women for whom the fear of pregnancy had made sexual intercourse a potentially life-
threatening burden, then who knows what the effect would be for women who had not 
gone through such hardship?  It was for this reason that doctors had to be “particularly 
diligent and conscientious” when deciding whether or not to prescribe hormonal 
contraception.  Aresin’s not-so-implicit fear was that if younger women in particular 
                                                 
123 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1446, unnumbered volume (5 in sequence), Karl Romund, Bericht 
über die 3. Rostocker Fortbildungstage der Arbeitsgemeinschaft (hereafter AG) Ehe und Familie in der 
DDR, MdJ, Berlin, November 2, 1967, 2-3 of document, 26-27 of archival file; BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, 
DP1 VA 1446, unnumbered volume (5 in sequence), program brochure for 3. Rostocker Fortbildungstage: 
Probleme der Ehe- und Sexualberatung, undated but from 1967, 30 of archival file. 
124 Aresin, Sprechstunde des Vertrauens, 59. 
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became too accustomed to having sexual encounters without consequence, they would 
lose their desire to become pregnant at all.125 
 But just a few years later, in 1971, Aresin seemed more concerned with refuting 
the fear that the Pill might lead to a diminution in the capacity of women to experience 
sexual pleasure than she was in addressing the potential sexual profligacy and lack of 
desire for children that use of the Pill supposedly might entail.  In a survey that Aresin 
conducted (presumably with visitors to her counseling center, although she did not 
divulge the provenance or number of her interlocutors), 47 percent of women using the 
Pill whom she had polled reported no reduction in their capacity to experience sexual 
pleasure while 35 percent felt that the Pill exerted a positive influence over their sex lives 
because they no longer had to worry about the prospect of unwanted pregnancy.  Only 18 
percent of women who made use of hormonal contraception mentioned any negative 
effects of the Pill on their capacity to derive pleasure from sexual activity.  Concern for 
women’s sexual well-being was, to be sure, not the only reason for more explicit 
discussion of contraceptive use; just one year before the decriminalization of abortion, an 
article in the popular magazine Deine Gesundheit (Your Health) urged women to resort to 
contraception to avert terminations of pregnancies since the negative health consequences 
of terminated pregnancies were “often overlooked.”126 
Aresin might have taken her cue from fellow participants at the Fourth Continuing 
Education Conference for ESB counselors that took place in Rostock in 1968 who argued 
that the wider availability of contraception was an integral part of recognizing sexuality 
                                                 
125 Aresin, Sprechstunde des Vertrauens, 61. 
126 “Wunschkindpille” (part of “Tatsachen, Tendenzen, Theorien” rubric), no authorial attribution, Deine 
Gesundheit 3 (March 1971), 78.   Deine Gesundheit had a lay readership of about one million per month by 
the mid-1970s: Gerhard Misgeld, untitled editorial foreword, Deine Gesundheit 7 (July 1975), 194. 
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as a “basic human need.”  Gerhard Misgeld, Full Professor (Ordinarius) of 
Psychopathology at the Humboldt University of Berlin, and Dr. Bernd Bittighöfer of the 
Institute for Social Sciences at the Central Committee of the SED contended that the 
provision of birth control was necessary for the full realization of gender equality under 
socialism.  The full development of human capabilities was feasible in marriage provided 
that neither spouse felt inhibited—and Misgeld and Bittighöfer recognized that the 
prospect of an unwanted pregnancy might very well constitute such an inhibition.127  
Misgeld and Bittighöfer were not afraid that increased access to contraception would 
result in a diminution in the GDR’s birth rate or a rise in immorality (Unsittlichkeit) 
because they were confident that the populace’s ever-increasing level of socialist 
consciousness would serve as a bulwark against sexual profligacy.128 
A similar shift was occurring in the discussion of abortion at the ESB counseling 
conferences.129  In 1966, Mehlan estimated that there were 60,000 abortions in the GDR 
every year, with 10,000-15,000 of these procedures resulting in severe health problems, 
3,000-5,000 inducing sterility, and sixty causing death.130  For every three to four live 
births, there was one abortion.  While Mehlan noted that the overall number of abortions 
                                                 
127 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1757, MdJ, Berlin, Bericht über die IV. Rostocker Fortbildungstage 
[October 3-5, 1968], 2 of document, 109 of archival file. 
128 Ibid. 
129 A new set of regulations went into effect in 1965 that provided commissions with the discretion to 
approve abortions in cases in which the woman requesting a termination of her pregnancy was a) under the 
age of sixteen, b) over the age of forty, c) already the mother of five children, d) already the mother of four 
children with the last birth having occurred within the previous fifteen months, e) the victim of rape or 
incest, or f) psychologically incapable of carrying a fetus to term.  Atina Grossmann, “‘Sich auf ihr 
Kindchen freuen’: Frauen und Behörden in Auseinandersetzungen um Abtreibungen, Mitte der 1960er 
Jahren,” in Akten—Eingaben—Schaufenster: Die DDR und ihre Texte: Erkundungen zu Herrschaft und 
Alltag, eds. Alf Lüdtke and Peter Becker (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1997), 241-257, here 250. 
130 The number of abortions in Weimar Germany had been much higher: there were an estimated 875,750 
abortions in Germany in 1924, and more than a million terminated pregnancies per year between 1929 and 
1931; see Willem Melching, “‘A New Morality’: Left-Wing Intellectuals on Sexuality in Weimar 
Germany,” Journal of Contemporary History 25 (1990): 69-85, here 74. 
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had declined, its incidence was on the rise for younger, childless, and single women.  
Mehlan’s proposed solution to this in 1966 was not to reform the criminal status of 
abortion, but instead to provide more parenting and marital preparation seminars for 
those intending to wed.131  What Mehlan did not mention, however, was that abortion 
commissions were supposed to refer women whose requests for abortion were denied to 
counseling centers.  This guideline reflected the de facto recognition that the extensive 
restrictions on abortion, ostensibly designed to “protect” women from its harmful 
consequences, could have deleterious repercussions themselves.132  But it also provided a 
new forum in which women could express their dissatisfaction with the punitive abortion 
statute: 
 
Frustrated and angry with decisions by local commissions, women, in petitions to 
the Ministry of Health, argued for their right to a legal abortion by exploiting the 
rhetoric of socialist citizenship and promises of social participation for women 
contained in the [Law for the Protection of Mothers and Children].  Women did 
not accept the ruling logic that because the state had now provided (ostensibly) 
adequately for children, they should always bear them willingly.133 
 
Only two years later, and perhaps in response to popular protest, participants at 
the 1968 ESB conference were calling for expanding the scope of allowable abortions 
beyond those designed to prevent an endangerment of the life or health of the mother to 
                                                 
131 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1446, Vermerk über die Teilnahme an den 2. Rostocker 
Fortbildungstagen über Probleme der Ehe- und Sexualberatung vom 16. bis 18. Oktober 1966, veranstaltet 
von der AG Ehe und Familie in der GfG, Walter Krutzsch, MdJ, Sekretariat des Ministers, Berlin, October 
24, 1966, 3 of document, 99c of archival file. 
132 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1757, Stellvertreter von Neudert, Direktor des BG Schwerin, to 
MdJ, HA IV, Berlin, Betreff: Bericht über die Tätigkeit der Ehe- und Familienberatungsstellen im Bezirk 
Schwerin, September 10, 1968, 3 of document, 83 of archival file.  Abortion approval commissions asked 
demoralizing questions of many women and not infrequently took so long to deliberate on a case that the 
legal window for a legally permissible abortion would close in the interim.  Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, ed., 
Familienpolitik, 35. 
133 Grossmann, “Pronatalism, Nationbuilding, and Socialism,” 459. 
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include both a “social-medical indication” (to maintain ideal birth spacing and prevent 
premature pregnancies, pregnancy outside of marriage, too many children in a family, 
and illegal abortions) and a “social indication” if a pregnancy endangered a woman’s 
vocational training.134  Lykke Aresin went so far as to admit that other state-socialist and 
Scandinavian countries allowed abortion for “social reasons.”  While the GDR 
supposedly did not need a “social indication” because of the “ongoing improvement of 
our standard of living,” she admitted that counselors faced with East German women 
requesting an abortion should take their social circumstances into account as an 
“ancillary,” albeit not a determinative, factor.135  Aresin was taking advantage of 
discretionary wiggle room afforded by a relaxation of abortion restrictions in 1965, but 
her choice to highlight the fact that East Germany’s socialist neighbors had a fully 
fledged social indication for abortion that the GDR lacked could not have been 
unintentional.136 
These public breaches with protocol were undoubtedly harbingers of the 
impending change in the law: 
                                                 
134 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1757, MdJ, Berlin, Bericht über die IV. Rostocker Fortbildungstage 
[October 3-5, 1968], 2-3 of document, 109-110 of archival file. 
135 Aresin, Sprechstunde des Vertrauens, 65-66. 
136 Beginning in March 1965, abortion commissions in the GDR could approve termination of pregnancy 
on the basis of age (i.e., women over the age of forty or under the age of sixteen), fecundity (mothers with 
more than five children), pregnancies resulting from race or incest, and pregnancies in rapid succession 
(i.e., giving birth to a fourth child fewer than fifteen months after giving birth to a third child).  Women 
who circumvented the commission approval system and obtained an illegal abortion would henceforth be 
subject to punishment by public shaming and condemnation rather than jail time.  Harsch, “Society, the 
State, and Abortion,” 62-63; Hahn, Modernisierung und Biopolitik, 236.  As a consequence of this reform 
and a new target rating for abortion approvals of approximately 70 percent, the number of legal abortions 
rose exponentially, from 739 to 825 annually between 1959 and 1962 to roughly 21,000 annually between 
1966 and 1970.  Hahn, Modernisierung und Biopolitik, 234; Harsch, “Society, the State, and Abortion,” 80.  
West Germany was also moving towards a less punitive stance, as abortion prosecutions declined in the 
FRG from 1,186 in 1964 to 319 in 1970; see Edward Ross Dickinson, “Policing Sex in Germany, 1882-
1982: A Preliminary Statistical Analysis,” Journal of the History of Sexuality 16, no. 2 (May 2007), 204-




Although [the] precise timing [of the Abortion Law of 1972] was influenced by 
the possibility of visa-free travel to Poland (with the consequent possibility of 
obtaining abortions across the border), this law […] was, more importantly, the 
culmination of a longer period of debate and the shifting climate of opinion in the 
1960s.  A younger, more female medical profession agreed with many women 
that individual freedom of choice was important, and the high disease and 
mortality rates associated with illegal abortions were now taken as arguments in 
support of legalisation, rather than used as evidence against abortion altogether.137 
 
 
A countervailing argument maintains that there were no premonitions in the discourse of 
East German experts about the scope of reproductive law reform that would occur in 
1972.  Daphne Hahn, for instance, has maintained that even though figures like Aresin 
brought up more expansive abortion legislation in other countries during the 1960s, they 
did not invoke such statutes as models that the GDR was necessarily bound to follow.  
Hahn’s perspective minimizes the importance of the incremental shifts underway 
especially by the late 1960s because she has not found explicit mention of “abortion on 
demand” (Fristenlösung) in East German discourse of the time.138  But the evolution of 
expert opinion did not necessarily have to invoke the term Fristenlösung to prepare the 
ground for the decriminalization of abortion. 
 Not long after the legal reform, however, an official amnesia set in that failed to 
acknowledge that abortion had ever been criminalized or that the use of contraception 
had ever been stigmatized or restricted in the GDR.  When East German adolescents saw 
                                                 
137 Mary Fulbrook, The People’s State: East German Society from Hitler to Honecker (New Haven, CT and 
London: Yale University Press, 2005), 153; Harsch, “Society, the State, and Abortion,” 82.  To minimize 
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with extensions possible up to three years thereafter if suitable day care options were not available.  These 
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a 1974 production of physician and KPD member Friedrich Wolf’s 1929 play 
“Cyankali,” which criticized the criminalization of abortion in Weimar Germany as a 
form of institutionalized discrimination against working-class women, they felt that 
“watching [the play] is like confronting the Middle Ages” since they “never really 
realized the bitter consequences that pregnancy can have under different societal 
circumstances.”139  “Different societal circumstances” referred, of course, to capitalism.  
But the reactions imputed to these teenagers did not include even the slightest recognition 
that similarly “medieval” conditions and attitudes regarding the legal status of abortion 
had prevailed in the GDR until its decriminalization just two years earlier.  This amnesia 
continued into the 1980s; an article chronicling the history of marital and sexual 
counseling and attitudes towards abortion prior to the existence of the GDR appeared in 
Deine Gesundheit in October 1984, but the author made no mention of why it took the 
SED until the 1970s to resume with any semblance of conviction the Weimar-era KPD’s 
reform initiatives with regard to contraception and abortion.140 
 With regard to birth control, officially sanctioned discourses no longer spoke of 
the Pill as potentially inducing licentious behavior, but instead as providing young 
unmarried women in particular with the means to demonstrate a responsible attitude 
towards sexual activity.141  An anecdote that appeared in Deine Gesundheit in 1972 is 
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illustrative of this rhetorical transformation.  Gerhard Misgeld wrote of a female music 
student who asked her mother if it would be acceptable for her to go on a camping trip 
with her longtime male schoolmate.  Her mother did not object, but she did advise her 
daughter to make sure that she had contraception close at hand.  To this end, the ever-
dutiful daughter went to a doctor’s office in Berlin in mid-July 1972.  A nurse asked her, 
within earshot of other patients in the waiting room, why she had come, and when she 
said that she wanted to obtain Ovosiston, the nurse mockingly “replied by asking whether 
she had already used up her previous package.”  The girl responded, “‘I have never taken 
Ovosiston, but I would like to start.’”  The nurse then asked, “‘How old are you?’”  When 
the young woman indicated that she was sixteen, 
 
in one second, all of the girl’s self-esteem, built with the help of parents, school, 
and the Free German Youth, was shattered.  First the nurse, then all of the other 
women in the waiting room began to laugh loudly, derisively, and raunchily.  The 
nurse put her arm around the girl’s shoulders, gave her a “motherly” pat on the 
back, and shoved her out the door while saying, “Well, little girl, then come back 
in two years.”142 
 
The nurse had cavalierly violated the young woman’s privacy, and had allowed her own 
“narrow moral views shaped by the opinions of the past” to serve as a pretense for 
denying “someone access to the possibilities offered by science for the responsible 
shaping of one’s life.”  For Misgeld, this episode revealed a failure of empathy, a failure 
to observe the law, and a failure to provide a young woman with the tools to ensure her 
                                                                                                                                                 
men regardless of age or marital status.”  Hera Cook, The Long Sexual Revolution: English Women, Sex 
and Contraception 1800-1975 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 272, 290, 295, quotation from 
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142 Gerhard Misgeld, untitled editor’s foreword, Deine Gesundheit 9 (September 1972), 258. 
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“absolute bodily, mental, and social well-being.”143  Of course, Misgeld’s condemnation 
of the nurse’s injudicious conduct would presumably have carried more weight with 
Deine Gesundheit readers if it had not been preceded in quite recent years by many 
sexual experts’ aversion to making the Pill available to healthy, unmarried young women.  
But he perhaps had this in mind when he criticized gynecologists who complained that 
“only one-tenth of the women seeking abortion are informed about contraception” and 
the fact that these doctors tended to place the blame for this ignorance solely on the 
shoulders of parents, schools, and societal institutions.  In Misgeld’s estimation, these 
gynecologists should instead have been more diligent about ascertaining the extent to 
which their own colleagues—like the nurse maligned in this cautionary tale—were part 
of the problem rather than the solution.144  Proponents of contraception at the counseling 
centers and the East Germans who consulted them in large numbers had contributed to 
the eventual, albeit far from monolithic, acceptance of birth control as an officially 
sanctioned and morally unobjectionable aspect of socialist family life. 
 
Was Wilhelm Reich Correct about the Socialist Taking the Doctor’s Place? 
On the whole, relationship counseling centers that were known to harbor 
empathetic, knowledgeable medical professionals who were willing to dispense family 
planning advice and contraceptives were among the most popular in the GDR during the 
1960s.  While this is doubtlessly true, I do not, however, assume that medical counseling 
was intrinsically more appealing than its non-medical counterpart because East Germans 
deemed the former to be free of the objectionable socialist ideological taint that marred 





the latter.145  Instead, I draw upon the analytical approach of Michael Hau, who has 
argued that at the turn of the century, various expert and lay discourses and practices, 
although at times ostensibly contradictory, contributed to solidifying the societal salience 
of the medicalization paradigm.  This was the case because the competing paradigms 
actually subscribed to many of the same assumptions regarding beauty and hygiene—
even if they did not acknowledge as much.146 
The practice of medicine in the GDR was supposed to be inflected by a socialist 
sensibility.  Socialist medicine was to serve as “the embodiment of the intended unity of 
individual and societal interests” and, as such, constituted “the best form of 
prophylaxis.”147  The medicalization of East German relationship counseling thus did not 
represent the triumph of the “modern” or “individualistic” over the “collective” or 
“traditional” forms of counseling favored by non-medical experts within the SED.  But it 
did become the fulcrum around which disputes over counseling methodology in the GDR 
would unfold.  An institution that was intended to augur a new era of marital harmony 
actually spawned conflict among the counselors themselves. 
The existence of a significant rift between medical and judicial experts suggests 
that the “psychologization of the socialist self” remained contested terrain within and 
beyond governmental circles.  During the Weimar era, one of the primary fault lines in 
the world of relationship counseling ran between public and private counseling centers.  
Given the absence of private counseling centers in the GDR, the lack of discursive space 
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for contesting the SED’s vision for state-supervised counseling centers, and the 
diminished public presence of religious authorities in relationship counseling, 
contestation over counseling methodology in East Germany took the form of a dispute 
over professional territory between legal and medical professionals.148  Indeed, the 
rivalries that had existed between public and private purveyors of counseling during the 
Weimar era were replaced by disputes between the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry 
of Health.  The DFD, which sought to make known the singular dedication of its 
members to the cause of improving marital relationships, played at most an ancillary role, 
both in the counseling centers themselves and in the debates over how they should be 
run.149 
To the extent that relationship counseling had been available in the GDR prior to 
1965, it came in the form of ESBs that reported to the Ministry of Health; by virtue of the 
fact that ESBs featured a predominantly medical staff, these counselors were attuned to 
the proclivities of visitors who “until now have been inclined to seek counseling from a 
professional expert.”150  Judges employed in the region of Karl-Marx-Stadt could not 
help but concede that doctors were considered to be “‘father confessors’” in some areas, 
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and they hoped that medical professionals could be convinced to refer patients to EFBs 
for non-medical counseling when appropriate.  Since doctors commanded public trust, 
according to these judges, their patients would presumably be more likely to follow their 
recommendations than heed exhortations to seek out the services of an EFB that came 
from other sources.151   
Harsch characterizes the “revival of ‘family and sexual counseling’ [as 
bespeaking] the rising influence of medical experts on social policy.”152  It is precisely 
for this reason that numerous Ministry of Justice officials expressed their frustration at 
the desire of doctors to assert a hegemonic role in marital counseling.  The “softer” 
version of this critique came in the form of arguing for the necessity of multiple 
professional approaches in solving the invariably complex array of problems faced by 
married couples and families, and noting that prudent health experts agreed with jurists 
on this point.  A Ministry of Justice report noted that: 
 
Doctors maintain that marriage counseling should limit itself primarily to 
medical questions—precisely a continuation of the tradition of the 
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doubtlessly useful Marital and Sexual Counseling Centers.  It is said in 
support of this opinion that the Legal Counseling Centers of the courts and 
pedagogical counseling centers can address legal and pedagogical 
problems.  The disadvantage of such a solution is that it tears apart along 
professional lines the problem areas of such socially important institutions 
as marriage and family—problem areas that are inextricably intertwined 
with one another.  For this reason, preference should be given to a 
counseling center that essentially encompasses all of these problem areas.  
The Ministry of Health and doctors with extensive specialist experience, 
like Professor [Elfriede] Paul, agree with this point of view.153 
 
 
 The tension between medical and juridical expertise was more overt at the first 
conference for ESB counselors in 1965.  At the same time that the Ministry of Justice 
was preparing to launch the rapid expansion of EFBs, the Ministry of Health was mulling 
over new guidelines for expanding its own network of ESBs.  None other than conference 
organizer Karl-Heinz Mehlan was responsible for drafting these ground rules in his 
capacity as director of the Working Group on Marriage and Family at the Society for the 
Protection of Health.  In explaining the Ministry of Health’s intentions, Dr. Dolberg and 
Dr. Geißler “attempted to defend their one-sided perspective on these questions,” 
according to Dr. Beyer, who had been invited to attend the conference on behalf of the 
Ministry of Justice.  The situation did not get any better when Krutzsch of the Ministry of 
Justice gave a joint presentation with Chief Medical Officer (Obermedizinalrat) Dr. 
Rayner on the topic of collaboration between ESBs and EFBs.  In Beyer’s view, Rayner 
was overly defensive about the doctor’s primacy in counseling and proved to be a bad 
speaker to boot.  Only after the roundtable discussion at the conclusion of the conference 
was a consensus reached that a unitary system of marital and family counseling was 
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necessary due to the complex nature of marital and family questions, and that the role of 
doctors in this complex must be secured.154 
 But this consensus was a tenuous one at best.  Not long before the Second 
Continuing Education Conference for ESB counselors in 1966, Dr. Rayner had sent a 
draft of the guidelines for ESBs to Krutzsch for constructive feedback.  According to 
these guidelines, the ESBs were supposed to foster individual happiness, fulfilling 
relationships, and harmonious familial life, all of which were believed to be conducive to 
good health and a robust capacity for work (Leistungsfähigkeit).  Interestingly, increasing 
couples’ reproductive success was not part of this list.155 
Krutzsch was not pleased that the Ministry of Health was setting the same goals 
for ESBs as the Ministry of Justice was stipulating for EFBs.  He felt that EFBs were 
uniquely positioned to address marital and familial problems from multiple perspectives 
–including pedagogical and medical ones—without impinging upon the professional 
prerogative of existing counseling centers operated by the Ministries of Education and 
Health.156  Because of the recalcitrance of local health authorities, however, many EFBs 
faced obstacles in fulfilling their objectives, and thus Krutzsch expected that the Ministry 
of Health’s new guidelines would emphasize the responsibility of district medical officers 
(Kreisärzte) to provide sufficient medical personnel for both EFBs and ESBs.  Some 
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district medical officers were complaining that they could not staff an EFB with doctors 
because efforts to sustain an ESB took up all of their time and resources, but to Krutzsch, 
this kind of excuse was simply unacceptable.  Krutzsch reminded Rayner that there were 
doctors who managed to juggle the responsibility of working in both EFBs and ESBs.157 
The Ministry of Health’s guidelines also neglected to remind health officials that 
there would be an EFB in every district and municipality in the foreseeable future or 
mention the ways in which existing ESBs could liaise with these newly established 
institutions.  Krutzsch felt that the document left medical authorities with the false 
impression that ESBs were in a position to solve all problems related to familial life; in 
other words, even if they did not explicitly state that the establishment of EFBs would be 
superfluous given the superiority of ESBs’ medical focus, it would not be difficult for an 
otherwise uninformed (or willfully ignorant) reader to draw such a conclusion.  He also 
pointed out that ESBs and EFBs in a number of municipalities managed to coordinate the 
location and timing of their consultation hours or even merge into unitary counseling 
centers (EFSBs) without losing sight of their respective strengths.158  By October 1966, 
such mergers had already occurred in Magdeburg, Berlin-Lichtenberg, Berlin-Köpenick, 
and Leipzig, and by November 1967, the number of merged counseling centers in the 
GDR grew to nineteen.159 
At the 1966 ESB counselor conference, Krutzsch attempted to resolve these 
discrepancies between the Justice and Health Ministries’ visions for counseling centers 
                                                 
157 Ibid., 2 of document, 200 of archival file. 
158 Ibid., 2-3 of document, 200-201 of archival file. 
159 Ibid., 3 of document, 201 of archival file; BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1446, unnumbered 
volume (5 in sequence), Karl Romund, Bericht über die 3. Rostocker Fortbildungstage der AG Ehe und 
Familie in der DDR, MdJ, Berlin, November 2, 1967, 2 of document, 26 of archival file. 
 
 437 
by speaking with Rayner, Geißler, and Dr. Rothe.  Out of these informal discussions 
emerged a set of mutually agreed upon propositions.  EFBs and ESBs should work 
together closely, although the exact nature of this cooperation would depend upon local 
circumstances.  This collaboration could take the form of organizational coalescence, as 
in the combined EFSB model, or by holding office hours at the same time and in the 
same building, having the same medical personnel at both the local EFB and ESB, and 
ensuring that EFBs and ESBs referred clients to one another.  The parties to this 
conversation hoped to formalize their agreement in the form of a joint statement 
emanating from both ministries.160 
 The dialogue between Krutzsch and his counterparts at the Ministry of Health did 
bear some fruit.  The Ministry of Justice began to move away from strict adherence to § 4 
of the FGB, which would have entailed establishing an EFB in every municipality even 
when the values of pragmatism and parsimony dictated otherwise.  A ministerial directive 
from 1966 stipulated that it was not in fact necessary to establish an EFB in every 
municipality in a given district.  The Karl-Marx-Stadt Regional Council mistook this to 
mean that EFBs were only to be established in large regional urban centers like Karl-
Marx-Stadt, thereby incorrectly absolving the Hainichen District Council of the 
responsibility to establish a local EFB.161  This misinterpretation of the directive is not 
surprising given the Ministry of Justice’s own January 1969 assessment of the status of 
EFB formation, which maintained that it was acceptable for a single urban EFB to 
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encompass more than one city neighborhood or an urban area and its immediate rural 
environs.162 
 For its part, the Ministry of Health made a major concession when it issued 
Decree 3/68 in April 1968, following upon guidelines issued on January 8, 1968, which 
proclaimed that ESBs were to be considered as the medical branch of the more 
comprehensive, multi-disciplinary EFBs, thus implying the ultimate supremacy of the 
latter over the former.163  Medical counseling would remain the predominant mode of 
counseling, but in the battle of wills between the Ministries of Health and of Justice, 
some medical professionals chose to be deferential towards their jurist colleagues in this 
instance, even if only on paper.  Indeed, many medically trained counselors still strongly 
resisted the directive’s contention that ESBs were junior partners in a unitary system of 
counseling dominated by EFBs, since they felt—and not without justification, at least as 
far as the relative popularity of ESB counseling was concerned—that ESBs were quite 
capable of handling the demand for marital counseling on their own.  Even though 
Mehlan had been the primary author of earlier guidelines for ESBs that Krutzsch had 
criticized for slighting the stature of EFBs, Mehlan suddenly became the Ministry of 
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Justice’s hero for criticizing colleagues who felt that ESBs should monopolize the field of 
East German relationship counseling.164 
But as Karl-Heinz Eberhardt of the Ministry of Justice pointed out, the Ministry 
of Health continued to insist on the establishment of ESBs in all municipalities.  While 
many local officials had argued that it was unnecessary to establish an EFB in 
municipalities where a functional ESB already existed, the Ministry of Justice turned this 
line of reasoning on its head—the Ministry felt that the founding of EFBs should take 
precedence over the creation of ESBs where demand or resources were insufficient to 
sustain both institutions.165  Geißler of the Ministry of Health worried that if ESBs did not 
continue to exist in their own right, then sexual counseling would get short shrift, but he 
ultimately adopted a conciliatory stance in favor of EFSBs that would combine the best 
attributes of both types of counseling centers.166 
 
What’s in a Name? 
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The naming of the counseling centers proved to be a subject of controversy that 
reflected competing visions about the goals of East German relationship counseling not 
only in terms of its methodology, but also its target audience.  Official ambivalence 
regarding the role of sexuality in relationship therapy extended to the question of whether 
or not to include the word “sexual” in the name of relationship counseling centers.  By 
removing the word “sexual” from the name of the EFBs envisioned in the 1965 FGB 
draft, the Ministry of Justice was effectively dissuading the unmarried from seeking 
therapy, according to Dr. Oerter of the Ministry of Health.  He explained that the 
Ministry of Health has  
 
some reservations about the term “Marital and Family Counseling Center” 
deployed in the Family Law Code draft, since a) “marriage” of course falls under 
the rubric of “family” and b) not all problems having to do with the elimination of 
sexual disorders and contraception should be seen in connection with the concepts 
of “marriage” or “family.”167 
 
 
 The Ministry of Health’s commitment to broad outreach was echoed in its draft of 
proposed guidelines that emphasized that ESBs were open to adults and youth regardless 
of marital status.168  In the interest of providing young couples with a sound basis for 
marriage, EFBs were ultimately interested in attracting an unmarried clientele as well, but 
even the popular Berlin-Lichtenberg EFSB only managed to attract twenty-six unmarried 
visitors in 1966 (out of a total of 400) and fifty-five unmarried visitors in 1968 (out of a 
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für die gesamte Hygiene, September 26, 1966, 2 of document, 191 of archival file. 
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total of 1098).  Visitors under the age of twenty were also in short supply: there were 
sixteen such visitors at the Berlin-Lichtenberg clinic in 1966 and thirty-three in 1968.169 
The debate over the naming of counseling centers also seeped into the press.  A 
1965 interview with Berlin gynecologist Dr. Lothar Obgartel quoted him as saying that 
“‘[w]e consciously strive for the term marital and sexual counseling in contrast to the 
often declared marital and family counseling.  This is not merely a play on words, […] 
the naming should indicate that the counseling is not limited to those who are married or 
engaged.’”170  Obgartel defended his advocacy of the importance of including the word 
“sexual” in the title of the counseling centers by indicating that “‘[i]t is particularly 
important to imbue young and single people in particular with a sense of their 
responsibility and to prepare them for a happy marriage.’”171  Whether or not the word 
“sexual” was a mere stand-in for a course of “preparation for marriage” that did not 
necessarily prioritize sexual intimacy, the presence of the word was significant in and of 
itself because it asserted very publicly the centrality of medical expertise to the kind of 
counseling that the centers had to offer. 
By 1978, Obgartel had apparently grown tired of the debate over naming; in 
contrast to his earlier stance, he now opined that it was “pointless” to “get worked up 
about the ‘nameplate’ (‘Firmenschild’) or organizational framework of such counseling 
centers,” whether they be EFBs, ESBs, or EFSBs.  In the end, Obgartel reminded his 
                                                 
169 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1757, Kuckoreit, Direktor des BG Karl-Marx-Stadt, to MdJ, HA 
IV, Berlin, Betreff: Ehe- und Familienberatungsstellen, September 9, 1968, 3 of document, 71 of archival 
file; BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1757, Jahresbericht 1968 der EFB [sic] Berlin-Lichtenberg, sent 
by Müller, Stadtbezirksgericht Berlin-Lichtenberg, to Karl-Heinz Eberhardt, MdJ, HA IV, Berlin, April 9, 
1969, unpaginated document, 166 of archival file. 
170 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1445, Band 2: “Gut beraten in die Ehe: Zu Familien- und 




readers, they all served the same purpose, namely that of “meeting the populace’s 
growing need for expert advice, treatment, and help regarding sexual, relationship, or 
familial problems.”172  Even officials in Berlin sometimes viewed EFBs and ESBs as 
functionally interchangeable; some counseling centers were simultaneously listed as 
ESBs in Ministry of Health records and as EFBs in Ministry of Justice records.173 
 The Ministry of Justice adopted a decidedly different stance than Obgartel did in 
the mid-1960s.  A 1965 report sought to make a strong case for using the term “marital 
and family counseling center”: 
 
As far as the name is concerned, it seems as if the term used in the law’s draft—
“Marital and Family Counseling Centers”—is the most advantageous one.  To be 
sure, this term does not encompass the full range of counseling offered, since it 
does not include premarital sexual relationships.  This would be the case with the 
term “sexual counseling.”  The survey regarding marriage counseling has already 
revealed quite clearly, however, that the strongest reservations exist about 
counseling in sexual-erotic matters—a finding that stands in stark contrast to the 
prevailing practices of counseling centers.  The name should not only aim to be as 
precise as possible, it must also provide the best strategy for overcoming existing 
reservations [on the part of the general populace].  For this reason the term 
suggested by doctors, “Counseling Center for Generational Questions,” must 
undoubtedly be rejected.174 
 
 
Aside from its positioning on the question of naming, this report makes explicit one of 
the core paradoxes of relationship counseling in the GDR—namely, that East Germans 
who were supposedly reluctant to discuss sexual matters in theory demonstrated an 
insatiable appetite for doing so in practice.  The SED was wary about fostering an 
                                                 
172 Lothar Obgartel, “Gut beraten,” Deine Gesundheit 2 (February 1978), 58-60, here 59. 
173 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1446, unnumbered volume (5 in sequence), Karl Romund, Bericht 
über die 3. Rostocker Fortbildungstage der AG Ehe und Familie in der DDR, MdJ, Berlin, November 2, 
1967, 2 of document, 26 of archival file. 
174 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1445, Band 2, Bericht über die Struktur und Arbeitsweise der 




institution in which the often derided capitalist-style overvaluation of sexuality might 
flourish, but it also sought to capitalize upon the apparently pent-up need to speak about 
sex for its own larger goal of imparting “socialist” values and influencing the contours of 
East German marital and familial life.  As Daphne Hahn has argued, the process of 
establishing a network of counseling centers enabled East Germans to explore the topic 
of sexuality to an unprecedented degree.175 
Squabbles over professional predominance notwithstanding, the official Ministry 
of Justice guidelines stipulated that each EFB was to have a doctor, a pedagogical expert, 
a jurist, and a social worker as the bedrock of its staff, although the actual composition of 
counseling collectives varied widely.176  The social worker alone was to receive a salary, 
while the other members of the counseling collective were to receive nominal 
honorariums, if they were remunerated at all.177  By contrast, medical and psychiatric 
professionals who worked in ESBs received compensation for their efforts from the 
Ministry of Health; it was for this reason that doctors in some jurisdictions sought to 
convert EFBs into ESBs.178 Doctors in the region of Erfurt were particularly obstreperous 
                                                 
175 Hahn, Modernisierung und Biopolitik, 280. 
176 Other kinds of EFB counselors included medical experts of various stripes (including psychiatrists, 
psychologists, gynecologists, and andrologists), housewives, youth welfare officials, DFD representatives, 
and, to a much lesser extent, SED or National Front representatives. 
177 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1445, Band 2, MdJ, Vermerk betr. Voraussichtliche Kosten, die bei 
der Einrichtung von Ehe- und Familienberatungsstellen entstehen, by Walter Krutzsch, Berlin, November 
6, 1965, 132-3 of archival file.  Marital and family counselors before 1933 had also worked on a largely 
voluntary basis; this was not merely a cost-saving measure implemented by the cash-strapped GDR; see 
Klautke, “Rassenhygiene, Sozialpolitik und Sexualität,” 298. 
178 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1446, Bericht über den Stand der Bildung und der Tätigkeit der 
Ehe- und Familienberatungsstellen in der DDR, MdJ, Berlin, 7 March 1967, 2 (148 of archival file); BArch 
Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1446, Bericht über den Erfahrungsaustausch vom 13. Dezember 1966 der im 
Bezirk Karl-Marx-Stadt in den Ehe- und Familienberatungsstellen tätigen Richter, 1 of document, 103 of 
archival file.  Complaints about doctors trying to convert EFBs into ESBs against the wishes of the 
Ministry of Justice continued until at least June 1967; see BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1446, 




about the issue of pay because they believed—correctly, as it turned out— that medical 
experts were receiving pay in some EFBs in the region of Magdeburg.  The directors of 
the Berlin-Mitte and Halle EFBs contemplated providing compensation for counselors, 
presumably to recruit professionals whose expertise was suddenly very much in demand 
given the rapid proliferation of counseling centers.179 
Such problems were not isolated occurrences.  Difficulty in recruiting suitable 
personnel was compounded by the exodus during the 1950s of doctors from East to West 
Germany.  The Ministry of Justice did not fail to recognize that the quality of counseling 
was suffering in some districts due to the lack of qualified specialists, and that the 
Ministry of Health would have to do more to ensure that doctors who were already 
working in counseling centers possessed the requisite knowledge for the task at hand.180  
The guidelines for the operation of counseling centers were silent, however, about how 
they might fulfill their extensive responsibilities without a comprehensive and well-
trained staff.  They also did not address how the simultaneous proliferation of EFBs and 
ESBs was likely to cause severe strain upon a limited pool of resources and professional 
expertise for relationship counseling. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Scharfenstein, Minister für die Anleitung und Kontrolle der Bezirks- und Kreisräte, Berlin, June 26, 1967 
[copy of letter forwarded by Jung to Minister of Justice Kurt Wünsche], 2 of document, 17 of archival file. 
179 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1446, MdJ, Berlin, Walter Krutzsch, Bericht über den 
Erfahrungsaustausch der im Bezirk Erfurt in den Ehe- und Familienberatungsstellen tätigen Richter vom 
22. November 1966, 2 of document, 118c of archival file; BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1446, 
unnumbered volume (5 in sequence), letter from Hertha Jung, DFD Bundessekretärin, to Fritz 
Scharfenstein, Minister für die Anleitung und Kontrolle der Bezirks- und Kreisräte, Berlin, June 26, 1967 
[copy of letter forwarded by Jung to Minister of Justice Kurt Wünsche], 3 of document, 18 of archival file; 
BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1445, Band 3, Vermerk über die Ergebnisse einer Untersuchung über 
den jetzigen Stand der Tätigkeit von Ehe- und Familienberatungsstellen, die auf örtlicher Ebene organisiert 
sind, Berlin, December 13, 1965, 3 of document, 108 of archival file. 
180 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1757, Band 5, MdJ, HA IV, Berlin, Bericht über den Stand der 
Bildung und Tätigkeit der Ehe- und Familienberatungsstellen in den Bezirken und Kreisen, entsprechend 
dem Stand vom 1. März 1969, March 15, 1969, 12 of document, 47 of archival file. 
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 Given the relative dearth of personnel and the recognition that the university 
curriculum for doctors and jurists did not explicitly focus on relationship counseling, 
experts of various stripes could agree that life experience, and not merely the acquisition 
of professional expertise, constituted a vital qualification for being an effective 
counselor.181  Lykke Aresin noted that the success of an ESB medical collective 
depended less on “the specialties that they represented than on the personality and the 
capabilities of the counselors.”182  Krutzsch made this point as well, noting that having a 
“well-known and well-liked citizen” as an EFB counselor is a “big advantage.”  In one 
instance, a female teacher visited the EFB in Sömmerda to ask if she was making the 
right choice in marrying her boyfriend.  The EFB counselor just so happened to know the 
man in question and was aware that he had “developed in a positive direction in recent 
times”; the counselor thus gave the teacher the green light for nuptials.183  Krutzsch felt 
that it was the ultimate testament to this counselor’s stature in Sömmerda that the teacher 
apparently had more confidence in his opinion of her potential husband than she did in 
                                                 
181 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1445, Band 2, Bericht über die Struktur und Arbeitsweise der 
bisher tätigen Eheberatungsstellen, August 19, 1965, 13 of document, 40 front side of archival file; 
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182 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DQ1 3458, Berichterstattung über die Durchführung von medizinisch-
wissenschaftlichen Veranstaltungen in der DDR, Formblatt Nr. 6 (nur für den Dienstgebrauch), Rostock, 
June 1, 1966, 9 of document, unpaginated archival file. 
183 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1446, MdJ, Berlin, Protokoll über die Fachtagung der 
Familienrichter (in Erfurt) am 22. November 1966 zu dem Thema: Erfahrungsaustausch über Ehe- und 
Familienberatungsstellen, 9-10 of document, 132-133 of archival file. 
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her own assessment.  But on numerous other occasions, Krutzsch and his colleagues at 
the Ministry of Justice found themselves confronted with officials at the municipal and 
district level who did not share this enthusiasm for relationship counseling. 
While scholars of National Socialism have dealt extensively with intra-
governmental disputes regarding areas of competence and jurisdiction, historians of 
governance in the GDR have generally elided such contestation in their accounts.184  As 
was the case with the implementation of the new age of marital consent for women 
during the mid-1950s, there was a considerable degree of dissent and blatant disregard for 
the FGB’s provisions regarding the establishment of EFBs on the part of lower-level 
functionaries.185  For this reason, 
 
it is necessary to focus more closely on the role of the (lower-level or local) 
functionaries as active carriers of and participants within the system of rule, rather 
than as merely simple apathetic yes-men, or complicit opportunists, 
unquestioningly carrying out dictates from “above.”  There is a point of 
considerable import to be made in connection with this: namely that the 
predominant tendency in GDR historiography of defining the “state” as a tightly 
knit, unitary block of decision-making apparatchiks located in Berlin needs to be 
modified in favour of a more expansive definition of what and who constituted 
the “state.”186 
 
 One of the biggest frustrations engendered by the process of creating a network of 
EFBs was the sluggishness with which many district councils followed exhortations from 
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regional courts and Berlin-based authorities to establish them.187  Time and time again, 
regional court officials who were responsible for reporting on the status of EFB 
development to the Ministry of Justice bemoaned the failure of local officials to take any 
initiative at all in finding appropriate space and staff for counseling centers.  Many 
municipal authorities did not consider it worthwhile to devote much effort into something 
for which there seemed to be little or no popular demand.188 
The fact that one Ministry of Justice official jotted down a marginal comment on 
a progress report about the establishment of EFBs in the region of Karl-Marx-Stadt that 
the report’s contents gave him or her “cause for optimism” would seem to imply that 
other status updates on EFBs—of which there were many—provided grounds for a far 
more pessimistic prognosis regarding the long-term viability of EFBs.189  Indeed, when 
Barwinsky of the Neubrandenburg Regional Court reported that there were often judges, 
                                                 
187 To cite but one example: BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1747, Jennes, Direktor des BG 
Magdeburg, to MdJ, HA IV, Berlin, Betreff: Ehe- und Familienberatungsstellen, September 11, 1968, 1 of 
document, 72 of archival file. 
188 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1446, Bericht über den Stand der Bildung und der Tätigkeit der 
Ehe- und Familienberatungsstellen in der DDR, MdJ, Berlin, March 7, 1967, 5 of document, 151 of 
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familial problems—but in many cases, they did so instead of going to the EFB since the Rechtsauskunft’s 
hours were more convenient and because in many cases EFB visitors with legal problems would likely be 
referred to the court anyway.  Some local authorities argued that there was “no pronounced need” (kein 
ausgeprägtes Bedürfnis) for EFBs even in places where the legal information office of the local KG was 
quite popular; at least one Ministry of Justice official noted that if there was a demand for counseling from 
court personnel, then there would have been a demand for a well-run EFB as well if local officials had put 
enough effort into establishing one; see BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1757, Ehrenwall, Direktor des 
KG Cottbus, to MdJ, HA IV, Berlin, Betreff: Einschätzung über die Tätigkeit der Ehe- und 
Familienberatungsstellen im Bezirk, September 9, 1968, 2 of document, 65 of archival file.  Along similar 
lines, the EFB in Calau managed to attract only one to two visitors a month, but the lay assessors’ 
collective (Schöffenkollektiv) at the nearby power plant VEB Kraftwerke Lübbenau-Vetschau had 
“conversations” (Aussprachen) with about fifty married couples every year.  The same Ministry of Justice 
official wondered why these lay assessors’ Aussprachen could not be combined with EFB activities to 
make the latter more popular; see BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1757, Ehrenwall, Direktor des KG 
Cottbus, to MdJ, HA IV, Berlin, Betreff: Einschätzung über die Tätigkeit der Ehe- und 
Familienberatungsstellen im Bezirk, September 9, 1968, 3 of document, 66 of archival file. 
189 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1757, letter from Kuckoreit, Direktor des BG Karl-Marx-Stadt, to 




teachers, and doctors willing to serve as counselors in districts lacking an EFB, a 
Ministry of Justice official sarcastically commented in the margin: “What are the three of 
them waiting for?”190  They might very well have answered: “For some semblance of 
initiative and substantive institutional support on the part of the district or municipal 
council!”  And while Barwinsky offered to his superiors the reassurance that there was a 
timeline in place for establishing EFBs in districts that lacked them, the Ministry of 
Justice official was not so easily convinced: “And what exactly is that timeline?”191  S/he 
had reason to be skeptical, since it seemed as if very few district councils considered 
establishing or running an EFB as one of their regular responsibilities or incorporated 
EFBs into their working plans for governance.192 
Some officials in Berlin alleged that insubordination at the municipal or district 
level resulted from the fact that the February 17, 1966 Implementation Directive 
(Durchführungsbestimmung) for the Family Law Code did not specify which department 
or agency within district councils was actually responsible for establishing EFBs.193  It 
was not uncommon for the Ministry of Justice to have to rely upon district courts, which 
were generally more compliant than non-judicial officials at the local level, to strong-arm 
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municipal and district councils into issuing decrees for establishing EFBs at all.194   
Given the apparently widespread confusion about the distinction between ESBs and 
EFBs, many local officials might have assumed that local health or internal affairs 
officials would take care of the matter.  Indeed, some municipal councils felt that 
establishing an EFB was superfluous if there was already an ESB in the area since they 
failed to recognize that the two institutions were under separate ministerial jurisdiction.195 
This message did not sink in everywhere, since an official by the name of 
Oettmeier noted that an EFB in Geithain had shut down because the “competing” ESB 
(Konkurrenz-Eheberatungsstelle) was more popular—an interesting use of terminology 
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BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1757, letter from Barwinsky, BG Neubrandenburg, to MdJ, HA IV, 
Berlin, Betreff: Einschätzung zum Stand der Arbeit mit den Ehe- und Familienberatungsstellen im Bezirk 
Neubrandenburg, September 10, 1968, 2 of document, 76 of archival file; BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 
VA 1757, MdJ, HA IV, Berlin, evaluation of EFB reports from Bezirksgerichte, Stand Oktober 1968, 3 of 
document, 101 of archival file.  Sometimes, the reverse was true: in Gräfenhainichen in 1968, for example, 
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since EFBs and ESBs were at least officially supposed to be collaborators, not rivals.196  
In Neustrelitz, the creation of an EFB had been delayed by the lack of availability of a 
suitable space for it, but a Ministry of Justice official made the trenchant observation that 
“the ESB [already] has rooms there.”  If local officials had been able to house an ESB, 
then they should have been able to find room to accommodate an EFB as well.197  The 
official wondered why authorities in Neustrelitz did not follow the example of their 
counterparts in Templin, where there were plans afoot to merge the quite popular ESB 
with the EFB that had not managed to attract a single visitor: “See!  Why was this not 
possible in Neustrelitz!”198 
It was thus not merely low-level governmental “niches” that could be immune to 
the pressures of “democratic centralism”; mid-level functionaries could also exhibit 
obstreperousness when it came to fulfilling directives from Berlin.  As Peter Caldwell 
contends, 
 
By the time of the GDR, democratic centralism amounted to little more than the 
claim that the actions of the party leadership were in agreement with the interests 
of the masses.  But even this orthodox conception focused attention on the 
relationship between part and whole within the system and thereby implied some 
degree of give and take.  Insofar as democratic centralism claimed that a 
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file. 
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relationship existed at all, it provided language through which the interests of 
social groups, institutions, and individuals could surface.199 
 
 
What Caldwell does not explicitly state is that the “social groups” and “institutions” that 
sought to make their interests known could also include state functionaries.  By October 
27, 1966, there were 73 EFBs reported by 118 district courts throughout the GDR, with 
Berlin and the regions of Karl-Marx-Stadt and Erfurt leading the way in terms of the 
number of EFBs established.  But 94 district courts had not yet submitted reports 
regarding the existence of EFBs in their jurisdiction, and the region of Potsdam was a 
particularly egregious laggard in this respect: not a single district court in this region had 
complied with the injunction to file such a report.200  By March 1967, the situation had 
not improved much, since there were still only three EFBs scattered throughout the 
eighteen districts and municipalities that comprised the region of Potsdam.  Ultimately, 
the Potsdam Regional Court blamed the Potsdam Regional Council for its lack of 
leadership and failure to recognize that EFBs “could be very efficacious in stabilizing 
marital and familial relationships and in preventing marital conflicts.”  Because of this 
leadership vacuum, district councils in the region of Potsdam neither received nor 
solicited any updates on the work of EFBs from at least 1972 until mid-1974.201   
                                                 
199 Peter C. Caldwell, Dictatorship, State Planning, and Social Theory in the German Democratic Republic 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 9. 
200 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1446, Vermerk, MdJ, Sekretariat des Ministers, Berlin, October 27, 
1966, 107 of archival file.  By late 1971, the Oranienburg and Potsdam-Stadt EFBs were doing relatively 
well, but seven EFBs in the Bezirk of Potsdam had ceased operation and the remaining EFBs in the region 
attracted hardly any visitors.  See BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 3007, Band 1.3561, Bericht über die 
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document, 1 of archival file. 
201 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 2144, folder: Bildung und Besetzung der Ehe- und 
Familienberatungen, Band 1, Ausschnitt aus Monatsbericht von Knecht, BG Potsdam, über den Stand der 
Arbeit der Ehe- und Familienberatungsstellen im Bezirk Potsdam, September 18, 1974, 1 of archival file. 
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The level of recalcitrance got to the point that Fritz Scharfenstein, Minister for the 
Direction and Control of Regional and District Councils, felt compelled to reassure 
Minister of Justice Hilde Benjamin in April 1967 that he had berated local councils in the 
regions of Potsdam, Neubrandenburg, and Gera for having been delinquent in fulfilling 
their responsibility to establish a comprehensive network of EFBs.202  A project that was 
designed to expand the possibilities for exerting “socialist” influence over the tenor of 
family life and sexual relationships was also revealing the limitations encountered by 
Berlin-based officials in shaping the behavior of their own governmental subordinates. 
Despite the frequent calls for EFBs to do a better job of publicizing their activities 
and enticing young people in particular to visit, the Ministry of Justice squelched an 
attempt on the part of the youth periodical für dich to spread the word about EFBs in 
1967.  Even though the article in question had been drafted by the Ministry of Justice’s 
own Karl Romund, Romund’s colleagues Ullmann and Einhorn felt that publishing such 
a piece would be “premature and insufficiently informative (wenig aussagekräftig).”  
While Ullmann and Einhorn did not mention the rationale behind their hesitation to 
proceed with publication, one can surmise that Romund’s surprisingly unequivocal 
admission that numerous regions had been remiss in establishing EFBs did not accord 
well with the governmental imperative to characterize the building of the network of 
                                                 
202 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1446, letter from Fritz Scharfenstein, Minister für die Anleitung 
und Kontrolle der Bezirks- und Kreisräte, to Hilde Benjamin, MdJ, Berlin, April 4, 1967, 187 of archival 
file; BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1446, unnumbered volume (5 in sequence), letter from Minister 
der Justiz Kurt Wünsche to DFD Bundessekretärin Hertha Jung, July 31, 1967, 23 of archival file. 
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counseling centers as an unmitigated success story, at least in communication for public 
consumption.203 
 Yet Romund was not alone in his frankness.  An article slated for publication in 
Deine Gesundheit mentioned that the towns of Wittenberg and Hettstedt each had both an 
EFB and an ESB, but that they were not successful in collaborating with one another or, 
for that matter, in attracting visitors.204  Even in Aschersleben, which had the supposedly 
ideal-case scenario of an ESB and EFB that collaborated well together, visitors remained 
far and few in between; unlike many other such centers, which either sharply curtailed 
their hours or shut their doors entirely, the Aschersleben ESB and EFB optimistically (if 
perhaps futilely) vowed to redouble their efforts in giving public lectures and running 
notices in the local press.  Residents of towns like Quedlinburg, which as of early 1968 
had neither an ESB or an EFB, found that two local gynecologists and a dermatologist 
were offering sexual counseling on a more informal basis in their own offices instead.205 
 Even though the Ministry of Justice never realized the FGB’s call for fully 
functional EFBs in every district, officials still hoped that the network of EFBs and ESBs 
could serve as a point of pride—and if one looks only at the official numbers in 
aggregate, it was.  Despite the multifarious obstacles outlined above, the expansion of the 
                                                 
203 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1446, Band 4, draft of letter from MdJ, Berlin to Schubert, 
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Berlin, February 1, 1968, 13 and 15 of document, 24 and 26 of archival file. 
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EFB network proceeded apace.  By February 15, 1967, the number of EFBs had grown to 
116, and in March 1967 Ministry of Justice official Krutzsch predicted that there would 
eventually be approximately 200 EFBs throughout the country.  His prediction was 
accurate, since 205 EFBs were officially in existence in the 230 districts of the GDR by 
March 1969.206 
The proliferation of counseling centers was one aspect of inter-German 
competition in which the East Germans appeared to be outperforming their West German 
rivals.  Gerhard Misgeld pointed out in 1971 that even though the GDR’s Working Group 
on Marriage and Family (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Ehe und Familie) had been established in 
                                                 
206 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1446, Bericht über den Stand der Bildung und der Tätigkeit der 
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archival file; BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1446, unnumbered volume (5 in sequence), letter from 
Hertha Jung, DFD Bundessekretärin, to Fritz Scharfenstein, Minister für die Anleitung und Kontrolle der 
Bezirks- und Kreisräte, Berlin, June 26, 1967 [copy of letter forwarded by Jung to Minister of Justice Kurt 
Wünsche], 1 of document, 16 of archival file; BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1757, MdJ, HA IV, 
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ESB had merged with an EFB to form an EFSB.  See BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1446, 
unnumbered volume (5 in sequence), Karl Romund, Bericht über die 3. Rostocker Fortbildungstage der AG 
Ehe und Familie in der DDR, MdJ, Berlin, November 2, 1967, 1-2 of document, 25-26 of archival file.  By 
January 1969, once the ESB was at least officially supposed to have become the medical branch of the 
more comprehensive EFB (as per the Ministry of Health’s Directive Number 3/1968 for the Activity of 
Marital and Sexual Counseling Centers as the Medical Branch of Marital and Family Counseling 
[Richtlinie Nummer 3/1968 für die Tätigkeit der Ehe- und Sexualberatungsstellen als medizinischen Zweig 
der Ehe- und Familienberatung]), the number of ESBs had declined to seventy, nine of which existed in 
districts that lacked an EFB, with a slight bounce back to seventy-three ESBs (twelve of which were in 
districts that lacked an EFB) by March 1969.  The number of hybrid EFSBs, meanwhile, had increased to 
fifty, which was still not enough to offset the decline in the number of ESBs.  See BArch Berlin-
Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1757, MdJ, HA IV, Berlin, Bericht über den Stand der Bildung und Tätigkeit der 
Ehe- und Familienberatungsstellen in den Bezirken und Kreisen, January 16, 1969, 1 and 3 of document, 
114 and 116 of archival file; BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 VA 1757, Band 5, MdJ, HA IV, Berlin, 
Bericht über den Stand der Bildung und Tätigkeit der Ehe- und Familienberatungsstellen in den Bezirken 




1964 and its counterpart in the FRG had been in existence since 1952, the GDR group 
had overseen the establishment of a network of counseling centers that was roughly ten 
times the size of its West German counterpart (about 200 in the East versus 23 in the 
West).207  While Misgeld sought to capitalize upon this comparative advantage in order to 
impress a domestic readership, efforts were underway to trumpet the accomplishments of 
the East German system of relationship counseling on a wider stage as well.  The flagship 
counseling centers attracted visitors from other (mostly socialist) countries—the head of 
a Warsaw polyclinic visited the Berlin-Lichtenberg EFSB, jurists and doctors from Chile, 
Bulgaria, and Hungary consulted with the EFB in Berlin-Mitte, and Africans of 
unspecified nationality paid a visit to the EFB in Berlin-Prenzlauer Berg.208 
In Chapter 3, I argue that Rudolf Klimmer’s involvement with the publication Der 
Kreis (The Circle) indicates that the boundaries of transnational homophile activism 
during the 1950s did not necessarily end where the Iron Curtain began.  In an analogous 
fashion, albeit in this case with the imprimatur of official state support, Karl-Heinz 
Mehlan sought to make the GDR a key player in a transnational dialogue about family 
planning and therapeutic approaches to sexual disorders that also transcended the Cold 
War divide.  A particularly salient example of this phenomenon was the Fourth 
Continuing Education Conference for ESB counselors that took place in October 1968.  
While the first conference in 1965 had attracted 250 attendees, none of whom were from 
                                                 
207 Gerhard Misgeld, untitled editor’s foreword, Deine Gesundheit 10 (October 1971), 290.  Misgeld did 
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outside of the GDR, the 1968 symposium featured 550 participants from not only East 
Germany but also West Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Poland, Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, and the United States, with prominent Munich-based anthropologist and 
doctor Karl Saller, Amsterdam-based sexologist Coenraad van Emde Boas, and New 
York-based gynecologist Hans Lehfeldt among them.209  On the cusp of the politics of 
détente between the FRG and GDR that became known as Ostpolitik in West Germany, 
Mehlan and his colleagues in family planning were inducing a kind of Cold War thaw of 
their own. 
 
The (D)evolution of the Network of Relationship Counseling Centers During the 
1970s and 1980s 
 The number of visitors to many EFBs continued to be low during the 1970s, and 
numerous counseling centers existed “in name only.”  The director of the Lüritz District 
Court went so far as to submit virtually the same—fallacious—report touting the success 
of the local EFB every year for much of the 1970s.210  As was the case before the 
legalization of first-trimester abortion and free distribution of contraception in 1972, “the 
sexual counseling centers receive[d] the most visitors,” and Lykke Aresin and Karl-Heinz 
Mehlan remained among the most popular counselors, attracting hundreds of visitors 
                                                 
209 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DQ1 3458, Berichterstattung über die Durchführung von medizinisch-
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annually from throughout the GDR.211  To satisfy this demand, Judge Paul Witte of the 
Greifswald District Court believed in 1972 that judges needed more practical training so 
that they too could be effective birth control counselors.  In doing so, however, Judge 
Witte might not have been aware that sexual pedagogues had already made a similar 
recommendation (as noted above) in 1965:  
 
I consider this topic to be an important one since in previous [continuing 
education] conferences [for EFB counselors in Leipzig] it was always emphasized 
that terminating a pregnancy should only be a last resort and that preference 
should be given to the prevention of [unwanted] pregnancy.  But I do not recall 
that lectures on this topic imparted to judicial practitioners any concrete 
knowledge of possible methods of contraception based upon the most modern 
research.  We could do a better job of conducting marital and sexual counseling, 
even though we do not want to compete with the experts.  We need more concrete 
knowledge in order to become more convincing.  I attended a lecture here in 
Greifswald in which the topic became clearer to me because of the use of slides 
and demonstration of different kinds of contraceptives.  Something similar would 
be suitable for the judges who will convene [for the 1973 continuing education 
conference for EFB counselors] in Leipzig.212 
 
 
What was different in 1972, however, was that this recognition of the need for sexual 
enlightenment of court personnel came from a judge, and not an expert in sexual 
pedagogy.  Instead of waging an ongoing struggle for supremacy between legal and 
pedagogical forms of relationship counseling on the one hand and medical and 
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psychological approaches on the other, Judge Witte acknowledged that since much of the 
populace continued to equate “marital and sexual counseling” with contraceptive advice, 
then jurists would have to make a good-faith effort to become effective birth control 
counselors, albeit without stepping on the toes of the doctors whom he characterized as 
“the experts.” 
 Judge Witte’s comments also stemmed from more practical exigencies, however, 
since personnel issues remained a pesky problem.  Even though EFBs and ESBs were 
supposed to have counselors with some degree of background or expertise in psychology 
or psychotherapy, Lykke Aresin noted that “it has been particularly difficult to find 
suitable psychologists” for a 1972 continuing education seminar for EFB counselors.213  
If psychologists were supposed to be an integral part of the marital and sexual counseling 
collective, then why was it so difficult for Aresin to find a suitable speaker?  She asked 
psychologist Heinz Grassel, but despite his extensive involvement in previous training 
sessions, Grassel wound up reneging on his commitment to participate, much to the 
consternation of the Ministry of Justice.214  By noting that “[a] psychologist should be 
part of every counseling center, since psychological problems are at the forefront of the 
problems encountered during counseling,” officials might not simply have been issuing a 
prescriptive statement that they presumed would be followed.  They might also have been 
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implying that the goal of having someone with psychological expertise in every 
counseling center was far from being attained in practice.215 
 During the waning years of the GDR, the precarious viability of individual 
counseling centers became even more pronounced in that the total number of ESBs, 
EFBs, and EFSBs dropped from 274 in 1977 to 230 in 1985, and fell even further to 189 
by 1987.216  In an attempt to curry favor with the ever-elusive constituency of youthful 
advice-seekers, Ms. Friedrich, a legal adviser for the SED at the VEB 
Dienstleistungskombinat (Repair Services Combine) in Dresden, attempted to launch a 
computer-mediated matchmaking service called “Boy Meets Girl through the Computer” 
(Sie und Er per Computer).  While Friedrich might not have been a consummate 
wordsmith in devising this rather guileless name, she did not lack for ambition; she hoped 
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that her idea for a computer-mediated “relationship counseling center” 
(Partnerberatungsstelle) would be adopted throughout the GDR.217  Perhaps young East 
Germans reluctant to visit relationship counseling centers for decades had really just been 
longing for a matchmaking service all along.  Karin Langner, who led the ESB in Berlin-
Prenzlauer Berg for ten years, was confident that she and her colleagues were “doing 
quite a good job of realizing the vision that the KPD had for the duties of marital and 
sexual counseling.”218  But the belated reclamation of this legacy by the SED and the 
disputes that characterized its implementation suggest that some discursive and 




 Some historians have been inclined to relegate East Germany to nothing more 
than a “footnote” in world history.219  Even those historians of the family and sexuality 
who consider East Germany to be worthy of sustained historical attention have tended to 
consign sexual and marital counseling centers to the margin of their own accounts.  This 
has occurred not because of a historiographical consensus that the counseling centers 
were a failure, but paradoxically because of their perceived “success” as a relatively 
benign and popular form of intervention on the part of an “educational dictatorship” 
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218 “Das Interview,” with Karin Langner, conducted by Annegret Hofmann, Deine Gesundheit 10 (October 
1984), 318. 
219 Bernd Faulenbach, “Nur eine ‘Fußnote der Weltgeschichte?’: Die DDR im Kontext der Geschichte des 
20. Jahrhunderts,” in Bilanz und Perspektiven der DDR-Forschung, eds. Rainer Eppelmann, Bernd 
Faulenbach, and Ulrich Mählert (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2003), 1-23. 
 
 461 
intent upon reshaping family life along “socialist” lines.  Alternately, historians have 
criticized the SED’s promotion of relationship counseling as yet another obtrusive form 
of governmental encroachment upon the private sphere in the name of enhancing the 
country’s demographic viability and economic output.  These perspectives fail to take 
into account the difficulties that many EFBs and ESBs faced in attracting visitors and the 
lackluster commitment on the part of many local officials to establishing and maintaining 
them.  Such tribulations exposed fissures in the edifice of “democratic centralism” that 
limited the SED’s ability to shape its own institutions, much less East German families, 
according to inflexible preconceptions.   EFBs in particular were more often than not 
confirming rather than refuting existing prejudices regarding their apparent superfluity, 
and the relatively greater popularity of the kind of counseling offered by ESB specialists 
could not help but make the jostling for supremacy between judicial and medical or 
psychological professionals that much more pronounced.220  In its attempts to reshape the 
East German family along socialist lines, the SED unwittingly reproduced the 
Foucaultian paradox of bewailing the prevalence of talk about sexuality while providing 
new institutional incitements to sexual discourse.  
The degree to which sexual matters became a central preoccupation for both EFBs 
and ESBs points to another facet of the emergence of “sex as a cultural language” in the 
GDR.  Laura Engelstein has argued that “sex as a cultural language” was lacking in the 
Soviet Union—and, by implication, in other state-socialist polities—because “it was 
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precisely the ability to represent, elicit and satisfy desire in publicly available forms that 
the regime inhibited.”221  Like the new terms for marriage and divorce codified by the 
Marriage Ordinance ten years earlier, the network of relationship counseling centers 
enabled “sex as a cultural language” to flourish even as many officials and counselors 
remained uneasy about the ostensible reification of sexuality that might result.222  
Contrary to the SED’s reputation as a haven for petit-bourgeois moralizing, the 
counseling centers were supposed to provide an institutional and discursive space for 
non-judgmental candor.  Youth took advantage of the lectures offered by EFB and ESB 
counselors to ask not merely about the moral valence of premarital sexuality, but also 
about the role of desire and pleasure in intimate relationships.  Even homosexuals could 
at least in theory, if not in practice, enjoy a brief respite from the opprobrium of societal 
discrimination by discussing their travails with a relationship counselor. 
The hybridity of counseling centers, whether in terms of the acronyms applied to 
them or their reliance upon a combination of individualistic, collective, professional, and 
ideological therapeutic approaches, stemmed from the hope that in engendering 
emotionally satisfying sexual relationships for East Germans, these centers would also 
foster an emotionally satisfying relationship between ordinary citizens and the polity in 
which they resided.  As part of a larger complex of policies pertaining to reproduction 
and the family, marital counseling centers “became increasingly important venues for 
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state legitimation.”223  The willingness of the populace to consider the counseling session 
as a Sprechstunde des Vertrauens thus served as a litmus test not only for popular 
confidence in the efficacy of premarital education and marital therapy, but also for trust 
in the state itself.
                                                 
223 Timm, Politics of Fertility, 260. 
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CHAPTER 7.  CONCLUSION 
 
 
 In March of 1958, the District Court in the city of Stralsund exonerated Georg S. 
at the conclusion of a trial in which his landlord Friederike K. and her friend Ilse B. 
accused him of having spread slanderous rumors regarding the nature of the relationship 
between the two women.  After Friederike K. and Ilse B. appealed the court’s verdict, 
Georg S. hoped that drafting an Eingabe to Wilhelm Pieck, President of the GDR, would 
put an end to his legal troubles once and for all.  Instead, Pieck ordered a re-trial, and in 
April of 1959, the same court ruled in favor of the female plaintiffs and sentenced Georg 
S. to a public rebuke (öffentlicher Tadel).1  What had happened in the interim to change 
the mind of the court in Stralsund?2 
Georg S. engaged in this allegedly calumnious behavior because he was 
convinced that Ilse B.’s husband, a local governmental official in charge of the 
Permanent Housing Commission, had conspired with Friederike K.’s family to prevent 
his complaints about his domicile and his desire for alternate living quarters from being 
addressed satisfactorily.  Georg S. was convinced that if anyone deserved a public 
reprimand, it was Friederike K. and Ilse B.  He was mortified by the “disgraceful same-
                                                 
1 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 1195, Teil 2, letter from Georg S., Stralsund, to Minister der Justiz 
Hilde Benjamin, Berlin, February 9, 1960, unpaginated archival file; BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 
1195, Teil 2, Protokoll, Urteil, Kreisgericht (hereafter KG) Stralsund-Stadt, March 10, 1958, 1st 
unnumbered page of document; BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 1195, Teil 2, Protokoll, Urteil, KG 
Stralsund-Stadt, April 8, 1959, 1st unnumbered page of document. 
2 Lay judges (Schöffen) also took part in both trials, but the nature of the trial transcripts does not allow one 
to discern any potential differences of opinion among members of the court’s judicial collective. 
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sex sexual activities (das schändliche und gleichgeschlechtliche Treiben) involving 
Friederike K. and Ilse B. because they pose a moral threat to my children.”3  He 
contended that 
 
he had seen with his own eyes how frequently the [female] plaintiffs kissed each 
other, called each other pet names, and shrieked loudly when they were having 
fun together.  He also saw with his own eyes how both [female] plaintiffs nestled 
close together and kissed as they walked down the street.  On the basis of this 
conspicuous behavior, he came to the conclusion that the relationship between the 
two women went far beyond the typical scope of friendship and that they had a 
more intimate relationship.  The witnesses S. [Georg’s wife] and H. testified that 
they had also observed the [female] plaintiffs kissing on numerous occasions and 
that they had heard plaintiff B. call plaintiff K. “my darling, my love, my little 
dove” (“meine Süße, meine Liebe, meine Taubi”).  The witness [Ms.] S. also 
testified that she had heard how the plaintiffs said to one another, “Stop tickling 
me!  I can’t take it anymore!”4 
 
 
Georg S. was confident that the government would reward him for having brought such 
reprehensible conduct to its attention.  And when the Stralsund court initially absolved 
him of culpability in 1958, Judge Zimmermann bestowed accolades upon him for his 
willingness to speak his mind: 
 
Our society has no interest in holding criminally accountable every citizen who 
makes critical remarks about the conduct of others.  This would only be 
conducive to undermining the working people’s trust in our state organs.  Every 
citizen of our republic has the right to criticize the behavior of others when he 
does not agree with it and when he cannot reconcile it with his moral views.  Our 
citizens should always be encouraged to report to state authorities things that do 




                                                 
3 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 1195, Teil 2, Protokoll, Urteil, KG Stralsund-Stadt, March 10, 1958, 
2nd unnumbered page of document. 
4 Ibid., 3rd unnumbered page of document. 
5 Ibid., 4th- 5th unnumbered pages of document. 
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The court also found that Georg S. had not exaggerated the egregious nature of Friederike 
K.’s and Ilse B.’s public displays of affection: 
 
Of course, it has long been customary for women who have been friends for a 
long time to kiss when greeting or parting from one another.  Normally, no one 
would be offended by this.  But when these pleasantries (Sichgutsein) extend 
beyond this (aus dem Rahmen fällt) and the exchange of intimacies occurs quite 
often, then one cannot blame a citizen who draws his own conclusions about this 
kind of behavior.  Not every citizen is predisposed to approve of such behavior; 
instead, everyone has his own particular views about such things.  The court also 
finds the behavior of the plaintiffs to be somewhat exaggerated (etwas 
übertrieben) and can thus completely understand why the defendant suspected 
that their relationship was more than just a friendly one.  The [female] witness S., 
who is also a friend of the plaintiff K., burst into a fit of laughter when asked by 
the court whether she had also kissed the plaintiff K.  She subsequently became 
indignant and testified that she would certainly not kiss a woman.  This attitude 
on the witness S.’s part reveals that not all citizens behave like the plaintiffs do.  




In the interest of fulfilling the pedagogical potential of socialist jurisprudence, even 
though the women themselves were not on trial, Judge Zimmermann opined that 
 
[i]t thus falls to the plaintiffs to realize in the future that if they behave in this 
manner, someone else might take offense.  Friendships (freundschaftliche 
Beziehungen) between women should remain morally unobjectionable.  Even 
though same-sex sexual relationships between women are not subject to criminal 
penalty, they are in violation of the moral views of our working people.7 
 
 
This constituted a remarkably candid admission that even though the “working people” 
disapproved of lesbian relationships, this was not in and of itself sufficient justification 
for criminalizing them.  During the re-trial, however, Stralsund District Court Director 
Meyer turned this logic on its head.  He noted that even though same-sex sexual activity 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 4th-5th unnumbered pages of document. 
7 Ibid., 6th unnumbered page of document. 
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involving women was not a criminal offense, Georg S. was guilty of having committed a 
“gross violation of the plaintiffs’ honor” because he subjected them to the prospect of 
moral vilification by credulous community members.8  In other words, whether accusing 
Friederike K. and Ilse B. of a moral failing or a crime, Georg S. was infringing upon both 
legal codifications and community standards. 
 If the trial transcript is to be believed, Georg S. admitted that he lacked evidence 
to substantiate his allegations, confessed to the error of his ways, and expressed a desire 
to move on with his life.9  But the grievances expressed in his February 9, 1960 Eingabe 
to Minister of Justice Hilde Benjamin would seem to indicate otherwise.  Ministry of 
Justice official Müller echoed the chastising that Georg S. had received during the 1959 
re-trial: 
 
It was not justified for you to make such an allegation about the filer[s] of the 
civil suit in your letter to the President of the German Democratic Republic about 
your housing problem since the behavior of the civil suit filers has very little to do 
with your problem.  It is therefore understandable that your contentions—to the 
extent that they are not proven—must necessarily be construed as slanderous by 
the civil suit filers.  The confidentiality of the mail has not been violated since you 
should have been prepared for the fact that your letter to the President would be 
forwarded to other state organs for processing.10 
 
 
The drastic change of heart on the part of the Stralsund District Court and the 
central organs of East German governance regarding the laudability of Georg S.’s 
disclosure might have been the result of his unfortunate decision to step on the wrong set 
of political toes.  But it is also evocative of themes that have permeated the chapters of 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 4th unnumbered page of document. 
9 Ibid., 3rd unnumbered page of document. 
10 BArch Berlin-Lichterfelde, DP1 SE 1195, Teil 2, letter from Hauptreferentin Müller, Ministerium der 




this dissertation.  It would seem as if the people of Stralsund and governmental 
functionaries could agree that both Friederike K.’s and Ilse B.’s purported sexual 
profligacy and Georg S.’s prying into their personal affairs were morally unacceptable.  
But aside from the issue of Georg S.’s mendacity, what was really objectionable was the 
fact that either the two women or Georg S. would have the audacity to make publicly 
visible acts that should have remained behind closed doors if they transpired at all.  In 
Müller’s estimation, Georg S.’s ostensible prevarication was all the more blameworthy 
because he falsely assumed that Friederike K.’s and Ilse B.’s private affairs would have 
any bearing upon his housing grievances.  The state did not really need or want to know 
about the nature of the relationship between these two women.  Müller thus effectively 
conceded the existence of a private sexual realm that was beyond the reach of 
governmental intervention eight years before the SED would codify this principle into 
law by decriminalizing consensual same-sex sexual activity involving adult men.  But 
this respect for privacy did not extend to the realm of epistolary communication.  Even if 
Georg S.’s intentions had been noble, he should have realized that anything he wrote in a 
letter to President Pieck would likely become public knowledge—at least within the 
governmental orbit.  Müller thus unwittingly confirmed the function of Eingaben as a 
semi-public domain for contending views on such volatile topics as the legal and moral 
status of female same-sex intimacy. 
 
Sex and the Socialist Self 
 As Chapters 2 and 3 reveal, Dresden-based psychiatrist Rudolf Klimmer made 
extensive use of Eingaben to oppose legal and societal discrimination against gay men in 
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East Germany and beyond.  More fundamentally, he challenged a conception of the 
socialist self that would have relegated sexual autonomy to the denigrated realm of 
bourgeois individualist thinking.  Katrin Sieg argues that “[t]he effacement of sexuality 
and subjectivism from socialist identity occurred under pressure from the cold war [sic 
lowercase].”11  But Klimmer cultivated a network of like-minded sexologists and 
homophile activists that transcended the Cold War divide and that enabled him to 
circumvent limits placed upon the public articulation of his ideas in the GDR. 
Other historians have emphasized that Klimmer’s efforts were largely in vain due 
to monolithic opposition in the GDR.  Klimmer himself was frustrated by the obstacles 
that he encountered from a government that he had anticipated would be supportive of his 
ideas.  Although he waged his campaign on his own, Klimmer encountered a much 
greater degree of support for his views regarding homosexuality than other scholars have 
acknowledged.  And he persevered because the SED and influential professional experts 
begrudgingly came to accept that the spirit of progressive sex reform could be revived in 
the GDR as long as it remained invisible.  This was not necessarily the result of any 
nostalgia for or even conscious awareness of the elective affinity that had existed 
between the Weimar-era KPD and progressive sex reform.  Instead, it reflected lingering 
uncertainty about the efficacy of ideological and jurisprudential influence in enabling 
“healthy” (hetero)sexuality to prevail under state socialism. 
Even as East German policymakers heralded the evaporation of the bourgeois 
divide between public and private, they effectively codified sexual privacy as a right 
                                                 
11 Katrin Sieg, “Deviance and Dissidence: Sexual Subjects of the Cold War,” in Cruising the Performative: 
Interventions into the Representation of Ethnicity, Nationality, and Sexuality, eds. Sue-Ellen Case, Susan 
Leigh Foster, and Philip Brett (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 93-111, here 96. 
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worthy of governmental protection under state socialism when they moved to repeal § 
175.  This respect for privacy stemmed from an implicit acceptance of Klimmer’s 
contention that the etiology of homosexual desire lay not in decadent bourgeois mores 
but in a congenital disposition that did not care whether it found itself living under 
capitalist or state-socialist auspices.  By delegating the task of morally censuring 
homosexuality to “societal forces,” East German policymakers effectively conceded that 
socialist jurisprudence was not necessarily a direct reflection or enforcer of popular moral 
standards, propagandistic proclamations to the contrary notwithstanding. 
The SED remained hopeful, however, about the capacity of socialist jurisprudence 
to effect decisive change, if not in the case of biologically based same-sex sexual 
orientation then at least in the socially contingent constellation of gender relations.  It was 
for this reason that the Marriage Ordinance of 1955 stipulated parity in the age of marital 
consent for men and women, as noted in Chapter 4.  While West German legislators saw 
the presence of “women standing alone” in the wake of the Second World War as a 
“problem” in need of a solution, East German authorities did not bewail the existence of 
“women standing alone” as long as they would come to espouse a socialist work ethic 
and moral codex.  But because authorities incorrectly assumed the congruence of societal 
and governmental attitudes regarding the destigmatization of unwed parenthood, they 
ultimately fostered resentment rather than gratitude on the part of precisely the young 
women whom the new statute had been intended to help.  By unwittingly empowering 
these women to articulate their own ideas about motherhood and marriage, the new law 
also fostered discourse about the topic of premarital sexuality in ways that reinforced the 
centrality of sexuality to the socialist self.  
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 While young women resented the imposition of a seemingly foreign moral 
standard when it came to the SED’s policy on unwed parenthood, aging wives berated the 
party-state for not upholding moral values that the regime and the populace did hold in 
common.  As in the debate about the decriminalization of homosexuality, however, it 
became evident that there was no consensus regarding socialist sexual morality or the 
efficacy of the GDR’s laws in enforcing it.  More specifically, the formal introduction of 
no-fault divorce in the 1955 Marriage Ordinance (the subject of Chapter 5) meant that 
adultery was no longer necessarily a rationale for granting a divorce.  The new statute 
thus granted considerable discretion to individual judges in determining what exactly 
socialist morality had to say about marital infidelity.  East German women did not 
appreciate being “liberated” from “marriage as a pension institution” when they had no 
viable means by which to secure a pension of their own.  Aggrieved husbands asked 
whether it was more objectionable from a moral standpoint to uphold a failed marriage 
for financial considerations alone or to allow a spouse to embark upon a new, more 
promising marital union with a more politically (and sexually) compatible partner.  
Despite the Marriage Ordinance’s emphasis on the importance of ascertaining the 
meaning of a marriage “for society,” in everyday judicial practice, the meaning of a 
marriage “for society” was often indistinguishable from its meaning for the couples 
themselves. 
 The need to apply the new divorce law on a case-by-case basis with wildly 
unpredictable outcomes, along with widespread skepticism or even cynicism regarding 
the efficacy of societal intervention in averting marital discord, necessarily pointed to the 
untenability of the notion that socialist family law could or even should prioritize 
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collective over individual interests.  This focus on the individual was perpetuated by the 
institutionalization of relationship counseling by the new Family Law Code of 1965, 
which I analyze in Chapter 6.  But counseling centers proved to be no panacea for the ills 
of socialist marital life.  They were not any better suited than the law in reconciling the 
fundamental paradox of the SED’s rhetorical celebration of the collective and pragmatic 
prioritization of individual privacy.  Counseling collectives were also hamstrung by 
ongoing intra-governmental disputes regarding the primacy of ideological or scientific 
methods in the promulgation and realization of socialist marital ideals.  And even though 
officials in Berlin characterized citizens’ willingness to confide their marital travails to 
counselors in state-run centers as a litmus test for their trust in the GDR’s governmental 
apparatus as a whole, the commitment of local authorities to establishing and maintaining 
counseling centers was lackluster at best.  The counseling centers that heeded the 
palimpsest of Weimar-era progressive sex reform in making the dispensing of 
contraceptive products and advice their central mission were most effective in cementing 
such trust.  This was yet another manifestation of the centrality of the sexual to the 
constitution of the socialist self. 
 
Expanding the Socialist Sexual Imaginary 
 This dissertation has chronicled efforts on the part of East German officials and 
citizens alike to expand the socialist sexual imaginary.  My use of the term “sexual 
imaginary” is inspired in part by Joshua Feinstein’s concept of the “civic imaginary,” 
which he defines as “the symbolic field on which both the East German state and its 
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inhabitants drew to define themselves and contest issues.”12  In my formulation, the 
“sexual imaginary” was a subset of the “civic imaginary,” and it arose in response to 
popular discontent given the absence of an unfettered public forum in which to reconcile 
the antinomies between discursively mediated ideals and embodied experience.  The 
imaginary was both a symptom and a cause of the indeterminacy of socialist sexual 
mores.  And it was not reducible to a dichotomy between clearly delineated official and 
popular attitudes.  Indeed, the open-endedness of the imaginary implies that there was a 
spectrum of conceivable subject positions on the part of officials and ordinary East 
Germans alike in a way that Mary Fulbrook’s notion of “normalization” or Jan 
Palmowski’s invocation of the “transcripts” of socialism do not.  In a polity that severely 
curtailed the existence of non-state-run organizational life, the contestation of norms 
frequently took place, if not in the realm of the imagination, then in a civil society that 
necessarily occupied the space of the “imaginary.”  This “imaginary”—comprised of 
Eingaben, socialist brigades, redacted letters to popular publications, internal 
governmental deliberations, criminal and civil trials, and relationship counseling 
sessions—provided the adhesive that prevented the “honeycomb” of the GDR from 
disintegrating into societal atomization for as long as East Germans felt that expanding 
the socialist sexual imaginary would still matter.13 
But why would East Germans have reason to believe that expecting better of the 
socialist sexual imaginary would matter?  Was the regime’s willingness to loosen the 
reins regarding sexual mores merely a tactic intended to distract East Germans from their 
                                                 
12 Joshua Feinstein, The Triumph of the Ordinary: Depictions of Daily Life in the East German Cinema, 
1949-1989 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 7, 9. 
13 For a discussion of the “honeycomb state,” see Mary Fulbrook, The People’s State: East German Society 
from Hitler to Honecker (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 235-249. 
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political and economic discontent?14  Or was it a concession to the consumerist desires of 
a populace that had already become conditioned to the commodification of sexuality 
through exposure to West German media?15  As noted in Chapter 1, Josie McLellan 
warns against viewing East German sexuality according to a simplistic dichotomy 
between liberatory “romance” and overweening “repression.”16  Edward Ross Dickinson 
criticizes the tendency in a broad swath of historical scholarship to view sexuality 
primarily as a site of displacement for “real” political and socioeconomic concerns.17  
Bearing these analytical caveats in mind, it is instructive to view East German sexuality 
as a particularly charged physical and conceptual domain in a polity that never 
satisfactorily resolved the paradox of seeking to dissolve the public-private divide while 
concomitantly upholding it.18  This unresolved conceptual framework provided 
opportunities for the expression of popular grievances regarding the discrepancies 
between everyday experience and professed ideals. 
This was not, however, a paradox entirely of the SED’s own making, and it 
predated the affiliation of the KPD with the Weimar-era sex reform movement.  As Gert 
Hekma, Harry Oosterhuis, and James Steakley convincingly propound: 
 
The public-private dichotomy, central to liberal political thought, has long been a 
problem for socialism.  Both the utopian socialists and classical Marxists 
criticized the public-private dichotomy, but the latter never advanced beyond this 
                                                 
14 Franz X. Eder, Kultur der Begierde: Eine Geschichte der Sexualität (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2002), 236. 
15 Josie McLellan, “Visual Dangers and Delights: Nude Photography in East Germany,” Past and Present 
205, no. 1 (November 2009), 143-174, here 148. 
16 Josie McLellan, Love in the Time of Communism: Intimacy and Sexuality in the GDR (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 2-3, 214. 
17 Edward Ross Dickinson, “The Men’s Christian Morality Movement in Germany, 1880-1914: Some 
Reflections on Sex, Politics, and Sexual Politics,” Journal of Modern History 75, no. 1 (March 2003), 59-
110, here 99, 106. 
18 Paul Betts, Within Walls: Private Life in the German Democratic Republic (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 3, 5. 
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to develop a political theory of gender and sexuality. […] Although Marxism as a 
social theory recognizes that humans have no fixed nature and are a product of 
history, socialists (like liberals and others) have tended to view gender and 
sexuality as biological givens and thus essentially ahistorical.19 
 
 
The purveyors of nineteenth-century socialist utopia such as Charles Fourier deviated 
from this consensus.  In “granting such importance to sexual issues, the utopian socialists 
in a sense recognized that the personal is political, but their sexual radicalism was 
contemptuously dismissed by the scientific socialists, especially in Germany.”20  These 
“scientific socialists” included Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, who “were convinced 
that once society was liberated from the deformities of class oppression, a natural, 
heterosexual, monogamous love would finally flourish.”21  As we have seen, many in the 
East German populace and officialdom were inclined to agree. 
But this does not mean that the prospect of reviving the spirit of progressive left-
wing sex reform was doomed from the outset after 1945.  Lauren Kaminsky asserts that 
“[t]he official and unofficial attitudes toward sex, gender, and the family central to state 
socialism in central and eastern Europe had their roots in the tension between the utopian 
sexuality and conservative morality that shaped family life in the Stalin-era Soviet 
Union.”22  In other words, “scientific” socialism in its Marxist-Leninist or Stalinist guise 
had not obliterated utopian socialism, but instead had adopted—however haphazardly or 
unwittingly—some of the latter’s key tenets.  If Kaminsky is correct that Stalinism in the 
                                                 
19 Gert Hekma, Harry Oosterhuis, and James Steakley, “Leftist Sexual Politics and Homosexuality: A 
Historical Overview,” in Gay Men and the Sexual History of the Political Left, eds. Gert Hekma, Harry 
Oosterhuis, and James Steakley (Binghamton, NY: Haworth, 1995), 1-40, here 7. 
20 Hekma, Oosterhuis, and Steakley, “Leftist Sexual Politics,” 10. 
21 Hekma, Oosterhuis, and Steakley, “Leftist Sexual Politics,” 12; Dan Healey, Homosexual Desire in 
Revolutionary Russia: The Regulation of Sexual and Gender Dissent (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2001), 2. 
22 Lauren Kaminsky, “Utopian Visions of Family Life in the Stalin-Era Soviet Union,” Central European 
History 44, no. 1 (March 2011), 63-91, here 91. 
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USSR perpetuated at least some elements of socialist sexual utopianism, then it would 
seem as if alternative sexual imaginaries were also conceivable in a state-socialist polity 
like the GDR whose leadership class had been imbued with Stalinist thinking during 
wartime exile.23 
It is important to bear in mind that there were numerous instances in which the 
GDR opted not to follow the example of the USSR, most notably when it came to 
provisions regarding homosexuality and abortion and the rehabilitation of social hygiene 
as an academic discipline.  The perspective of sexuality demonstrates noteworthy ways in 
which the GDR was not a marionette deployed on the Cold War stage for the amusement 
of its Soviet puppeteers.  This dissertation has endeavored to contextualize sexual 
discourses that were inflected by the specificities of East German society even as their 
constituent elements were informed by historical and contemporaneous transnational 
currents of influence.  The open or clandestine propagation of these discourses might 
have been constrained by the Iron Curtain, but could also transcend geopolitical 
boundaries.  Both the conservative iteration of sex reform as social Darwinist eugenics 
and the progressive branch that reified the personal as political had been discredited by 
events of the recent past.  Was there room for a new kind of sex reform consensus to 
emerge? 
Even as they disagree about the scope, loci, and ramifications of transformations 
in East German sexuality, Dagmar Herzog, Joshua Feinstein, and McLellan concur that 
                                                 
23 Catherine Epstein, The Last Revolutionaries: German Communists and Their Century (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2003). 
 
 477 
the crucible of this change occurred during the early to mid-1970s.24  Herzog places 
greater emphasis upon a relatively gradual evolution in the espousal of new sexual mores 
from above, whereas McLellan posits an uneven, but nonetheless momentous, sexual 
revolution in attitudes and behaviors that was catalyzed from below.25  For McLellan, the 
impetus from below came primarily in the form of alterations in sexual practices rather 
than discourses because of the absence of a Western-style civil society.26 
How, then, does one account for the emergence of a preoccupation with sexual 
self-determination, which is typically associated with postmaterialist, postwar western 
European New Left politics, in a state-socialist society devoid of New Left political 
parties or social movements?27  McLellan observes that “[f]or all the frustrations of the 
shortage society, East Germans, particularly those born after 1960, showed certain 
postmaterialist traits.”28  Their postmaterialist sensibility was the product of individual 
initiative and exposure to Western media.  I would counter, however, that without 
discounting the salience of sexual philistinism it is possible to discern such 
“postmaterialist” preoccupations during the first two decades of the GDR’s existence as 
well.  In identifying the seeds of sexual change that were sown in the GDR during the 
1950s and 1960s, I am inspired by the example of Americanists who argue for the 
                                                 
24 Dagmar Herzog, Sex after Fascism: Memory and Morality in Twentieth-Century Germany (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2005), 185, 187; Feinstein, Triumph of the Ordinary, 219; McLellan, Love in 
the Time of Communism, 12, 16. 
25 Dagmar Herzog, “East Germany’s Sexual Evolution,” in Socialist Modern: East German Everyday 
Culture and Politics, eds. Katherine Pence and Paul Betts (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2008), 71-95; McLellan, Love in the Time of Communism, 9-11. 
26 McLellan, Love in the Time of Communism, 3-4. 
27 Andrei Markovits and Philip S. Gorski, The German Left: Red, Green and Beyond (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993); Johannes Huinink and Michael Wagner, “Partnerschaft, Ehe und Familie in der 
DDR,” in Kollektiv und Eigensinn: Lebensverläufe in der DDR und danach, eds. Johannes Huinink and 
Karl Ulrich Mayer (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1995), 145-188, here 152; McLellan, Love in the Time of 
Communism, 15. 
28 McLellan, Love in the Time of Communism, 210. 
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reperiodization of the sexual revolution.  K. A. Cuordileone, for instance, postulates that 
“social fissures, market trends, and ideological contradictions of the 1940s and 1950s” 
played a vital role in impelling the sexual upheaval of the ensuing decades.29  Alan 
Petigny attributes causal significance to alterations in beliefs and practices regarding 
premarital and extramarital carnality during the two immediate postwar decades.30  
Elizabeth Heineman and Sybille Steinbacher advance analogous arguments about the 
importance of the 1950s as a crucible of sexual change in the FRG.31  If the East German 
sexual revolution was catalyzed primarily from below as McLellan contends, then it is 
important to heed the longue durée of East German sexual attitudes rather than focus 
primarily on the impact of policy reforms and the ascension to power of SED First 
Secretary Erich Honecker during the 1970s. 
Curious East Germans poked holes in the physical and symbolic ramparts fending 
off the deluge of immoral capitalist influences that threatened to inundate the ostensibly 
morally pristine paradise of East German propagandists’ imagination.  The articulation of 
a more progressive sexual vision in the GDR was not, however, merely an attempt to 
pluck at the forbidden fruit of a more permissive and prosperous West German society.  
Decoupling New Left-style concerns from an exclusive linkage to the milieu of western 
European capitalism amplifies existing research on socialist modernities by suggesting 
that “modern” conceptions of sexuality in the GDR both echoed and differed from their 
                                                 
29 K. A. Cuordileone, Manhood and American Political Culture in the Cold War (New York and London: 
Routledge, 2005), xxii. 
30 Alan Petigny, “Illegitimacy, Postwar Psychology, and the Reperiodization of the Sexual Revolution,” 
Journal of Social History 38, no. 1 (2004), 63-79, here 71. 
31 Elizabeth Heineman, Before Porn Was Legal: The Erotica Empire of Beate Uhse (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2011) and Sibylle Steinbacher, Wie der Sex nach Deutschland kam: Der Kampf um 
Sittlichkeit und Anstand in der frühen Bundesrepublik (Munich: Siedler, 2011), as noted by Donna Harsch, 
“Eroticism, Love, and Sexuality in the Two Postwar Germanys,” German Studies Review 35, no. 3 
(October 2012), 627-636, here 631-632. 
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capitalist counterparts.32  And East Germany’s concomitant retraditionalizing impulse did 
not stem merely from uncritical emulation of West German cultural conservatives or 
from an indigenous wellspring of prudishness.  Instead, the contestation of sexual mores 
emanated from the efforts of citizens and officials to expand the socialist sexual 
imaginary in ways that have been ignored or downplayed in historical scholarship to date.  
The proliferation of sexual discourse could and did occur in East Germany, and perhaps 
its most “revolutionary” aspect was its potential to nurture utopian aspirations amidst the 
frequently repressive atmosphere of “real-existing” socialism.
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